HKSAR v. Ng Wing Fai
Read the full judgment text of CACC 261/2000 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 19 April 2001.
1. The applicant was charged with one offence of falsely applying to goods a trade mark, contrary to section 9(1)(b) of the Trade Descriptions Ordinance, Cap. 362 ("the Ordinance") and two offences of applying a false trade description to goods, contrary to section 7(1)(a)(i) of the Ordinance.
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CACC000261/2000 CACC 261/2000 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 261 OF 2000 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC 368 OF 2000) ________________
________________ Coram: Hon Mayo Ag. CJHC, Stock JA and Suffiad J in Court Date of Hearing: 19 April 2001 Date of Judgment: 19 April 2001 ________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ Hon Mayo Ag. CJHC (giving the judgment of the Court): 1. The applicant was charged with one offence of falsely applying to goods a trade mark, contrary to section 9(1)(b) of the Trade Descriptions Ordinance, Cap. 362 ("the Ordinance") and two offences of applying a false trade description to goods, contrary to section 7(1)(a)(i) of the Ordinance. 2. After a trial in the District Court before H.H. Judge Day the applicant was found guilty of the section 9 offence and one of the section 7 offences. The prosecution did not proceed with the second section 7 offence i.e. the third charge and it was dismissed. The Judge sentenced the applicant to 2 years 3 months imprisonment on both counts and ordered that the sentences be served concurrently. The applicant now seeks leave to appeal against his convictions. 3. The offences arose out of a raid which was conducted by the Customs and Excise Department on 7 August 1998 at three separate premises in Kowloon Bay. They are all in close proximity to each other. The Judge adopted for convenience the approach used by the prosecution of referring to the separate premises as Units A, B and C. 4. Unit A is essentially the office premises of a firm trading under the name Cyberasia Technology Company ("Cyberasia"). This is a sole proprietorship of the applicant. However at the time of the raid the applicant was in Unit B with a man called Hung Kim-lung. The Judge described what was found in Unit B at p. 2 of his reasons for verdict:
5. So far as the other units were concerned the Judge had this to say at pp. 3 and 4 of his reasons for verdict:
6. There was further evidence suggesting a linkage in the business activities conducted in the three units. The Judge referred to this at p. 5 of his reasons for verdict:
7. The main issue which had to be determined was the extent if any to which the applicant was involved in the operations in Units B and C. 8. In a cautioned statement the applicant admitted that he was the sole proprietor of Cyberasia whose place of business was Unit A. The business of the company was buying and re-selling computer spare parts. He did not make any other admissions relevant to these offences. 9. However he went into the witness box and provided an explanation for the presence of the goods which were the subject matter of the charges and of the overall circumstances surrounding this matter. 10. He said that his friend, Mr Lau Chun-yung who was a Taiwanese gentleman conducted a business out of Units B and C. He suspected that Mr Lau did indeed modify computer parts and re-mark them but this was none of his business. So far as the 64 CPUs which had been found in Unit A were concerned he admitted that he had bought these from Mr Lau for re-sale shortly before the raid had taken place. 11. The explanation he gave for the presence of documents relating to Units B and C being found in Unit A was that Mr Lau often went to Taiwan and he had asked the applicant to keep these for him. The reason for the manuals being in his office was that Mr Lau did not read English and had requested him to translate them for him. The manuals had been left in his office after one of his visits. He gave explanations for other items found. 12. The Judge did not accept the explanations proffered and was satisfied at the appropriate level that the applicant was guilty of counts 1 and 2 as charged. 13. Ground one of the perfected grounds of appeal contains two complaints that the Judge interrupted the applicant's testimony. 14. It is apparent from a perusal of the transcript that there is no merit whatever in this ground. The first so-called interruption referred to relates to a question the Judge asked concerning the physical presence of Mr Poon in Unit C at the time of the raid. This was in connection with the fact that documentation concerning his employment had been found in Unit A. The Judge simply asked whether it was a coincidence that Mr Poon had been working in Unit C at the time of the raid. This was a perfectly legitimate question. 15. The second matter complained of is even more frivolous if that is possible. It related to evidence concerning some stickers which had been found. The Judge simply informed the parties that he understood the explanation which had been proffered. 16. Complaint is made in ground two that the Judge had questioned the applicant in an "adversarial manner" at page 58A-T of the appeal bundle. 17. The passage in question reads:
This ground appears to be partially misconceived. Very few questions were put to the applicant. There is largely just an exchange between counsel for the applicant and the court. There is no merit in this ground. 18. In ground three complaint is made that the Judge entered into the arena by inviting prosecuting counsel to ask further questions of the applicant after he himself had asked some questions. 19. It is apparent from the context of this complaint that even after the initial conclusion of the applicant's cross-examination a number of issues still remained outstanding. It was perfectly in order for the Judge to extend an invitation to counsel to ask further questions after he himself had attempted to clarify matters. Incidentally there is nothing in the complaint that counsel for the defence had no opportunity to object to this course of action being pursued. It is apparent at p.59 line O of the appeal bundle that Mr Hemmings was not minded to object. There is nothing in this ground. 20. Ground 4 is framed in this way:
21. One of the main points being made by Mr Hemmings for the applicant in this ground is that the applicant was not sufficiently put on notice during cross-examination that his testimony concerning the whereabouts of the various documents was being called in question. In this connection he referred to the judgment of Li CJ in Lo Chun-nam v. HKSAR FACC 6/2000 unreported where the Chief Justice considered the principles enunciated in Browne v. Dunn [1894] 6 R. 307. 22. The present case can clearly be distinguished from Lo Chun-nam. No particular significance attached to the contents of the documents. The critical question related to the circumstances surrounding where they had been found and how they might have got there. It must have been very clear to the applicant that the explanations he was attempting to proffer were bound to be critically reviewed by the Judge. In addition to this, it should have been obvious to the applicant that this was a matter which needed to be attended to. There could have been no prejudice to the applicant occasioned by the way in which the Judge dealt with the matter. This ground must also fail. 23. The case against the applicant was an overwhelming one and these convictions were in no way unsafe or unsatisfactory. The application for leave to appeal against convictions is dismissed.
Representation: Mr Eddie Sean, Ag. SADPP of the Department of Justice, for the respondent Mr John Hemmings, instructed by Messrs Ivan Tang & Co. for the applicant |