Ip Ming Wah t/a Wah Ngan Co v. Lai To Hei and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 4242/2000 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 September 2000.
1. This is an application for leave to appeal against a decision of the Labour Tribunal pursuant to section 35A of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Chapter 25), an appeal to the Court of First Instance against the decision of the Presiding Officer having been dismissed by Yam J on 3 August 2000. Section 35A provides as follows:
Cites 1 case
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HCMP004242/2000
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 4242 OF 2000 (ON APPEAL FROM HCLA 5/2000) -----------------
----------------- Coram: Hon Wong JA in Chambers Date of Hearing: 6 September 2000 Date of Decision: 6 September 2000 ----------------- DECISION ----------------- 1. This is an application for leave to appeal against a decision of the Labour Tribunal pursuant to section 35A of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Chapter 25), an appeal to the Court of First Instance against the decision of the Presiding Officer having been dismissed by Yam J on 3 August 2000. Section 35A provides as follows:
2. The point of law of general public importance is said to be this:
3. Reliance is placed upon a decision of the late Jerome Chan J in Chan Suk Bing Angie v. Harbour Phoenix Ltd & Anor [1992] 2 HKC p.459 in that case, the learned judge held that:
4. The learned judge was plainly correct in his interpretation of the purpose of the Ordinance. But the matter goes further than this. It is, of course, for the Presiding Officer trying the case to decide, in the exercise of his discretion, whether it is necessary to make further investigations into any issue that is not clear or any issue that is necessary to assist him to come to a proper decision. He must exercise his discretion judicially. Each case must depend on the facts and evidence that is before him. If the evidence is sufficient and clear, there is no need for him to make any investigation. He can make a decision on the material that is before him. This is clearly such a case. Moreover, the applicant has not even at this late stage raised any matters relevant to his case in his affirmation to indicate that there were matters calling for the Presiding Officer to investigate. 5. I agree with Yam J that there was no need for the Presiding Officer to intervene in this case and therefore the Presiding Officer had not failed to discharge or derogate from his duty to make further investigation into the case. In my judgment, no point of law of general public importance is involved and the application is accordingly dismissed.
Representation: Mr Victor Dawes, instructed by Messrs Chan and Cheng, for the Defendant (Applicant) |
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