HKSAR v. Wong Wai
Read the full judgment text of CACC 265/1997 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 5 December 1997.
1. The applicant faced three charges - using a false instrument contrary to s.73 of the Crimes Ordinance ("the Ordinance"), possession of a false instrument contrary to s.75(1) of the Ordinance and possession of equipment for making a false instrument contrary to s.76(1) of the Ordinance. In the first, it was alleged that he, on 13th November 1996 at the Bank of East Asia, at 10 Des Voeux Road Central, together with Zhou Rui-xiong, used instruments namely, eight Certificates of Time Deposit of t
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CACC000265/1997 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 1997, No.265
------------------------------- Coram: Hon. Power, V.-P., Mayo, J.A. & Stuart-Moore, J.A. Date of Hearing: 13 November 1997 Date of Delivery of Judgment: 5 December 1997 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Power, V.-P. (giving the judgment of the Court): 1. The applicant faced three charges - using a false instrument contrary to s.73 of the Crimes Ordinance ("the Ordinance"), possession of a false instrument contrary to s.75(1) of the Ordinance and possession of equipment for making a false instrument contrary to s.76(1) of the Ordinance. In the first, it was alleged that he, on 13th November 1996 at the Bank of East Asia, at 10 Des Voeux Road Central, together with Zhou Rui-xiong, used instruments namely, eight Certificates of Time Deposit of the China Construction Bank, Guangzhou Branch, numbered 960006-960011 (inclusive), 960016-960017 (inclusive) each with face value of $8,000,000 United States currency, and one Certificate of Time Deposit of the China Construction Bank, Guangzhou Branch, numbered 960015 with a face value of $10,000,000 United States currency, and five Certificates of the aforesaid Bank, confirming the issue of the said nine Certificates of Time Deposit, which were, and which he knew or believed to be false, with the intention of inducing somebody to accept them as genuine, and by reason of so accepting them to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person's prejudice. He pleaded not guilty to that charge and it is against his conviction thereon which he now appeals. He pleaded guilty to the other two charges and we are not concerned with them here. 2. Judge Gill in his Reasons for Verdict said:
3. It is pertinent here to set out the admitted facts which, insofar as they are relevant, were as follows:
4. At trial there was clear evidence to establish that the documents were clumsy forgeries. The judge stated:
The judge reviewed the evidence of the applicant in which he said that although Ankon had done no business in Hong Kong, Zhou had a successful sister company in Guanzhou and that he had believed Zhou when he told him that he had CTDs and was seeking to raise capital on them and that, in consequence of this, he had introduced him to Lau. The applicant said that he only went to the Bank of East Asia as an interpreter and to protect the introduction fee which he expected he would get from Zhou for introducing him to Lau. He said that he had no suspicion as to the authenticity of the documents. 5. The trial judge found:
There is no real challenge made to the correctness of these findings. The judge went on:
6. It is this finding that is challenged in this appeal. It is submitted that there is no evidence to establish that the bank would, by reason of accepting the CTDs, have been acting to its own or any other person's prejudice. 7. Mr. Mullick, who appears for the Applicant, rightly submits that the prosecution to establish the commission of an offence under s.73 of the Ordinance must prove that the offender had the intention of inducing somebody to accept a document as genuine and, by reason of so accepting it, to do some act to his prejudice. He refers to the meaning of "prejudice" in s.70 and submits that the applicable part of that section is contained in s.70(1)(f) which reads as follows:
Mr. Mullick submits that the conviction is fatally flawed as the trial judge did not identify any prejudice which the bank or any other person would suffer. He suggested the judge made this plain when he said:
He submits that an unidentified intention to defraud is not enough to establish an offence. Frauds of this kind are normally not aimed primarily at the institution which issues the receipt but rather at a third party to whom the receipt will be shown in an endeavour to induce him to lend money. Be that as it may, was the judge correct in his finding that no intention to induce the bank to act to its prejudice could be identified? 8. We suggested to Mr. Mullick that the prejudice which the bank would suffer, and which it was intended that it should suffer, would lie in its issuing of a receipt stating that it held CTDs to the value of US$74m. We have no doubt that the issuing of such a receipt indicating that the bank held valid documents, when in fact they were false, would, on the ordinary meaning of the word, be a prejudice to the bank. Mr. Mullick submitted, however, referring to s.70, that a prejudice under the section only arose if the receipt was issued as a result of the bank's "having accepted the CTDs" as genuine in connection with "its performance of any duty" and that, as the bank was under no duty to accept the CTDs for safe keeping, the acts of the applicant and the other offenders could not constitute prejudice as defined. We do not agree. It was intended that the bank accept the CTDs and issue the receipt. If the bank had acted as the applicant and the other offenders intended that it should act it would have accepted the CTDs in the performance of a duty which, as they intended, it had at their inducement undertaken. We are satisfied that it was proved that the offenders used an instrument which they knew to be false with the intention of inducing the bank to accept it as genuine and, by reason of so accepting it, to issue a receipt acknowledging that they had safe custody of CTDs to the value of US$74m, and that this would have been an act to the bank's prejudice as that term is defined in s.70. The evidence did, therefore, establish an offence under s.73. The judge misdirected himself when he held that there was no evidence to establish the specific prejudice which the bank would suffer. There was such evidence and, it seems to us, had the judge properly directed himself, he must have convicted. 9. Application for leave to appeal against conviction on 1st charge is granted. We will hear counsel as to the application of the proviso. 10. After hearing counsel's submission, the proviso is applied and the conviction is to stand. Appeal is dismissed. 11. The applicant also applied for leave to appeal against sentence on the 2nd and 3rd charges. Since no arguable ground is submitted, application is dismissed.
Representation: Mr. Wayne Walsh, S.A.D.P.P. (Ag.) (D.P.P.) for the Respondent. Mr.John Mullick assigned by D.L.A. for the Applicant.(re: Conviction) Applicant in person (re: Sentence) (I) Applicant's application to Court of Appeal to certify a point of law of great and general importance refused by Court of Appeal. Please refer to CACC265/1997 dated 18 December 1997 (II) Application for leave to appeal to Court of Final Appeal dismissed. Please refer to FAMC1/1998 dated 21 April 1998 |
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