Olympic Garden Properties Ltd v. Gold Rich Investments (Asia) Ltd

Read the full judgment text of HCMP 2705/1997 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 28 August 1997.

1. No.23 Plantation Road is a 4 storey-building. It has two garage spaces on the ground floor, namely, garage spaces A and B.

Case No.HCMP 2705/1997
Court
High Court CFI
Date28 Aug 1997
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCMP002705/1997

MP 2705/97

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SAR

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS

-----------------

IN THE MATTER OF ALL THAT the one equal and undivided 4th part or share of and in ALL THAT piece or parcel of ground registered in the Land Registry as RURAL BUILDING LOT NO. 680 And of and in the messages erections and building erected thereon known as NO.23 PLANTATION ROAD, HONG KONG ("the Building") TOGETHER with the exclusive right and privilege to hold use occupy and enjoy ALL THAT the First Floor of the Building Subject to and with the benefit of a Deed of Mutual Covenant and Deed of Mutual Covenant and Grant registered in the Land Registry by Memorial No. 19733 and Memorial No.318245.

and

IN THE MATTER OF an Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 10th June 1997.

And

IN THE MATTER OF Section 12 of Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, Cap.219.

-----------------

BETWEEN
OLYMPIC GARDEN PROPERTIES LIMITED Plaintiff

AND

GOLD RICH INVESTMENTS (ASIA) LIMITED Defendant

-----------------

Coram: Hon. Mr. Recorder Tang, S.C. in Court

Date of Hearing: 28 August 1997

Date of Delivery of Judgment: 28 August 1997

-----------------

JUDGMENT

-----------------

          By a Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 10th June 1997, the Plaintiff agreed to sell to
1 the Defendant a share in Rural Building Lot No. 680 together with the exclusive right to use,
1
occupy and enjoy the 1st floor of No.23 Plantation Road.
          Disputes have arisen as a result of certain requisitions raised on behalf of the purchaser. However, I am told that the contract is still subsisting and that the real issue which I have
to decide today is whether the Vendor is able to make a good title to a 1 share in R.B.L. 680
1
together with the exclusive right to use, occupy and enjoy the 1st floor of No.23 Plantation Road.

1. No.23 Plantation Road is a 4 storey-building. It has two garage spaces on the ground floor, namely, garage spaces A and B.

2. On 19th May 1960, a Deed of Mutual Covenant was executed. The effect of the Deed of Mutual Covenant is that R.B.L.680 was vested in tenants in common in equal shares, namely; Wong Yuet Oi as to 1/2 and James Hsioung Lee and his wife, Rebecca, as to the other 1/2.

3. Under the Deed of Mutual Covenant, James and Rebecca Lee were entitled to the exclusive use and enjoyment of the ground floor, the 1st floor, garage space A and a garden.

4. The Plaintiff relies on an Assignment dated 15th September 1975 as its root of title. By this assignment, Mr. Lee assigned his exclusive right to the use and enjoyment of the 1st floor and garage space A to Mrs. Lee. However, as the submission of Mr. Christopher Wong who appeared for the purchaser (Defendant) has made clear, by that assignment, Mr. Lee assigned to Mrs. Lee,

"All that one equal and undivided moiety or half part of share of and in ALL THAT one equal and undivided 4th part or share of and in ALL THAT piece or parcel of ground registered in the Land Office as Rural Building Lot No. 680."

If that is the root of title, there would be some doubt as to whether Rebecca Lee had a 1/4 share in the land. It may be that the reference to an equal undivided 1/4 share in the assignment was a mistake. I am told on the same day, James Lee made an assignment in favour of his daughter in respect of the ground floor and garden and that in that assignment, Mr. Lee apparently also only conveyed an 1/8 share in the land to his daughter. I think it is unlikely that Mr. Lee only intended to assign an 1/8 share in the land to his daughter. But I am not concerned with that.

          On the same day, there was a Deed of Severence made between James and Rebecca Lee. There, it was recited that they held an equal ½ share in the land as joint tenants and that the purpose of the Deed was to sever the joint tenancy. In the Deed, the parties went on to assign to one another a ¼ share in Lot 680 as tenants in common. I am of the opinion that such express assignment is unnecessary. On severence of the joint tenancy, the former joint tenants would
without more hold the land as tenants in common in undivided 1 shares. The Deed of
1
Severence is silent on the exclusive right to use any part of No. 23 Plantation Road. However, the parties purportedly granted to each other, the right to use their respective ¼ share to the exclusion of each other. That is not possible as it would be inconsistent with unity of possession which is essential to tenancy in common.
          On 12th November 1985, Rebecca Lee assigned a 1 share in the land together with the
1
right to the exclusive use and enjoyment of  the 1st floor to the Plaintiff. The Assignment was silent on garage space A.

5. By an Assignment dated 15th February 1986, Rebecca Lee assigned the right to the exclusive use of garage space A to Wong Chor Cheung and Wong Yuen Wai for HK$20,000. No share or interest in land was assigned by this assignment.

6. Mr. Wong submitted that the Plaintiff's title is unclear because

(1) the 1975 deed of assignment only assigned an 1/8th interest in the land to Mrs. Lee
(2) that in the 1975 deed of assignment, although the exclusive right to use and enjoy the 1st floor and garage space A was assigned by Mr. Lee to Mrs. Lee, that is insufficient because the exclusive right was not vested in Mr., Lee alone but was vested jointly in Mr. and Mrs. Lee

7. I would agree with Mr. Wong that if the Plaintiff's title rests on the 1975 deed of assignment alone, then unless the 1975 deed of assignment is rectified or that the reference to a 1/4 share therein is held to be merely a typographical error, the Plaintiff's title is unclear. However, the matter does not stop there. It is clear from the devolution of title recited earlier, that as a result of the Deed of Severence, Mrs. Lee had vested in her a 1/4 share in the land as a tenant in common already.

8. Whatever may be the position regarding Mr. Lee's assignment to his daughter in 1975, as to which I express no view, I am satisfied that Mrs. Lee had at least a 1/4 interest in the land.

9. Moreover, I am of the view that the assignment to her by Mr. Lee in 1975 of the exclusive right to use and enjoy of the 1st floor and garage space A was sufficient. Prior to the assignment, she and Mr. Lee were the only persons entitled to use the 1st floor and garage space A. After the assignment, she became entitled alone.

10. It follows that, in my judgment, as a result of the Deed of Severence and the 1975 Deed of Assignment, Rebecca Lee had good title to at least a 1/4 share in the land together with the exclusive right to use the 1st floor and garage space A.

11. Although Mr. Wong rightly did not press this point, I turn to consider the effect of Rebecca Lee's separation of garage space A from the 1st floor. Lai Wing Ho and Lai Kam Fong v. Chan Siu Fong Chan Siu Fong, a decision of Gordfrey J. (as he then was) is in point:

12. There, a predecessor in title of the Vendor was entitled to 2/68th share together with the exclusive right to use and enjoy the 11th floor and roof of No.42 Nullar Road. However, later the roof was assigned separately from the 2/68th share. The 2/68th share together with the exclusive right to use the 11th floor devolved on to the Vendor. On a claim by the purchaser that the Vendor's title was defective, Godfrey J. declared that the Vendor has shown a good title. He said at page 8.

"What a vendor agreed to sell to the purchasers was 2/78th share in Rural Mansion, "together with the sole and exclusive right and privilege to hold, use, occupy and enjoy 11th floor". I entertain no doubt that the Vendor has shown a good title to this 2/78th share, equally I entertain no doubt that under the scheme created by the DMC, no owner of any of the other shares could succeed in establishing any right in himself, inconsistent with or averse to the right in respect of the 11th floor express to be conferred on the owner of this 2/78th share. Nor, a fortiori, could a owner of the main roof. So the Vendor's title is, in my judgment, an assailable."

13. I think the same applies here. Here, under the Sale and Purchase Agreement, the vendor, that is the Plaintiff, has agreed to sell a 1/4 share together with the right to use the 1st floor to the Defendant hereto, no owner of any other share in the land can succeed "in establishing any right in himself inconsistent with or averse to the right in respect of" the 1st floor or the 1/4 share expressed to be conferred on the purchaser here by the Plaintiff. That is to say the fact that garage space A has been separately assigned does not affect the Plaintiff's title to the 1/4 share in the land or the exclusive right to enjoy the 1st floor.

14. Thus, I make an order declaring that the title of the property is good. I make no order as to costs.

(Robert Tang, S.C.)
Recorder
Court of First Instance

Representation:

Mr. Keneath C.L. Chan - instructed by M/s Yeung & Chan for the Plaintiff.

Mr. Christopher Wong - instructed by M/s Robert W.H. Wang & Co. for the Defendant.