Chung Wo Sang Future v. Tai Lin Radio Service Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCLA 112/2002 on BabelCite. This HCLA judgment was delivered on 11 July 2003.
1. The Defendant carries on a well-known retail business in electrical appliances. Its shops are manned by salesmen in its employ. The Claimant is one of them. Like others, he is paid a monthly "salary" or a "basic salary". On top, he receives commission in respect of goods that he sells on behalf of the Defendant. The narrow issue raised in this Labour Tribunal appeal is whether the commission constitutes the Claimant's contractual entitlement or is payable only at the discretion of the Defenda
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HCLA000112/2002 HCLA 112/2002 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE LABOUR TRIBUNAL APPEAL NO. 112 OF 2002 (ON APPEAL FROM LABOUR TRIBUNAL CLAIM NO. 3888 OF 2002)
____________ Coram: Deputy High Court Judge A Cheung in Court Date of Hearing: 24 June 2003 Date of Judgment: 11 July 2003 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ 1.The Defendant carries on a well-known retail business in electrical appliances. Its shops are manned by salesmen in its employ. The Claimant is one of them. Like others, he is paid a monthly "salary" or a "basic salary". On top, he receives commission in respect of goods that he sells on behalf of the Defendant. The narrow issue raised in this Labour Tribunal appeal is whether the commission constitutes the Claimant's contractual entitlement or is payable only at the discretion of the Defendant. 2.In the proceedings below, the Claimant sued the Defendant for outstanding annual leave pay, holiday pay, year-end pay and sickness allowance. There was no dispute that the Defendant had paid the Claimant various sums in respect of these items of payment, which were calculated according to the basic salary of the Claimant. But the Claimant argued that these payments should be calculated by reference not only to the basic salary, but also to his average commission. The Tribunal accepted the Claimant's argument, and with the exception of the claim for year-end pay (which the Tribunal held to be discretionary in nature), the Tribunal found in favour of the Claimant in respect of the other items of claim. 3.The Defendant now appeals to this court. 4.Under the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57), sickness allowance, holiday pay and annual leave are all calculated by reference to the employee's "wages": section 35(1), section 41(1) and section 41C(1) respectively. 5.Section 2(1) of the Ordinance defines "wages" as follows:
6.In a nutshell, if the commission of the Claimant in the present case "is of a gratuitous nature or ... is payable only at the discretion of the [Defendant]", it does not fall within the meaning of wages, and should not be taken into account in calculating sickness allowance, holiday pay and annual leave. Conversely, if commission is a contractual entitlement of the Claimant, it forms part of his wages and must be taken into account. 7.It thus becomes necessary and important to look at what the contract of employment between the Claimant and the Defendant, which is a standard-form contract, says. The contract of employment, dated 16 August 1993, reads as follows:
8.Apart from the written contract, it is also important to bear in mind a "Notice" in Chinese setting out the payment of commission. It was dated 24 August 1994 and was signed by the Claimant. It reads as follows:
9.Although both sides said before the Tribunal that oral representations relating to payment of commission were made (in their respective favour), the Tribunal did not make any finding in favour of either party on the subject in question. All that the Tribunal said in relation to the system of commission is as follows:
10.In respect of the employment contract, I agree with Mr Yuen SC, counsel for the Defendant, that the first thing to note is that the contract does not expressly provide for any contractual entitlement to payment of commission. Clause 1 sets out the employee's "salary" ( - it has been increased over the years), which is "payable fully in arrears". It does not refer to commission. Still less does it refer to any entitlement to payment of commission. The contrast between salary and commission cannot be ignored. 11.Clause 2 deals with probation, termination of contract, and, as it were, non-payment of various sums upon termination of contract. Clause 2 is the only place where "commission" is mentioned in the entire contract. 12.Probation is quite irrelevant here. Termination according to clause 2 may be effected by either party, by either one month's notice or "one month's salary in lieu of such notice". The payment in lieu of notice is by reference to the "salary" of the employee - a clear reference to the salary set out in clause 1 of the contract. In other words, if either party wishes to terminate the contract, either one month's notice has to be given, or a sum equivalent to the salary set out in clause 1 has to be paid. The payment in lieu does not comprise any other items of payment, apart from the salary mentioned in clause 1. 13.More importantly, the third sentence in clause 2 sets out specifically one consequence of termination of contract: "in such event" - in the event of termination, the employee "will not be entitled to receive any bonus, allowance, overtime pay and commission that [he] would have earned unless the Company in its discretion decides otherwise". 14.As I said, this is the only place where "commission" is mentioned. The sentence refers to "any ... commission". It suggests that the existence of commission is a possibility, rather than a certainty. Furthermore and perhaps more importantly, it sets out that in case of termination, there would be no entitlement to commission "unless the Company in its discretion decides otherwise". What is certain about the last sentence in clause 2 is that in case of termination, payment of any commission would be at the absolute discretion of the Defendant. What it does not say for certain is that during the currency of the employment, there is an entitlement to commission payment. I accept that on the one hand, this (an entitlement to commission) is a possible interpretation or possible underlying assumption of this part of clause 2. But on the other hand, it is also consistent with the view that this part of clause 2 is really there to dispel any possible doubt that there is any contractual entitlement to commission in the particular case of termination. 15.This latter interpretation is supported by the fact that this part of clause 2 refers not only to commission but "bonus", which according to clause 3 (particularly the last sentence thereof) is "entirely at the Company's discretion". In other words, so far as bonuses are concerned, the situation is entirely covered by clause 3. The inclusion of "bonus" in the last part of clause 2 is really to double-bolt, as it were, the situation regarding termination, i.e. in case of termination, no bonus whatsoever is payable unless the employer in its discretion decides otherwise. 16.I accept that the phrase "that you would have earned" in the last sentence of clause 2 would seem to suggest that in the absence of termination, the employee would "earn" bonus, allowance, overtime pay and commission, in the normal course of event. This suggests a contractual entitlement to these payments. But again the difficulty with this reading in favour of a contractual entitlement is that this part of clause 2 applies not only to commission, but also to bonus, which is specifically said to be entirely at the employer's discretion according to clause 3. In any event, the use of the word "earned" is just one of the many factors that one needs to bear in mind in finding out the true nature of any payment of commission in the present case. 17.As mentioned above, clause 3 deals specifically with Chinese New Year bonus and bonuses in general. They are payable at the discretion of the employer. (In fact, that was the reason why the Tribunal below rejected the Claimant's claim in respect of year-end payment.) That clause 3 may be used in favour of an argument for a discretionary commission has been discussed above. On the other hand, one could also argue for a contractual entitlement in respect of commission by contrasting the specific provisions in clause 3 relating to Chinese New Year bonus and other bonuses, which are expressly said to be discretionary in nature, with the total absence of any reference to the nature of commission in the contract. One could also argue that the draftsman of the contract certainly knows how to use "at the sole discretion" and "at the Company's discretion", if the intention of the parties requires the use of these phrases. Indeed, "at the sole discretion of the Company" is also used in clause 4 dealing with adjustment of salary. 18.All this is quite true. But at the end of the day, after surveying the contract clause by clause and as a whole, the one thing that stands out from the rest is the lack of any specific reference to the employee's entitlement to payment of commission, unlike its entitlement to salary, and unlike a female employee's entitlement to maternity leave set out in clause 10 of the standard form employment contract (which of course does not apply to the Claimant in the present case). 19.But in the context of the present case, one needs to consider the Chinese Notice relating to commission as well. In my judgment, the opening sentence in the Notice ("可享有") does not necessarily refer to a contractual entitlement to commission. Literally, it means that the employee "may enjoy" payment of commission, and the Notice goes on to set out how and under what circumstances commission would be paid. First, it says that the amount of commission varies, and is to be determined by the employer according to market conditions; the employer may at any time revise the amount of commission and the method of calculating commission. Secondly, it sets out the date of payment of commission - on or before the 20th day of each calendar month in respect of the previous month's commission. The use of the words "應得" suggests some sort of entitlement. Thirdly, in clear echo of the latter part of clause 2 in the employment contract, the Notice goes on to say that in case of termination or resignation, the employee would not be "considered for payment of commission" ("將不獲考慮發給是項佣金"). The use of the words "考慮" goes towards neutralizing the previous use of the words "應得" in respect of payment of commission. Furthermore, the fact that commission is not payable upon termination or resignation goes some way towards illustrating the true nature of the commission. If the commission is earned as a contractual right, one would have thought that termination or resignation should not have any effect on the employee's entitlement to its payment, particularly when termination of the contract by the employer need not be for cause. Yet both clause 2 and this part of the Notice refer to non-payment of commission in case of termination of contract, unless the employer otherwise in its discretion decides. 20.The rest of the Notice deals with calculation and repayment of commission, which is more or less neutral so far as the present issue is concerned, except that the employer retains the right to demand repayment of commission in case the goods sold have been returned or the customer fails to honour his or her instalment payment commitment - again the matter is at the discretion of the employer. 21.I have already set out the Tribunal's factual findings relating to the operation of the system of commission in the present case. The very limited findings relating to how the system works in practice, in my judgment, are no doubt relevant by way of background, but do not throw any real light on the true nature of the commission payment. 22.Bearing everything in mind, including the background facts and the documentary evidence, as well as the general circumstances of the case, I am of the view that on balance, the commission payment here is merely a discretionary payment. It is not a contractual entitlement. The factors favouring a discretionary commission outweigh that for a contractual entitlement. This is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. 23.But there is a further ground against the Claimant's claim. In New Bright Industrial Company Ltd v. Wong Sau Chi [1995] 2 HKC 357, a Labour Tribunal appeal, the court had to deal with a similar question in respect of various items of payment, amongst which was an "over limit bonus". The relevant part of the late Jerome Chan J's judgment (at pp. 364H-365F) is reproduced below:
24.In my judgment, the present case bears similarities to the over limit bonus in New Bright. The working of the commission system is left very much to the unilateral decision of the employer. The goods or types of goods that would attract payment of commission are determined by the employer. The amount of commission, or the method of calculating the amount, is also determined by the employer. Moreover, the employer can change all this at any time. If the goods are returned, or if the customer fails to honour his or her instalment payment commitment, the employer may decide whether to ask for refund of any commission already paid to the employee in question. Furthermore, if the employer decides for whatever reason to terminate the employee's contract, it need not pay the employee any commission that has been "earned" (used in a neutral sense here) but that has not been paid. In those circumstances, it is really up to the employer to decide how much commission it wishes to pay its employees. If it wanted to, it could render the whole system of commission payment illusory given its absolute control relating to what goods or what types of goods that would attract payment of commission and how much commission would be paid. I can easily think of examples in which the payment of commission may be rendered illusory in practice. 25.Of course, commercially speaking, the commission system makes goods sense, and is, no doubt, designed to benefit not only the employees but also the employer, in terms of promoting sales in general and promoting the sale of those goods that require promotion in particular. Payment of commission enhances to a great extent (particularly given the relatively small salary) the diligence or incentive of the employees in selling the goods of the Defendant. Likewise, commercially speaking, it may well not be sensible or wise to withhold payment of commission in case of termination (after all, according to clause 2, the employer may in its discretion decide to make payment of commission in case of termination). Morale of the staff would have to be taken into account. Speaking generally, there are obviously many commercial considerations here. But one must not mix up commercial considerations of this kind with contractual entitlement, nor should one confuse the expectation - no matter how reasonable or legitimate - of the employees with their contractual entitlement, if any. In my judgment, what is of importance here is the employer's right and discretion, not as a matter of commercial reality, but as a matter of law, regarding payment of commission. 26.In my judgment, based on the same reasoning that persuaded the court in respect of the over limit bonus in New Bright, the present commission payment arrangement is no more than a system at the discretion of the employer. As such, it does not fall within the statutory definition of "wages". 27.For these reasons, I am of the opinion that this appeal must be allowed. 28.Given my conclusion, I need not express any view on the further arguments of Mr Yuen to the effect that the commission has to be actually (but not merely notionally) earned, and his complaint regarding over-payments to the Claimant. 29.In conclusion, I make the following order:
30.As regards costs, any claim for costs in respect of the proceedings in the Labour Tribunal should be dealt with by the Labour Tribunal upon application. As for the costs of this appeal, I make an order nisi that the Claimant pay to the Defendant the costs of this appeal, such costs to be taxed if not agreed. Unless either party applies to vary this costs order nisi within 14 days after this judgment is handed down, the same shall become absolute after the expiry of the 14-day period. 31.I also direct that this judgment be orally interpreted by the court interpreter to the Claimant when it is handed down. (If the time is not convenient to the Claimant, he should contact the Court Registry for the making of an alternative arrangement.)
Representation: Mr Chung Wo Sang Future, the Claimant, appearing in person Mr Rimsky Yuen, SC, instructed by Messrs Baker & McKenzie, for the Defendant Remarks: |
Cases cited in this judgment