Yuen Chak Construction Co. Ltd. v. Yu Kam Sang
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 9490/2001 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 6 September 2002.
1. This is my ruling on the question of costs arising out of the defendant's Summons dated 14 March 2002 which sought to set aside the Interlocutory Judgment entered herein against the defendant on 23 August 2001 in default of giving a Notice of intention to defend.
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DCCJ009490/2001 DCCJ9490/2001 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO. 9490 OF 2001
Coram: Deputy Judge W Chan in Chambers Date of Judgment: 6 September 2002 ______________________ R U L I N G ______________________ 1.This is my ruling on the question of costs arising out of the defendant's Summons dated 14 March 2002 which sought to set aside the Interlocutory Judgment entered herein against the defendant on 23 August 2001 in default of giving a Notice of intention to defend. 2.At the beginning of today's hearing, parties have agreed that the Judgment should be set aside and I have already made an order by consent to that effect. 3.The Writ of Summons endorsed with a Statement of Claim was issued in these proceedings on 11 June 2001. It was served by registered post on 13 June 2001. 4.The Writ of Summons was preceded by a letter before action from the plaintiff's solicitors to the defendant dated 11 April 2001. In the letter, the nature of the plaintiff's claim had been stated and the claim had been quantified at $422,000. 5.In paragraph 10 of his Affirmation made on 13 March 2002, the defendant stated as follows:
6.Therefore, even at that stage, the defendant was aware that a demand had been made by the plaintiff, and it was a claim for some $400,000. 7.Ms Yau, acting for the defendant today, made the complaint that in contravention of paragraph 3(b) and (d) of Practice Direction 24.2, the Chinese language version of the Writ did not contain the cause number, names and addresses of the parties, and a summary in Chinese of the relief claimed. Ms Yau went on to submit that in view of the non-compliance with the Practice Direction in preparing the Writ, the Default Judgment obtained in respect thereof is irregular. 8.It should, however, be pointed out that the Writ of Summons served on the defendant did provide in Chinese language guidance for the recipient pointing out the importance of returning the accompanying Acknowledgement of Service and the serious consequence of a failure to do so within time. 9.The defendant received the Writ of Summons through the post in mid-June 2001. On 18 June 2001, the defendant applied for legal aid. On 19 June 2001, a Memorandum of Notification of an Application for Legal Aid was filed in this action. Ms Yau fairly conceded that by that stage, the defendant must have been aware of the identity of the plaintiff and the cause number in question. 10.To complete the relevant chronology, legal aid on that occasion was refused on 15 August 2001. Thereafter the plaintiff entered the Default Judgment on 23 August 2001. 11.In my judgment, the failure to comply with Practice Direction 24.2 did not have the drastic consequence of rendering the Default Judgment an irregular one. The legal status of Practice Directions has been explained in Practice Note PD/1 at page 1248 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002:
12.The same principles of course are applicable to proceedings in the District Court. 13.Furthermore, I am not satisfied that the non-compliance of Practice Direction 24.2 in this case has caused prejudice to the defendant. He knew that an action was pending in the District Court against him. He knew that the claim was made against him by the plaintiff. He knew that it was a claim for some $400,000. He ought to have taken heed of the warnings in Chinese language accompanying the Writ. 14.Accordingly, I hold that the Default Judgment entered on 23 August 2001 was a regular judgment. In the exercise of my discretion, I make the following order as to costs:
15.I am not minded to depart from the usual order made on interlocutory applications that costs should be paid 'in any event' rather than 'forthwith'. I take into account that the defendant at the time when default judgment was entered was not legally represented. I maintain my original ruling that costs should be paid only 'in any event'.
Representation: Present: Mr Yeung Man-sing, of Messrs Hui & Lam, for the Plaintiff Ms Yau Ha-sin, of Messrs Liu, Chan & Lam, assigned by the Legal Aid Department, for the Defendant |