Yuen Wai Han v. South Elderly Affairs Ltd.

Read the full judgment text of DCEO 6/2001 on BabelCite. This DCEO judgment was delivered on 28 October 2002.

1. In this action, the plaintiff claims against the defendant for unlawful pregnancy discrimination under section 8A and section 11(1)(c), or alternatively, section 11(2)(c) of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, Cap. 480.

Case No.DCEO 6/2001[2002] 3 HKLRD 621
Court
DCEO
Date28 Oct 2002
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

DCEO000006/2001

DCEO6/2001

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES CASE NO. 6 OF 2001

BETWEEN
Yuen Wai-han Plaintiff
AND
South Elderly Affairs Limited Defendant

Coram: H H Judge Wong

Date of Judgment: 28 October 2002 at 9.33 am

__________________________

J U D G M E N T

__________________________

1.In this action, the plaintiff claims against the defendant for unlawful pregnancy discrimination under section 8A and section 11(1)(c), or alternatively, section 11(2)(c) of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, Cap. 480.

The Undisputed Facts

2.The plaintiff is a social worker. She has been a registered social worker since July 1999. Since 23 July 1999 until 18 June 2000, she was employed as a supervisor in Lok Yee Sanatorium Limited. Some time in May 2000 she was interviewed by Mr Chan Hoi-hung of the defendant and was employed by the defendant as a part-time social worker working on Sundays.

3.During the interview she told Mr Chan that she was four months pregnant. About two weeks later, after she worked as a social worker, Mr Chan asked if she was interested in the post of supervisor, and she had another interview with Mr Chan on 10 June 2000. Mr Chan told her that her qualification as a social worker would bring a professional image to the defendant, and he wanted to attract more business for the defendant.

4.Mr Chan asked her to sign a contract for the post of supervisor. She indicated that she wanted 10 weeks' no pay maternity leave. Chan told her that in the contract there was a clause that only employees who had worked for more than 40 weeks were entitled to paid maternity leave, so she signed the contract. After she signed the contract, Chan asked whether she understood how to handle applications for social welfare allowance for residents of elderly homes. She told Chan she had not handled such applications before, but told Chan, according to her understanding, the procedure for such applications.

5.According to the contract, she had to report for duty on 18 June 2000, so she submitted her resignation to Lok Yee in the morning of 12 June 2000. At about noon on 12 June 2000, Chan called her by phone and rescinded the contract.

Reasons for Rescission

6.According to the plaintiff, Chan told her that after discussion with other directors, because she was pregnant she was not suitable for the job. Chan, on the other hand, said that the decision was based on the fact that she was inexperienced and did not know how to handle applications for social welfare allowance.

Was the termination of contract due to her incompetence or because of her pregnancy?

7.The plaintiff had been working as a supervisor until July 1999. That was clearly stated in her application form, and Chan knew about this. He agreed that he was impressed with the defendant's qualification and that would boost the image of elderly homes, and in comparison with others she was suitable, notwithstanding her experience. Yet in the same breath he said they required at least three years' experience as supervisor. When asked why the defendant rescinded the contract, Chan replied that that was because she had one year's experience in Lok Yee.

8.Chan clearly was not telling the truth. Although Chan said the main reason was her lack of knowledge about applications for social welfare, he agreed that the amount of social welfare allowance could be obtained from pamphlets or from telephone hotline.

9.He further said that what the supervisor had to do was to explain to the elderly and their family about social welfare allowance and the procedural matter would be handled by a clerk. The other director, Lau Pik-chuen, concerning social welfare procedure, said it was a clerical matter. The supervisor's duty is to liaise with the family members.

10.In any event, the plaintiff, during the interview, had told Chan her understanding of the procedure for making such applications. Further, according to the job duty list of a supervisor supplied by the defendant to the plaintiff, the application for social welfare allowance was not included in the list.

11.By reason aforesaid, I am satisfied that incompetence or lack of experience, the lack of knowledge in relation to social welfare allowance applications, could not have been a factor or the only reason for the defendant to rescind the contract of employment with the defendant.

12.The plaintiff in her evidence did say that Chan told her on 12 June 2000 that he had discussed with other directors because of her pregnancy, she was not suitable for the job. Miss Cheng Yim-king, a senior Equal Opportunities Officer of the Equal Opportunities Commission, on about 5 July 2000 wrote to the defendant informing the defendant that the plaintiff had lodged a complaint of pregnancy discrimination against them and asked them to provide relevant information.

13.On 17 July the Commission received a reply from the defendant. In that letter, apart from saying that at the time of signing the contract they found out from conversation that the plaintiff was not familiar with the business of homes for the elderly, social welfare issues and general knowledge about old people. Then in the following paragraph it wrote:

"Because our hostel consists of five buildings, each consists of upper and lower floors occupying a total area of about 40,000 square feet. Every day residents with disabilities have to be carried by tables and chairs from the 1st floor to the ground to facilitate them to walk and participate in activities on the lawn. As this sort of work is on a regular basis, therefore the supervisor, apart from administering the centre, usually has to take the lead in this sort of work."

14.This, in my view, is not a gratuitous information. It subtly brought out one of the reasons for rescinding the contract: that is, that the supervisor had to take the lead in moving tables and chairs regularly; therefore, the position of a supervisor was not suitable for pregnant women.

15.My view is fortified by the fact that pursuant to a telephone conversation between Chan and Miss Cheng of the Equal Opportunities Commission, Miss Cheng, by letter dated 25 July 2000, asked Chan to confirm the following conversation:

(1) the Centre had, in mid-July, employed a male as supervisor and he had reported for duty immediately;

(2) the reasons for rescinding the contract of Miss Yuen were:

(a) she was not familiar with the business of elderly homes, social welfare matters and general knowledge of the elderly;

(b) supervisor had to move the elderly home's objects. As she was pregnant, the Centre felt she was not fit to take up that position.

16.Despite repeated demands, the defendant had not given a positive reply either verbally or in writing. The defendant argued that Chan already knew the plaintiff was pregnant and so pregnancy could not have been a factor in the termination of her contract. However, when Chan entered into the contract on behalf of the defendant, the other directors had not been consulted. It was after consultation with the other directors that the contract was terminated. Chan admitted he made a mistake.

17.Mr Lau Pik-chuen, the other director, said that in law, the Centre cannot be without a supervisor for more than one month, and it is difficult to find a supervisor. Since the defendant, if she were to be employed, would have to take 21/2 months - that is, 10 weeks - no pay maternity leave in a few months' time, it would be a problem for the defendant.

18.So probable inference is that Chan overlooked this problem as he was too eager to employ the defendant because of her qualifications. It was only after discussion with Lau that they realised pregnancy was a problem.

19.In the premises, I find on balance that pregnancy was at least one of the reasons for the termination of the contract with the plaintiff.

The Law

20.Section 8A of Sex Discrimination Ordnance provides:

"A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of Part III or Part IV if:

(a) on the grounds of her pregnancy he treats her less favourably than he treats or would treat a person who is not pregnant."

Section 11(1)(c) provides:

"It is unlawful for a person in relation to employment by him at an establishment in Hong Kong to discriminate against a woman:

(c) by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer her that employment."

21.In R v Birmingham City Council ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1989] 1 AC 1155 at 1194, per Lord Goff:

"This is discrimination under the statute if there is less favourable treatment on the ground of sex; in other words, if the relevant girl or girls would have received the same treatment as the boys but for their sex. The intention or motive of the defendant to discriminate, though it may be relevant so far as remedies are concerned, is not a necessary condition of liability. It is perfectly possible to envisage cases where the defendant had no such motive and yet did in fact discriminate on the ground of sex."

This is the "but for" test which has been applied in the Court of Final Appeal in The Secretary For Justice and Others v Chan Wah and Others [2000] 3 HKLRD 641. In R v Great Britain China Centre [1992] ICR 516 at 528, between letter (g) and (h) per Niell LJ:

"...3. The outcome of a case will therefore usually depend on what inferences it is proper to draw from the primary facts found by the tribunal. These inferences can include, in appropriate cases, any inferences that it is just and equitable to draw from an evasive or equivocal reply to a questionnaire."

22.As I have found that pregnancy was at least one of the reasons for the defendant to terminate the contract of the plaintiff, and that a male staff had subsequently been employed in that position by the defendant, I am satisfied that a person who was not pregnant would not have received the same treatment as the plaintiff; that is, the rescission of the contract.

23.The defendant is therefore in breach of section 8(a) of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance and is liable to the plaintiff for damages.

24.At the request of counsel, the assessment of damages will be adjourned generally with liberty to restore.

25.There will be no order as to costs.

H H Judge Wong
District Court Judge

Representation:

Present: Mr Herman L H Poon, Acting Legal Advisor of Equal Opportunities Commission, for the Plaintiff

Mr James Collins, instructed by Messrs Lousich, Lau & Ngan, Solicitors, for the Defendant