Malaysia Borneo Finance Corporation (M) Berhad v. Choo Kim San

HCMP000159/1977

-----------------

-----------------

-----------------

Coram: Zimmern, J.

Date of Judgment: 22nd July, 1977.

----------------------------------

D E C I S I O N

----------------------------------

1. I do not have to repeat for the purpose of this decision all the other proceedings culminating in the consent order of the 30th June 1977 wherein it was ordered that two issues be tried. The first issue called a preliminary issue came before me for hearing on the afternoon of the 8th July 1977.

The Parties.

2. By agreement, the plaintiffs were

and the defendant was Malaysia Borneo Finance Corporation (M) Berhad, a Malaysian Corporation without a place of business in Hong Kong which I shall call "Berhad".

The Issue.

3. Whether the registration of the said judgment herein is liable to be set aside upon the application of Fermay and/or Asiatic.

The Registered Judgment.

4. On the 22nd February Berhad as plaintiff obtained a judgment against one Choo Kim San (whom I shall call San) the defendant in Civil Suit No. 2887 of 1976 in the High Court of Malaysia for two sums of money to talling nearly four million Malaysian Dollars with interests. San was served by substituted service and the judgment was in default of appearance.

5. On the 4th March 1977 Berhad applied by way of ex parte summons to the Registrar for an order that the judgment of the High Court of Malaysia against San be registered in the Supreme Court of Hong Kong pursuant to section 4 of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance. The summons was heard by Mr. Registrar Stapp on 6th April 1977 and the learned Registrar ordered the registration in terms and further ordered that San be at liberty to apply to set aside the registration within seven days after service upon him of notice of such registration and that execution upon this judgment shall not issue until after the expiration of that period or if an application be made to set aside registration until such application has been disposed of. It was not till the 9th day of June 1977 that Berhad applied to the Registrar for leave to serve the notice of registration of the judgment on San in the manner set out in the Registrar's order of that date. Pursuant thereto San was duly served and has not applied to set the order of registration aside. I need not have to say anything why Fermay and Asiatic have the locus standi to apply to set aside the registration of the judgment save that Mr. Litton, leading counsel for Berhad, concedes that they and each of them have that locus standi.

Fermay's Case for Setting Aside the Registration of the Judgment.

6. Mr. Swaine, leading counsel for Fermay, rightly says that on his application the court is bound to set aside the registration if it is satisfied:

7. On the jurisdiction point as the civil suit in the High Court of Malaysia is an action in personam and there is no dispute about this he firstly argues that High Court can only have jurisdiction if one or more of the conditions set out under section 6(2)(a)(i) to (v) is present. He secondly argues that none of the conditions is fulfilled.

Mr. Swaine's First Argument.

8. Mr. Swaine relies on two cases :

In the first a New Zealand case the plaintiff, an English company, obtained leave in the High Court of England to serve the writ out of the jurisdiction on the defendant, a New Zealand company in New Zealand. The defendant did not enter an appearance and did not submit to the jurisdiction of the English court. The plaintiff obtained a judgment in personam against the defendant in England and registered that judgment in New Zealand under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act (New Zealand) the equivalent of, though not identical with, out Ordinance, The defendant company applied to the Supreme Court of New Zealand to set aside the registration. McGregor, J. at p.822 said

"In my opinion when the status refers to jurisdiction both in s.6 (1) (b) and in s.6 (3) it is apparent the reference is to jurisdiction so as to confer extra-territorial validity on the judgment and not jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. In the present case the judgment is clearly valid by the lex loci. The Court in England had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter and the judgment is enforceable in England. But none of the conditions set out in s.6 (3) is present to enable the English Court to assume a jurisdiction which would give extra-territorial validity to its judgment .... It seems to me that in regard to actions in personam subs. (3)(a) of s.6 gives an exclusive definition of the prerequisites of jurisdiction of the original court for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not subs. (1)(b) is applicable."

In the second case, an English case, an Italian company brought proceedings for breach of contract against a Belgian company in a Belgian court. The Belgian company joined an English company to the proceedings and served notice of the proceeding on the English company in accordance with the laws of Belgium. The English company took no part in the proceedings and did not submit to the jurisdection of the Belgian court. The Belgian court gave judgment against the English company in favour of the Belgian company which then registered that judgment under the Foreign Judgment (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. The English company applied to have the registration set aside on the ground that the Belgian court had no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case. Widgery J., as he then was, set aside the registration. As the arguments in the case were involved I set out hereunder part of the headnote of the case at p.829:

"Held, that, although the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933, was not an Act codifying the principles of common law whereby a foreign judgment would be recognised by the courts of this country, and although it did not enact the common law principle in to to, it was an Act which made no fundamental change in the common law approach to the recognition of foreign judgments and such recognition was not based on the principle of comity of nations and reciprocity. That being so, the only foreign judgments which could be registered were those that came within paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of section 4(2) of the Act; and, as this was an action in personam which did not come within paragraph (a) and was excluded from paragraphs (b) and (c), the registration of the judgment would be set aside."

Both the New Zealand and English Acts have identical sections in terms of our section 6(1) and (2). I ought therefore to follow these authorities and find that section 6(2)(a)(i) to (v) is exclusive in an action in personam.

Second Argument.

9. Mr. Litton having conceded that the High Court of Malaysia could not have had jurisdiction under section 6(2)(a) (i) and (ii) Mr. Swaine only had to deal with on (iii) to (v). As to section 6(2)(a)(iii) which reads:

"If the judgment debtor being a defendant in the original court had before the commencement of the proceedings agreed, in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings, to submit to the jurisdiction of that court or of the courts of the country of that court."

Mr. Swaine says the word "agreed" must mean an express agreement. That is where the defendant expressly agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of that court. He says if the legislature had intended that an implied agreement would suffice it would not have used the words found in (iii). He relies on the whole of the sub-chapter headed "THE THIRD CASE. AGREEMENT TO SUBMIT" in the 9th Edition of Dicey and Morris "The Conflict of Law" at pp.998-1000 and in particular the passage therefrom reading "It may be laid down as a general rule that an agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court must be express : it cannot be implied". He also relies on Vogel v R. and A. Kohnstamm Ltd.⁽³⁾. Mr. Swaine went into this case in extense and all I repeat is that at p.133 it is reported that Ashworth J. held

There is no evidence in this case that San expressly agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Malaysian High Court before, during or after the proceedings in which Berhad obtained its judgment.

10. As to section 6(2)(a)(iv) which reads:

Mr. Swaine says it is a prerequisite of (iv) that at the time of the institution of the proceeding San was resident in Malaysia. He says resident here means living and for the original court to have jurisdiction under this head Berhad will have to prove that San was, at the date of the issue of the writ which was 3rd December 1976, living in Malaysia. There is no evidence whatsoever that San was then living in Malaysia. The writ was addressed to him care of his solicitors and service was by way of substituted service.

11. Mr. Swaine relies on Grogan v The London and Manchester Industrial Assurance Co. ⁽⁴⁾ when at p.763 Manisty, J. dealing with a form of proposal to an assurance office said

"That document, after the heading, asks first, the name of the person proposing to effect an assurance, secondly his profession or occupation, then his residence. Now that, in my opinion, means the place where he is living or residing at the time of making the proposal, and not where he has been residing before or where he is going to reside afterwards."

He also relies on R. v The Guardians of Stourbridge Union ⁽⁵⁾ wherein Blackburn, J. said

"The question in this case is, whether it can be said that the pauper was resident at this parish during this time. There have been cases where a man having been physically away, he has retained a residence, and then the animus revertendi has to be looked to. But there is no case where, being physically absent, and having no residence, he has been held to continue constructively to reside there".

Then 9th Cheshire's Private International Law wherein the learned editor at p.669 dealing with the same subsection in the English Acts says "As residence is required temporary presence would appear to be excluded". Finally the speech of Viscount Summer at p.12 in Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co. v Todd⁽⁶⁾

"At first, perhaps, the Courts might have said that, as a corporation could not 'reside' any-where in any true sense, they must leave it to the Legislature to enact residence in an artificial sense, but they felt bound to make the Acts work as they found them and arrived at a compromise, under which certain propositions, I think, are now well settled. The word 'resident,' it is laid down, has to be applied to artificial persons by analogy from natural persons. With these, residence depends on personal facts. Place of birth, nationality and allegiance are not the tests, nor is domicil, except in a sense that makes it barely distinguishable from residence. Voluntary choice and habitual and repeated action are mainly material, such as making a home, keeping an establishment, pursuing a settled object in or at a particular place. A man can change his residence at will, except that a certain duration of time or fixity of decision is requisite, and, but for the peculiar cases of a convict in gaol or a lunatic lawfully detained in a madhouse, I do not think that residence is ever determined for a natural person simply by the law."

12. As to section 6(2)(a)(v) which reads

"If the judgment debtor being a defendant in the original court had an office or place of business in the country of that court and the proceedings in that court were in respect of a transaction effected through or at that office or place."

Mr. Swaine says there are two limbs to this :

13. As to the first limb he says paragraph 5 of Chong Kah Keng's affirmation of 29th June 1977 is the only evidence adduced by Berhad in respect of San's place of business and it is no more than a deliberate attempt to use the language of the Ordinance. Paragraph 5 reads :

"I am informed by Mr. Hezan Shan the General Manager (Administration) of the Plaintiffs and by Lee Ing Chee and I verily believe that the Defendant had an office and a place of business at 164 Jalan Tuanku Abdul Rahman, Kuala Lumpur from 1969 until July 1974 which was then the Head Office of the Plaintiffs, under the control of the Defendant and or his nominees. The aforesaid three loans were released by the Plaintiffs to the Defendant's agents on or about 3rd October, 1973, 15th October, 1973 and 13th February, 1974 as stated in the said Statement of Claim ('CKK-1'). The Defendant also resided from 1969 to July 1974 at 115 Jalan Sungei Besi, Kuala Lumpur which was then a branch office of the Plaintiffs. At the said branch office, the Defendant maintained a well furnished air-conditioned bedroom."

14. As to the second limb he says the transactions are in respect of three loans pleaded in paragraphs 1, 6 and 11 of Berhad's statement of claim in the original court and further rolled up in paragraph 16. There is no evidence that the transactions were effected through San's place of business if he ever had one.

15. So much for Mr. Swaine's submissions on the jurisdiction point and I now turn to Mr. Litton's.

Mr. Litton's First Argument.

16. As to section 6(2)(a)(i)-(v) he says though free from authority no country will give effect to the judgments of another country save where the facts fall in within (i)-(v). Then as a matter of reciprocity the courts in Hong Kong will hold that the original court had jurisdiction in an action in personam. He says the words "shall be deemed to have jurisdiction" cannot be construed as words of exclusion. If the legislature had intended (i)-(v) to be exclusive then it would have used the words "shall not be deemed to have had jurisdiction unless". He further said (i)-(v) are the absolute minimum. He then went into the Titan Case ⁽²⁾ and the Sharps Commercials, Ltd. Case ⁽¹⁾ and said that any finding in these cases that (i)-(v) are exclusive is purely obiter. They do not bind me and I ought not to follow them. He says on its ordinary construction the provisions of section 6(2) could only have been meant to provide minimum requirements in which the courts in Hong Kong will say the foreign courts have jurisdiction. It is intended to lay down what the Hong Kong courts would expect the foreign courts to lay down in a reciprocal situation. By so enacting the legislature never intended to restrict the Hong Kong courts in their recognition of foreign jurisdiction exactly in the same way that the foreign courts will not be restricted in their recognition of our judgments. He says on a totality of evidence there is an abundance of facts from which I should find that the Malaysian court had jurisdiction whether or not such facts come within (i)-(v) but in any event such facts do come within (i)-(v). The facts relied on are:

He submits that San has impliedly submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Malaysian court.

Mr. Litton's Second Argument.

17. He says the court is concerned with ordinary residence and that is where a man is said to have his home relying on 9th Dicey and Morris's The Conflict of Laws at p.97. He says on the evidence before the court the fair way to put it is that San was both a resident of Hong Kong and Malaysia. The material date to consider is December 1976 (the month the writ was issued in the Malaysian High Court). San was arrested in Hong Kong in June 1976 and allowed out on bail upon inter alia surrender of his travel documents. He failed to answer to his bail in October 1976 and there is evidence that he was in Taiwan in December 1976. He says no inference can be drawn from San's conduct that he had ever abandoned his Malaysian residence. Residence is a broader issue than mere physical presence.

18. As to section 6(2)(a)(iii) Mr. Swaine is wrong to say express agreement is required. Outside of contractual situation there is nothing to say agreement must be express. San had given instructions to one Michael Kwong to act as his agent (exhibit CCK2 of Mr. Chong Kah Keng's affirmation of 4th July 1977) and the court and draw inference from his state of mind. I ought, he says, to apply the approbation and reprobation rule, and say San has invoked the jurisdiction of the Malaysian court.

19. As to section 6(2)(a)(iv) Mr. Litton has nothing to add to what he has said about residence save to say that the word "Resident is not to be restrictively construed".

20. As to section 6(2)(a)(v) Mr. Litton says on the statement of claim and the trust deeds exhibited San laid his ground for the fraud by establishing his fraud in the premises of Berhad. This section must be given broad and liberal construction. The transaction was the loans and the loans were made through that office.

21. Mr. Litton then contends that the burden of proof is on Mr. Swaine as applicant.

Findings.

First Argument.

22. Mr. Litton's arguments on this issue are hold but unconvincing. If as he says the requirements contained in section 6(2)(a)(i)-(v) are the absolute minimum then to my mind unless it is proved (I shall deal with the onus or burden of proof later) that at least one of the five requirements is satisfied the court is bound to set the registration aside because one cannot accept less than the minimum. I do not think he could have used the word "minimum" in this sense. I can only conclude that he means that even if none of the five requirements is present in any given case a court nevertheless has a discretion or an inherent jurisdiction to say the original court had jurisdiction if the circumstances of that case so warrant. He says the common law is not moribund.

23. With respect to Mr. Litton all his arguments were canvassed before Widgery, J., as he then was, in the Titan Case ⁽²⁾ including the argument that if the legislature had intended section 6(2)(a)(i)-(v) to be exclusive then it would have used the phrase "would be deemed not to have jurisdiction unless" without success. I am fully aware of the fact that the judgment creditor in the Titan Case ⁽²⁾ had nothing whatsoever to do with the country which entered judgment against it whereas San undoubtedly had a lot to do with Malaysia. He was one of that country's nationals and had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of its High Court in a few cases which I shall deal with more particularity when I deal with another issue. In my opinion this does not matter. We are concerned with the construction of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, and what was the common law prior to the passing of the Ordinance in regard to enforcing foreign judgments in Hong Kong. These matters have been fully considered by the learned judge in the Titan Case ⁽²⁾ under the equivalent English Act and I intend to follow him. I accordingly hold that section 6(2)(a)(i)-(v) are exclusive and unless Berhad's judgment comes within section 6(2)(a)(i)-(v) I am bound to set aside the judgment.

The Burden of Proof.

24. Mr. Swaine submits that the burden or onus is on Mr. Litton to prove that the foreign judgment comes within the provisions of section 6(2)(a) and Mr. Litton submits that it is on Mr. Swaine to prove the negative as he who alleges must prove. The answer to this in my opinion is a matter of law on the construction of the Ordinance. The principle is cited thus in 12th edition of Phipson on Evidence para. 91:

25. In this case Berhad is the party which has invoked the aid of the law to enforce its foreign judgment. Section 4(1) of the Ordinance provides

"A person, being a judgment creditor under a judgment to which the provisions of this Ordinance apply, may apply to the Supreme Court .... to have the judgment registered in the Supreme Court and on any such application the Court shall subject to proof of the prescribed matters and to the other provisions of this Ordinance order the judgment to be registered."

Under Order 71 rule 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court an application under section 4 may be made ex parte but the court may direct a summons to issue.

26. The order to register the judgment was made upon an ex parte application in this case. Order 71 rule 3 sets out the prescribed matters which have to be proved by affidavit in support of the application of and includes rule 3(1)(c) which reads:

"stating to the best of the information or belief of the deponent -

Section 6(1)(a)(ii) provides:

"On an application in that behalf duly made by any party against whom a registered judgment may be enforced the registration of the judgment shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfied that the courts had no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case."

This is one of provisions of the Ordinance to which the registration of the judgment is subject and once an application is made by any party against whom a registered judgment may be enforced the burden or onus is on the judgment creditor, upon hearing of the issue to prove that the registration of the judgment is not liable to be set aside under section 6 beyond the best of information and belief asserted under Order 71 rule 3(1)(c)(iv). I am not unmindful of the fact that by agreement between the parties Mr. Swaine presented his arguments first thus making his client the plaintiff. The onus of proof is a matter of law and in respect of this issue, on the construction of the Ordinance, I find the onus to be on Berhad.

The Second Argument.

27. As to section 6(2)(a)(iii) Mr. Swaine's arguments are well founded. Mr. Litton's argument that the court should infer from San's submission to the Malaysian Court by his appointment of Michael Kwong as his agent is quite unacceptable. No principal is bound until and unless the agent acts within his authority. There is no suggestion that Michael Kwong before or albeit after the proceedings agreed in any way with anyone to submit San to the jurisdiction of the Malaysian Court. I accept the passage cited by Mr. Swaine from p.999 of the 9th edition of Dicey and Morris that it may be laid down as a general rule that an agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court must be express: it cannot be implied. There is no evidence that San had submitted by himself or through an agent at any time to the jurisdiction of the original court in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings. The judgment does not come within section 6(2)(a)(iii).

28. As to section 6(2)(a)(iv) Mr. Litton does not and of course cannot contend that San was physically in Malaysia in December 1976 when the proceedings were instituted and that is the material date. It is common ground that San was in Hong Kong at least from June 1976 to October 1976 when he failed to answer to his bail and disappeared. There is evidence that he was seen in Taiwan in December 1976. Simon Sik On Ip's affidavit of 7th June 1977 filed on behalf of Berhad paragraph 5 reads as follows:

"I was informed by one Lee Ing Chee, who was engaged by the Deferdant between 1972 and 1976 to look after his business interests in Hong Kong and was also the nominee of the Defendant in the boards of management of public and private companies in which the Defendant had and still has controlling interests, that the Defendant has since 1972 resided in Hong Kong with his wife and a daughter. Some time in 1974, the Defendant bought a flat in the mid-levels where he lived with his family. However, he also retained during that period a room (Room 204) in the Imperial Hotel, Nathan Road, Kowloon, in which he had and still has substantial beneficial interest. Despite his residence in the mid-levels he continued to stay in the said hotel room from time to time."

Chong Kah Keng filed on behalf of Berhad an affirmation on 29th June 1977. He is an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaysia and solicitors for the plaintiff. Paragraph 4 of his affirmation reads as follows:

"I have read what purports to be a copy of the Affidavit of Mr. M.E. Ives sworn herein on 23rd June, 1977. At all material times the Defendant was and still is a Malaysian citizen holding a blue identity card (which is the identity card of a citizen of Malaysia) and the address shown therein is '9 Rock Road, Kuching' which is part of Malaysia. The Defendant affirmed an Affidavit on 15th January, 1975 in connection with Civil Suit No. 931 of 1974 in the Malaysia High Court in Kuala Lumpur wherein he affirmed that he is a Malaysian citizen. There is now produced and shown to me a photostat copy of the said Affidavit and marked 'CKK-2."

Exhibit CKK-2 is a copy of an affirmation of San's dated 15th January 1975 paragraph 7 of which reads:

"I am a Malaysian Citizen and hold a blue identity card and the address shown in that card is '9, Rock Road, Kuching'".

There is no dispute Kuching is part of Malaysia. San is also reputed to have had residence at 115 Jalan Sungei Besi in Kuala Lumpur at the time of the transactions sued on. Mr. Litton admits that from 1972 San had dual residence i.e. both in Hong Kong and Malaysia. He says that is the fair way to put it as the court is concerned with ordinary residence and the court cannot abandon its dignity by keeping pace with a man like San. San has not abandoned his residence in Malaysia be it in Kuching or Kuala Lumpur. I am unable to agree with him. The burden is on Berhad to prove that at the time of the institution of the proceedings i.e. December 1976 San was resident in Malaysia. Let me say that on the evidence filed on behalf of Berhad the evidence that San has been in Hong Kong since 1972 is merely hearsay but Mr. Litton has admitted this. Whilst I am in agreement with Mr. Swaine that the word "resident" in section 6(2)(a)(iv) means "living in" I do not have to decide it on the issue in this case. The burden is on Berhad to prove that in December 1976 San was resident in Malaysia. Whatever his residence might have been held out to have been in 1973, 1974, 1975 Berhad admits that San has been resident in Hong Kong since 1972. There is no evidence that San kept any sort of a home in Malaysia in December 1976. Berhad has not discharged its onus of proof under this head.

29. As to section 6(2)(a)(v) the burden is on Berhad to prove that San had an office of business in Malaysia and that the proceedings in the original court were in respect of a transaction effected through or at that office. The transactions according to the statement of claim were effected on or about (1) 3rd October, 1973, (2) 15th October, 1973 (3) 13th February, 1974. The transactions were alleged to have been loans by Berhad not to San but to his agents for whom he is liable in the alternative. San is liable for the loans as a constructive trustee. Mr. Litton took me through the statement of claim and said that on it and the trust deeds San laid his ground for the fraud by establishing his fraud on the premises of Berhad and San also had a place of business at the same premises. First the loans, the subject matter of proceedings, were not made to San but in respect of the first made to Tunku Shahabuddin and in respect of the second and third loans to Yap Tshan. San was sued as an undisclosed principal or otherwise on the strength of two trust deeds exhibited to the affidavit of Chong Kah Keng's affirmation of 29th June, 1977 being exhibits CKK-2, CKK-3 and CKK-4 respectively. Under the deeds San settled immovable properties on the beneficiaries namely the borrowers mentioned in the statement of claim solely for the purpose of using the properties to obtain loans of stated amounts for which loans San gave the beneficiaries full indemnity. On the face of the deeds dated 2nd October, 1973 and 11th October, 1973 San is said to have been of No.164 Jalan Tuanku Abdul Rahman, Kuala Lumpur, the address of Berhad. Paragraph 5 of Chong Kah Keng's affirmation reads as follows:

"I am informed by Mr. Hezan Shah the General Manager (Administration) of the Plaintiffs and by Lee Ing Chee and I verily believe that the Defendant had an office and a place of business at 164 Jalan Tuanku Abdul Rahman, Kuala Lumpur from 1969 until July 1974 which was then the Head Office of the Plaintiffs, under the control of the Defendant and/or his nominces. The aforesaid three loans were released by the Plaintiffs to the Defendant's agents on or about 3rd October, 1973, 15th October, 1973 and 13th February, 1974 as stated in the said Statement of Claim ('CKK-1'). The Defendant also resided from 1969 to July 1974 at 115 Jalan Sungei Besi, Kuala Lumpur which was then a branch office of the Plaintiffs. At the said branch office, the Defendant maintained a well furnished air-conditioned bedroom."

30. There is no evidence filed on behalf of Berhad that San was ever one of its directors or officers in October 1973. He was suing Berhad in 1974. Mr. Swaine says and says quite properly that paragraph 5 of Chong Kah Keng's affirmation is a deliberate attempt to use the language of the Ordinance but consists entirely of hearsay. These are not interlocutory proceedings and on an important matter of this nature I shall not condone such hearsay evidence. Be that as it may even taking that hearsay into consideration I still cannot find any evidence that the three transactions were effected through or at a place of business of San's in Malaysia. Nobody ought to have known better than Berhad through its officers, as to how and between whom these loans were negotiated and where transacted. Again if San is alleged to have had an office or place of business in 1973 and 1974 in Berhad's premises why are there no particulars at all.

31. I find that the original court had no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case and set aside the registration of the judgment.

32. Accordingly I do not have to deal with the second issue raised by Mr. Swaine.

Representation:

H. Litton, Q.C., and Winston Poon (Johnson, Stokes & Master) for Malaysia Borneo Finance Corporation (M) Berhad.

Swaine, Q.C., and Robert Tang (Peter Mo & Co.) for Fermay Co., Ltd.

K.H. Woo (C.P. Lai & Co.) for Asiatic Nominees, Ltd.

(1) [1956] N.Z.L.R. 819

(2) [1966] 1 Q.B. 828

(3) [1973] 1 Q.B. 133

(4) 53 Law Times 761

(5) 6 The New Reports 225

(6) [1929] A.C. 1