Gaiman Ltd. v. The Secretary for Justice
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 3119/1997 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 15 May 1998.
1. I have before me an Originating Summons dated 22nd September 1997 issued on behalf of the Plaintiff herein, which on 10th June 1996 purchased Inland Lot No.6070, otherwise known as No.30, Po Shan Road, a property which was and is held under Conditions of Sale dated 4th November 1940. By the Originating Summons the Plaintiff asks for Orders against the Defendant herein, the Secretary for Justice, in the following terms :-
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HCMP003119/1997 1997, No.MP3119 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS ---------------
--------------- Coram: The Hon Mr Justice Stone in Court Date of Hearing: 1 April 1998 Date of Handing Down Judgment: 15 May 1998 ________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ The Application 1. I have before me an Originating Summons dated 22nd September 1997 issued on behalf of the Plaintiff herein, which on 10th June 1996 purchased Inland Lot No.6070, otherwise known as No.30, Po Shan Road, a property which was and is held under Conditions of Sale dated 4th November 1940. By the Originating Summons the Plaintiff asks for Orders against the Defendant herein, the Secretary for Justice, in the following terms :-
The History of the Property 2. No.30, Po Shan Road is a fine old house standing at the upper end of Po Shan Road. The Lot upon which the house stands is held under Conditions of Sale dated 4th November 1940, Special Condition (2) of which is of particular significance. It reads as follows :-
3. An Occupation Permit appears to have been issued on 4th July 1950 for one European type house - which, I understand, is the structure remaining in existence today - and thereafter nothing of significance to the present case occurred until 1950. At which point the present story effectively begins. 4. On 27th November 1950, the architect's firm of Messrs Leigh and Orange wrote to the Registrar General asking if, in the event of the purchase of the property by British Cigarette Company Limited or British American Tobacco Limited, permission could be given to convert the house into three flats. The letter in question referred to the terms of Special Condition (2) of the Conditions of Sale and continued :-
5. This prompted the Registrar General to seek approval from the Colonial Secretary on 28th November 1950, and the Colonial Secretary responded thereto on 4th December 1950 in the following terms :-
6. Thereafter this decision was communicated to Messrs Leigh and Orange by the Registrar General by letter dated 11th December 1950 :-
7. The result of all this was that the modification in question was endorsed on the copy of the Conditions of Sale in the Land Registry by means of the following handwritten annotation in the margin abutting Special Condition (2) :-
8. Consequent upon this permission, the property was assigned to British American Tobacco Company (China) Limited on 23rd December 1950, the required conversion works went ahead, and the Building Authority issued an Occupation Permit on 4th May 1951; the latter document appears in standard form and refers to "three European type flats at No.30 Po Shan Road on I.L.6070" as complying in all respects with the Building Ordinance and being suitable for occupation "for domestic purposes". 9. I am told that after this conversion had occurred the Lot changed hands on three occasions, in September 1953, July 1954 and May 1955 respectively, although for present purposes the details do not seem to me to much matter. What does matter, however, is the purchase by the current Plaintiff, whom I apprehend is a developer, by Assignment on 10th June 1996. And that after such purchase, to quote from the affidavit in support of the application :-
10. I think it fair to observe that this simple paragraph does not serve immediately to convey the reality of the 19 storey apartment block which I understand is proposed, with each of the flats therein being of five storeys each. However, as Sir John Swaine S.C. observed, what may or may not constitute a 'flat' may well be a debate "for another day"; for the purposes of this application, both Sir John for the Plaintiff and Mr Merry, who appears on behalf of the Secretary of Justice, were united in their view that the Court's task upon this application solely involved the narrow issue of construction of the amendment to the Special Conditions of Sale. Accordingly, it is to this issue that I now turn. The Issue for Decision 11. In a nutshell, the issue for determination is encompassed by the first declaration sought in these proceedings, namely, whether the modification of Special Condition (2) of the Conditions of Sale was in substance and effect a modification which served to permit the erection of three new flats upon this site. 12. Sir John Swaine S.C., in an attractive and wide-ranging argument, submitted that the modification in question did indeed permit the subsequent erection of three new flats. He stressed the significance of the modification in the Land Registry, and drew the attention of the Court to the absence of a covenant to repair and maintain and deliver up at the end of term, thus enabling the owner to rebuild. What was in fact intended and approved, he asserted, was the modification of the building restriction to enable three flats to be built from time to time, and the correct analytical approach, and the correspondingly correct legal conclusion, was that the Government had permitted the erection of three flats via the means, in this particular context, of converting the existing building. As a matter of logic, said Sir John, there would obviously come a point when conversion as such could be so extensive as, in effect, to amount to the erection of a new building; but that if there was a small gap that required to be bridged, between the concepts of conversion and erection, this could easily be effected by the implication of a term permitting rebuilding as three flats as an obvious inference from the agreement : the officious bystander would have no doubt, said Sir John, that both parties would have agreed to such a term had such been mooted, and in this connection he placed reliance on the well known observations of Mackinnon L.J. in Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries (1939) 2 KB 206 at 227. 13. Mr Merry, on behalf of the Secretary for Justice, disagreed. Whilst he accepted that modification of a restrictive covenant could occur in a relatively informal manner, there was no doubt that the relaxation of such restrictions should be "jealously construed". BAT was in the position of a supplicant, and the Government had received nothing in return for the relaxation. At the time of the correspondence leading to the modification the parties were contemplating the conversion of an existing building which then stood at that site and clearly, submitted Mr Merry, the modification was solely for that existing building, which had been erected in accordance with Special Condition (2) as one residence, and not for some future building; moreover there was a clear and obvious distinction between conversion and erection. In short, this was "a specific request for a specific modification which was specifically granted" in the particular circumstances prevailing in 1950, and as reflected in the correspondence of that time, and in fact part of that very correspondence (the letter of 11th December 1950 addressed to Messrs Leigh and Orange) was specified in the handwritten modification, which itself did not refer to the subject of the conversion, thereby necessitating reference to the letter itself, which apparently also was attached to the file in the Land Registry. 14. The particular context of the request for, and the grant of, the modification was important, submitted Mr Merry; the analytical nub of the argument was the permission to modify the existing house, so that there could not be demolition of that structure and the erection of a whole new building consisting of three flats. And as to the argument as to an implied term, the function of an implied term was simply to fill in necessary and obvious gaps and not to extend the substantive agreement, so that if, in the situation prevailing in 1950, the officious bystander had been asked whether BAT could tear down the existing structure and create a purpose-built block of flats, the answer predictably would have been in the negative. Decision 15. Both Counsel are, I think, agreed that the approach the Court should take in considering this matter is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties. As Litton J.A. succinctly put it in Real Honest Investment Ltd v. A-G [1997] 2 HKC 182 at 193B-C :-
16. Accordingly, in considering the issue for determination, I have taken into account the relevant correspondence and the contemporaneous events as revealed in the evidence before the Court, and I have viewed these matters against the cogent submissions advanced on each side. The issue is a pure question of construction, and the answer, it seems to me, permits solely of a black or white response - there is, I think, no room for compromise. 17. Accordingly, after some reflection, I have come to the conclusion that the effect of the modification to Special Condition (2) does not permit of the erection on the site of three new flats, of whatever dimension; the nature of the building that can be so erected is dealt with by the Special Condition itself. And in so construing the modification of that Condition, I have had difficulty in making the transition urged upon me by Sir John Swaine S.C. so as to move from the concept of "conversion" within the wording of the modification to that of "erection" as sought in this application, whilst invocation of the services of the officious bystander does not, in my judgment, rescue the situation by means of the necessary implication of a contractual term. Indeed, if I may respectfully say so, it seems to me more likely, as indeed Mr Merry suggested, that the response of this celebrated notional observer when confronted with the Plaintiff's argument would have been not "but of course", but "of course not". 18. Be that as it may. Whilst I have not found this a straightforward matter, in the circumstances I regret that I am unable to accede to the Plaintiff's application, and I decline to make the declarations sought. The Originating Summons of 22nd September 1997 is dismissed. It necessarily follows, I think, that such dismissal should be with costs to the Defendant, to be taxed if not agreed, and I make an order nisi in these terms with regard to costs. 19. It remains only to thank both Counsel for their crisp and cogent arguments.
Representation: Sir John Swaine, S.C. and Mr J.J.E. Swaine, inst'd by M/s Lo, Wong & Tsui, for the Plaintiff Mr Malcom Merry, inst'd by the Secretary for Justice |