T.M. Ho H.C. So & Co v. Wong Hon Leung and Another

Read the full judgment text of HCA 14225/1998 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 July 1999.

1. The Plaintiff brings this action against the two named Defendants for charges for work done and services rendered. The amount of claim is $130,000. The Plaintiff is a firm of certified public accountants.

Cites 1 case

Case No.HCA 14225/1998
Court
High Court CFI
Date23 Jul 1999
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCA014225/1998

HCA 14225/98

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 14225 OF 1998

-----------------

BETWEEN
T.M. HO H.C. SO & COMPANY Plaintiff

AND

WONG HON LEUNG and LO PIK YU Defendants

-----------------

Coram: Hon Chung J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 23 July 1999

Date of Decision: 23 July 1999

-----------------

DECISION

-----------------

1. The Plaintiff brings this action against the two named Defendants for charges for work done and services rendered. The amount of claim is $130,000. The Plaintiff is a firm of certified public accountants.

2. According to the Plaintiff, it was introduced to the 1st named Defendant in 1977. The two named Defendants and businesses related to, or run by, the 1st named Defendant were at that time under investigation by the Inland Revenue Department ("IRD"). The 1st named Defendant instructed the Plaintiff to deal with the IRD investigation regarding this.

3. In an affirmation dated 1 February 1999, Mr Ho Thick Man of the Plaintiff stated that:

"It was agreed in writing by the Defendant on behalf of his wife and himself that they would pay the Plaintiff the sum of $35,000 in respect of each year of the field audit undertaken by the IRD on himself, his wife and his business."

The document referred to by Mr Ho is exhibited as "TM-2", it reads:

"I agree to accept your professional fee at the rate of $35,000 per Year of Assessment for handling the taxation affairs in connection with the field audit undertaken by the IRD on myself, my wife and the captioned business.

Yours faithfully,
Wong Hon Leung"

4. The Defendants indicated in their Acknowledgement of Service that they contest the claim. No defence was filed or served and judgment in the sum of $130,000 was entered on 14 October 1998 together with interest and costs.

5. The Defendants applied to set aside the said judgment. At the end of a hearing on 10 May 1999, Master Barnes set aside the judgment on condition that the $130,000 claimed by the Plaintiff be paid into Court. I understand that the condition has been complied with.

6. Both the Defence and Counterclaim filed by the Defendants on 21 May 1999, and the affirmations filed by the Defendants in support of the setting aside application put forward the same defence in essence. As regards the 2nd named Defendant, it is alleged that there was no binding agreement between her and the Plaintiff for the Plaintiff to ground a claim against her. Further, the 1st named Defendant alleged that the work done by the Plaintiff was done improperly or negligently. It was also alleged that there has been an over-charge, and this formed the basis of the counterclaim against the Plaintiff.

7. In the Plaintiff's affirmations, the Plaintiff asserted that it had performed the work properly.

8. Having heard the Plaintiff's submissions and perused the documents, I consider that the Master's decision to set aside the judgment conditionally to be a correct decision. I bear in mind that the Court of Appeal had said in a number of decisions that it is inappropriate and undesirable for a court to set out in detail why leave to defend ought to be given in an O.14 application. These remarks may also be applicable to this appeal. However, since the Defendants are acting in person, I consider it appropriate to set out briefly why I agree with the Master as follows:

(a) It is arguable as to whether the 2nd named Defendant has entered into the written agreement with the Plaintiff (as the Plaintiff contended). The express wording of this document refers only to the 1 st named Defendant. It was only signed by him and the operative part of the document states : "I agree to accept your professional fee ...".
(b) It is arguable whether by supplying documents to the Plaintiff (it is unclear whether this was done by her or the 1st named Defendant), or attending the IRD with the Plaintiff, the 2nd Defendant can be regarded as having entered into the agreement with the Plaintiff, and if so, whether the agreement was for a fixed charge of $35,000 for work on every year's assessment.
(c) If the Plaintiff is advancing a case that a separate agreement has been made with each of the two named Defendants, it is arguable whether each of them should be liable for the Plaintiff's professional charges for work on six years of assessment. It is part of the Plaintiff's case that only four years of re-assessment were related to the 1st named Defendant himself.
(d) It is arguable whether the agreement was that the fixed sum was payable for work done irrespective of the quality or quantity of the work, or whether a term of due and reasonable care and skill ought to be implied.
(e) It is arguable whether the agreement relied upon by the Plaintiff is upon its true construction an "entire" contract or a "lump sum" contract, or whether the charges specified therein were severable. In the former case, a party to the agreement can only claim the specified sum if the agreement has been completely performed: see Chitty on Contracts (1994) 27th Edn., paras. 21-022 to 21-029.
(f) It is arguable whether the work of the Plaintiff was defective, and if so, whether the defective work was substantial or not substantial.
(g) If the agreement is not a "lump sum" contract, it is arguable whether the Defendants are entitled to a diminution of the charges and/or the counterclaim by reason of the alleged defective work of the Plaintiff.

9. I should mention that in coming to the conclusion of dismissing the appeal, I have taken into account the decisions and matters set out in pages 19G-21R of the transcript in the decision of Redland Concrete v. Hing Lee Construction, HCA 8140 of 1998.

10. For the above reasons, I agree with the Master and therefore dismiss the appeal with costs to the Defendants in any event.

(A. Chung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Representation:

Mr Raymond Tsui, inst'd by M/s Peter Mo & Co., for the Plaintiff/Appellant

1st Defendant in person, present

2nd Defendant in person, absent (authorizing the 1st Defendant as her representative at the hearing)