Cheung Pik Wan and Another v. Tong Sau Ping and Others

Case No.HCA 3867/1984[1986] HKLR 922

Court

High Court CFI

Date—

Judge—

Case Document

100%Judiciary

HCA003867/1984

1984, No. 3867

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

HIGH COURT

________

BETWEEN

	CHEUNG PIK WAN	1st Plaintiff
	SZE SIN YU	2nd Plaintiff
	and
	TONG SAU PING	1st Defendant
	NG CHI KEE ANDIX	2nd Defendant
	TEO BEE KHENG MICHELLE	3rd Defendant
	KWONG ON BANK LIMITED	4th Defendant

_____________

Coram: Hon. Hunter, J.

Dates of hearing: 10th, 11th, 14th-16th, 21st-23rd, April 1986.

Date of delivery of judgement: 23rd May 1986

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JUDGMENT

___________

1. This unfortunate case concerns the ownership of Flat 5, and the Flat Roof on the First Floor of Union Building, 160 Sha Tsui Road, Tsuen Wan (the flat). The 2nd plaintiff has taken no active part in the proceedings and I have seen no document explaining her presence. So I shall call the 1st plaintiff the plaintiff. The plaintiff seeks the avoidance of an assignment of the flat by the 1st defendant to the 2nd and 3rd defendants jointly dated 1st February 1982, and of the contemporaneous mortgage by the 2nd and 3rd defendants to the 4th defendant. The 1st defendant left for the United States when trouble broke and has taken no part in the suit. The 4th defendant has settled its dispute with the 2nd and 3rd defendants on financial terms, and has offered no active resistence to the plaintiff. What remains in issue is the ownership of the flat of which the 2nd and 3rd defendants claim to be bona fide purchasers for value without notice.

2. The basic facts are these. The plaintiff came to Hong Kong from Mainland China in 1964. She is illiterate: has received little or no education: and then spoke only her native Fu Chow dialect and no Cantonese. She worked and saved, and with such savings bought the flat on 30th January 1973. She married a seaman, who some years ago seems to have jumped ship in the U. S. A. Their children likewise went to the U.S.A. in circumstances not fully explained. In 1978 she resolved to try to visit the United States in order to see them.

3. She was introduced to a travel agency, Mayfair Enterprises Co. at 554/556 Nathan Road. This was run by the late Lo Cho Lim (Lo) and his 2nd wife, the 1st defendant. Lo and the 2nd defendant are half brothers, being respectively the children of their mother's 1st and 2nd marriages. To comp1ste the relationships, the 3rd defendant is an English speaking Chinese woman from Singapore who married the 2nd defendant on 2nd April 1982.

4. It was bluntly suggested to the plaintiff in cross-examination by counsel for the 2nd and 3rd defendants, that she went to this agency in the hope and expectation that it would procure her illegal entry into the U.S.A. This she denied. The 2nd defendant returned to Hong Kong in March/April 1979, having comp1sted his education in England by graduating with a degree in Applied Economics. He was unable to find a regular employment as a teacher until November 1980. During the intervening period (save for one specific tour) he denied that he had worked for the agency. But it is clear that he spent a good deal of his time there 'helping out' and must have learnt much about it. He also denied that the agency was indulging in illegal activities, and that this suggestion had been put on his instructions. Beyond noting that the agency in fact later procured, unknown to her, the entry of plaintiff illegally into the U.S., I must take it that its business was basically legitimate.

5. The basic history of the flat and of the parties' dealings with it following the plaintiff's introduction to the 1st defendant was never seriously in issue and the main events in the story can be summarised as follows:-

(1)	At all material times the flat was sub-divided into three or four units. When she was in Hong Kong the plaintiff lived in one. The others she sub-1st to her relatives and friends.
(2)	The title deeds to the flat, consisting of a bundle, of documents up to and including the assignment to the plaintiff, were normally kept by the plaintiff in her safe deposit box.
(3)	She handed these deeds to the 1st defendant at her request on two occasions. The first was shortly after the introduction in 1978. They were later returned. The second was in 1979 when they were not.
(4)	On 11th September 1979 at the Kowloon office of Messrs Gallant Y.T. Ho (the solicitors) she executed a Power of Attorney in favour of the 1st defendant.
(5)	In its preamble, this power is described as one to 'manage and deal with my landed property' identified as the flat. The first fourteen numbered paragraphs answer this description. But these are followed by a group of unnumbered paragraphs which go far beyond and falsify it. They include unqualified and unrestricted powers to sell and to borrow, including borrowing for the donee's own purposes. The implications of these powers to the donor and the need for clear acceptance and understanding by her is obvious. I am unable to accept the suggestion that the clauses speak for themselves in any language.
(6)	At no time thereafter did the 1st defendant as donee openly exercise, or attempt to exercise, any power of management over this flat. When she was in Hong Kong the flat was managed and the rent collected by the plaintiff. When she was in the United States the same functions were performed by her niece who also resided in the flat. No occupant was ever made aware of the 1st defendant's existence or alleged status.
(7)	On 21st September 1979 the solicitors received the Power of Attorney back. It came from the Kwangtong Provincial Bank with instructions to them to prepare a mortgage of the property in its favour to secure the 1st defendant's borrowings.
(8)	On 27th September 1979 in purported exercise of her power under the Power of Attorney, the 1st defendant used the plaintiff's name to guarantee her personal banking obligations to the said bank, and mortgaged the flat as security for general banking facilities then put at $100,000.
(9)	On 1st January 1981 the 1st defendant escorted the plaintiff to the United States. On the eve of her departure Lo and the 1st defendant handed a bundle of papers to her which they called her title deeds. The true deeds were then of course in the possession of the bank. Those which the plaintiff received and believed to be genuine were probably photostat copies. They are said still to be in the possession of the Police, and were not produced in evidence.
(10)	On 30th December 1981 the 2nd and 3rd defendants signed, in their solicitor's office, the following documents:-
(i)	A receipt addressed to their bankers, the 4th defendant, acknowledging the receipt of a loan of $130,000 on the security of the flat.
(ii)	A confirmation that the flat was sold to them 'with vacant possession'.
(iii)	In escrow, together with the 1st defendant as attorney, an assignment of the flat from the plaintiff to themselves. This assignment was expressed to be made in performance of an agreement to sell the flat for $240,000. The receipt of this sum was expressly acknowledged. The document was delivered as a deed on and dated 1st February 1982.
(iv)	Also in escrow a mortgage of the flat to the 4th defendant to secure the said loan. This was delivered and dated 9th February.
(v)	A statutory declaration, later dated 9th February, made for the purposes of section 5(4)(b) of the Powers of Attorney Ordinance (Cap. 31) that they were unaware of the revocation of the Power of Attorney.
(11)	Between 30th December and 1st February the monies loaned by the 4th defendant were used to discharge the then indebtedness of the 1st defendant to the Kwangtong Provincial Bank and procure the re-assignment of the flat by that bank.
(12)	The execution of these documents in 1982 has as yet had no effect upon the occupancy of the flat. Those who were 1st into possession by the plaintiff or her niece remain in possession, and have throughout paid their rent directly or indirectly to the plaintiff.
(13)	In November 1983 the 2nd defendant made his first visit to the flat and learnt directly for the first time of the existence and position of these occupants. On 30th March 1984 the 2nd and 3rd defendants launched possession proceedings in the Tsuen Wan District Court to which all the occupants were eventually joined. These were withdrawn on 6th September 1984 having regard (inter alia) to this action.
(14)	Consequent upon the 2nd defendant's visit and these proceedings the plaintiff became aware of the assignment to the 2nd and 3rd defendants and of the existence of the Power of Attorney.

6. In these circumstances the issues of fact and law which arise for determination and which I will consider in turn can be formulated as follows:-

(1)

Was the plaintiff induced to part with possession of her title deeds by the fraud of the 1st defendant, and if so was the 2nd defendant party to such fraud?

(2)

Has the plaintiff established her plea of non est factum in relation to the Power of Attorney?

(3)

Were the 2nd and 3rd defendants bona fide purchasers of the flat for valuable consideration?

1. Fraud

7. I have no doubt at all that the 1st defendant was fraudulent. I think she recognized the plaintiff as a simple uneducated woman, who was isolated by her illiteracy and very limited ability to understand or to make herself understood in Cantonese. She could readily be influenced or imposed upon. The 1st defendant and Lo had, I think, little difficulty in persuading the plaintiff initially to part with her deeds upon the pretext that they were needed to demonstrate her wealth and good standing to the United States Immigration Authorities. These deeds represented to the plaintiff her life savings and her future security. In parting with them I suspect that she made clear to the 1st defendant both her simplicity and gullibility, her apprehensions and the deeds' value. I am satisfied that the 1st defendant obtained possession of the deeds on the second occasion on the simple excuse that they were needed to 'process' the plaintiff's application and would be carefully preserved and returned. There was no truth in this. In reality the 1st defendant's intention was to use them to obtain money for herself. The speed with which she took the comp1sted Power to her bankers: and the total absence of any need for such a Power, and of any attempt to make legitimate use of it really speak for themselves.

8. Conversely there is no evidence directly to implicate the 2nd defendant in this fraud. I think during his period of unemployment he was much closer to the agency than he admitted. I further find that he in fact drove both the plaintiff and the 1st defendant to the airport on 1st January 1981 because on his mother's evidence there was ample time for him to do that and to visit his father's grave. But association with the business, and with this particular fraud, are two very different things.

2. Non est factum

9. This raises difficult questions of fact and the law. On the facts there was a comp1ste conflict between the evidence of the plaintiff and of the three members of the solicitors' firm who were concerned with the preparation and execution of the Power of Attorney. This has not been easy to resolve. The plaintiff made a mixed impression in the witness box. I did not doubt the truth of the hard core of her evidence, but her palpable anxiety and limited experience and education, raised some serious questions on points of detail. To the members of the firm this was a piece of transient business conducted seven years ago. None had, nor could be expected to have, any direct recollection. They were forced to try to reconstruct the events with the assistance of the file and their then usual practice. Counsel for the 2nd and 3rd defendants was unable in cross-examination of the plaintiff to start to canvass the full differences between the two accounts because lamentably no proper proofs were then in her possession. A lot of relevant questions were either not asked or misdirected.

10. The fundamental difference and conflict between the two accounts emerged as one of timing. The firm's account was that the whole operation occupied the best part of two hours on the day in question, 11th September, during the whole of which time two women said to be the plaintiff and the 1st defendant were present in the firm's offices. There were four stages to it namely:-

(1)	An interview with Louisa Li Ting Yick who took the client's instructions and prepared the manuscript note on the file. This gives the address of the flat: the plaintiff's name with the address of '554 Nathan Road, 13/F, Flat A, Kowloon': the 1st defendant's name and the same address, the 1st defendant's telephone number: and 'full power on property'. This latter phrase was based upon very inadequate investigation. The interview was said to have taken some twenty minutes.
(2)	Transfer to Ada So Wai Ching who typed up the document answering she thought the 'full power' description and then explained it. I use that word deliberately in preference to translate, because she said she did this not word for word but sentence by sentence, adding that she explained the meaning or gist of the sentence. She estimated that this process would have occupied about one hour.
(3)	Execution of the document before the solicitor Kwan Man Kwong. This was a formal occasion occuping only a 'matter of minutes'. It took no longer than was necessary to obtain the signatures on the plaintiff, the 1st defendant, the attesting solicitor, and Miss So.
(4)	After execution the document was delivered to the messengers' department for sealing and it then passed to the accounts department for preparation of a bill. It is estimated that not less than 15 minutes would have passed before the document and bill were ready for collection.

11. By contrast the plaintiff's account corresponded with this in time and content only at Stage 3. She said that she was persuaded to agree to sign what the 1st defendant called a 1stter of guarantee, which was to ensure that when all the procedures associated with her trip were comp1sted her documents would be returned to her. This was at the agency. She then accompanied the 1st defendant to an office across the road where she remembered seeing a man behind a desk in his office who must have been Mr kwan, the solicitor. A piece of paper, by which she later showed she meant a document similar to the Power of Attorney folded so that the last page was exposed, was put before her which she signed. There was little or no conversation with the man: and she was emphatic in rejecting any suggestion of receiving any explanation or translation from a woman. Shortly after this she left without recollecting seeing anyone else sign and leaving the 1st defendant behind.

12. Upon a consideration of the whole evidence I have, for a number of reasons, reached the conclusion that the plaintiff is right when she says that she was in this office basically for the brief period of execution only. First, this whole affair was being stage managed by the 1st defendant, and this is exactly what she would want to bring about. She would wish to reduce to a minimum the chances of the plaintiff discovering the true nature of the document. Secondly both Miss Li and Miss So conducted their conversations in Cantonese. The bulk of these must have been beyond the plaintiff's understanding. In particular any sort of translation or explanation of a document as complex as this would have been valueless to her in Cantonese. If the plaintiff had attempted to speak to them in Cantonese she must, I think, have revealed her Fu Chow dialect and limited understanding. But very unfortunately this did not happen. I am not persuaded that the ladies' reconstructed recollection is right when they say they receive instructions from and spoke to not the 1st defendant alone, but the plaintiff and the 1st defendant together. They were conscious they said of the importance of receiving the plaintiff's instructions as donor and of her understanding the contents of the document. I simply do not see how this could have happened in fact either with the plaintiff being totally silent or without her dialect being revealed.

13. Thirdly it is not, I think, without significance that all the information recorded in Miss Li's memorandum could have come from the 1st defendant alone and from the deeds she then had in her possession. The falsity of the plaintiff's recorded address is significant. Miss Li said that this came from the 1st defendant. I accept that, but I cannot believe that at the time she regarded this as an accommodation address for the plaintiff but as a residential address for the 1st defendant. The giving of this address by the 1st defendant is calculated to have involved the use of comparatively simply Cantonese which the plaintiff might have understood. This suggests to my mind that she was not there to hear it, and the presence of this address in the memorandum and later in the Power of Attorney points to lack of understanding on the plaintiff's part. Fourthly the Power of Attorney itself and the solicitor's account were, I am sure, taken and kept, and the latter paid, by the 1st defendant. This is consistent with the plaintiff's account of leaving at the end of Stage 3.

14. On the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied that when the plaintiff put her signature upon this Power of Attorney, which she could not read, she had no idea of its true contents because she had given no instructions for its preparation and had received no translation or explanation she could understand. By reason of the fraud of the 1st defendant, whom she then trusted, she thought she was doing no more than signing a document which safeguarded the future return of her documents. I am therefore satisfied that the first essential ingredient in a plea of non est factum as set out in Gallie v. Lee (1971) AC 1004 is made out, because the document she signed bore no relation at all to that which she thought that she was signing. In the words of Lord Wilberforce: 'the element of consent to it is totally lacking'. p. 1026.

15. This brings me to the much more difficult question which Lord Wilberforce describes as the laws 'dilemma' when it is faced with persons who are 'illiterate or blind or lacking in understanding' p. 1027. His conclusion is that: 'the law ought ....... to give relief if satisfied that consent was truly lacking but will require of signers even in this class that they act responsibility and carefully according to their circumstances (my emphasis) in putting their signature to legal documents'. The narrowness of this plea has frequently been emphasized. This limitation readily defeats the man who could have read the document but in fact chooses or fails to do so: Avon Finance Co. Limited v. Bridger (a 1979 decision) (1985) 2 All E.R. 281. It might also operate against a blind man who spoke the same language as the draftsman or proferor of the document, but chooses to ask no questions. I have to consider this question of carelessness in a very particular context, which I suspect was not remotely in their Lordship's minds, of the doubly disabled lady who could neither read the document nor understand the draftsman's Cantonese. Was she careless in failing to make any real inquiry of anyone other than the 1st defendant? Was she careless in trusting the 1st defendant and in allowing herself to be guided solely by her?

16. In Gallie v. Lee Lord Pearson approved two directions to juries given in 19th century cases, p. 1037. First in Vorley v. Cooke (1857) 1 Giffard 230, 236-237, Stuart V-C said: "He was deceived, as anyone with the ordinary amount of intelligence and caution would have been deceived, and he is therefore entitled to be relieved". In Lewis v. Clay (1898) 67 L.J.Q.B. 224, 225, Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. left this question to the jury : "Was the defendant, in signing his name as he did, recklessly careless, and did he thereby enable Lord W.N. to perpetrate the fraud?" It is my belief that a jury so directed here would conclude that it was not careless, or 'recklessly careless' of this plaintiff to be deceived by the 1st defendant, and I so hold.

17. It follows in my judgement that this plea succeeds and that both the Power of Attorney and the assignment of 1st February 1982 are void. Although this conclusion suffices for the determination of this case, I think it right to proceed to express my views upon the last question.

3. Bona fide purchase

18. Notwithstanding my finding that the 1st defendant procured the execution of the Power of Attorney by fraud, the document would then be voidable only, and the assignment of 1st February 1982 to the 2nd and 3rd defendants would be valid if they were bona fide purchasers for value. They plainly gave value by their discharge of the Kwangtong Provincial Bank mortgage out of their borrowings from the 4th defendant. What is in issue is their bona fides. More particularly what is in issue is the bona fides of the 2nd defendant. The 3rd defendant left all arrangements to him and he throughout was dealing with the matter for both. Notice to him is notice to both. An inquiry into bona fides here raises not only the absence of notice; "genuine and honest absence of notice" but the whole conscience of the buyers, per Lord Wilberforce in Midland Bank Trust v. Green (1981) AC 513, 528.

19. Having very carefully considered the whole of the evidence I have reached the conclusion that the 2nd and 3rd defendants cannot be regarded as bona fide purchasers and I so hold. I shall now attempt as shortly as I can to summarise my reasons for so concluding.

1.	This was by no means a normal or arm's length transaction. The initial agreement was said to be made between the half brothers Lo and the 2nd defendant. Lo named a price and the 2nd defendant accepted it without any inspection or further investigation or inquiry. The 2nd defendant very soon discovered that the vendor was not to be his brother, as he at first thought, but the 1st defendant acting under a Power of Attorney; and that she had borrowed large sums of money on the security of the property. The 2nd defendant was very familiar with the agency and with the living standards of Lo and the 1st defendant at their flat there. I accept his denial that he did not associate the plaintiff's name on the Power with the lady he had met more than once at the agency. But his assertion that at the outset he chose to ask no questions as to how this Power and this borrowing had come about I find remarkable. If it is true, which I doubt, he started by refusing to ask the obvious.
2.	The 2nd defendant knew from the outset that the flat was occupied by someone whom he said was described to him by the 1st defendant as "one of the nieces of the previous owner". Both defendants knew that the statement they made to the fourth Defendant on 30th December 1981 was something to which it attached importance but was not, in fact, true. They were not buying and had not bought with actual vacant possession: at most only with an assurance of future possession.
3.	Neither defendant inspected the premises. There is an ancient principle expressed by Lord Loughborough L. C. in Taylor v. Stibbert (1794) 2 Ves Jun 437, 439-40, which was cited with approval by Lord Wilberforce in Williams and Glyn's Bank v. Boland (1981) A.C. 487, 504 that: "It was sufficient to put the purchaser upon inquiry that he was informed, that the estate was not in the actual possession of the person with whom he contracted:-that he could not transfer ownership and possession at the same time: that there were interests, as to the extent and terms of which it was his duty to inquire (my emphases)". This case vividly illustrates the common sense of this principle. When the 2nd defendant eventually inspected in November 1983 he at once discovered facts which led directly to the plaintiff. He admitted that if he had learnt earlier what this visit revealed he would never have bought. He can hardly complain if the law attributes to him the knowledge he could so readily have acquired at the proper time.
4.	The whole history of lack of inspection and the use of this flat between November 1981 and November 1983 is unbelievable, and in my view, not reconcilable with a bona fide purchase with vacant possession. The flat was bought on the 1st February 1982 to provide a matrimonial home and the wedding was celebrated on 2nd April. It was never so used. Husband and wife continued to live apart, and the 2nd defendant did no more than remonstrate orally with Lo and the 1st defendant. By the first anniversary of their wedding the 3rd defendant had had enough. Having failed to get explanation or action out of the 2nd defendant she returned in despair to her family in Singapore. This forced a response from the 2nd defendant. But this was not to press for possession of the flat: but to take in June 1983 a 2-year lease of another flat. Then, when consequent upon his visit in November he learnt that he and his wife had been grossly misled, if only as to possession, by his brother and the 1st defendant, he said that he did not even speak to his brother. To me the only credible explanation for such behaviour is that the 2nd defendant was all along aware that the 1st defendant could not give possession.
5.	The assignment purports to record the payment of a purchase price of $240,000. But beyond the money borrowed from the 4th defendant, there is no single piece of paper, no entry in any of the parties' bank accounts, recording or evidencing any further payment. I have been told that various sums, all in cash, and in many different currencies, were paid over the period November 1981 to October 1982 in three tranches.
	(i)	November/December 1981

(a)

£4,000 in English £20 notes brought back from England by the 2nd defendant in April 1979, placed in a brown envelope with a string fastener, kept in safe-keeping by his mother, unopened, allegedly (to him) in her safe deposit box but in fact in their flat: not invested by the 2nd defendant in his saving account or otherwise: or touched by him during his 18 months unemployment when he was living upon and allegedly receiving pocket money from his mother together with the gift of a motor car. She in turn was being supported by intermittent remittances from two other sons living abroad.

(b)

What was first said to be about HK$20,000, but which during the hearing firmed into HK$22,000, borrowed by mother from a form of mutual loan or Chit Fund Association in December 1981 and then handed to the 2nd defendant. There are conflicting entries about this in the loan card, and no other record and no repayment.

(ii)

Early 1982. Foreign currency savings in numerous different currencies accumulated by the 3rd defendant from unspent allowances and kept by her in a drawer at the Y.M.C.A. She declined to put an estimate on the value in Hong Kong dollars. This was put by the 2nd defendant first at $30,000 and then at $20,000. There was no record of currencies, amounts or exchange rates.

(iii)

October 1982- This date is the more remarkable having regard to the failure to give possession. The 2nd defendant says he paid $19,000, the whole proceeds of the sale of "his" motor car into a named account at a named bank at Lo's direction. Again no supporting entry was produced.

20. I am not satisfied by this evidence. I do not accept that this sale was agreed at $240,000. I think it was probably agreed at a sum very much closer to that required to discharge the 1st defendant's liability under the first mortgage. It was a considerable benefit to her to be relieved of this liability. Why the 2nd defendant took the risk of this transaction I do not know. The flat was cheap, and he may perhaps have believed that which he later asserted in an affirmation in the District Court proceedings dated 16th July 1984, namely that the statutory declaration and section 5(4) of the Powers of Attorney Ordinance combined to operate "conclusively" in his favour.

21. Accordingly in my judgement this defence fails. I will hear counsel upon the appropriate relief.

22. I cannot leave this case without referring to procedure. When it was first called on three bundles of documents were handed in labelled respectively plaintiff's documents, 2nd and 3rd defendant's documents and 4th defendant's documents. The defendants' bundles were each substantial and there was massive duplication between them. Each bundle was differently put together. None, as I recollect it, was done properly, namely, simply and consistently in chronological order.

23. The court should not have repeatedly to have to emphasize that it is the duty of all solicitors concerned in a case to co-operate in the preparation before the hearing of one single bundle (if necessary in more than one part) containing all documents, the authenticity of which is not in dispute, and assembled in chronological order. This simple mechanical exercise is a practical necessity, because almost invariably it leads to a quicker understanding and resolution of the problem, and therefore to a saving in costs.

24. The duty in this case was wholly ignored. Counsel's opening with three different bundles was made very difficult: the calling of evidence which involved sensible reference to documents was impossible. I then made two orders:

(i)

I disallowed all costs incurred by all the solicitors in the preparation of these three separate bundles. This means that no costs are to be recoverable from any party including the solicitor's own clients.

(ii)

I adjourned the hearing to enable a single chronological bundle to be prepared. In the event, this occupied the rest of that day.

25. On the second day I was presented with a single composite bundle. Duplicates had been removed from this, but unbelievably no one had started to assemble the residue in chronological order. The solicitors concerned had either not listened to or not understood what had been said on the first day; and counsel had apparently made no contribution. Thereafter everybody had to suffer the considerable inconvenience of this bundle for the rest of the trial. In these circumstances, the first day's costs were thrown away to very little purpose. The least I can do is likewise to disallow all costs incurred in the preparation of this composite bundle. But I wish to make it clear that should this occur again I shall seriously consider ordering those responsible personally to pay the costs thrown away.

26. This may be symptomatic of a deeper problem. This was a running list case. The documentation was not the only manifestation of lack of proper preparation and readiness for trial. Nor was this an isolated example. I do respectfully urge the professions to address themselves to the problems of running list cases coming on for trial in a state which is no credit to them or fair to the litigants.

(D. S. Hunter)

Judge of the High Court

Representation:

Mr. Wesley Wong instructed by M/S Wing Sum Lo & Co. for Plaintiffs.

1st Defendant absent.

Miss Sze Kin instructed by M/S Howell & Lo for 2nd and 3rd Defendants.

Mr. K.M. Chong instructed by M/S Alfred Lau & Co. for 4th Defendant.

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