Ng Kam Chou v. Chung Yoi Chiu and Antoher
Read the full judgment text of HCA 968/1978 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. This is a running down case in which the plaintiff sues the 1st defendant as driver and the 2nd defendant as owner of a private vehicle registration number AN1331 as a result of a collision outside 635 King's Road when he was knocked down and severely injured. The accident occurred on the 8th of March 1974 at 12.10 p.m. in the early hours of the morning. It is specifically pleaded that the plaintiff was at the material time crossing King's Road from north to south along the stud crossing whic
|
HCA000968/1978
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG HIGH COURT -----------------
----------------- Coram: Mr Commissioner Hooper in Court Date of Judgment: 28th March 1980. ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- 1. This is a running down case in which the plaintiff sues the 1st defendant as driver and the 2nd defendant as owner of a private vehicle registration number AN1331 as a result of a collision outside 635 King's Road when he was knocked down and severely injured. The accident occurred on the 8th of March 1974 at 12.10 p.m. in the early hours of the morning. It is specifically pleaded that the plaintiff was at the material time crossing King's Road from north to south along the stud crossing which is outside number 635 King's Road. The usual particulars of negligence are set out. 2. Save that a collision occurred between the plaintiff and this vehicle, which it is admitted was driven by the 1st defendant as servant or agent of the 2nd defendant on the date and place stated in the pleadings, the defendants in their Defence deny the plaintiff's claim and maintain that the plaintiff suddenly dashed out from the pavement across the road. They allege that the 1st defendant immediately pressed the horn, applied the brakes and swerved the vehicle to the right but could not avoid hitting the plaintiff. There is also the usual allegation that the accident was caused and/or wholly contributed to by the negligence of the plaintiff himself, and the usual particulars of negligence are set out. Liability 3. Only one witness gave evidence in these proceedings and that was the plaintiff himself. He testified that he had come out of the building on the corner of the junction of King's Road and Healthy Street East and that it was his intention to cross to the other side of King's Road. There was only one place where he could cross the road and this was the stud crossing right at the entrance or exit to the building referred to. That stud crossing is the one on the western side of Healthy Street East. Having come to the junction of Healthy Street East and King's Road he stood at the side of the road by the kerb. He looked to his right in the direction of Central and then moved his eyes in the direction of Shaukiwan. He saw no traffic coming from Central, but he saw a mini-bus far away going in the direction of Central. The "small lights" were on. By this he presumably means the side lights. He saw that it was about to stop. Having found that there was nothing coming from the direction of Central he crossed the road and was then struck by a motor car and lost consciousness. It is common ground that that car was the 2nd defendant's car which was proceeding in an easterly direction. The plaintiff also testified that no street lights were on at the time because it was a save fuel period and furthermore that no traffic lights had been erected at this location. Under cross-examination, after it had been established that he lived in Western District, and that he would sometimes take a mini-bus home when the trams were no longer running it was suggested to him that he was in a hurry to catch the mini-bus on the other side of the road. This he denied saying "I did not have to do it". When it was suggested to him that he was interested in the mini-bus because it was heading towards Central he replied "I did not have that in my mind". It was further suggested that he did not, in fact, use the stud crossing but he replied "That was the only place I could cross the road". It was also suggested to him that he simply dashed across the road to which he replied "Even if I did, that would not be the position. It would be along the crossing." Finally when amongst other things it was put to him that it was because he dashed into the road all of a sudden that the accident occurred he replied "That should not be so". 4. The effect of his answers therefore was that he did not have to hurry to catch the mini-bus, he did not have it in mind that the mini-bus was heading towards Central, he did use the stud crossing because it was the only place he could cross the road, even if he did dash across the road it would be on the crossing and that should not be the case in any event. 5. It is surprising that it should have been put to the plaintiff that he did not use the stud crossing, because that is the place where the plaintiff has pleaded that the accident occurred and the defendants in their amended Defence have admitted that the accident took place on the date and place stated therein. Furthermore the sketch Exhibit P1 which was put in by agreement is not inconsistent with that contention and is indicative of the fact that the plaintiff was carried some distance before falling to the ground at position 'X' and the car came to a stop at the position shown on the other side of the junction. In any event no witness was called for the defence and there is no evidence to contradict the plaintiff's assertion. There is no evidence from the defence to establish that the plaintiff did dash out across the road, but on the contrary there is the evidence of the plaintiff that that should not have been the case which certainly does not amount to an admission. There is thus no evidence to establish that the plaintiff did dash across the road. I find as a fact that the plaintiff did cross the road at the pedestrian stud crossing on the western side of Healthy Street East and in the absence of evidence to the contrary I find that he did not dash across the road as alleged by the Defence. 6. I have reached the conclusion that both parties were negligent and their negligence was a direct cause of the accident. I do, however, find that the negligence of the plaintiff was minor compared with that of the defendant. 7. The effect of stud crossings has been dealt with by this Court on a number of occasions. The leading authority is the judgment of the Learned Chief Justice in Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1978 in which he said -
8. He then went on to quote from the judgment in Ngai Yuk-kwong v. Cham Kam Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1977 and went on to say -
9. The plaintiff in this case was undoubtedly negligent in that he did not at any stage notice the defendant's vehicle on the road. Had he been paying proper attention he must have seen this vehicle, especially at night time if the lights were on. The defendant on the other hand was obviously negligent in that he failed to see the pedestrian on the stud crossing. The evidence was that there were no street lights as it was a save fuel period, which means that the defendant should have been driving with his headlamps full on. That being the case he should have been aware of the stud crossing and he should have approached it with considerable care. Furthermore, since the plaintiff must have crossed at least two-thirds of the east-bound carriageway before being struck, the defendant could not have been paying attention at all, for otherwise one cannot see how he could have failed to have seen the pedestrian. Furthermore, there were no skid marks to indicate that the defendant took any emergency measures to avoid the accident. 10. I hold that the plaintiff was 20% to blame and the defendant was 80% to blame. Quantum Special Damages 11. These have been agreed at $12,850. General Damages 12. The report of Dr R. G. M. Wedderburn (Exh. P2) was admitted in the Court as an agreed exhibit. It reveals that after the accident on the 8th of March 1974 the plaintiff had concussion and was at first treated in the General Surgical Unit at the Queen Mary Hospital and subsequently transferred to the Orthopaedic Unit on the 10th of March 1974. He only has one symptom, post-concussional in nature, which is vertigo or dizziness. He was off work for two years (this has been amended by agreement between the parties to one year) and started to work in the Urban Council library but he resigned from this because of attacks of vertigo, but 18 months ago he joined Tai Chong Motors as a clerk in the accounts department. He has only been off work on five different days in the last 18 months because of the vertigo although he sometimes gets it at work but he says the Company Doctor gives him medicine which gives him relief rapidly. The attacks of vertigo are becoming less frequent and less severe and are likely to disappear completely or only occur once or twice a year in the future. There have been no episodes suggestive of post-traumatic Epilepsy. 13. The report goes on -
In fact, the plaintiff was off work for only one year so that it would appear that the time that he was off work was more than reasonable. 14. The report continues -
15. Dr Wedderburn finally concludes his report with the following paragraph -
Loss of Future Earnings 16. Although Mr Pirie has asked the Court to award damages for this I do not think that it is appropriate to do so. There is no difference between his pre-accident employment earnings and his post-accident employment earnings despite the fact that he has been off work on five different days during the last 18 months because of the vertigo and dizziness. The evidence of Dr Wedderburn as contained in his report indicates that these attacks of vertigo are becoming less frequent and less severe and are likely to disappear completely or only occur once or twice a year in the future. The chances of his losing earnings as a result of them are therefore extremely slim and I do not think I should take them into consideration. I will award nothing under this head. Pain, Suffering and Loss of Amenities 17. The plaintiff is obviously entitled to a substantial award under this head. I consider also that the dizziness or vertigo which he has suffered and is likely to suffer in the future is a matter which can be properly assessed under this head. 18. I have been referred to three cases -
In the first case damages for pain suffering and loss of amenities were assessed at $45,000, in the second at $30,000 and in the third $45,000. The injuries in the first case were less severe and the pain and suffering would have been less but the residual injuries were worse. In the second case there would be a shorter period of hospitalization but some residual disability. The pain and suffering, however, would have been less than in the present case. In the third case there were no injuries to the hips but again the residual injuries would have been more severe and would have affected him more as he was a farmer. 19. Taking all things into consideration as set out in the report of Dr Wedderburn and also the evidence of the plaintiff himself to the effect that his main discomfort lies now with his head in that he suffers from dizziness I assess and award damages at $40,000 under this head. 20. There will, therefore, be judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $12,850 Special Damages and $40,000 General Damages less 20% to reflect the contributory negligence of the plaintiff himself. Interest 21. As I was not addressed on this matter I will now hear counsel.
Representation: Mr Nicholas Pirie instructed by Hoosen & Co. for the plaintiff Mr Freddie Lee instructed by W. S. Lo & Co. for the defendants |