Sim Hok Gwan v. Tin Tin Yat Po Ltd and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCA 287/1979 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. The plaintiff claims damages for libel contained in two articles, which appeared in the Chinese language in the Tin Tin Yat Po on 8th and 9th January, 1979.
Cited by 2 cases
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HCA000287/1979
----------------- Coram: Roberts, C.J. Date of Judgment: 9th March, 1981 ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- Preliminary 1. The plaintiff claims damages for libel contained in two articles, which appeared in the Chinese language in the Tin Tin Yat Po on 8th and 9th January, 1979. 2. The first defendant is the proprietor, printer and publisher of that newspaper. The second defendant was the editor of that newspaper on the date of publication of the articles complained of. 3. The full Chinese texts of these articles were annexed to the Statement of Claim. Certified translations of the articles were similarly annexed at pages 11 to 14 and 18 to 19 of the bundle of pleadings. 4. Mr. HSU Cheng-chun, a court translator, who had prepared these translations, when questioned by Mr. Wei, for the defendants, as to their accuracy, agreed to a number of amendments. These were incorporated in a fresh translation, which was accepted as accurate by both parties and was put in evidence as Exhibit D2. It is to this translation that I shall refer throughout my judgment. 5. The defendants admitted publication of the two articles, but denied that the words bore, or were capable of bearing, a defamatory meaning, or that they had published them of the plaintiff. In their defence they also pleaded justification of the allegations contained in the articles. 6. However, by virtue of an order, dated 2nd February, 1981, and made by a judge in Chambers, this defence was restricted to the allegations relating to Mrs. CHOI Yee-wan. The defence was amended accordingly on 13th February, 1981. 7. But at the outset of the hearing, counsel for the defendants announced that the defence of justification was now wholly withdrawn. Background 8. The plaintiff was born in Indonesia in 1939, where he was educated to the age of 18. He then received medical training in West Germany, where he qualified as a doctor at the University of Koln. After 5 years' service in German hospitals he went to the United Kingdom. Here he obtained the diploma of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists in December 1973 and became a member of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (M.R.C.O.G.) in July 1978. 9. After holding general appointments as a house-officer in Germany and England, he served as house-officer or registrar in the gynaecological and obstetric wards of varous hospitals in Britain from October 1972 until October 1978, when he came to Hong Kong, because of the serious illness of his mother. 10. Soon after his arrival, he was appointed as acting Senior Medical Officer at the Caritas Medical Centre (C.M.C.) in Shum Shui Po with effect from 23rd October 1978, for an initial trial period of three months, at the end of which his terms of appointment would be reviewed. (The letter of appointment referred to six months but according to Dr. Sim he was told verbally that three months was the intended trial period). There was provision for termination by three months' notice or one month's salary in lieu of notice, on either side. 11. In January 1979, his trial period was extended for six months from 23rd January, 1979. In July 1979, he was offered appointment on permanent or contract terms. In September 1979, he accepted appointment on contract terms and continued to work at C.M.C. until August 1980, when he entered private practice. 12. He stated, in evidence, that he regarded himself as a competent gynaecologist and obstetrician and that he estimated that he had delivered about 1,000 babies, many of which deliveries had involved complications. 13. I found Dr. Sim a good witness, who was careful and straightforward in his answers. He did not exaggerate or show emotion. I accept his evidence as accurate. Are the articles defamatory? 14. It is for the plaintiff to establish that the words complained of are defamatory. The classic test, as set out by Lord Atkin in Sim v. Stretch(1) is whether the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally. 15. The question of whether words are defamatory will depend to some degree on the occupation of the plaintiff. As a matter of common-sense, it would not be defamatory of a professional footballer to say that he is not fit to fly an aeroplane, though it would be of a professional pilot. 16. In general, it is defamatory to impute to a professional man a lack of knowledge, skill, judgment or efficiency in the conduct of his professional activities. (Drummond-Jackson v. British Medical Association(2)). This may be said to apply particularly to a doctor, on whose competence the lives of others so often depend. 17. I have to decide whether, bearing these principles in mind, the plaintiff has established that the "natural and ordinary meaning" of the words is defamatory in the manner alleged in the Statement of Claim. To determine the natural and ordinary meaning, I should ascribe to the words the meaning which I consider they would convey to ordinary reasonable persons using their general common-sense, taking into account both the literal meaning of the words and any inference or innuendo which can reasonably be drawn from them. Article of 8th January, 1979 18. Are there any passages in the first article, P.1, published in the Tin Tin Yat Po on 8th January, 1979, which are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning? I think that there are several which must be examined with this possibility in mind. (a) The headlines read as follows -
19. The word "bungled" suggests a substantial degree of carelessness. I find that, reading the headlines as a whole, a reasonable reader would draw the inference that it was the bungling of the obstetrician which caused the death of two babies and injuries to two others. 20. As a matter of common-sense, weight should be given to the likelihood that headlines have a greater impact than the body of a text, as they are intended to. They can be described as underlining those parts of the following article which the newspaper regards as its salient features. (b) The first sentence states that an anonymous letter had disclosed that "dereliction of duty on the part of an obstetrician of the Centre had caused the bursting of the cerebral blood vessels of the four new born babies, who would probably become imbecile". 21. "Dereliction of duty" in the ordinary meaning of the phrase denotes, in its content, substantial carelessness on the part of the obstetrician, a carelessness which was responsible for causing severe injuries to four babies. 22. This assertion is qualified by a later passage in the same paragraph which describes how a reporter, after conducting an "in-depth investigation", had discovered that two of these babies had died, that one was in a critical condition and that one had recovered. The article, therefore, is asserting that the anonymous letter, as quoted at the top of the first paragraph was substantially true. 23. I observe also that the anonymous letter was said to be from a doctor in the Caritas Medical Centre, which the ordinary reader might think gave the allegation a degree of authenticity. (c) The article avers that the reporter met several doctors in the Centre and "gained the impression that they were critical of the obstetrician's conduct and consider it necessary for the Medical Centre to take disciplinary action". 24. There is another reference to "disciplinary action" in the headline "Caritas Medical Centre has not yet taken disciplinary action". The word "yet" suggests that there has, at the very least, been conduct which should be the subject of disciplinary proceedings. The quotation of the supposed views of other doctors must mean that his conduct had attracted the censure of his colleagues. (d) The article describes how "a pregnant woman recently had her bladder cut through while undergoing a Caesarian operation and now is still waiting for a mending operation. However, the woman reportedly has only a slim chance of success and may suffer from the incontinence of urine for life." 25. In the next paragraph, the doctor who was responsible for this was identified as the same doctor who had dealt with the four babies. 26. The woman is described as "no longer capable of bearing children". 27. At the end of the article, the husband is said to describe what happened as "an accident". Clearly it was, since no surgeon would intentionally cause such an injury; but I do not think that the use of the word weakens the general impression given by the article that the puncture of his wife's bladder was caused by the carelessness of the obstetrician. (e) The hospital is said, in the second paragraph, to have taken the matter so seriously that it had adopted "emergency measures", whereby expectant mothers would be attended by a paediatrician if difficult labour was expected. The inference to be drawn is that these measures were necessary because the hospital did not trust the obstetrician. 28. In my judgment, those parts of the article to which I have referred are capable of bearing, and do bear, a defamatory meaning. Nothing in the article, read as a whole, tempers this construction. 29. I find that the natural and ordinary meaning which the article would convey to reasonable persons would be that an obstetrician at the Caritas Medical Centre had carried out his professional duties as such in so negligent a manner as to cause the death of two babies, severe injury to two others, and permanent damage to Mrs. Choi. Also that his colleagues were critical of his conduct and that disciplinary proceedings should be taken against him by the hospital. 30. I am also satisfied that an obstetrician described in these terms would be lowered in the estimation of right-thinking members of society and that the plaintiff has therefore established that the first article is defamatory. Article of 9th January, 1979 31. In considering the second article of the 9th January, I must approach its interpretation as if it were a separate publication, unconnected with the first, unless there is some reference within the second article which relates it to the first and adopts or repeats such defamatory words as appear therein. I find no such link. 32. The main passages in the second article which should be examined are - (a) The headlines which read -
33. The effect of these headlines, in my opinion, is to suggest that there had been a "bungling incident" by an obstetrician (there is no tempering of the phrase by "alleged" or "complained of" or a similar cautionary words) and that Caritas had established a special enquiry. (b) the first three sentences of the article assert that the paper had received a complaint "about an obstetrician's bungling operations causing death or imbecility of babies", though the C.M.C. had not. 34. As I have found earlier, the description of an obstetrician as "bungling" implies a high degree of carelessness on his part. The reference to him is inserted as if it were a complaint, not a fact. But if words are defamatory, it is no defence to the publisher of them that he was merely reproducing someone else's words or that he reported them as being the substance of a complaint rather than as being an established fact. 35. I do not think that the references to a patient suffering from a cut in the bladder are capable of hearing a defamatory meaning, either by themselves, or in their context, which does not assert that the cut was due to negligence, nor that the obstetrician who bungled over the babies was responsible. 36. However, I have no hesitation in finding that the headlines and first three paragraphs of this article are defamatory, in that their natural and ordinary meaning is that an obstetrician at C.M.C. had carried our his professional duties as such in so negligent a manner as to cause death or permanent brain damage to babies and that his conduct was being investigated. Nothing in the article, read as a whole, weakens or qualifies this conclusion. Identification (General) 37. The next question is whether the plaintiff has established, as he must do in a libel action, not only that there was a publication of libellous matter, but that the defamatory words were published of him. 38. In many cases, this is clear, since the plaintiff is named, or his identity can be discovered, by a construction of the words used in the defamatory matter. But in other cases, as in this instance, the plaintiff seeks to show that the words would be understood to refer to him because of facts or circumstances which are extrinsic to the words themselves. 39. The test which must be adopted is set out by Lord Donovan in Morgan v. Odham's Press(3) in the following terms -
40. It is not necessary to establish that everyone would understand that the libel referred to the plaintiff. It is sufficient if a reasonable person who knew the facts and circumstances extrinsic to the words (even if there are not many of such persons) would reasonably believe that the plaintiff is the person referred to by the defamatory words. 41. In order to establish that the libel was published of the plaintiff, witnesses may be called to say that they understood the libel to refer to him - see Morgan v. Odhams Press Ltd. 42. Six witnesses (in addition to the plaintiff, whose evidence also is admissible on this issue), said that they read the first article of 8th January and thought that the obstetrician mentioned therein was the plaintiff. Only one mentioned the second article of January 9th. 43. Counsel for the plaintiff tendered in evidence a copy of the Ching Po, another Hong Kong newspaper, dated 7th January. In that paper there appeared an article which described the conduct of a gynaecologist/obstetrician in a church hospital in Kowloon. It alleged that the obstetrician, of Indonesian nationality, carried out questionable operations, as a result of which four babies might become imbecile. 44. Mr. Wei objected to the admission of this article but reserved argument until later. Mr. Gray, after the conclusion of the evidence, sought leave to amend paragraph 5 of the Statement of Claim to include this article among the matters relied on to show that the two articles in the Tin Tin Yat Po referred to the plaintiff. 45. I refused to permit this amendment. The effect of such refusal is to bar the plaintiff from seeking to rely on the article in the Ching Po to identify the plaintiff (see Bruce v. Odhams Press(4). 46. In my view, however, even if the pleading had contained a reference to this article, it would not have had any probative value in establishing the identity of the obstetrician in the Tin Tin Yat Po articles, It is from the publication which is complained of, with the extrinsic facts which arise from that publication, and not from other publications (unless the latter are adopted by, linked to, or repeated in, the former) that the identification must be derived. A plaintiff cannot rely on the publication by X of matter which clearly identifies him, to support his claim that a publication by Y does so. 47. However, while the plaintiff cannot rely on the Ching Po article to support his contention that the Tin Tin Yat Po articles refer to himself, I see no reason to reject the Ching Po article for other purposes, if it is relevant evidence in relation to them. 48. In my view, the contents of the Ching Po article are relevant to the credibility of those witnesses who say that they identified the plaintiff from one or more of the Tin Tin Yat Po articles but who also admit that they had previously read the Ching Po article, as three out of six say they had done. 49. Had Mr. Wei wished to tender this article, in order to cross-examine upon it in order to try to discredit witnesses who said they had identified the plaintiff from Tin Tin Yat Po articles, it would surely have been admissible. 50. I think that the document remains admissible because it is relevant, despite the fact that it was sought to be put in by the plaintiff and that the use to which he intended to put it has not been permitted. 51. The three witnesses who admitted that they had read the Ching Po article before they read the Tin Tin Yat Po articles may well have been assisted in their identification of Dr. Sim by the references in Ching Po to "Indonesian nationality." Indeed, one of them admitted that he had already identified Dr. Sim from the Ching Po article. While I do not doubt that they did identify Dr. Sim as the obstetrician described in the first Tin Tin Yat Po article, the likelihood that their minds were already conditioned by the article in Ching Po, which points more clearly to Dr. Sim, makes me give little weight to their evidence, in so far as it suggests that an ordinary reader would identify Dr. Sim from the first Tin Tin Yat Po article by itself. 52. I also note the plaintiff's own evidence of telephone calls which he received, which indicated that third parties had understood the article to refer to him. 53. As to the other three witnesses, who had not read the Ching Po article, I accept their evidence as showing that there were some persons who did identify Dr. Sim from the first article on 8th January. None of them gave evidence of identifying him from the second article. 54. I am not, of course, bound to find that, because some persons gave evidence that they identified Dr. Sim from the first article, and accept their evidence to this effect, a reasonable person possessed of knowledge of the extrinsic facts would so identify him. 55. It is, however, evidence to which I may give such weight as I think proper in deciding, in my capacity of the finder of fact, whether a reasonable person would so identify Dr. Sim. 56. In dealing with this question, I do not overlook the evidence of Dr. Yu, who testified that he did not identify the plaintiff as the obstetrician mentioned in the first article, either when he first read the first article or when he read it a second time. 57. I cannot accept this evidence. He was visited by a Tin Tin Yat Po reporter on 8th January, after the publication of the first article, and received a complaint from him. He investigated it. He must have known from the outset that the article was critical of Dr. Chandran or the plaintiff, since there were only two obstetricians on the staff of C.M.C. 58. He must have discovered very early on that it was the plaintiff who treated Mrs. Choi. Yet he said that he had no idea who the doctor referred to was after he re-read the first article; nor after he had read the second article. He only identified him after his investigation. 59. I found Dr. Yu an unwilling witness, who did his best to avoid questions and gave the appearance of hostility to the plaintiff. I attach no weight to his denial that he failed to identify the plaintiff from the first article. 60. I have cited the test to be applied when the identity of a defamed person is in issue. Would the words convey a meaning which is defamatory of the plaintiff to a reasonable person possessed of knowledge of the extrinsic facts. 61. In applying the test, however, it is necessary to decide what extrinsic facts are to be assumed to be within the knowledge of the hypothetical reasonable reader. Are these to be limited to general matters, or to include detailed and specific knowledge of whichever of the following matters is knowledge to be attributed to the reasonable reader -
62. I think that all this information must be assumed to be known to the hypothetical reasonable reader. Of course, if the number of those who would possess a knowledge of all these extrinsic facts would not be large, this factor would have an effect on any award of damages. Identification 63. What are the factors which suggest that a reasonable person would believe that the plaintiff was the person libelled in the first article?
64. The following extrinsic facts were established by the plaintiff -
65. I decide that the contents of this article and the extrinsic facts established in relation to it, point so clearly at the plaintiff that an ordinary sensible person in possession of knowledge of these extrinsic facts would reasonably conclude that the plaintiff was the obstetrician who was defamed in the article. Indeed, it seems likely, from the evidence given by witnesses called by the plaintiff, that some persons who knew no more than that he worked as an obstetrician at C.M.C. had reached the same conclusion. 66. One passage in the second article reads as follows -
67. It was suggested that this reference justified the terms of the first article being used to help to indentify the plaintiff as the obstetrician in the second. 68. It seems to me to be, in accord with good sense, when judging the reaction of the reasonable reader, to attribute to him knowledge of other publications which are clearly linked. If the second article had referred in unambiguous terms to the first and made it clear that the person criticized in both was the same, I would have admitted the terms of the first to help to determine identity in the second. 69. But this is not a clear link. The "complaint" is merely said to have been published in the Tin Tin Yat Po - it does not say when, or about what or in relation to whom. It is too vague and I discount it. 70. Thus, I have to decide whether, from its own terms, the same conclusion as to identity should be reached in relation to the second article as I have reached in relation to the first. Are there any significant differences between it and the first, which would lead me to a different result? 71. The key passages in the second article make reference to -
72. In essence, this article points the accusing finger at an obstetrician who worked in Caritas and had caused the death of babies. 73. However, (d) does not state that an obstetrician performed the operation, nor when it took place. I don't consider that this passage is sufficiently explicit to connect Dr. Sim with this article, as the reference to Mrs. Choi did in the first article. 74. So in the second article, a reasonable person with knowledge of the extrinsic facts might well have decided that it applied, either to Dr. Sim or to Dr. Chandran, the other obstetrician. 75. I have mentioned the effect of a "dual libel". If defamatory matter is published from which either would reasonably be identified, this is a sufficient basis on which either may found an action for defamation, since both are to be regarded as sufficiently identified. I therefore reach the same conclusion as in the first article, with regard to identity, applying the same test as I did in that instance. Damages 76. These fall into two main headings, compensatory and exemplary damages, both of which are claimed. 77. It is established that the defendants published a libel of a most serious nature of the plaintiff in his professional capacity. The libel is made worse because it defames him not only in his profession but also in that branch of it in which he has specialized. I believe that the average reader, who had identified Dr. Sim with this article, would not want to have him, a man whose incompetence had killed two babies, injured two others and done permanent damage to a pregnant woman, treat a member of his family. 78. There was no evidence of special damage. The plaintiff did not lose his job, in spite of the tarnishing of his reputation which he thinks there was among his colleagues, though he said that it was because of the article that he left the hospital service and entered private practice. 79. I give some weight to the injury caused to the plaintiff's feelings. He gave evidence of the distress which was caused to him by the cooling off, as he saw it, of his colleagues' attitude towards him and I accept that he was both angry and upset and that he had a right to be. 80. Although the Tin Tin Yat Po had a circulation of over 70,000 at the material time, it is only persons with the knowledge of the extrinsic facts referred to above to whom the article can be said to have been published. The number who would possess such knowledge would be small but it would include many members of the staff of C.M.C. and some of his relatives and acquaintances. Although the group is not numerically large, it includes those whose opinion matters most to him, namely his close friends and family and his professional colleagues. 81. The libels were given a prominent position on the front page each day, with headlines which were highly defamatory. Some weight is to be given to this. 82. I do not overlook the instruction of Lord Hailsham, L.C., in Broome v. Cassell(5) that the plaintiff -
Aggravation 83. Are there any factors which aggravate the libel? I think there are two. The failure of either defendant to offer any apology at any time to the doctor. And their persistence in a defence of justification until the very opening of the trial. 84. I am conscious of the principle as quoted by Lord Hailsham in Broome v. Cassell that when assessing how much should be awarded by way of exemplary damages, where there has been a joint libel, the sum must represent the highest common factor - i.e. the lowest sum for which any of the defendants can be held liable on that score. The Lord Chancellor also observed (obiter) that he thought that the same rule hould apply generally and in particular to aggravated damages. This expression is supported in relation to aggravated damages by Lord Reid (at p.1090) and I follow it in considering the assessment of aggravated damages to be included in the compensatory award. 85. The failure to apologize applies to both defendants. No apology of any kind has ever been tendered by either. 86. Mr. Mai, Managing Director of the first defendant, refused to offer one in the witness box when invited to do so. And he said that the company had never given one because it felt it was not in the wrong. Nor is there evidence of any apology by the second defendant. 87. Both defendants continued to maintain a defence of justification, up to the morning of the trial, at first in relation to all allegations against Dr. Sim, and later in relation only to those relating to Mrs. Choi. 88. I do however regard the blameworthiness of Mr. Wai (whom I see as the voice of the first defendant), as higher. He was in a superior position to Mr. Li, the second defendant and would, to a great degree, have determined the approach adopted by both defendants. 89. His attitude seemed to be that it was proper for his paper to publish any report so long as it purported to describe an "incident", and he refused to admit that the allegations against Dr. Sim were serious ones. 90. I shall therefore inflate compensatory damages by an amount which takes account of Mr. Li's conduct, as being less heinous than that of the first defendant. Difference between two articles 91. In assessing an appropriate award of damages, I must consider each article separately. In doing so, I regard the first article as more damaging than the second for the following reasons -
92. In deciding upon an appropriate award, I bear in mind that an award of damages must not be excessive, though unfortunately I have very little to guide me on what is a reasonable figure for serious libels of a professional man in the way of his profession. 93. English cases give no more than a reference point though a useful one, since what I have to do is to assess what I think a Hong Kong jury would award in a case of this nature. The only recent Hong Kong case to which I was referred was a 1978 decision of Li, J., in which he awarded $30,000 and $20,000 respectively to two plaintiffs plus $50,000 exemplary damages each for gross libels about the private lives and sexual conduct of the plaintiffs. 94. It seems to me, though I do not have a full report of the action, only a summary of it in the Hong Kong Law Journal, that the award of compensatory damages was low. Had it been for me to award damages, on the basis of the limited facts stated in the extract, I would have been inclined to a much higher figure. And I regard the libels of Dr. Sim as more serious than those in Li J.'s case. 95. Recognizing the subjective nature of any figure, but trying to guess at the award a jury would make, I arrive at a figure of $120,000 for the libels contained in the first article and $60,000 for those in the second. Exemplary damages 96. Although the basic rule is that damages are awarded as compensation for injury, not as punishment for wrong doing, it is established by Rookes v. Barnard(6) that exemplary (punitive) damages may be awarded in the various circumstances described by Lord Devlin in Rookes v. Barnard, as interpreted in Broome v. Cassell(5). 97. The only set of circumstances relevant here is where the defendant has committed the libel with the intention of gaining some advantage which he calculates will outweigh the sum be might have to pay to plaintiff by way of compensation. 98. The mere fact that a libel is committed in the course of business carried on for profit is not sufficient to bring a case within the second category. Newspapers are usually published for profit and, as Mr. Lai said in evidence, it is advertising revenue, not sales, which keep a paper solvent. 99. The plaintiff must also establish that the defendant knew that what was to be done was defamatory, or had a reckless disregard as to whether it was or not and decided to carry on doing it because the prospects of material advantage outweighed the prospects of material loss (per Lord Hailsham in Broome v. Cassell at p.1079). 100. Has the plaintiff satisfied these tests? 101. There was no evidence that the possibility of economic or material advantage was in the minds of the defendants. 102. Their view was that the articles repeated a series of incidents which made good news items; and that news sells papers. But I see this as no more than a general, and natural, comment on the way papers are run, not as an admission of any specific intents, in these cases, to publish in the hope that sales would be assisted. 103. The second defendant was undoubtedly less than careful in his approval of the offending articles. His explanation was that he trusted his experienced reporters, who had been working for the Tin Tin Yat Po for some time, and that he was assured by them that the articles were true. He asked them to check with Dr. Yu, but this was to be next day, after the first article was to be published. 104. I do not think that his conduct amounts to a reckless disregard of the kind mentioned in Lord Hailsham's test. Newspapers are beset by deadlines, by inadequate staff to check their stories properly and by the need to fill space. These factors tend to induce in many a regrettable degree of carelessness. I find that this is a proper description of the conduct of the second defendant on the evening before the publication, but this is not enough to justify an award of exemplary damages. 105. The three reporters were not called and there was no evidence as to what checks they carried out or to whom they spoke, though we know that they interviewed Mr. Wong, the husband of the "woman with the perforated bladder". I have no material on which I could attribute a high degree of recklessness as to the possibility of libel to them, and through them to the first defendant as their employers. Mr. Lai was not concerned with the publications until later. 106. I therefore find that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy me that exemplary damages should be awarded. Injunction 107. The statement of claim seeks an injunction to restrain the defendants from any repetition of the libels. 108. Such relief will usually be granted only if there is reason to apprehend further publication by the defendants. 109. I see no such risk. The second defendant, is no longer a newspaperman and I have heard nothing to suggest that the first defendant might be so-minded. 110. I therefore refuse to order the injunction sought. 111. There will be judgment for the plaintiff against both defendants for $120,000 in respect of the first libel and $60,000 in respect of the second, with costs. Representation: C. Gray, Ribeiro & Roderick Wu (Johnson, Stokes & Master) for Plaintiff Wei, Q.C. and T. Tai (Kwan & Kwan) for Defendants (1) (1936) 2 All E.R. 1237. (2) (1970) 1 All E.R. 1094 at 1104. (3) (1971) 2 All E.R. 1156. (4) (1936) 1 K.B. 697. (5) 1972 A.C. 1027 at p.1071 (5) 1972 A.C. 1027 (6) [1964] A.C. 1129 |
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