Shun Fat Container Service Co Ltd. and Others v. Commissioner for Transport
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 217/1989 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 21 June 1989.
1. This is an application for judicial review. The applicants use some land near Tai Po Tau village as a container park. The respondent (the Commissioner for Transport) hags decided (he says, "for reasons of road safety") that all vehicles exceeding 11 metres in length should be prohibited from entering the road which gives access to the land. The applicants are understandably aggrieved by this decision. They complain that the respondent took his decision, not just for reasons of road safety, bu
Cited by 2 cases
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HCMP000217/1989 [A decision made for proper reasons and for those reasons alone will not be reviewed-merely because the material before the decision maker included irrelevant matters.] 1989 M.P. 217 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG HIGH COURT ------------------
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-------------------- Coram: Godfrey, J Date of Judgment: 21 June 1989 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ----------------------- 1. This is an application for judicial review. The applicants use some land near Tai Po Tau village as a container park. The respondent (the Commissioner for Transport) hags decided (he says, "for reasons of road safety") that all vehicles exceeding 11 metres in length should be prohibited from entering the road which gives access to the land. The applicants are understandably aggrieved by this decision. They complain that the respondent took his decision, not just for reasons of road safety, but for other reasons as well, namely (i) that pedestrians were walking on the road; (ii) that the vehicular traffic on the road created noise and dust. They also complain that the respondent, in deciding as he did, failed to give any regard to the consequences to the applicants that might follow from his decision; and failed to give any regard to the feasibility of improving the safety of the road without restricting the applicants' use of it. 2. The legislative background is simple. The respondent has power to make regulations about road traffic: see section 11 of the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap. 374. Under section 11, he has made the Road Traffic (Traffic Control) Regulations. By Regulation 14, he has taken power to designate any area as a prohibited zone, in which the driving of any specfied class or description of motor vehicles on any road is prohibited. The power is not in terms restricted; but I have no doubt (and it is not contended otherwise) that it may be exercised only for traffic control purposes. An exercise of the power for these and other purposes would be open to review : see Sadler v. Sheffield Corporation [1924]1 Ch. 483. In the present case, the respondent has given "road safety" as his reason for exercising the power. I have no doubt (and again if is not cotended otherwise) that "road safety" is a proper traffic control purpose. The applicants say that, having given "road safety" as the reason for his decision, the respondent cannot advance any other reason to justify it. The respondent is content with this. He says that that was indeed the reason, and the only reason, for his decision. The applicants say that it was not. The only issue is : Did the respondent arrive at his decision for reasons other than "road safety" reasons? All else (as it seems to me) is irrelevant. It is not for the court to decide, on an application for judicial review, whether the respondent could or even (in the Court's view) should, have arrived at a different decision, so long as the decision was not such as to be an affront to reason. 3. The facts are as follows :- 4. On 6th June, 1988, one Tang Tit-heung, Village Representative of Tai Po Tau Village, wrote to the Transport Department. Mr Tang wrote to express the concern and unrest of the villagers over the use of the land in question for parking container trucks and container storage. He complained that there were presently about 60 to 70 container trucks making daily use of this parking lot. The volume of traffic, said Mr Tang, had caused intolerable disruption to the tranquil village life and was potentially dangerous. He instanced the use of the road by pedestrians at the same time as the container trucks. He added that the road had not been designed to take such a load as that of the container trucks, and he suggested that the concrete slabs which formed the cover of a ditch traversing the road could easily give way, rendering the container traffic at that location very accident-prone. He also complained that the noisy and frequent container traffic had seriously disrupted the classes of Kai Chi Primary School (which is built upon land abutting the road). He asked that steps should be taken to restrict or ban the road for the passage of trucks. 5. On 27th June, 1988, a Mr Bok Kwok-ming, an engineer employed in the Transport Department of the Hong Kong Government inspected the road. His observations are in evidence. They are as follows :
6. The applicants dispute the accuracy of some of this; but the fact is that Mr Rok formed the view that container trucks exceeding 11 metres in length should be prohibited from using the road. He said "I am of the view that the existing road conditions on Tai Po Tau village road are hazardous and, from a road safety point of view, unsafe." (In relation to this evidence, it is fair to observe that several of the points made by Mr Bok are concerned with other matters than road safety. Some of them are matters of background; and some of them are criticisms of the road surface rather than of the safety of users of the road.) 7. Also on 27th June, 1988, the Supervisor of the Kai Chi School wrote to the Director of the Education Department. The Supervisor wrote:-
8. On 4th July, 1988, the Executive Secretary of the Transport Complaints Unit wrote to the respondent referring to a Mr P.K. Tang who, he said, had told the Unit that the area had been used as a container depot and that, since the access road linking with the container depot was only about 10 feet wide, the container vehicles had to climb on the pavement while passing through the road. This posed a hazard and noise nuisance to the student of the Kai Chi Primary School located beside the access road. Mr Tang had proposed "to ban the container vehicles from routing via the road" to enhance pedestrian safety. 9. On 17th October, 1988, the respondent took what I may describe as his original decision, to prohibit the use of vehicles over 11 metres in length from using this road. His decision was due to be published on 11th November, 1988. 10. However, on 3rd November, 1988, two of the applicants came on the scene by their solicitors, who wrote to the Transport Department in the following terms:
(I should interpose that the solicitors now act for all the applicants, who are, between them almost the only persons using this road for vehicular traffic.)
(I interpose again to point out that the reference to 4th November, 1988 appears to have been a slip.)
11. The solicitors added that they wanted the decision urgently reviewed. 12. On 4th November, 1988, the solicitors followed up their letter of the day before. They pointed out they were now acting for two further clients and they said this :
They referred to two of their clients, the first and second applicants, and pointed out that they were subsidaries of China Resources (Holding) Company Limited, They continued :
13. On 8th November, 1988, the solicitors wrote further, stating that they had had no reply to their earlier two letters, and adding :
14. On 10th November, 1988, the respondent wrote to the solicitors, thanking them for their letters of 3rd, 4th and 8th November, 1988 and stating that legal advice was being sought. In the meantime, he added, he had decided to defer publication of the Gazette Notice and he said that the prohibition would not be implemented on 11th November, 1988. 15. On 14th November, 1988, there was a meeting of the Tai Po Development District Board, Traffic and Transport Committee (1988/89). At this meeting, various views had been expressed about the present matter. A Mr Chan had said that Tai Po Tau Village Road was very narrow and that there was a school in the vicinity. He expressed the opinion that to improve the road was a matter for the Government, and not the transport companies concerned. Mr Wong shared similar views to those of Mr Chan. He said that the companies should respect the local residents' opinions and Government policy to ban container vehicles. Moreover, container vehicles, he said, might create noise pollution problems. A Mr Yau also supported the banning. He was particularly concerned about the potential traffic hazard caused to residents and school children. 16. On 16th November, 1988, the Traffic Engineering (New Territories) Division of the respondent's Department canvassed views within the Government. 17. On 18th November, 1988, the Chief Highway Engineer, New Territories, responded. He said nothing about road safety, but referred to the Government's land use policy. 18. On 22nd November, 1988, a view was expressed by the Project Manager of the New Territories/North East. He said that obviously much depended on the validity of the representations from the container carpark owners and the consequent implications. He said that, that aside, he found no reasons not to support the proposed banning in consideration of the noise generated which would affect Kai Chi Primary School, upon which the Director of Environmental Protection no doubt would be commenting. He said he was unable to offer any comments on the practicability of upgrading the existing village road unless and until details of the proposed improvements were available. 19. The Director of Environmental Protection did in fact express a view. He said :
20. On 24th November, 1988, the Director of Education wrote a memorandum in which he said :
21. On 25th November, 1988, the Commissioner of Police wrote a memorandum. He said :
22. On 2nd December, 1988, the District Officer (Tai Po) made his contribution. He said that he supported the ban on container trucks from using the road, and that, with regard to the container carpark owners' proposal to improve the road to the Government's satisfaction at the owners' expense, he thought it should not be entertained as it would set a bad precedent for other similar problematic cases in the district, or even in the territories. 23. In the result, and after taking legal advice, the respondent came to a decision, his decision, which is the decision complained of in these proceedings. It is recorded in a letter dated 29th December, 1988 from the Attorney-General to the applicants' solicitors. The Attorney-General wrote :
24. On 31st January, 1989, this application was launched. Mr Justice Mortimer gave leave to proceed with it. On 3rd February, 1989, he ordered a stay of the decision until the determination of these proceedings. In due course the hearing was fixed for today, 21st June, 1989. It is deplorable that in these circumstances the respondent's evidence was not filed until 14th June, 1989. I am not sufficiently informed as to the reasons for this delay to cast any blame upon anybody. I content myself with observing that proceedings for judicial review are meant to be determined speedily (whether or not there is a stay of any sort) and on no account should they be postponed for months, as these were. If they are, for any good reason, postponed for any length of time, that does not excuse a delay on the part of the respondent in filing evidence. I would urge all those who are named as respondents to an application for a judicial review to put in their evidence as soon as possible. If, for whatever reason, and due to whatever misunderstanding, they leave that until a few days before the hearing (when it is a hearing the date of which has been fixed for weeks or even months), they will inevitably expose themselves to a request by the applicant for an adjournment. This is most undesirable. And applicants for a judicial review should bear in mind that, except in most unusual circumstances and only by the leave of a judge, the respondent's evidence is the end of the evidence. The idea that evidence on a judicial review can be allowed to proliferate by affirmations and affidavits winging their way from one side to the other until the date of the hearing is one of which all applicants and respondents ought now, and finally, to be disabused. 25. When the respondent's evidence was eventually filed, it was, as one would expect, helpful and clear. I would, however, urge upon all those who are responsible for filing evidence, to bear in mind the great convenience that would follow from an adherence to the Practice Direction reported in [1983]1 WLR 922. There are many helpful indications as to the proper way in which evidence ought to be prepared in those directions. In particular, I would draw attention to the requirements as to marking of affidavits which is as follows (See page 923) : "At the top right hand corner of the first page of every affidavit and also on the back sheet, there must be written in clear permanent dark blue or black marking :
(For example, 2nd defendant E.W. Jones, 24th July 1982.) I would also mention the way in which copies of letters should he exhibited. (and I read again from page 923):
26. At the hearing before me, it was submitted that I should consider a great deal of further evidence. This I refused to do. I was, however, told that the further evidence sought to be filed by the applicants would show that the respondent's views about road safety, in connection with this particular road, were wrong; and that, anyway, the road could be improved. I have no doubt that that is what the evidence would have disclosed. But these matters, in my judgment, are not matters for me. It is not for the Court to substitute its own (or anyone else's) view for that of the respondent on the matter whether or not the use of a read ought to be restricted on ground's of road safety. The court is concerned only to review the decision, not to reconsider it. If the decision has been arrived at illegally, improperly or irrationally, it is amenable to review. But the court never substitutes its own judgment for that of the decision maker. If it is believed that this is the function of the court upon a judicial review, then it is time that belief was dispelled. The remedy by way of judicial review is a very useful one which enables the court to control acts of government which constitute an abuse of power. But if the remedy is itself abused it will become worse than useless; it will become a snare and a delusion. 27. The considerations urged on me by the applicants are matters entirely irrelevant to the decision to which I have to come, which is whether or not the decision of the respondent can properly be called into question (and equally irrelevant, as it seems to me, to the decision to which he had to come). His function was to concern himself with the safety of the road in its existing condition at the date he made his decision. It is not, in my view, necessary for him to take into account what improvements might be made to the road in order to make it better fitted for the use which the applicants wish to make of it. This matter is of course a serious one from the applicants' point of view. But it is equally serious, as it seems to me, to the mother and the father of any child who when crossing the road from Kai Chi School is killed or seriously injured. 28. I do not have to make any judgment upon these matters. It is not for me to balance the considerations for and against making a restriction order; that would involve the Court's usurping the function of the respondent. My task is simply to review the decision made by the respondent. I have to say that I cannot fault his decision. It was not unlawful; it was not improper; and it was not irrational. There is no doubt that, as was submitted to me, he had before him a number of considerations, over and above road safety considerations. Having canvassed the views of a wide number of people, this is hardly surprising. But did he rely on such considerations? If I had felt able to conclude on the material before me that the decision at which the respondent had arrived was not taken on road safety grounds but was taken on some other ground, or on that and other grounds, I would have thought the matter susceptible to review and I would have quashed his decision. But there is no material before me upon which I can or should come to that conclusion. The applicants have not shown that any ground, other than the road safety ground on which the respondent relied, lay at the foundation of his decision. And they have not shown that he failed to have regard to any consideration which, if he had had regard to it, would have compelled him to come to the conclusion that the road was safe for use by vehicles over 11 metres in length. For the reasons I have endeavoured to state, this application must he dismissed.
Representation: Mr J. Swaine Q.C. and Mr Louis Chan instructed by Messrs. Tang & Co. for the Applicants. Ms V. Harstein and Mrs A. Cabrelli for Crown/Respondent. |
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