Leung's Metal & Electronics Ltd (in Liquidation) v. Bulkelly & Parners (A Firm)

HCA001110/1978

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

HIGH COURT

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Coram: Silke, J. in Court

Date of Judgment: 13 July 1979

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JUDGMENT

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1. The plaintiff, Leung's Metal and Electronics Ltd, had been the owner of factory premises at flats A and C on the 10th Floor of Fon Wah Industrial Building, Castle Peak Road, Tsun Wan where they carried on business.

2. They were desirous of moving to new premises, having disposed of the old, at Mercantile Industrial and Ware House Building (Stage II) unit C 6th Floor 16-24 Ta Chuen Ping Road, Kwai Chung.

3. To this end they entered into a contract - "the contract" - dated 24th August 1977 with Bulkelly & Partners, a firm which describes themselves as "Decorators".

4. The purpose of the contract is defined in its heading as "Decoration Works for your New Factory".

5. To the main contract was attached that which is entitled "Quotation" which set out in detail the works required.

6. The main contract contained certain terms which I set out in full for they have direct bearing on the issues involved in this trial.

7. They are: The material used for the decoration of the office should be new material. 2. For other partitions and decorations material can be used from our old factory, but any insufficient material should be borne by the contractor".

8. The Quotation went into detail as to that which was to be dismantled and reused. Apart from various wooden and glass fixtures there is specific reference to a "Wire mesh partition" - and it is with the dismantling of this that we are concerned.

9. The defendant firm employs no workers of its own and therefore engages persons to do the work for it.

10. Here they employed some person in respect of the dismantling of the wooden and glass fixtures and one Wong Gow (or Kau), trading as Luen Hing Metal Factory, to dismantle the wire mesh partition and, presumably the wire mesh door also referred to in the contract.

11. A third party notice was issued in respect of Wong Gow but he cannot be traced and, while he appears in the title to the action as a Third Party, he has not been before me.

12. In the course of the dismantling work done by him he made use of that which has been described as Electrical Welding Equipment ("the equipment") to cut some of the metal. The use of the equipment caused sparks to fly out and some landed on foam rubber lying near by and caused a fire. The fire spread rapidly to the various combustibles stored in Flat C of the premises and caused the contents of Flat C to be either distroyed or badly damaged.

13. The plaintiff is now in liquidation and the Official Receivers consent to this action has been exhibited in the Agreed Bundle II. This is a form of surrogate action in so far as the plaintiff has been paid a sum by its insurance company who, through the plaintiff, seek to recover that sum from the defendant firm as a result of that which they say is that firm's negligence.

14. I am not concerned with quantum as it has been agreed, should I fix liability upon the defendants, that the assessment of damages, which necessitates the scrutiny of a large volume of documents, be adjourned to the Registrar.

15. It is common case that Wong Gow was an independent contractor. I have before me in the Agreed Bundle II and under the provisions of the Evidence (Hearsay) Rules, a statement which he made about the 13th September 1977 to Charles Wong Hau of Toplis & Harding (H.K.) Ltd, insurance adjustors, who were preparing a report on the fire on behalf of Commercial Union Assurance Co. Ltd.

16. In that he refers to the "pulling down" of the metal works in question: of "pulling down" an iron shelf approximately 30 feet in length attached to a "metal net" : of there being colour boxes delivered by a paper factory piled seven to eight feet high on the other side of the "iron net" and that in their vicinity were two rolled up sheets of foam rubber at a distance of about 4 feet from the "iron net".

17. He goes on "while I was cutting the metal shelf with an electrical welding apparatus sparks fell onto the ground of the godown and split, some of them bounced onto the foam rubber which were subsequently ignited".

18. He then refers to the unavailing efforts to put out the resulting fire before the Fire Brigade arrived. The fire raged for about two hours.

19. The wire mesh partition consisted of sections of wire mesh spot welded at intervals of six to eight inches to milled steel angle irons. This in sections of about three feet by two feet with the angle irons running from floor to ceiling and across the length of the partition. What remained of the metal shelf was stretched across the wire mesh about two thirds of the way up the partition near the airconditioning duct. The agreed photo I shows this on the left side of that photograph.

20. Mr Leung (2PW), who described himself as the person who runs the plaintiff company, tells me that there were identical partition in Flat A and Flat C each about thirty-five feet long - the contract described them generally as seventy feet long - and that the upright angle irons were screwed into the concrete cement floor and ceiling of the premises. He thought the retaining screws to be three fons (or 3/8 of an inch) thick. Both the mesh and the frame were in good condition.

21. He describes the metal shelf as being welded to the angle iron comprising the frame of the wire partition. While no specific mention is made of this shelf in the contract it is clear that in order to dismantle the partition the shelf would have to be removed.

22. He says that Mr Tsang, of the defendant firm, inspected the premises and was aware of the construction of the wire mesh partition and of the shelf attached to it. He also says that there was no discussion as to the method to be used in dismantling. He further said that Mr. Tsang visited the premises while work was in progress in Flat A from time to time. It is his evidence that the electrical welding equipment was used to dismantle the wire mesh partition in Flat A but he does not recall whether or not Mr. Tsang's visit coincided with its use.

23. It will be remembered that other work was being carried out by another contractor.

24. Mr. Tsang (1DW) in his evidence denies any visits to the premises other than one of inspection before the work began. He says he was concerned with the decoration of the new premises where he did spend time and not the dismantling of the old although he was aware that material in the old, including the wire mesh partition, was to be reused in the new.

25. Nothing, in my view, really turns on this, though a good deal of play has made of it, as there is no evidence that Mr Tsang was directly aware of the use of electrical welding equipment in the premises. It really touches upon credibility rather than anything else.

26. Professor Leung, Professor of Electrical Engineering in the University of Hong Kong was called by the plaintiff and his description of the electrical welding equipment is not in dispute.

27. This consists of an electrical transformer with intermittent current which is plugged into the power supply. It has two cables coming from it - one of these ends in a clasp which is attached to the metal to be welded, the other to a welding rod.

28. The rod is moved towards the object to be welded and at a distance of one half to one quarter of an inch away an electrical spark jumps between the rod and the metal. This will melt the rod, the metal or both.

29. There is an electrical charge in both the rod and the metal. The spark to which he refers manifests itself in a very hot flame - over 1000^o centigrade - which causes the melting to which I have referred. Effectively there is a completed electrical circuit - the spark forms a conductor : the circuit closes letting the charge run to the metal.

30. As the rod melts it gets shorter and is moved towards the metal dripping onto the metal. If held too far away the circuit would be broken.

31. He goes on that this equipment can also be used to cut metal. For this purpose a higher temperature is required.

32. The user increases the power and moves the rod further away from the object to be cut thus, by creating a greater gap, getting a bigger flame. The effect would be to melt the metal to be cut which would leave an irregular finish.

33. The sparks resulting from either welding or cutting are caused by the metal as it melts - the higher the density of the metal the bigger the spark. There is more heat in something when it is dense.

34. None of this is really controversial. What is is the Professor's evidence as to the use of such equipment for cutting in Hong Kong and, in particular, its use in this dismantling operation.

35. He says it is in common use in Hong Kong and here it would have been quicker than using a hacksaw. Metal which is jutting out can be removed completely by this method, mechanical means such as a hacksaw would take a long time.

36. To remove the partition in question he says that normal way would be to use such equipment. In giving those pieces of evidence he presumes that the angle irons were embedded in concrete.

37. It would be unlikely that oxy-acetylene equipment would be used in a job like this as it would require special voltage.

38. He agreed in cross-examination that to remove the mesh spot welded at intervals to the angle iron a chisel would be the best method. He further agreed that it was not absolutely necessary to use this equipment for the general removal of the partition but it would be more economic. He thought it would be more expensive to use hacksaw and chisel in terms of time needed.

39. The effect of his evidence is: that to remove the mesh more likely to use a chisel; to remove the upright angle irons from the floor and ceiling more likely to use the equipment; probably use the equipment to remove the shelf running along the mesh and attached to the angle iron.

40. The defendants called a Mr Sin Chun Wong (2DW) the sole proprietor of Hop Cheong Chun Kee - which carried on the business of metal works. He had done some work in the past for the defendant and he gave evidence of the practicalities of the work method of one such as himself or Wong Gow - engaged in the metal work trade. He has been in business for 15-16 years and, with respect to Professor Leung, his knowledge of what actually goes on is much nearer the ground.

41. It was his evidence that the equipment is mostly used for welding and seldom for cutting. The side effect of the latter use is that "the piece of thing would be damaged".

42. Where upright angle irons are attached to a floor - or ceiling - by screws then, even if the screws are frozen into the cement, the best method of removing the angle iron is to sheer off the head of the screw with a chisel or to saw the angle iron with a hacksaw. There would be no difficulty in this. He suggests that to remove an angle iron embedded in concrete then to dig up the concrete would be the best method.

43. It is agreed that the angle irons had to be cut into lengths which would fit in an eight foot lift so as to take them away from the premises. Again it is his evidence that to do this a hacksaw would be the best instrument to use.

44. There was produced to me an angle iron (B) and a piece of wire mesh (C) similar to the ones comprising the wire mesh partition.

45. He was asked to and did, in 25 seconds, saw through the angle iron B - in court.

46. To use, he said, the equipment would not leave a clear cut finish and that a cutting finish out of shape could not be reused again.

47. Further he had dismantled partitions such as the one here on many occasions - and he had done this work for the defendants also. On no occasion did he use the equipment. But he could only cut with a hacksaw an angle iron which is upright not one lying along and attached to the floor.

48. For material to be reused he would work with a hacksaw and chisel. If not for reuse then the equipment could be used.

49. He accepted that amongst the tools of his trade would be the equipment, an electrical saw and oxy-acetylene equipment. Of this last he says that a form of licence from the supplier of cylinder is needed, also permission from the person upon whose premises it is to be used.

50. The tools would also include a chisel, hacksaw and a hammer. Using these implements, he estimated that the work needed in Flat C would take about one day. The use of the equipment would not speed this up. It would be slower he says because it would be necessary to use the hacksaw to clean up the damaged metal.

51. The effect of his evidence is (1) that the equipment is seldom used for cutting in Hong Kong; (2) that it is unlikely to be used for the dismantling of this partition the materials of which are to be reused; (3) that its use could slow down the job; (4) that a hacksaw and chisel would be the tools to use to do the work adequately.

52. I accept his evidence on these points.

53. I would find the evidence to show that the mesh was spot welded to the angle iron at intervals of six inches to eight inches apart;

54. : that the upright angle irons were fixed to the floor and ceiling with 3/8" screws - and that there is no evidence to show them to have 'frozen' in the concrete on that the angle irons were embedded in the concrete;

55. : that the shelf was welded to the upright angle irons at intervals where they formed the frame for the mesh.

56. I note that, while both counsel canvassed widely the method used to dismantle the whole of the partition the plaintiff's pleadings specifically refers to the removal of the shelf - as does the statement of Wong Gow.

57. I would accept that the equipment was used in Flat A. It is clear beyond peradventure that in using the equipment in Flat C Wong Gow was negligent.

58. While the evidence is simple I have found it necessary, as a result of the subtle point raised by Mr Stone, to go into it in considerable detail.

59. It is accepted by both sides - indeed they could hardly do else - that the general rule is that a contractor is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor engaged by him.

60. As to most general rules, exceptions exist. Such as : where an employer personally interferes with the work of the contractor; where the contractor is employed to do work which is dangerous : highway cases.

61. We are here concerned with work variously described as "extra hazardous" and "dangerous".

62. And Mr. Stone's point is, if I perceive it correctly, that if it is possible to use a method which is of itself dangerous in the doing of a task which is of itself innocuous then the reasonable employer should foresee the use of such method and adopt measures by which the possible consequences of the use of such method can be avoided. He would divide the matter into two separate things : the task - the method used to perform the task.

63. I accept that it is a correct statement of the law than an employer who employs an independent contractor to execute a task from which, in the natural course of things injurious consequences to other must be expected to arise is bound to see that everything is done which is reasonably necessary to avoid those consequences.

64. This is supported by the line of authority starting with Laugher v. Pointer (1826) 5 BSC 547 going through Bower v. Peate (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 321,⁽¹⁾ Hughes v. Percival (1883) 8 A.C. 443⁽²⁾ whether or not a contractor has failed to take the necessary precautions - Honywill and Stein Ltd v. Larkin Brothers (London's Commercial Photographers) Ltd (1934) I.K.B. 191 C.A.⁽³⁾ - with which I shall deal in detail in a moment - and to Salsbury v. Woodland (1970) 1 Q.B. 324 C.A.⁽⁴⁾ upon which Mr. Woo, for the defendant firm, placed the greatest reliance.

65. Mr Stone relies to a great extent on an Australian case McInnes v. Wardle (1931) 45 C.L. R 548 - (H.C. of A.)⁽⁵⁾ and to that which he described as Sachs L.J. being the only one to attach his mind to the problem in the trees case (Salsbury v. Woodland).⁽⁴⁾

66. In other word ask yourself what is the task - what is likely to be used in task - if method is dangerous then the employer is liable.

67. The question is, as I see it, should the defendant have or ought he to have foreseen the use of the equipment by the independent contractor.

68. Photography of itself is an innocuous task and in Honywill⁽³⁾ it was photography in bad natural light which, in those non technical days, required the use of a magnesium flare. This made a combination of the task, and the method necessary to effect it, hazardous and dangerous.

69. Slesser L.J., who read the judgment of the Court of Appeal referred, at page 195, to the fact that

"The Respondent's evidence was that the use of flashlight is the normal way of photographing interiors, and is employed in photographing large interiors in the majority of cases, but that it is invariably attended with danger."

The trial judge had found that in lighting the magnesium flare at a distance of not more than four feet from the curtain the photographer was negligent.

70. Further it was not contested that the respondents were liable to the appellants either in contract or for negligence but it was contended that no damages, or merely nominal damages, were recoverable from the respondents by the appellants because, it was said, the appellants suffered no damage.

71. In reference to the judgment of A.L. Smith L.J. in Holliday v. National Telephone Co. (1899) 2 Q.B. 362⁽¹⁾ (a highway case) the learned Lord Justice had this to say (at page 199)

"The decision in this case, in our judgment, does not depend merely on the fact that the defendants were doing work on the highway, but primarily on its dangerous character, which imposes on the ultimate employer an obligation to take special precautions, and they cannot delegate the obligations by having the work carried out by an independent contractor. This is equally true when the work being done for the ultimate employer is being done on another persons premises".

72. And again (p.199)

"The principle is that if a man does work on or near another's property which involves danger to that property unless proper care is taken, he is liable to the owner of the property for damage resulting to it from the failure to take proper care and is equally liable if, instead of doing the work himself, he procures another, whether agent, servant or otherwise, to do it for him".

73. But this principle is clearly governed by the phrase used by the learned Lord Justice (at p.290) "a dangerous operation in its intrinsic nature" which related to the facts of Honywill.⁽²⁾

74. He concludes (p.200-201) "But the rule of liability for independent contractors acts attaches to these operations" (that is operations not necessarily attended with risk) "because they are inherently dangerous and hence are done at the principal employer's peril".

75. Salsbury v. Woodland and Others (1970) 1 Q.B. 324 C.A.⁽¹⁾ concerned the employment by the house occupier of an apparently competent tree felling contractor to remove a large hawthorn tree standing in the front garden of the house adjoining the highway. Thereafter the facts become somewhat complicated and I am concerned only with the finding by the trial judge that the first defendant (the occupier) was liable for the negligence of the second defendant (the contractor) whose negligence lay in the removal of the tree.

76. The occupier's appeal succeeded. Widgery L.J. - (as he then was) - in his judgment directed his mind to the issue that the occupier was not responsible for the negligence of the contractor, even if the contractor was negligent.

77. In this instant case, of course, that I have held the contractor to be negligent.

78. Having set out the general rule, he went on (at page 336-337)

"I think it is entirely accepted that those cases - and there are some - in which an employer has been held liable for injury done by the negligence of an independent contractor are in the cases, where the employer owes a direct duty to a person injured, a duty which he cannot delegate to the contractor on his behalf. The whole question here is whether the occupier is to be judged by the general rule which would result in no liability, or whether he comes within one of the somewhat special exceptions - cases in which a direct duty to see that care is taken rests on the employer throughout the operation".

79. He adopts the statement of principle set out in Salmond on Torts 14th Edition (1965) at p.687, which statement is also contained in the 17th edition of that classic work (1977) at p.486 and unaltered.

80. With great respect I would also adopt that statement of principle and I do not think McInnes v. Wardle (1931) 45 C.L. R 548⁽²⁾ to make or intend to make any alteration to it.

81. In Salsbury⁽¹⁾ (at page 345) Harman L.J. emphasized the words "which from its nature is likely to cause danger" used by Atkin L.J. in Belvedere Fish Guano Co. Ltd v. Ramham Chemical Works Ltd (1920) 2 K.B. 487 at page 504.⁽³⁾ And he used the words of Slesser L.J. in Honywill⁽⁴⁾ to illustrate this when he said

"...... an ultimate employer is not responsible for the acts of an independent contractor merely because what is to be done will involve danger to others if negligently done".

82. Mr Stone placed emphasis on the words of Sachs L.J. in Salsbury,⁽¹⁾ the third judgment of the Court of Appeal, in his attempt to widen the ambit of the liability of the ultimate employer for the negligence of his independent contractor. The passage relied on reads

"There is another category when the work done is so inherently dangerous or, as it is sometimes termed, 'extra hazardous' in relation either to those on a highway or to negligence generally, that the public interest demands absolute responsibility. Typical instances include work done with or the manufacture of explosives or inflamable material. It is into that category that the present case was placed by the judge".

83. And then

"In the present case it seems clear to me that there was nothing 'inherently dangerous' in the operation of removing this particular hawthorn tree. Any competent workman could do it perfectly safely and without the slightest risk to the telephone wires, to the house, or to any other property if he tackled it in the standard way : nor could any occupier of land normally foresee (my italics) that there was any danger involved in such an operation or that a competent contractor could be prone to what was describes as 'extreme stupidity'."

84. It is these words, Mr Stone says, that support his contention, based on McInnes v. Wardle, ⁽²⁾ that one looks separately at the task and then the method used to perform the task and if the latter can be said to be negligent whereby damage is caused then, however innocuous the task the method, if its danger can be or ought to have been foreseen by the employer, makes him liable in negligence. The element of constructive knowledge.

85. Now in the Australian case of McInnes⁽²⁾ the method used - fire - by the independent contractor was found, and which finding was upheld in the Appeal Court, to be "the usual and ordinary method used in the fumigation and destruction of rabbits".

86. The trial judge also found in the words of Dixon J. (at page 551)

"..... the appellant (the employer) knew, and, if he did not know, should have known, what was necessary in order to do the work to his satisfaction, and it was his business to see that the contractor knew what was required of him. To exterminate rabbits on the land it was necessary, in His Honours opinion, to clear the bracken in places and the obvious method of clearing was by burning which was certainly the common practice under suitable conditions."

Dixon J. accepted these conclusions and went on to say

"They amount to a finding that the appellant knew, or ought to have known, that in the course of operations conducted for his benefit upon land in his occupation, fire would be employed if, as was likely, its use was found necessary and expedient in the opinion of the person whom he authorised to be there for the execution of the work."

87. He concluded that the appellant failed in his duty to see that reasonable care was used and was therefore liable.

88. I was also referred to the passage in the judgment of McTiernan J. in McInnes⁽¹⁾ at p.554 when he said:

"There was no evidence of any express direction or authority to burn and the act of lighting a fire during the months of December of January was an offence under the Bush Fires Act 1913 S.8. For this reason I hesitate to infer that McLeay (the independent contractor) had any actual authority or permission to do the unlawful act of burning the bracken."

He went on - and Mr Stone relies on these words

"Clearly he was free to do the work without burning, or for that matter, without clearing if he could. On the other hand, I think that the defendant (the employer) knew - and if he did not know he should have contemplated - that there was a possibility of McLeay setting fire to the bracken if he was required (as under the term of the contract he might be) to do the work effectively, and was then left to do it in his own way."

89. McTiernan J. then went on to quote with approval what he terms the "Statements" of Lord Watson and Lord Fitzgerald in Hughes v. Percival (1883) 8 A.C. 443⁽²⁾ at pages 451 and 455. And particular emphasis is placed by Mr Stone on those words of Lord Watson where he said

"It appears to me that he could not escape liability unless he further proved that it could not have been reasonably anticipated that any workman of ordinary skill in such operations, who was neither insane nor dishonest, would have dreamt of cutting the wall."

90. But it must be remembered that Hughes v. Percival⁽²⁾ was a party wall case the cutting of which had disastrous effects on an adjoining house. Lord Fitzgerald in his speech at p.452 referred to the undertaking as being perilous to the neighbours on both sides so as to render "care and precaution necessary at every step until the whole of the new structure was substantially completed: or so far as least, that nothing remained to be done which could effect the stability of either of the party walls".

91. I was also referred to one decision in these courts : Yu Yuk Fung v. Pui Kee Iron Works and Others (1970) H.K.L.R. 72.⁽¹⁾ There Blair-Kerr J. held the worker negligent and said, at page 81, of the employer (the 6th defendant) - who had left the matter entirely to her husband that:

"As I have said he simply left the first defendant to get on with the job and he took no precautions of any kind against injury to pedestrians in Pak Kung Street."

A pipe was removed from a well, it was rusty, broke, and caused injury.

92. With respect to Mr Stone while his argument has its attractions in the Australian case upon which he relies and in the other cases he cites the common thread, whatever McTiernan J. might have to say in McInnes,⁽²⁾ is the combination of the task and the method - the method being the obvious and usual method of performing the task and which made the operation as a whole hazardous or dangerous.

93. In this instant case, on the evidence, I would find the obvious and usual method of removing the wire mesh partition, the materials of which were to be reused, was a hacksaw and chisel. To use the electric welding equipment was unnecessary and highly dangerous in a place where combustibles were stored. In the normal course of events the task - and the method - was not extra hazardous or inherently dangerous. The defendants could not, in my view, normally foresee that there was any danger involved or that Wong Gow would be extremely stupid.

94. The plaintiff fails on the issue of tortious negligence.

95. But that is not quite an end to the matter for it is pleaded in paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim

"Further or alternatively, it was an implied term of the aforesaid contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants that the dismantling and removal works undertaken pursuant to the contract would be executed with all due care and skill in a manner calculated to preserve the safety of the plaintiffs existing premises."

96. Mr Woo indicated, but did not press the point, the use of the general word "premises". As he says it was things upon the premises which were damaged not the building itself. However, if I did find substance in this pleading, I would not find it to fail on this ground. Had the safety of the premises been in the mind of the independent contractor it is manifest that the would not have used the equipment he did. The issue is again: are the defendants contractually liable for his negligence.

97. Mr Woo's basic submission on this point, and shortly made, was that the only implied term was that the job be performed skillfully and that the liability, if any, arose in tort, as opposed to contract, if damage was caused. He urges that this was a simple operation which could have been completed without the slightest danger to anyone and is taken outside any implied term by the use of an independent contractor.

98. I would point out that there is no evidence before me, other than his actions here that Wong Gow was anything but a competent contractor when employed as such by the defendant.

99. It was Mr Stone's contention that this case falls four square within the general principles, set out in Chitty on Contracts 24th Edition paras 781-787, as to implied terms.

100. He cites Kimber v. William Willett Ltd (1947) 1 All E.R. 361⁽¹⁾ where a firm of carpet layers agreed to take up and clean a carpet in the plaintiff's dining room. At the door of the room the carpet was attached to the hall carpet, which itself was tacked to the floor boards in the hall, by being sewn to a tongue of that hall carpet.

101. When the dining room carpet was removed the tongue of the hall carpet was left protruding under the door without being tacked down. The plaintiff who occupied the premises caught her foot in the tongue of the hall carpet, fell and suffered injuries.

102. It was her case that there was an implied term in the verbal contract with the defendants that the work should be done in a workmanlike and safe manner - and that it was not so done.

103. The trial judge thought that she was right - that the term was broken and that she suffered injuries as a result. This finding was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The case however was one very much based on its own facts.

104. Mr Woo submits that on its facts it can be distinguished from this instant case.

105. I agree with him.

106. Here there is an independent contractor. Mr Stone submitted that Mr Woo could be right in his submission if there had been reference to an independent contractor in the contract as between the plaintiff and the defendant.

107. There is however no prohibition in the contract as to the employment of an independent contractor. There must be in my view a general implied term that the work would be done competently. There was, as I have said, nothing to indicate that Wong Gow was anything but competent prior to his engagement by the defendants. They took reasonable steps to have the work carried out: that Wong Kau would perform an act of crass stupidity could not in my view have been or should have been, foreseen by them.

108. In the event there will be judgment for the defendants with costs on the issue of liability.

Representation:

William Stone, instructed by Johnson, Stokes & Master, for the plaintiff

Patrick Woo, instructed by John Ip & Co., for the defendant

(1) Laugher v. Pointer (1826) 5 BSC 547 going through Bower v. Peate (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 321

(2) Hughes v. Percival (1883) 8 A.C. 443

(3) Honywill and Stein Ltd v. Larkin Brothers (London's Commercial Photographers) Ltd (1934) I.K.B. 191 C.A.

(4) Salsbury v. Woodland (1970) 1 Q.B. 324 C.A.

(5) McInnes v. Wardle (1931) 45 C.L. R 548 - (H.C. of A.)

(1) Holliday v. National Telephone Co. (1899) 2 Q.B. 362

(2) Honywill and Stein Ltd v. Larkin Brothers (London's Commercial Photographers) Ltd (1934) I.K.B. 191 C.A.

(1) Salsbury v. Woodland (1970) 1 Q.B. 324 C.A.

(2) McInnes v. Wardle (1931) 45 C.L. R 548

(3) Belvedere Fish Guano Co. Ltd v. Ramham Chemical Works Ltd (1920) 2 K.B. 487 at page 504

(4) Honywill and Stein Ltd v. Larkin Brothers (London's Commercial Photographers) Ltd (1934) I.K.B. 191 C.A.

(1) Yu Yuk Fung v. Pui Kee Iron Works and Others (1970) H.K.L.R. 72

(1) Kimber v. William Willett Ltd (1947) 1 ALL E.R. 361