Grand Subject Investment Limited v. Mable Road Company Limited and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCA 8357/1991 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. This plaintiff in this action, Grand Subject Investment Limited ("Grand Subject") claims that on 28th November 1990 the 1st defendant Mable Road Company Limited ("Mable Road") agreed to sell to Grand Subject the 10th floor, Tower 2, Enterprise Square, Kowloon Bay ("the property"). Grand Subject seeks as against Mable Road specific performance of the alleged agreement. Grand Subject accepts that the alleged agreement was not made directly with Mable Road, but says that it was made with the 2nd
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HCA008357/1991 1991, No.A8357 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG HIGH COURT ____________
____________ Coram: Godfrey J. Dates of hearing: 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23 June 1993 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ 1. This plaintiff in this action, Grand Subject Investment Limited ("Grand Subject") claims that on 28th November 1990 the 1st defendant Mable Road Company Limited ("Mable Road") agreed to sell to Grand Subject the 10th floor, Tower 2, Enterprise Square, Kowloon Bay ("the property"). Grand Subject seeks as against Mable Road specific performance of the alleged agreement. Grand Subject accepts that the alleged agreement was not made directly with Mable Road, but says that it was made with the 2nd defendant, First Pacific Davies (Hong Kong) Limited ("First Pacific"), acting on behalf of Mable Road. If, as Mable Road contends (and First Pacific accepts) First Pacific had no authority to enter into any such agreement on behalf of Mable Road, then, says Grand Subject, First Pacific is liable to Grand Subject for damages, for breach of warranty of authority, or, failing that, for damages for having made a number of negligent misrepresentations to Grand Subject in the course of the negotiations which preceded the making of the alleged agreement. I shall deal first with Grand Subject's case against Mable Road, as to which the material facts (as I find them) are as follows. 2. On 11th September 1989, Mable Road purchased from the Hong Kong Government at auction New Kowloon Inland Lot No.6115 on which the complex of buildings now known as Enterprise Square has been developed. The conditions of sale included the following Special Condition 14:-
3. On 29th September 1989, First Pacific wrote to Kerry Properties Limited, an associate of one of the consortium of shareholders in Mable Road, soliciting appointment as marketing agents for the proposed development and setting out, among other things, its view that:-
What precisely First Pacific meant by "pre-commitment" is not spelt out in this letter and, indeed, is far from clear, at any rate to me. I should add, for the sake of completeness, that in other materials prepared by First Pacific for Mable Road, similar statements were made; to the effect, e.g., that it should be part of the marketing strategy to achieve high level of "pre-commitment"; to source "pre- commitment" of large space users within the shortest time so as to ensure high levels of take up in the early part of the campaign; to formulate a differential pricing strategy for the various floors and storeys of the development encouraging "pre-commitment" of Tower B and C and the lower floors; and so on. Of course, if a pre-commitment were to involve Mable Road in a breach of Special Condition 14, it would be most unwise for Mable Road to make it. 4. On 27th September 1990, First Pacific and Vigers (Hong Kong) Limited ("Vigers") were appointed as joint marketing agents for the development. The terms of the appointment were finally settled only on 7th January 1991, but I am satisfied that the agreement made on this latter date between Mable Road, First Pacific and Vigers falls to be treated as having effect, not only from 1st November 1990 as is expressly provided, but as from 27th September 1990, on the principle that parties who act in the course of negotiations on the assumption that, if and whenever an contract is made, it will govern what was being done meanwhile, will be treated as bound by that assumption : see Trollope & Colls Ltd v. Atomic Power Constructions Ltd [1967]1 WLR 333. The agreement created a fee structure for the remuneration of the agents and by Clause 3 provided as follows:-
The First Schedule reads as follows:
The Second Schedule reads as follows:-
5. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 8 of the Second Schedule are of particular importance; they negate, in the clearest possible terms, any suggestion that by virtue of its appointment, First Pacific was at any time clothed by Mable Road with authority to commit Mable Road to a sale of the property. That, in my judgment, is the end of Grand Subject's case against Mable Road unless indeed Grand Subject can prove either (1) actual authority expressly conferred by Mable Road on First Pacific otherwise than by virtue of First Pacific's appointment; or (2) ostensible authority conferred by Mable Road on First Pacific by virtue of Mable Road's having held out First Pacific to Grand Subject as Mable Road's agent to commit Mable Road to the alleged sale. But Grand Subject can prove neither. It has proved that, at various marketing committee meetings at which representatives of Mable Road were present, it was agreed that the joint agents should be authorised to negotiate acceptable terms for sales and lettings; that the promotion campaign should try to convince prospects to "commit" to the building, or to make "pre-commitments" to purchase (whatever these phrases may mean); that drafts of letters of offer to purchase for "pre- consent" commitment should be prepared; and so on. But that is all; and, in my judgment, none of it comes anywhere near to the sort of formal act which would be required to prove Grand Subject's case that Mable Road had conferred on First Pacific actual authority to commit Mable Road to a sale of the property, especially when, as can be seen from the express terms of First Pacific's appointment, Mable Road intended precisely the contrary. And no case at all was made out in support of ostensible authority. Grand Subject's case against Mable Road, therefore, fails in limine; but I must go on with the narrative in order to deal with Grand Subject's case against First Pacific. 6. On 27th September 1990, the very day on which it was appointed as one of the joint marketing agents for the development, First Pacific wrote a letter introducing the development to a company which it called "C & C Fashion Products". This is the name of a successful and reputable company (or group of companies) in a substantial way of business in the leather goods trade. It is a family business, and prominent in its affairs is a member of the family called Cheng Shek To, Lysander ("Mr Cheng"). First Pacific's letter was marked for Mr Cheng's attention. The group needed bigger offices and the letter excited Mr Cheng's interest, especially the indication it contained of the developer's desire to "pre-commit" part of the development to reputable companies. Mr Cheng entered into negotiations with First Pacific's representatives, particularly a Mr Anthony Yuen ("Mr Yuen"), and Mr Cheng caused Grand Subject to be incorporated on 12th October 1990 as the vehicle for the proposed purchase. 7. I find that from Mr Yuen's point of view the negotiations were negotiations to tempt Mr Cheng into making an offer, not for immediate acceptance by Mable Road, but merely as an indication of serious interest on the part of Mr Cheng buttressed by the payment by him of a substantial sum of money. Such an offer would register Mr Cheng as a First Pacific introduction, rather than a Vigers introduction, if the deal came off. It would score some points for First Pacific with Mable Road and under the agreed agency fee structure would give First Pacific the lion's share of the agency fees for the particular deal. 8. From Mr Cheng's point of view, however, success of the negotiations would mean as he thought not only that he would get his foot in the door, but that he would be able to keep it there, that the developer would, indeed, be "pre-committed" to sell the property to him. However, I find it impossible to hold on the evidence that anything said by Mr Yuen to Mr Cheng in the course of the negotiations amounted to a clear and unequivocal representation by Mr Yuen to Mr Cheng that, if they were to agree on a price for the property, that alone would operate to commit Mable Road to the proposed sale at that price (in breach, of course, of the provisions of Special Condition 14 of the contract under which Mable Road had acquired the land under development). I am prepared to find that that was what Mr Cheng believed; but I am not prepared to find that he did so because that was what Mr Yuen had represented to him. Be that as it may, I find that an agreement on price was in fact reached. Mr Cheng offered, eventually, $1,500 per square foot; and in mid- November was given by Mr Yuen to understand that that price would be an acceptable price to offer. 9. On 20th November 1990, Mr Yuen sent to Mr Cheng a fascimile message. This was headed "Without prejudice and subject to contract" and reads as follows:-
10. The draft "offer letter" sent with this communication was expressed as an offer, not from Grand Subject but from Central Forward Developement Limited, another company associated with the C & C Fashion Group. It was addressed not to Mable Road but to First Pacific. It read as follows:-
11. Mr Cheng referred this draft to his solicitor, Mr Ronald Poon of Messrs K.B. Chau and Co. By 28th November 1990, after some intervening dicussions, Mr Poon had agreed amended terms with Mr Yuen and had been authorised by Mr Cheng to sign the "offer letter" on Grand Subject's behalf. The "offer letter" in its final form, headed "Without prejudice and subject to contact", was addressed by Grand Subject to First Pacific and read substantially as did the original draft, but with certain material differences. The guideline area was, in the final form, stated to be not less than 12,866 sq.ft. gross; and the proviso to Clause 4 had been amended so as to read as follows:-
And the following Specific Condition 9 had been added : - "9. SPECIAL CONDITION
12. In exchange for the "offer letter" and his firm's cheque for $500,000, Mr Poon received a photocopy of the cheque endorsed with the words "received by Anthony Yuen for and on behalf of (First Pacific) 28th November 1990". First Pacific duly banked the cheque. 13. This exchange concluded the negotiations. First Pacific sent a copy of the "offer letter" to Kerry Real Estate Agency Limited, the marketing arm of Kerry Properties Ltd; but received an immediate and negative reply in a letter dated 29th November 1990 which read as follows:-
14. Mr Yuen says he sent, by fascimile, a copy of the rejection letter of 29th November 1990 to Mr Cheng. A further copy was sent by hand. Mr Cheng says that he did not receive either of these; but it does not matter. So far as Mable Road was concerned, it did not accept the offer and whatever else may have been its result, the exchange relied on could not have constituted a contract between Grand Subject and Mable Road. Did the exchange then have any result at all? In my judgment, after the offer was transmitted by First Pacific to Mable Road and rejected (I need not speculate on what the result might have been if the offer had been accepted by Mable Road) the only legal obligation on anybody was an obligation on the part of First Pacific to return the $500,000 to Grand Subject. I accept that Mr Cheng believed that the result of the exchange, on his side, of the "offer letter" and the cheque, and on the other side, the receipt given by First Pacific for the cheque, was to constitute a legally binding agreement between Grand Subject and Mable Road to the effect that the latter would enter into a formal sale and purchase agreement for the sale of the property by Mable Road to Grand Subject at the price of $1,500 per square foot. Indeed, Mr Cheng appears to have been so advised by Mr Poon, at whose instance the words "Without prejudice to our right for specific performance" had been inserted, in the proviso to Clause 4 of the "offer letter", for just this purpose. 15. But whatever Mr Cheng or Mr Poon may have believed to be the result of the "offer letter", coupled with First Pacific's acceptance of the $500,000, my function is limited to construing the "offer letter" in order to see what if any contractual relationship between the parties was thereby intended to be constituted. As Sir Garfield Barwick said in Daiman Development Sdn. Bhd. v Mathew Lui Chin Teck [1981]1 MLJ 56 at p.58:-
16. If I were to construe the "offer letter" as Grand Subject invites me to do, I would be flying in the face of this valuable guidance, as well as in the face of the express terms of the "offer letter" headed as it is "without prejudice and subject to contract" and providing as it does that neither the offer nor the acceptance of it by First Pacific is to constitute a binding obligation on the part of Mable Road. And the parole evidence rule precludes me from receiving evidence to contradict the terms of the "offer letter". 17. Since then First Pacific did not purport to commit Mable Road to any binding obligation, the claim against First Pacific for breach of warranty of authority also fails. It gave no such warranty and it committed no such breach. 18. As to the alleged misrepresentations made by First Pacific to Grand Subject, no representations of sufficiently clear and unambiguous a character were established by the evidence such as would justify a decision in Grand Subject's favour on this aspect of the case. 19. There were a number of such representations alleged; e.g., that Mable Road had the intention to "commit" itself to interested purchasers; that Mable Road would devise packages to facilitate purchase of parts of the development, that a sale could be effected if an interested purchaser made a deposit of $500,000 forthwith; that if the purchaser should decide to acquire the 10th Floor, Mable Road would not seek to back out from the agreement in the event of any subsequent increase in market price; and so on. But I find none of these sufficiently established by the evidence. Even First Pacific's acceptance of the amendment made by Mr Poon to the proviso to Clause 4 of the "offer letter", knowing, as Mr Yuen told me, that it was "useless" to protect Grand Subject's interests, does not amount to such a representation. It is not to my mind attractive; but it is not actionable as a negligent misrepresentation, and that is what is required if Grand Subject is to succeed on this aspect of the case. 20. It will be obvious from what I have said that I have considerable sympathy for Mr Cheng. He was most anxious to secure the property. He did his utmost to do so. Since, as Mr Poon accepted, he was advised by Mr Poon that he had succeeded in doing so, the result of this action will be a serious disappointment for him. 21. I would express the hope that, in future, marketing agents who want prospective purchasers to "pre-commit" themselves to a purchase in a new development will be very careful to explain precisely what, on both sides, this "pre-commitment" is intended to entail; and that solicitors who act for such prospective purchasers will either ensure that the "pre-commitment" is legally binding on the developer or advise their clients in clear terms that it is not. 22. As for the present action, I find myself, not without regret, bound to dismiss it.
Representation: Mr Ronny Wong, Q.C. & Mr B. Yuen, inst'd by M/s Liau, Ho & Chan, for Plaintiff. Mr R. Ribeiro, Q.C. & Ms Maria Yuen, inst'd by M/s Deacons for 1st Defendant. Mr Adrian Huggins, Q.C. & Mr Johnson Lam, inst'd by M/s Richards Butler for 2nd Detendant. |