HKSAR v. Tung Yue Kin
Read the full judgment text of CACC 338/1997 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 8 May 1998.
1. On 19th May 1997, this Applicant was convicted of trafficking in a crystalline solid containing 15.31 grammes of methamphetamine hydrochloride ("ice"). This followed a trial before Deputy Judge Beeson (as she then was) and a jury. The Applicant now seeks leave to appeal against his conviction.
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CACC000338/1997 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL 1997, No.338
------------------------------- Coram: Power, V.-P., Mayo and Stuart-Moore, JJ.A. Date of Hearing: 8 May 1998 Date of Judgment: 8 May 1998 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Stuart-Moore, J.A. (giving the judgment of the Court): 1. On 19th May 1997, this Applicant was convicted of trafficking in a crystalline solid containing 15.31 grammes of methamphetamine hydrochloride ("ice"). This followed a trial before Deputy Judge Beeson (as she then was) and a jury. The Applicant now seeks leave to appeal against his conviction. 2. Miss Corrine Remedios, who did not appear in the court below, has raised on behalf of the Applicant three grounds of appeal. The first two of these can be dealt with together, and they amount to a suggestion that the trial judge descended into the arena and, in doing so, lost her cloak of impartiality. 3. Ground 1 reads:
Ground 2:
4. The prosecution's case was largely undisputed. It was the interpretation of their case and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence which were challenged by the defence. 5. The Applicant admitted that he was a user of this drug, and it was his case that the ice which the police found on him, contained in 22 separate packets each weighing approximately 0.69 gramme, was for personal consumption. The account given to the police of having bought the ice for $13,000 from someone called Ah Keung was confirmed by the Applicant when he gave evidence. In his testimony, the Applicant explained that because he was not at that time working, he had borrowed $15,000 from his mother. He needed a larger sum than usual to purchase ice because his normal supplier was going to be away for some time. He therefore bought a month's supply and, having done so, he went to have his mobile telephone repaired and after that was arrested. 6. The prosecution relied on a powerful combination of circumstances, in particular three things. They said that this was a relatively large and expensive quantity of drugs for an ordinary consumer to possess. They said it was packaged in just the way a trafficker would normally keep those drugs and, thirdly, an addict would be unlikely to wander about carrying such a large amount with him. 7. Within this context, the passages about which complaint is made occurred at the end of the Applicant's cross-examination. At page 51 in the appeal bundle, the cross-examination of the Applicant commenced and, amongst the topics covered were his income, his past expenditure on ice, his rate of consumption and his past dealings with Ah Keung, the supplier. As for the drugs in his possession at the time of his arrest, he agreed that Ah Keung did not specify how much money to bring with him, but to bring more than usual because he was going to be away from Hong Kong for some time. On meeting Ah Keung, he was asked for $13,000 and was given the 22 bags of ice although he did not count them when he was handed them. He was prepared simply to trust Ah Keung who he had dealt with on about ten occasions before. 8. The kindest way of describing the cross-examination is to say that the questions have very little depth to them. At the end of re-examination at page 56 in the bundle, the judge asked the questions about which complaint was made. There were 14 questions in all and I should read those:
9. The evidence provided in these answers was repeated to large extent in the summing up and particular criticism is made of the way the judge referred at page 17 in the summing up to the borrowed sum of $15,000 as appearing to have been "plucked out of the air because Ah Keung had not said how long he would be going away or what size purchase the defendant should make ....." 10. It is also suggested by Miss Remedios that there is added partiality to be found on the part of the judge at page 18 line C because the comments appear to have been made, she submits, with an air of disbelief. The judge said:
11. A very short while after that passage, the judge continued by saying to the jury:
12. There is no need to review the authorities cited in this case. This court in H.K.S.A.R. v. Jahangir & others, Cr.App. 35/1997 recently reviewed some of the authorities on this topic. 13. We have considered all the submissions most ably advanced by Miss Remedios, but we can find no substance in any of them. There is nothing which suggests to us that the judge's questions were other than perfectly properly made, nor indeed that they had been asked with an air of incredulity as it has been suggested. Even the most superficial reading of the questions asked by the judge shows that they were most restrained, and many of them were intended no doubt to clarify issues which had not properly or fully been covered in cross-examination. It is small wonder, in the light of the cross-examination, that the judge felt to need to ask these questions. 14. In the summing up, the judge repeated much of the evidence but at no stage treated it with scorn. At no stage did she disparage the answers that had been given. Indeed, while Miss Remedios makes her complaints of the passages already read out at page 18, it is clear that the defence case was very fully put to the jury in fair and accurate terms at a later stage in the summing up. 15. There is no merit in these grounds. 16. So far as the third ground of appeal is concerned, it is as follows. The judge directed the jury in these terms and complaint is made of it:
17. The complaint is that the jury may have concluded from that direction that there was an onus of proof on the balance of probabilities upon the Applicant. Miss Remedios submits that at the very least this may have led to confusion on the part of the jury as to where the burden of proof lay. 18. This can be dealt with quickly as while those words may be described as a misdirection, they cannot be read in isolation. There was, of course, an earlier standard direction as to the burden of proof. Following that, on page 15 of the summing up, the judge went on to say this:
19. After that passage came the passage which is complained about where the judge made the error of referring in terms to probability. But then she went on a very short while afterwards at page 25 line D:
20. In the context, we are satisfied that the misdirection of which complaint is made was not material. There is nothing in this ground of any substance. Accordingly the application must be dismissed.
Representation: Mr. Schapel for D.P.P./Respondent Miss Corrine Remedios instructed by D.L.A. for Applicant. |