Re Sing Tao Newspapers Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 792/1980 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. By the present originating summons, dated 6th September, 1980, Sing Tao Newspapers Limited (hereafter referred to as "Sing Tao") sought the following declarations:-
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HCMP000792/1980 Foreign litigation and Hong Kong arbitration between same parties on same subject matter - Stay of the foreign litigation pending determination by the Courts in Hong Kong of whether the Hong Kong arbitration should be allowed to proceed - Principles to be applied in determining whether a declaration should be made that the Hong Kong arbitration should proceed.
Coram: Rhind, J. in Chambers Date of Judgment: 8th May, 1981 ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- 1. By the present originating summons, dated 6th September, 1980, Sing Tao Newspapers Limited (hereafter referred to as "Sing Tao") sought the following declarations:-
2. Sing Tao is a Hong Kong registered company which carries on some business in California, whilst Hong Hua is a company incorporated in Taiwan which also carries on some business in California. 3. On the 17th April, 1978, Sing Tao and Hong Hua entered into the three agreements in respect of which declarations are now sought. Those three agreements were all prepared by Sing Tao's solicitor in Hong Kong, and were signed on behalf of Sing Tao and Hong Hua in Hong Kong. 4. All three agreements are closely interrelated in respect of parties, time, subject matter and performance. In brief, the Sales Agreement provided for the sale by Hong Hua to Sing Tao of two offset high speed presses at a price of US$300,000, payable by specified instalments. That price included delivery to San Francisco, California, where Hong Hua was required to install them, and get them into proper operating condition. It was expressly acknowledged in the Sales Agreement that the purpose for which the presses were required was for printing newspapers and publications circulated on the West Coast of the United States. The Hiring Agreement makes provision for those self-same presses to be rented out by Sing Tao to Hong Hua under what is commonly referred to as a lease - back arrangement. Finally, the Printing Agreement made provision for Hong Hua to set up a company in the United States to use the equipment supplied under the Sales Agreement for the purpose of printing Sing Tao's publications there, namely, the Sing Tao Jih Pao and the Express Daily News, at an agreed price. The company which Hong Hua set up, as required by the Printing Agreement, was its wholly owned subsidiary, Newsweb Printing Limited (hereafter referred to as "Newsweb"), a California corporation. 5. The Sales Agreement and the Printing Agreement each contain a provision relating to the arbitration of disputes, but those provisions are not identically worded. Each of those two agreements does, however, contain an identically worded clause about the law which is to apply: "This agreement shall be subject to and construed in accordance with the Laws of Hong Kong". 6. By contrast the Hiring Agreement is completely silent on the law which is to apply and it lacks any reference to arbitration. 7. So that the scope of the arbitration clauses in the Sales Agreement and the Printing Agreement, respectively, can be considered, and so that the differences between them can be observed, I will now set out the two provisions in full: Paragraph 11 of the Sales Agreement
8. Paragraph 14 of the Printing Agreement
9. Already the stage is sufficiently set to be able to say that if the court were prepared to order arbitration in accordance with Clause 11 of the Sales Agreement and Clause 14 of the Printing Agreement, it would inevitably follow that the court's order would have to be different from that prayed by paragraph 1 of the present summons which does not follow the precise wording of either of the two arbitration clauses just referred to. Any order made by the court would have to be to the effect that the Sales Agreement should be arbitrated in accordance with its Clause 11 and that the Printing Agreement should be arbitrated in accordance with its Clause 14. There is no scope for the court to come up with some re-written, composite clause which would cover both the Sales Agreement and the Printing Agreement. 10. The lack of a uniform arbitration clause would certainly not make the arbitrator's task any easier were the disputes under the Sales Agreement and the Printing Agreement to go to arbitration. Determining which matters fell within, and which outside the scope of the two differing arbitration clauses could add an unwelcome complication to the arbitration, and, in due course, I propose throwing that factor into the scale along with all the others in determining whether the balance of convenience dictates that the proposed arbitration should be allowed to proceed. 11. Without further ado, I now propose to rule on the Second and Third Orders sought by the Summons. 12. That Second proposed Order was to the effect that disputes between Sing Tao and Hong Hua under the Hiring Agreement should also be subject to arbitration. While not expressly abandoning this proposed Order, Mr. Litton, for Sing Tao did not waste the court's time by saying anything in support of it. Sometimes an agreement without any express arbitration clause can be regarded as supplemental to an agreement embodying an arbitration clause, with the result that the two agreements can in effect be treated as one arbitrable agreement. Wade-Gery v. Morrison(1) is an example of that type of situation. However, I see no scope for construing the Hiring Agreement as supplemental to either the Sales Agreement or the Printing Agreement. It is undoubtedly closely interrelated with both those agreements, and forms part of an overall business arrangement, without nonetheless, being supplemental. If the Hiring Agreement were to be regarded as supplemental for arbitration purposes, it could not conceivably be supplemental to both the Sales Agreement and the Printing Agreement in view of the fact that each of that pair embodies a differing arbitration clause. It would, therefore, be necessary to nominate which of the other two agreements the Hiring Agreement was supplemental to. On the view I take, it was supplemental to neither, so that problem does not arise. 13. The Hiring Agreement lacks any express arbitration clause; there is no scope for reading one into it on the view I take; there is no suggestion that there should be rectification. It inevitably follows that I must decline to make the Second Order sought by the Summons. 14. Very sensibly, not a word passed from learned Defence Counsel's lips to suggest that, in context, "Chairman of the Law Society for the time being" could mean anything other than "President of the Law Society of Hong Kong for the time being". Without hesitation, I am willing to make the declaration sought by paragraph 3 of the Summons. 15. The way is now clear to concentrate on the actively disputed issue before me, which was whether there should be arbitration in Hong Kong of the Sales Agreement in accordance with its Clause 11 and the Printing Agreement in accordance with its Clause 14. 16. Disputes having arisen in San Francisco between Sing Tao and Hong Hua, it was Sing Tao which took the first formal step by sending a Notice dated 30th July, 1980 from its San Francisco office to Hong Hua, announcing that the Sales Agreement, the Hiring Agreement and the Printing Agreement were all terminated because of Hong Hua's breaches and demanding arbitration of the disputes under all three Agreements in Hong Kong. Hong Hua having failed to respond to Sing Tao's suggestion as to who should be the arbitrator, Sing Tao wrote to the President of the Law Society of Hong Kong on 5th September, 1980, to appoint an arbitrator. On 15th October, 1980, the President of the Law Society of Hong Kong appointed Mr. S.V. Gittens, Q.C., to be the arbitrator in respect of the Sales Agreement and the Printing Agreement, but declined to make any appointment in respect of the Hiring Agreement, not wishing to be involved in the controversy whether this latter Agreement might be construed as arbitrable. 17. Meanwhile, on 1st August, 1980, Sing Tao, together with its Californian subsidiary, Sing Tao Newspapers (San Francisco) Ltd., (hereafter referred to as "Sing Tao (S.F.)", commenced proceedings against Hong Hua and Newsweb in the Superior Court, State of California, for the County of San Mateo. for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. 18. The printing presses, the subject of the three Agreements, were located at premises which Newsweb had rented from Sing Tao (S.F.) at 215, Littlefield Road, San Francisco. 19. By those Superior Court proceedings, Sing Tao sought, inter alia, pending arbitration, to have Hong Hua and Newsweb excluded from operating or handling the presses which Sing Tao now regarded as its own property. 20. Next, in the Municipal Court at San Mated, Sing Tao (S.F.) commenced proceedings against Newsweb, claiming arrears of rent and re-possession of the premises at 215, Littlefield Avenue. 21. The next step of interest on the litigation front was on 20th August, 1980, when Hong Hua and Newsweb filed a Cross-Complaint in the Superior Court proceedings. Sing Tao and Sing Tao (S.F.) were made the cross-defendants, as were also John Fung, who is an executive of the Sing Tao companies, Sally Aw Sian who is a director of those companies, and ten "John Does" (i.e. unidentified parties). 22. That Cross-Complaint embodied three separate causes of action. 23. The first cause of action was for breach of contract against Sing Tao and Sing Tao (S.F.). It alleged basically that Sing Tao was in breach of (a) the Sales Agreement by failing to pay the final instalment of US$63,000 and (b) the Printing Agreement by failing to pay US$11,730 due for printing the Express, and by refusing to give Newsweb the opportunity to print the Sing Tao Jih Pao. 24. The second cause of action alleged misrepresentation and fraud by John Fung, Sally Aw Sian and the ten John Does in relation to the negotiations and events leading up to the making of the three Agreements. 25. The third cause of action is described as being for declaratory relief. Besides seeking a declaration that any monies owed by the cross-complainants for rent on the premises at 215, Littlefield Avenue should be set off against monies owed by the cross-defendants in respect of the printing of the Express, this cause of action also sought rectification of a term in the Printing Agreement about its duration. Whereas the Printing Agreement is worded to the effect it is terminable upon six months notice, Hong Hua contends that the true intention was that it should run for 10 years from November 9th 1978. The duration of the Printing Agreement is also of significance for the Hiring Agreement which is expressed to be coterminous. 26. According to Counsel for Hong Hua, the steps about to be described which Sing Tao took in reaction to Hong Hua's Cross-Complaint have brought about a situation whereby it would no longer be desirable to allow Sing Tao to insist on arbitration in Hong Kong. Sing Tao's counsel, on the other hand, urges the contrary view-point, maintaining that whatever action Sing Tao has taken, it has always been without prejudice to Sing Tao's arbitration rights which have at all times been preserved. 27. In response to the Cross-Complaint, Sing Tao filed a Notice of Motion which came on for hearing in the Superior Court on 1st October, 1980 which sought (1) to quash service of the summons relating to the Cross-Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and (2) to dismiss the cross-action on the ground of inconvenient forum. Both parts of that Motion by Sing Tao failed. 28. Following that, a further Motion of Sing Tao's came before the Superior Court on 5th November, 1980. Unfortunately, the form of the Motion itself was not included in the papers before me. The contents of that Motion are a matter of inference from the briefs filed by the lawyers on each side in the Superior Court proceedings. Those briefs are to be found at page 138 of Exhibit "ATC-1" attached to Mr. Ai Ti Chu's Affirmation of 11th November, 1980, ant Exhibit "F.S.L.W. 4" attached to Mr. Francis S.L. Wang's Affidavit of 8th December, 1980. It is clear that part of the motion was by way of demurrer to get all of the Cross-Complainants' causes of action dismissed. The motion also sought to get Hong Hua's claims dismissed for want of capacity to sue. Another part of the motion was to stay the proceedings by way of Cross-Complaint pending the out-come of the present proceedings before the Supreme Court of Hong Kong as to whether there should be arbitration. 29. I do not know what order, if any, was made on the other Motions which were due to be deal with before the San Mateo Superior Court on 5th November, 1980, but I do know that the following order was made on the Motion to stay:-
30. There the matter rests at the moment. Hong Hua is urging me to refuse the declaration sought by paragraph 1 of the present summons so that all the disputes between Hong Hua and Sing Tao can then be determined by litigation in California, whereas Sing Tao wants at least the disputes within the arbitration clauses in the Sales Agreement and the Printing Agreement to be arbitrated in Hong Kong before Mr. S.V. Gittens, Q.C. 31. It was common ground between Sing Tao and Hong Hau before me that the Court in Hong Kong is exercising a discretionary power in deciding whether to declare that an arbitration should proceed. Needless to say, such discretionary power is not unfettered, but must be exercised in a judicial manner, This particular discretionary power can trace its origins to two sources. 32. There is firstly the general fact that, under our system of law, all declarations, being equitable in nature, share the characteristic with other forms of equitable relief that they are discretionary in nature. Then there is the circumstances peculiar to arbitration clauses in contracts that the courts are in effect empowered to suspend them, if the interests of justice so demand, with the result that disputes will then proceed to a litigation forum instead: Heyman v. Darwins Ltd.,(2) at p.373, per Lord Macmillan. 33. While, therefore, arbitration clauses do not enjoy the same degree of sanctity as other types of contractual provisions, the courts do, nonetheless, strive to give effect to them unless some good cause is shown why this should not be done. I do not think there can be any scope for doubting that the onus of satisfying the court that litigation rather than arbitration should proceed rests with the party seeking to avoid the contractual provision for arbitration. (See e.g. Heyman v. Darwins Ltd.,(2) at 388.) 34. No direct authority was cited to me on the test which our courts should apply in determining whether to declare that arbitration should proceed. In the somewhat analogous case of whether to grant a different type of equitable relief, namely, an injunction to restrain a party from foreign litigation in favour of domestic arbitration, the courts have adopted the test of the balance of convenience: Gorthon Invest A B v. Ford Motor Co., Ltd., (The "Maria Gorthon")(3) at p.727. Such a test commends itself to me as suitable for the determination of the matter before me. I propose, however, to add one refinement to this approach. I think it is incumbent on the party seeking to avoid arbitration (in this case Hong Hua) to show something more than a simple balance of convenience in its favour: it has to show "strong cause" why it would be convenient to deprive Sing Tao of its contractual expectations. By such an approach, the parties contractual arrangement will not lightly be set at naught. 35. This requirement of "strong cause" featured in The Eleftheria(4) at pages 99 and 100, which dealt with the not dissimilar situation of whether English courts will allow litigation to proceed in England in disregard of an express provision in a contract that it is to be litigated before a foreign court. 36. In short then, the test I am going to adopt is that Sing Tao will be entitled to a declaration that the arbitration in Hong Kong shall proceed unless Hong Hua can show strong cause on a balance of convenience why this should not be so. 37. For the purpose of carrying out this balancing exercise, the following considerations have been taken into account.
38. If Sing Tao can be seen to have taken active steps in the litigation set in motion by Hong Hua's Cross-Complaint, this court might then incline to the view that Sing Tao's conduct had brought about a situation where it would no longer be equitable for Sing Tao to insist on arbitration. Precisely what label should be attached to the equitable doctrine is not important. A range of concepts such as waiver, acquiescence, election, or the maxims of Equity like the one about not being able to approbate and reprobate at the same time, spring to mind. All of them share the characteristic that Equity does not approve of a party appearing to adopt one course, with all its incidental advantages and then wanting to switch to another. 39. This attitude of Equity's can be seen at work with respect to the enforcement of certain foreign judgments. Irrespective of whether a foreign court has jurisdiction according to the English rules of conflict of laws, if a defendant takes steps towards defending himself in foreign proceedings, he will be deemed voluntarily to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, with the result that the foreign court's judgment will be enforceable against him in England if he is sued on it there (or in Hong Kong if he is sued on it here). The type of step which will bring about this result is one where the defendant has asked the foreign court to exercise a discretion in his favour which could have resulted in the foreign proceedings being dismissed, or if he has sought a ruling on a plea on the merits in his favour before the foreign tribunal. In such circumstances, a defendant is prepared to take the benefit of a ruling in his favour which can bring the claim against him to an end. Equity says that the obverse side of the coin is that he must accept that the foreign court has jurisdiction over the claim if he loses. To satisfy an English (or a Hong Kong) Court that he has not voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, a defendant needs to be able to show that he stood aloof from the foreign proceedings, taking no steps in the foreign litigation. A defendant is not entitled to "take a chance" of a judgment in his favour without also accepting the consequences of a decision against him. 40. That principle was laid down by the Court of Appeal in Harris v. Taylor(5) and re-affirmed of recent years in Henry v. Geopresco International Ltd.,(6) 41. Of course, Harris v. Taylor(5) and Henry v. Geopresco International Ltd.,(6) were both cases concerned with the particular problem of the enforcement of foreign judgments, but The Maria Gorthon(3) illustrates that the principle they embody can be of wider application. In The Maria Gorthon(3) an injunction was sought in the English courts against an English-based defendant to prevent the continuation of foreign proceedings in favour of arbitration between the parties in England. One of the factors taken into account by the court as relevant in arriving at a determination to exercise its discretion by refusing the injunction was that the plaintiff had already taken steps in the foreign proceedings. 42. There can be no doubt that, according to Hong Kong notions, Sing Tao has taken steps in the Cross-Claim launched by Hong Hua. One unmistakable step was Sing Tao's unsuccessful Motion to get Hong Hua's cross-action dismissed on the ground of inconvenient forum, a type of step which had featured in Henry v. Geopresco International Ltd.,(6) itself. That Sing Tao in that instance was seeking an exercise of the Superior Court's discretion in its favour for the purpose of bringing Hong Hua's Cross-Claim to an end can be discerned from the content of Sing Tao's Californian counsel's brief lodged with the Superior Court in support of that Motion. The relevant part will be found in the exhibit to MI Ai Ti Chu's Affidavit, "ATC-1", at page 111:-
43. I have no doubt either that Sing Tao 's Motion to have the Cross-Complaint dismissed for want of personal service was equally a step in the proceedings. Likewise, Sing Tao's Motions by way of demurrer, and to dismiss for various reasons, which were all due to be heard before the Superior Court on 1st November, 1980, at the same time as the Motion to stay, would all have amounted to steps. What became of those Motions (other than the Motion to stay) was not revealed to me. 44. Having sought the benefit of verdicts in its favour by the steps it took in the Cross-Complaint, Sing Tao can hardly expect Equity to smile with favour on its present application. 45. For Sing Tao, it was urged that Hong Hua was not prejudiced by any steps Sing Tao might have taken in the Cross-Action. With that I cannot agree. The risk of a verdict adverse to Hong Hua from the steps Sing Tao took was prejudice enough. 46. Moreover, Sing Tao contends it was at all times made abundantly clear to Hong Hua that Sing Tao was reserving the right to arbitrate. No doubt, it is correct that at all times it has been Sing Tao's subjective intention to arbitrate, and it has tried its best to communicate that message to Hong Hua. Like all litigants, Sing Tao wants the best of all possible worlds for itself. However, the law is not concerned with Sing Tao's subjective wishes and intentions, only its actions. Once Sing Tao embarked on steps in the Cross-Complaint, no matter what internal mental reservations it made, it conducted itself in a way which would disincline Equity from bringing about a stay of the litigation. 47. Whether the steps Sing Tao took in the Cross-Complaint were by themselves sufficient to lead to a refusal of the declaration does not call for decision on the facts of the present case. Suffice it to say that the steps taken by Sing Tao in the Cross-Complaint started the balance tilting Hong Hua's way.
48. If there were any such inconsistent findings on substantial points which were in dispute, the result would inevitably be a mockery of justice. The prospect of conflicting decisions between arbitrators and courts within its own jurisdiction must surely be anathema to any legal system. Russell on Arbitration 19th Edition at page 202 shows that the English Courts certainly eschew the type of situation:-
I find the prospect of conflict between the findings of the arbitrator in one jurisdiction, and the courts in another jurisdiction almost equally uninviting. The way to avoid that undesirable type of situation - and surely the likeliest way of achieving justice - will generally be to forego the arbitration and to have the whole matter resolved before the courts in the one jurisdiction. 49. I will now proceed to cite several examples of where claims on substantially the same facts before the arbitrator and in the litigation between Sing Tao and Hong Hua could give rise to inconsistent findings. 50. One really fundamental issue on which there is scope for inconsistent findings relates to the question of title to the printing presses. Clearly, from its many assertions to that effect, Sing Tao considers itself to be the owner of the presses, but Hong Hua takes a different view, considering itself to have sufficient title to the presses to be able to permit its subsidiary, Newsweb, to use them as collateral for a loan from the Bank of Trade of San Francisco. See Mr. Joseph L. Strabala's Affidavit of 18th March, 1981, together with Exh. JLS-3. 51. In arbitration under the Sales Agreement, it is conceivable that the arbitrator could come to the conclusion that title to the presses had not passed to Sing Tao if he accepted Hong Hua's contention that Sing Tao has not yet paid the final instalment of US$63,000 of the sale price. However, in litigation on the Hiring Agreement and on any other non-arbitrable disputed, the courts might arrive at the opposite conclusion as to title. Such a result would be unsatisfactory enough if Sing Tao and Hong Hua were the only parties involved, but the posiition becomes even more intolerable when, as here, third party rights are involved as well. 52. Another source of potentially conflicting rulings is on the topic of whether Hong Hua employed competent personnel to run the presses. Mr. Litton for Sing Tao submitted a document (Exh. PI) to the court, entitled Points of Claim, which embodied the issued on which Sing Tao wishes the arbitrator to rule. Point of Claim No. 14 alleges a breach of the Printing Agreement in that Hong Hua failed to employ technically competent personnel. Sing Tao also maintains that Hong Hua is in breach of the Hiring Agreement by failing to employ technically competent personnel to operate the equipment. Thus, the stage is set for conflicting decisions on the arbitrable Printing Agreement and the justiciable Hiring Agreement. 53. The duration of the Hiring Agreement by its Clause 1 is expressly made to depend on the duration of the Printing Agreement. Hong Hua disputes that the provision in the Printing Agreement about being able to terminate it on six months' notice expresses the true intention of the parties which, according to Hong Hua, was that the Agreement should last for a non-terminable period of ten years. Hence, Hong Hua seeks rectification of the Printing Agreement, a course which would produce corresponding consequences for the duration of the Hiring Agreement. Sing Tao asserts that any such rectification of the Printing Agreement would be within the competence of an arbitrator appointed under the arbitration provision of the Printing Agreement. Even if Sing Tao were right on that, it would not help them because the problem would remain of the arbitrators finding on the rectification point, perhaps not coinciding with a court's finding on the duration of the Printing Agreement in so far as it affected the duration of the Hiring Agreement. 54. If rectification of the Printing Agreement were beyond the powers of the arbitrator so that any such rectification had to be determined by a court, this would be a strong argument in favour of sending all the claims to court because it would obviously be unsatisfactory to split the proceedings and to have multiplicity of proceedings in that way. 55. Sing Tao submits that in any event Hong Hua is not being sincere in its claim that rectification should occur, and has only manufactured this issue as a means of evading arbitration. As Sing Tao sees it, even Hong Hua acknowledges the Printing Agreement is at an end, for why else would Hong Hua claim damages under the Printing Agrement for its breach? Sing Tao queried the point of rectifying an agreement which has come to an end. 56. I see no reason why in appropriate circumstances an agreement which has terminated by breach should not have its provisions rectified, for the true nature of its provisions could be highly relevant to damages. In the case before me, whether the Printing Agreement (and hence the Hiring Agreement) were of ten years duration or whether they were terminable on six months' notice could be highly relevant to damages for their breach. 57. From documentary evidence of the type before me, I am in no position to judge mental states such as Hong Hua's sincerity and motives. All I can say is that on the material before me, there certainly appears to be at least an arguable case for Hong Hua that the issue of rectification arises. 58. Being thus sufficiently satisfied that rectification arises, I am of the opinion that, for the reasons previously stated, the duration of the Printing Agreement and the Hiring Agreement is an example of an area where there is scope for potentially conflicting decisions inside and outside the arbitration. 59. I do not think any point would be served by further multiplying the examples which can be found of issues where the risk exists of conflicting findings between the arbitrator and the courts. The examples I have already given would by themselves be sufficient to persuade me that strong cause has been demonstrated for refusing the declaration which is sought.
60. In exercising my discretion, some of the factors which weighed with the judge in the not unrelated situation in The Eleftheria,(4) already referred to, can usefully be taken into account. A passage at page 99 from that judgment sign-posts some of the sorts of features I consider I should put into the scales.
61. Applying that passage, mutatis mutandis, the answers to the following questions supply useful pointers to how the discretion should be exercised.
62. Besides the list of points I have relied on from The Elftheria,(4) two other general considerations I have taken into account are the inadvisability of splitting proceedings and the undesirability of multiplicity of proceedings. 63. Splitting of the proceedings between arbitration and litigation in the present instance would be likely to lead both to an artificial demarcation, and some wasteful duplication of effort. To perform his task properly, the arbitrator would need to consider the making, and alleged breaches and termination of the Sales Agreement and the Printing Agreement in the full matrix of all their surrounding circumstances, and the courts in California would in due course find themselves performing a similar task covering much of the same ground. The articiality of the task imposed on the arbitrator would be heightened by his being confined to disputed between Sing Tao and Hong Hua, whereas the reality of the matter is that the activities of the subsidiaries, Sing Tao (S.F.) and Newsweb, respectively, are inextricably mixed up with the activities of the parent companies. Far better to have the courts of one jurisdiction sort out the whole mare's nest with all interested parties being joined in. 64. Already there are two sets of proceedings in California - one before the Superior Court and one in the Municipal Court. Not adding yet another set of proceedings - arbitration in Hong Kong - furthers the principle that multiplicity of proceedings is to be discouraged. There is lastly the complicating factor already referred to of the lack of a uniform arbitration clause.
65. The cumulative effect of the foregoing factors leads me to conclude that Hong Hua Has overwhelmingly discharged the burden imposed on it of showing strong cause on a balance of convenience why the declaration sought by Sing Tao for arbitration with regard to the Sales Agreement and the Printing Agreement should not be made. The way is now clear, therefore, for the litigation to continue before the courts of California.
Representation: Mr. H. Litton, Q.C., & Mr. H.L. Wong (Stevenson, Low & Co.,) for Applicant Mr. J. Swaine, Q.C., & Mr. W. Poon (JSM) for Hong Hua Machinery Works Ltd. (1) 37 L.T. (N.S.) 270 (2) [1942] A.C. 356 (3) 1976 Lloyds Reports Vol. II 720 (4) [1970] p.94 (5) [1915] 2 K.B. 580 (6) [1976] 1 Q.B. 726 |