Midland Realty International Ltd v. Lee Ngok Wah
Read the full judgment text of HCA 9581/1983 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. The defendant was employed by the plaintiff, a company that deals in real estate, as a broker or estate agent under a contract of employment dated the 16th September 1982 for a period of three years. On the 30th December 1982 the defendant's contract was terminated by the plaintiff. Subsequently the defendant was employed by another company that also deals in real property.
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HCA009581/1983 HEADNOTE Vacation business - Standard to be applied for hearing an application.
BETWEEN
-------- Coram: Jones J. Date: 9th August 1983 _________ DECISION _________ 1. The defendant was employed by the plaintiff, a company that deals in real estate, as a broker or estate agent under a contract of employment dated the 16th September 1982 for a period of three years. On the 30th December 1982 the defendant's contract was terminated by the plaintiff. Subsequently the defendant was employed by another company that also deals in real property. 2. The plaintiff in this action claims damages for breach of contract and an injunction on the grounds that the defendant is in breach of a covenant contained in the agreement whereby he agreed inter alia for a period of 1½ years after termination not to engage in business of a similar nature to that of the plaintiff. 3. It was not until June 1983 that the plaintiff discovered the nature of the defendant's present employment. Correspondence then ensued between the plaintiff's solicitor and the defendant and his solicitor which was to no avail. The first letter from the plaintiff's solicitor was dated the 22nd June 1983. 4. The writ was filed on the 27th July 1983. Although the summer vacation did not commence until the 8th August 1983 the plaintiff applied on the 28th July 1983 for a certificate of urgency from the Master to proceed with the application for an injunction during the vacation, on the grounds that further irreparable damage will be done to the business of the plaintiff. On that bare assertion the Master granted his certificate. 5. With regard to the hearing of applications in the vacation. Order 64 rule 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
6. A practice direction requires the Master to grant leave if he is satisfied that the matter is urgent or if necessary he may refer the application to a judge. It is clear that the Master when exercising his discretion to grant a certificate must adopt a high standard see Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Dawn Property Co. Ltd. (Practice Note)(1). 7. The plaintiff has not proceeded with this matter as one of urgency, but has adopted a leisurely approach. Almost two months have elapsed since the plaintiff became aware of the position. Further no evidence was produced by the plaintiff to substantiate the ground on which the application was made. In the circumstances the plaintiff has failed to show that the application is one of such urgency that it should be heard during the vacation. The certificate of urgency should not have been granted by the Master. 8. Accordingly the summons will be adjourned to a date to be fixed during the next term. Costs will be to the defendant to be paid forthwith. 9. The plaintiff has filed affidavits by three university academics in which they purport to express an opinion on the construction of the clause that sets out the restrictive covenant. Suffice to say that it is the function of the Court to interpret the meaning of this clause. The affidavits are inadmissible.
Representation: Mr. Joseph Lee (Joseph C.T. Lee & Co.) for Plaintiff Mr. Patrick Chan (Chen, Ng & Leung) for Defendant (1) (1973) 1 W.L.R. 1450 |