Attorney General v. Tai Nga Ting and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 792/1985 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 31 October 1985.
1. This is a case stated by a magistrate following his acquittal of the respondents on a charge of publication of objectionable articles for gain contrary to Section 4(1)(b) and 4(2) of the Objectionable Publications Ordinance Cap.150.
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HCMA000792/1985 HEADNOTE Objectionable Publication-test IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO.792 OF 1985 ___________ BETWEEN
______________ Coram: O'Connor, J. Date of Hearing: 31 October 1985 Date of Judgment: 31 October 1985 ___________ JUDGMENT ___________ 1. This is a case stated by a magistrate following his acquittal of the respondents on a charge of publication of objectionable articles for gain contrary to Section 4(1)(b) and 4(2) of the Objectionable Publications Ordinance Cap.150. 2. The question posed was "Was I correct in holding that the articles in question were not objectionable within the meaning of the Objectionable Publications Ordinance, and acquitting the respondents accordingly?" 3. That question, as posed, does not raise a question of law. I, at the request of both counsel, treated it as posing the question whether the magistrate's decision was perverse, a decision that the magistrate would not have arrived at if he had properly considered the evidence and correctly applied the law to the evidence. 4. Mr. O'Reilly Mayne, responsibly, having considered the publications informed me that he could not support the magistrate either as to his verdict or his reasons. I, having myself looked at the publications, and considered the magistrate's reasons, am also of the view that the reasons are bad, and the verdict perverse. The publications are clearly objectionable. 5. The magistrate's reasons as set out in the case stated are :
6. As regards the first reason, I would observe what is required of a judicial officer is that he does his duty, difficult or otherwise, and applies community standards. 7. Reasons one and two are irrelevant. Reason three is relevant but by no means decisive. The courts are not bound to accept that the film censor correctly applies community standards. The films shown in Hong Kong are simply one matter for consideration in finding and applying the community standard. The fourth reason is factually erroneous. In any event such a matter is simply one matter for consideration, and would by no means be conclusive. 8. The fifth reason points towards the publication being objectionable, but is in no way conclusive. The sixth reason is not the correct test. It is not correct to look at what is available to the public, and decide that in the light of what is available the publication under consideration is not objectionable. The fact that dangerous drugs are freely available in Hong Kong, is no indication that community standards in Hong Kong approve of such drugs. 9. The proper test to apply is that set out in R. v. Mirchandani [1977] H.K.L.R.523, as approved in Attorney General v. I.P.P. Industrial Co. Ltd. Criminal Appeal No.397 of 1984. 10. I answer 'no' to the question posed, as understood by me. I send the case back to the magistrate with instructions to convict and proceed thereafter in accordance with law.
Representation: I.G. Cross, Acting Senior Assistant Crown Prosecutor, for the appellant. D.F. O'Reilly Mayne, Q.C., assisted by Lawrence Lok (W.K. To & Co.) for the respondents. |