Capacious Investments Ltd. v. Secretary for Justice
Read the full judgment text of HCA 5551/1999 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 January 2001.
1. At all material times until 20 December 1996, the plaintiff was the registered owner of various Lots of land in the New Territories. Pursuant to powers delegated to him, the Principal Government Land Agent made an order under section 13(1) of the Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance, Cap.370 ("RWUCO") directing, inter alia, that the Lots be resumed with effect from 20 December 1996. Notice of the said resumption was published in the Government Gazette as Government Notice No.4211 on
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HCA005551/1999 HCA5551/1999 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO.5551 OF 1999 ----------------------
----------------------- Coram: Deputy Judge Whaley in Court Dates of Hearing: 8 and 9 January 2001 Date of Judgment: 23 January 2001 ------------------------- J U D G M E N T ------------------------- 1. At all material times until 20 December 1996, the plaintiff was the registered owner of various Lots of land in the New Territories. Pursuant to powers delegated to him, the Principal Government Land Agent made an order under section 13(1) of the Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance, Cap.370 ("RWUCO") directing, inter alia, that the Lots be resumed with effect from 20 December 1996. Notice of the said resumption was published in the Government Gazette as Government Notice No.4211 on 19 September 1996. The Notice was also affixed on or near the land on 19 September 1996. The Notice states, inter alia :
Pursuant to the said resumption, on 20 December 1996 the said Lots reverted to and became vested in the Government of Hong Kong (now the Government of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region). 2. By a letter dated 6 November 1996 ("the Offer Letter") issued by the District Lands Office, Tuen Mun ("DLO") on behalf of the Director of Lands, the Government, inter alia, states in the following terms :
Attached to the letter was an Information Leaflet entitled : "How to receive compensation for agricultural land resumed by the Government". 3. The Offer Letter was originally sent by DLO to an old address of the plaintiff, as a result of which the plaintiff only received the letter on 16 December 1996, four days before the resumption. (While the plaintiff has reserved all its rights in respect of such delay, nothing turns upon it for the purposes of the present proceedings.) 4. After receiving the Offer Letter, the plaintiff instructed Messrs Lawson David & Sung ("LDS"), surveyors and valuers, to represent it in dealing with the Government in relation to the said offer. 5. It was not until one year later, by letter dated 17 December 1997, that LDS wrote to DLO pointing out alleged discrepancies in the registered areas of the Lots as stated by DLO, which LDS claimed had resulted in the registered area being understated, and concluded :
By return, DLO explained that there were in fact no discrepancies, which explanation was accepted by LDS. 6. By letter dated 4 February 1998 to DLO, LDS stated :
7. On 10 February 1998, Mr Tsui of LDS telephoned Mr Wong of DLO, and Mr Wong informed him that if the plaintiff was going to accept the sum offered, the acceptance letter should be signed and returned to the Government; further, that any question as to interest would have to be referred to LACO for its advice. 8. Under cover of a letter dated 16 February 1998 to DLO, LDS returned to DLO the Acceptance Letter duly signed by the plaintiff. The Acceptance Letter reads simply :
However, in the covering letter of 16 February 1998, LDS stated, inter alia :
9. By letter dated 30 March 1998, Legal Advisory and Conveyancing Office ("LACO") wrote to the plaintiff, inter alia, in the following terms :
10. Over the next few months, further correspondence ensued in relation to the plaintiff attempting to prove its title to the Lots concerned. 11. Then came what Ms Li described as a "bolt from the blue", in the form of a letter dated 14 July 1998 from DLO to the plaintiff, inter alia, in the following terms :
12. By letter dated 23 July 1998, DLO did make a fresh offer to the plaintiff, offering the sum of $21,409,596 "in full and final settlement of all claims, costs and demands including interest and professional fees which you may have ... arising out of or in connection with the resumption of the said land under the Ordinance or otherwise". (I mention this letter in order to complete the history of the parties' dealings : it is not in issue in these proceedings, which concern only the Offer Letter dated 6 November 1996.) 13. Finally, by letter dated 22 December 1998 to the plaintiff's solicitors, LACO stated, inter alia, as follows :
(Further months of correspondence followed this in relation to the discharge of a charge which had been registered against some of the Lots, which matter is also not relevant to these proceedings.) 14. On 1 April 1999, the plaintiff lodged the present proceedings. The Statement of Claim is, inter alia, in the following terms :
15. Mr Coleman, for the defendant, took me through the relevant provisions of the RWUCO, Cap.370 and the Lands Resumption Ordinance, Cap.124 ("LRO"), and also through relevant passages of Land Compensation and Valuation Law in Hong Kong, 2nd Ed., by Gordon N Cruden, in which the learned author expounds upon the two parallel regimes under which the question of compensation upon resumption of land can be pursued, namely, the statutory regime and the "ex gratia payment" regime :
The statutory regime 16. The plaintiff's Lots in this case were resumed under section 13 of the RWUCO. Section 26 of RWUCO provides that no person shall have any right against the Government or any other person to recover any money in consequence of such resumption "except to the extent of the rights to compensation provided for in section 27". That compensation is to be assessed as if the claim were made under the LRO for land resumed under that Ordinance. 17. The claims procedure as provided for by section 29 of RWUCO permits negotiations between the parties, within the statutory framework, but prior to any determination which may be called upon from the Lands Tribunal. In other words, there is provision for the parties to reach an agreement as to compensation under the Ordinance. Failing such agreement, the Lands Tribunal may be called upon to determine a claim in its entirety or simply as to part of it. 18. Section 33 of RWUCO provides that the Lands Tribunal may direct that interest be paid on compensation. In other words, under RWUCO, there is no general right to interest on an award of compensation, but if a question as to compensation is referred to the Lands Tribunal and it makes an award thereon, the Lands Tribunal is discretionarily empowered to direct that interest be paid thereon. 19. LRO also permits negotiations between the parties as to compensation (sections 6 and 8), and failing agreement thereon to submit the matter to the Lands Tribunal for determination. It should be noted that there is no requirement for the Government to make any offer of compensation under RWUCO, as compared to section 6 of LRO. 20. Section 17 of LRO provides :
21. The central question in this case is one of construction of the terms of the relevant correspondence in order to discover therefrom the intention of the parties. It is common ground that this must be ascertained objectively, namely :
(Chitty on Contracts, Vol.1, 28th Ed., para.12-043.) 22. Mr Coleman submits that the Government's offer by its letter of 6 November 1996 was clearly an offer of ex gratia payment, and not a statutory offer. I agree. Although the term "ex gratia payment" is not used in the letter, the terms of paragraph 3 clearly point to the fact that it is an ex gratia one :
23. It should be recalled that the letter is dated 6 November 1996, namely, six weeks prior to the date on which the Government's resumption of the land was due to take effect. Having informed the plaintiff that it had a "right" under the provisions of the Ordinance to claim compensation, and that such right could only be exercised after the land had been resumed, it was clear that the offer was being made in accordance with the Government's long-standing practice to make an offer of compensation prior to the date of resumption "in order to expedite payment to you". 24. The point was further elucidated in paragraph 10(iv) and 12 of the letter in the following terms :
25. The enclosed Notes entitled "HOW TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION FOR AGRICULTURAL LAND RESUMED BY THE GOVERNMENT" further illustrate the point, in paragraphs (3) and (4) thereof :
26. There is no dispute that the rate of compensation which was adopted, namely, $414.00 per square foot, accorded with the ex gratia rate which was applicable to agricultural land in the New Territories at the time, as advertised in the Government Gazette in G.N.4139 dated 13 September 1996 : "REVISED EX-GRATIA
27. Ms Li submits that, as a matter of law, compensation for the resumption of land is compensation purely for the value of the land itself, exclusive of any consideration of interest, and referred me in this connection to Suen Sun-yau v. Director of Buildings and lands [1991] HKDCLR 33. This concerned an application by the applicant as the owner of agricultural land to the Lands Tribunal for compensation under the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance, Cap.124. In awarding the applicant interest on the award of compensation, the presiding officer stated as follows :
It follows, submits Ms Li, that properly construed the offer was one simply for the value of the land, exclusive of any consideration of interest. Further that, the words "in full and final settlement of all and any claims which you may have in respect of the resumption of the above-mentioned land", can and must properly be interpreted in the same light, in particular the words "in respect of the resumption of the above-mentioned land" being entirely consistent with such an interpretation. She points further to the first sentence of paragraph (2) of the accompanying Notes :
as being consistent with such an interpretation. 28. It is, however, important to bear in mind that the meaning of the offer in the letter of 6 November 1996 falls to be construed in its context, namely, the full terms of the letter and its accompanying Notes. Properly construed, in my view, the offer was one of ex gratia compensation, which expressly did not relate to the provisions of the Ordinance, and the plaintiff was explicitly informed that if it did not accept the offer, it was entitled to submit a claim for compensation to the DLO in terms of section 29 of the Ordinance. 29. Furthermore, the qualification that the offer was "in full and final settlement of all and any claims which you may have in respect of the resumption of the above-mentioned land", meant that it was a comprehensive, all-inclusive offer, and if the plaintiff accepted it, he would have no further claim of any nature whatsoever (including for interest) against the Government. That, in my view, is the plain meaning of the letter. 30. The provision in section 17(3) of the LRO to the effect that :
had no application, since the offer was one expressly made outside of and apart from the statutory regime. (It is accepted by the defendant that the offer remained open or was subsequently re-opened for acceptance at some time around February 1998.) 31. It follows from the above that the Acceptance Letter duly signed by the plaintiff which was returned to DLO under cover of the letter from LDS dated 16 February 1998 - clearly the two documents must be read together - was not an acceptance of the Government's offer of 6 November 1996, since LDS stated in the cover letter :
Such a qualified acceptance clearly did not create a binding agreement. On a proper construction, the letter from LDS dated 16 February 1998 constituted a counter-offer by the plaintiff. 32. Ms Li submits that if the letter from LDS dated 16 February 1998 was a counter-offer, then the counter-offer was accepted by the Government by the letter of 30 March 1998 from LACO to the plaintiff. In my view, this is not correct. The relevant part of the letter states :
33. It refers only to the Government's original Offer Letter of 6 November 1996, not to any subsequent correspondence or events, and it was the terms contained "in the said letter" which the writer indicated that she understood been accepted. The fact is simply that wherever the writer had derived her "understanding" that the plaintiff had accepted the terms of that Offer Letter, she was wrong. The letter cannot be construed as representing that the Government was accepting the plaintiff's counter-offer of 16 February 1998. 34. In the letter of 30 March 1998, LACO went on to say, proceeding from the (erroneous) "understanding" that the plaintiff had accepted the terms of the Offer Letter of 6 November 1996, that the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that it had a good title to the Lots before compensation could be paid, and explained what was required of the plaintiff in that respect. Thereafter, further correspondence ensued in relation to the plaintiff's efforts to show that it had good title to the Lots in question, until by its letter of 14 July 1998, DLO informed the plaintiff that its acceptance was ineffective, and that its right to claim compensation had been barred by lapse of time. 35. These facts are to be distinguished from those which pertained in Yau Fook Hong Co. Ltd v. Attorney General [1988] 1 HKLR 573, which Ms Li cited in support of her argument. 36. The Government thereafter, by DLO's letter dated 23 July 1998, issued a fresh offer in the same amount, "in full and final settlement of all claims, costs and demands including interest and professional fees which you may have ...". The plaintiff has never purported to accept such fresh offer, insisting that it had accepted the original offer of 6 November 1996, or alternatively that the Government had accepted its counter-offer of 16 February 1998. 37. Notwithstanding the stalemate which had been reached, by letter dated 22 December 1998 to the plaintiff's solicitors, LACO stated :
Thereafter, on 1 April, the plaintiff lodged these proceedings. 38. The plaintiff's case in the alternative is that the Government, by reason of its actions and utterances as aforesaid, is estopped from alleging that the plaintiff has not, by reserving its rights to claim interest, effectively accepted the offer of 6 November 1996. In my view, however, for the reasons given above, the Government did not at any stage, whether by words or conduct, or both, represent to the plaintiff that the Government accepted that the plaintiff had accepted its offer of 6 November 1996, or that a binding agreement had come into existence. The Government's utterances and actions after receipt of the plaintiff's counter-offer of 16 February 1998, in particular its agreement to proceed with title checking in the meantime, were contingent upon it being established that a binding agreement had been concluded, or would at some stage in the future be concluded. The Government is not estopped in these circumstances from alleging that the plaintiff has not accepted its offer of 6 November 1996. 39. In all the circumstances and for the reasons given above, the plaintiff is not, in my view, entitled to either of the declarations or the order which it seeks. The plaintiff's claims are dismissed, and I make an order nisi that the plaintiff is to pay the defendant's costs of these proceedings, with a certificate for counsel.
Representation: Ms Glayds Li, SC, leading Ms Gekko Lau, instructed by Messrs Christine M. Koo & Co., for the Plaintiff Mr Russell Coleman, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Defendant |
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