Daryl Mark O'Shaughnessy v. David William Gunson and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCA 9218/1999 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 2 September 1999.
2. There is an unusual feature in this matter in that the First Defendant is a practising solicitor in Hong Kong. He was represented by a firm of solicitors and counsel. However, those solicitors came off the record and his counsel had to withdraw at the last minute. Despite conventional wisdom, the First Defendant chose to represent himself at the hearing before me. This created a number of problems including inconvenience to his opponent. And, I regret to say, I had considerable difficulties i
Cites 1 case
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HCA009218/1999 HCA 9218/99 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 9218 OF 1999 ____________
____________ Coram: Deputy Judge Li in Chambers Date of Hearing: 26 August 1999 Date of Handing Down Judgment: 2 September 1999 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ This is an application by the First Defendant for a declaration by the court to decline jurisdiction or alternatively an order to stay the proceedings. 2.There is an unusual feature in this matter in that the First Defendant is a practising solicitor in Hong Kong. He was represented by a firm of solicitors and counsel. However, those solicitors came off the record and his counsel had to withdraw at the last minute. Despite conventional wisdom, the First Defendant chose to represent himself at the hearing before me. This created a number of problems including inconvenience to his opponent. And, I regret to say, I had considerable difficulties in getting the First Defendant to frame cogent grounds for his application. Anyway, as I understood it, the First Defendant's arguments boiled down to 3 grounds:-
3.Ground (1) can be decided by reference to fairly basic principles which are well known. Both parties agree that Re Spiliada [1986] 3 All ER 843 is a convenient authority to rely upon. One only needs to refer to the headnotes for guidance:-
4.In the present case the connection with New Zealand on account of contractual proper law is not a strong one. There has never been real problem for common law courts, like Hong Kong courts, to grapple with foreign law especially when the foreign law is also the law of a common law jurisdiction. The connection with New Zealand due to banking transactions there is rather tenuous because the evidence shows that the relevant banking transactions and documents are those with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited in Hong Kong. The Plaintiff side has quite properly informed the court that the trust had a trustee resident in New Zealand but he has already resigned for some time and he is not connected with the theft alleged to have been committed by the First Defendant. Moreover, there is no evidence at all that judgment against the Defendants may be enforced in New Zealand. Neither Defendants has significant assets in New Zealand. If there are any real assets available for satisfaction of judgment, they are more likely to be in Hong Kong. There is little point in proceeding in New Zealand only to revert back to Hong Kong for enforcement. 5.On the other hand, the First Defendant is resident in Hong Kong. He works in Hong Kong. Apparently, he administered the trust that is the nexus in this case in Hong Kong. The Plaintiff is now resident in Australia but he is a pilot and comes to Hong Kong often. Another major source of evidence in this case, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited is, of course, based in Hong Kong. The money which the Plaintiff seeks to recover is allegedly misappropriated in Hong Kong. 6.In the premises, I had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that Hong Kong is the distinctly more appropriate forum than New Zealand. 7.On Ground (3), the applicable principles are also well settled. Mr. Pirie for the Plaintiff cited Prime Computer (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. Frank Sham Tak-keung and others [1992] 1 HKLR 115. Again, one only has to refer to the headnotes:-
8.Unfortunately, the First Defendant has not produced any evidence, nor did he make out by way of submission circumstances, to show that it is just and convenient to stay the Plaintiff's case. As Mr. Pirie for the Plaintiff pointed out, the failure on the part of the First Defendant to start to make a case is inexcusable because the First Defendant himself is a lawyer and he had adequate objective legal representation right up to just before the hearing before me. 9.Hence Ground (3) did not even get off the ground and was ruled out. 10.Ground (2) was of some substance. This turned on the interpretation of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a trust deed. The Clause reads:-
11.Counsel for the Plaintiff suggested that on the plain reading of the clause in question, only "proceedings to enforce or declare any such rights, powers, liabilities and obligations" under the deed need to be taken in New Zealand courts. In this case, vis-a-vis the First Defendant, the Plaintiff is claiming that the First Defendant effectively intercepted payment from the Second Defendant to the Plaintiff and misappropriated the money. The claim is one of conversion based on tort. Moreover, even if it is held that the claim is based on trust, it is trite law that a party who has turned his back to a contractual document cannot claim protection from that document. Mr. Pirie also relied on the case of Grupo Torras v. Al Sabah & others [1996] 1 Lloyds L.R. 7. In that case the defendant stole money from a company registered in Spain and went to England. When sued in England for conversion of the money belonging to the company, the defendant prayed in aid an international convention whereby suits against an European company must be prosecuted in the country of registration of the company. The English Court of Appeal held that the theft had nothing to do with the administration of the company. Hence the Plaintiff could sue for conversion in England. 12.I accept these arguments advanced for the Plaintiff and hold that Ground (3) fails too. 13.In the premises, the First Defendant's summons is dismissed. 14.Mr. Pirie suggested that when I come to consider the question of costs in dismissing the summons, I should award costs to the Plaintiff on an indemnity basis to be paid forthwith because the summons is hopeless in the first place. Obviously, the First Defendant cannot resist order for costs against him. However, although Grounds (1) and (3) are rather weak, Ground (2) relied upon by the First Defendant is not untenable. For this reason, I make an order nisi that the First Defendant do pay the Plaintiff's costs for this application to be taxed if not agreed and to be paid forthwith. The order nisi becomes absolute unless either party applies for variation within 14 days from the date of handing down this judgment.
Representation: Mr. Nicholas Pirie instructed by Messrs Haldones for the Plaintiff The First Defendant in person |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCA 9218/1999