Re Patient L
Read the full judgment text of DCMP 947/2001 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 2 April 2001.
2. Patient L ("the patient") had been the subject of an application dated 1st March 2001 by virtue of section 31 (1) of the Ordinance as a result of which the patient was ordered under section 31(1B) of the Ordinance to be detained no more than 7 days for the purpose of observation, investigation and treatment in Castle Peak Hospital. I must assume that the application and the order made on the 1st March 2001 were both regular and valid. Then on 6th March 2001, Deputy Judge Ma countersigned a Fo
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DCMP000947/2001 DCMP 740 and 947/2001 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 740 of 2001 ----------------
--------------- IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 947 of 2001 ---------------- In re Patient L --------------- Coram: Li, District Judge Date of Handing Down Reasons for Ruling: 2 April 2001 _________________________ Reasons for Ruling _________________________ On 27 March 2001, I received a Form 7, a prescribed form, under section 36 of the Mental Health Ordinance, Cap. 136 ("the Ordinance") relating to Patient L. This is one of the peculiarities of procedure under section 36 of the Ordinance. It will be seen that by virtue of that section Form 7 (a certificate completed by two medical doctors) may be forwarded to a District Judge who may countersign it resulting in the detention of a mental patient. Although clearly initiated by doctors, there is technically no applicant in such procedure. The judge is addressed or approached by a statutory form. The Patient 2.Patient L ("the patient") had been the subject of an application dated 1st March 2001 by virtue of section 31 (1) of the Ordinance as a result of which the patient was ordered under section 31(1B) of the Ordinance to be detained no more than 7 days for the purpose of observation, investigation and treatment in Castle Peak Hospital. I must assume that the application and the order made on the 1st March 2001 were both regular and valid. Then on 6th March 2001, Deputy Judge Ma countersigned a Form 4 whereby the patient was to be detained for a further period of 21 days under section 32(2) of the Ordinance for the purpose of observation, investigation and treatment in Castle Peak Hospital. The Form 4 has become DCMP 740 of 2001. I must also assume that the detention of the patient on the basis of the Form 4 countersigned by Deputy Judge was lawful. 3.The Form 7 I received on 27 March 2001 was meant for me to countersign that would result in the detention of the patient for treatment in Castle Peak Hospital for an unspecified period. This Form 7 has become DCMP 947 of 2001. For reasons that will become apparent, I refused to countersign the form. During the late afternoon of 27 March 2001, I spoke on the telephone with Dr. Cheng, one of the two doctors who signed the Form 7, telling him why, on legal grounds, I refused to countersign the Form 7. I expressly told Dr. Cheng that he should seek legal advice if he had misgivings about my decision. Then on 28 March 2001, a new Form 7, with exactly the same particulars as the one handled by me the previous day and signed by the same two doctors, came to the District Court for countersign. I refused to countersign and marked on the form that this new Form 7 with same particulars is an abuse of process. Obviously, certain members of the medical profession believed that the Form 7 ought to be countersigned and they did not quite understand the reason why I had refused to countersign the first Form 7 on the 27 March 2001. In the circumstances, I think it is my duty to hand down written reasons for my decisions in relation to the two Form 7s. The Form 7 4.In the Form 7s I received, two doctors of Castle Peak Hospital stated that the patient "is a patient liable to be detained in a mental hospital or in the Correctional Services Department". Both doctors also certified that in their opinion
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5.The particular medical conditions and symtoms of the patient are irrelevant in the present context and I am content to rely on the findings of the doctors that are within their expertise. It follows that I accept the opinion of the doctors quoted above. It is, however, the statement by the doctors that the patient "is a patient liable to be detained in a mental hospital or in the Correctional Services Department Psychiatric Centre" that caused and still causes my concern. The Ordinance 6.The relevant provisions in the Ordinance are as follows :-
The rights and liability of the patient 7.It is immediately apparent upon perusal of section 32(4) of the Ordinance that a patient, having been detained initially under section 31(1B) of the Ordinance and then under section 32(2) of the Ordinance, may no longer be detained "after the expiration of the ..... extension .... unless he has become a voluntary patient." The patient in the instant case, not being able to become a voluntary patient, has the right to be discharged and (to use the significant legal language) becomes no longer liable to be detained after the expiration of 21 days counting from 6th March 2001. 8.Presumably, the two doctors who signed the Form 7s thought that when they render their opinion as per section 36(1)(i) and (ii) of the Ordinance the patient becomes liable to be detained. But section 36(1)(a) clearly provides that the liability for detention must be otherwise than under that very section. Conclusion 9.As I marked on the forms, there was no apparent evidence or material on which I could be satisfied that the patient was a patient liable to detention under any other provision in the Ordinance or common law principle. Consequently, unless the patient was a voluntary patient, section 36 of the Ordinance did not apply and could not be invoked to detain him without his consent after the expiration of the extended observation period. 10.In case it is thought that the patient can be re-cycled through section 31 and the section 32 of the Ordinance in order to keep him detained for treatment to his ultimate mental well being, I would point out that there is every risk that the re-cycling is an abuse of process and blatant violation of the human rights of the patient. See the decision of the English Court of Appeal in R.v. East London and The City Mental Health NHS Trust and another, The Independent Law Reports 1 March 2001. In short, the law is quite clear - the patient must be released once the detention period under section 31 and/or 32 of the Ordinance has expired. 11.I hope I have made clear the reasons for my decision on each of the Form 7s relating to the patient that I refused to counter-sign.
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