Credit Control Centre (HK) Ltd. v. Fame Sure Ltd.
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1005/1996 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 12 March 1999.
2. All the 47 sale and purchase agreements contain the same terms and conditions except in relation to the parcel. The material terms for present purposes are in clauses 4, 5 and 6 as follow:-
|
HCA001005/1996 HCA 1005/96 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 1005 OF 1996 ____________
____________ Coram: Deputy Judge Z E Li in Court Date of Hearing: 3 - 5 March 1999 Date of Delivery of Judgment: 12 March 1999 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ The plaintiff was and still is the registered owner of 47 carparking spaces at 2nd Floor, Yee On Court, 79 Waterloo Road ("the parking spaces"). The defendant was and still is a real estate trading company. On 28th July 1995, the plaintiff entered into 47 formal agreements with the defendant for the sale and purchase of the parking spaces ("the agreements"). The contractual completion date for all the agreements was 15th January 1996, at 4.30 p.m. to be precise. On the appointed day at the appointed time, completion did not take place. On 16th January 1996, the plaintiff purported to forfeit deposits paid by the defendant. By the action herein, the plaintiff seeks also damages for breach of contract. The defendant also counterclaims for damages for breach of contract. Both parties aver that the other party was not ready and/or not willing to complete pursuant to the agreements. 2.All the 47 sale and purchase agreements contain the same terms and conditions except in relation to the parcel. The material terms for present purposes are in clauses 4, 5 and 6 as follow:-
3.The circumstances that led to the present dispute are largely incontestable. For case of reference, I set out below the facts that have been agreed or not disputed:-
4.The arguments before me ought to be set out too. They are:-
5.It is canvassed on behalf of the plaintiff that on full and proper analysis all factors and circumstances point to a pre-meditated plan on the part of the defendant to back out from the transaction. Mr Chain for the plaintiff suggests, however, that this case can be decided without resolving all the issues. Counsel reasoned that since the plaintiff had already contracted to deliver vacant possession free from encumbrances, no further guarantee from the plaintiff was needed. The plaintiff was entitled to use and possession of the parking spaces until the last minute. It was not open to the defendant to speculate that the plaintiff might not be able to fulfil its contractual obligations. The defendant in the circumstances must go through all the motions of getting fully ready and attend completion. The defendant having failed to do so, there must be judgment for the plaintiff. 6.I am not prepared to go all the way with Mr. Chain. There may well be cases in which it becomes clear well before completion date that the vendor cannot possibly deliver vacant possession with title free from encumbrances. In those cases, the purchaser may be justified in not going through the motions. Moreover, the concept of anticipatory breach of contract has been long established. My own experience in conveyancing work is that, to cover all eventualities, a purchaser concerned about not obtaining vacant possession or title free from encumbrances should firstly express the anxieties through solicitors by way of formal requisitions or otherwise. Then an arrangement should be made for inspection and delivery of keys or other sufficient token of vacant possession at the subject premises moments before completion. As soon as the purchaser or its representative is satisfied by actual inspection that vacant possession can be delivered, instructions to solicitors can be made over the phone to effect completion by exchange of title deeds and payment order. If site inspection moments before time for completion shows that vacant possession cannot be delivered, the purchaser would then be on very safe ground to refuse to part with the purchase money. 7.In the present case, I find that the defendant was able to complete. The defendant had sufficient funds available at its disposal to pay the balance of the purchase price. The evidence is quite clear in this regard. It is irrelevant that use of the funds needed the approval of bankers. The bankers had given approval to the defendant. 8.However, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant was willing to complete. The fact that the defendant had banking facility ear-marked for payment of the balance of the purchase price can be treated as indication of willingness to complete. On the other hand, it is clear from the evidence adduced for the defendant that well before completion date the defendant had decided not to make draft assignment available and not to attend completion until the plaintiff could give assurances that vacant possession could be delivered. But no steps were taken to even solicit such assurances. I cannot believe the defendant relied on information from car jockeys to conclude that it is not obliged to complete on a multi-million dollar transaction. This is only a red herring. The true intent manifested 3 days before scheduled completion when solicitors for the defendant wrote to solicitors for the plaintiff proposing postponement of completion. It is said that this proposal was made at the behest of the plaintiff. This is incredible. If indeed the plaintiff wanted postponement, it would not have the audacity to reply through solicitors dictating terms for the postponement. 9.As for the plaintiff's ability to complete, I accept that the plaintiff would be able to have the parking spaces vacated by compulsion or persuasion on completion date for delivery of possession to the defendant. The plaintiff could have paid off the users of the parking spaces. The plaintiff could have physically removed the vehicles of the users and settle with them by way of damages. Bearing further in mind that the defendant had had the agreements registered whilst none of the rental agreements was registered, it is highly unlikely that any claim by the users under the rental agreements for pre-mature termination would affect the defendant's title or peaceful enjoyment after completion. 10.It is true that the plaintiff did not actually have the parking spaces cleared at 4.30 p.m. on 15th January 1996. At one stage, I thought this should be regarded as failure on the part of the plaintiff to be ready for completion. On this, Mr. Chain draws my attention to the case of China Trade Investment Limited v. Silverpole Limited [1995] 1 HKLR 48 where it has been held that parties to a conveyancing transaction must co-operate in the completion arrangement. Counsel says that this authority casts on the defendant a duty to warn the plaintiff a couple of hours before completion time in order to enable the plaintiff to clear the parking spaces. 11.With respect, I do not read in any part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in China Trade Investment Limited v. Silverpole Limited that the duty to co-operate includes a duty to warn the other party that that other party is expected to fulfil its contractual obligations. On the other hand, since the defendant by its behaviour had demonstrated to the plaintiff that completion was very unlikely to take place, I hold that the plaintiff was entitled to preserve the rental agreements to mitigate its losses arising from postponement or the defendant's breach. 12.Both parties accept that the agreements should be treated separately because they had not intended them to be one transaction that make or break together. Since the plaintiff could in any event deliver vacant possession of 8 of the parking spaces not affected by any rental agreement, the plaintiff is entitled to succeed in any case on the corresponding sale and purchase agreements. As to the remaining 39 sale and purchase agreements, there cannot be any doubt that the plaintiff was willing to complete and the plaintiff was ready to do so but the defendant was unwilling so the plaintiff should succeed too and the defendant's counterclaims should fail. 13.Accordingly, there is judgment for the plaintiff with order nisi for costs and assessment of damages by a master. The defendant's counterclaims are dismissed. The order nisi will become absolute unless either party applies for variation within 28 days from the date of delivery of this judgment. 14.I take this opportunity to praise both counsel for the admirable way they have conducted their client's case thereby reducing the length of trial by half without losing focus on any pertinent issue.
Representation: Mr. Benjamin Chain instructed by M/s Yun & Co. for the Plaintiff Mr. Hylas Chung instructed by M/s Josip Ma & Co. for the Defendant |