|
HCMP000088A/1968
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS
ACTION NO. 88 OF 1968
|
IN THE MATTER of the Estate of Tse Lai Chiu, deceased. |
| BETWEEN |
|
|
|
TSE MOON SAK also known as STEPHEN TSE (Executor of the Will of TSE LAI CHIU, deceased) |
Plaintiff |
|
AND
|
|
|
TSE HUNG also known as TSE HUNG SAK |
1st Defendant |
|
TSE SIU CHEUNG |
2nd Defendant |
|
TSE NGA YIN |
3rd Defendant |
|
YIP WAN CHING |
4th Defendant |
|
TSE LAI FONG |
5th Defendant |
-----------------
Coram: Rigby, S.P.J. in Chambers.
Date of Judgment: 24 July 1969
-----------------
JUDGMENT
-----------------
1.This is an Originating Summons to determine a variety of questions arising out of a Will and Codicil made by the Testator TSE LAI CHIU. The Will was made on the 5th November 1958 and the Codicil thereto on the 1st August 1959.
2.By his Will the Testator appointed his two sons, the younger son who is the present plaintiff, and the elder son who is the present 1st defendant, as his executors and trustees. The Testator died on the 27th July 1960 and his Will was duly proved and registered by the executors on the 2nd July 1963.
3.At the time of his death the Testator left surviving him:-
|
(a) |
his two sons (the plaintiff and 1st defendant) |
|
(b) |
his widow (the 4th defendant) |
|
(c) |
six grandsons (three, including the 2nd defendant, being sons of the 1st defendant, and three being sons of the plaintiff) |
|
(d) |
seven grand-daughters (one married), including the 3rd and 5th defendants, all being daughters of the 1st defendant |
|
(e) |
three daughters-in-law, (two being the wives of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant respectively, and the third being the concubine of the 1st defendant) |
4.At the time of his death the Testator's real property consisted of a Crown Lease of premises at No. 204 Johnston Road for a period of 999 years commencing as from the 28th December 1899, together with a pharmaceutical business known as "Sun Hay Cheung", carried on on the ground floor of the premises at No. 204 Johnston Road. It is admitted by all parties - and, indeed, proved beyond doubt by documentary evidence - that a further property to which reference is made in the Will, to wit, No. 30 Wood Road, no longer formed any part of the estate of the Testator at the time of the making of his Will.
5.The primary matter for consideration is whether, by the terms of the Testator's Will, the property of No. 204 Johnston Road was left to the executors upon trust to administer it for the benefit of a number of specified persons named in the Will or whether, by the terms of the Will and the Codicil attached thereto, such property ought to be regarded as conferring an absolute vested interest in certain specified persons, to wit, the grandsons of the deceased. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then certain further questions arise as to the quantum and duration of the amounts to be paid to all or some of the specified beneficiaries. On the other hand, it is said by Mr. Patrick Yu, who appears for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants, that if the answer to the question is that a vested and absolute interest is concluded in favour of the specified beneficiaries, then the matter of quantum and duration of payments to the other named beneficiaries under the Will is no longer relevant.
6.By the terms of his Will the Testator directed that the Johnston Road property should be "wholly left and handed over to the said TSE Hung Sak and TSE Moon Sak for administration and rent collection. The rents collected, after deductions for payment of Government rates, Crown Rent, property tax, and other expenses on repairs etc., shall be paid into the account of the income of my estate."
He further directed the executors to take sums of money from the income of his estate and thereafter pay monthly allowances to specified persons, to wit, his wife, his sons, grandsons, grand-daughters, and daughters-in-law.
Provision was expressly made to the executors "to increase or reduce the above enumerated monthly allowances to be paid to various persons according to the prevailing circumstances and the income of my estate, and no other person shall demur."
7.Finally the Will concluded with the paragraph -
" I direct the executors of my will that when the two persons, the said Tse Hung Sak and Tse Moon Sak, are both old and incapable of managing the said business of my 'Sun Hay Cheung' and my property, the whole of the said house at No. 204 Johnston Road, Hong Kong, they may divide all the estate in my name equally among my grandsons for their enjoyment, and each shall get one share. However, only grandsons born of legal daughters-in-law are entitled (to such a share)."
8.It is, of course, this particular paragraph which causes some confusion in the light of the earlier paragraphs contained in the Will. Mr. Patrick Yu submits that the effect of the direction contained in this paragraph is to confer an absolute vested interest in both the "Sun Hay Cheung" pharmaceutical business and the Johnston Road property equally upon each of the grandsons, such vested interest being deferred only by prolongation of time as to when it should take effect. He submitted that, at any rate in theory, the grandsons could apply forthwith for partition of the Johnston Road property and a vesting order of their respective shares in the name of each one of them.
Mr. Ignatius Wong, appearing for the plaintiff, on the other hand submitted that the direction was vague and bad for uncertainty; he stressed the use of the words "old and incapable" and "may divide" and contended that there was a complete and unfettered direction given to the executors as to whether or not they should divide up the estate, and he submitted that the executors, if they chose to exercise their discretion not to divide up the estate, were themselves entitled to the beneficial interest in the property. For reasons which will become later apparent I do not propose to deal with the "Sun Hay Cheung" pharmaceutical business and will at this stage confine myself to the Johnston Road property. I find myself unable to accept Mr. Wong's submission that the executors would themselves be entitled to retain a beneficial interest in this property, particularly having regard to the earlier part of the Will directing that this property was "left and handed over" to the executors "for administration and rent collection". In my view Mr. Patrick Yu is right in his contention that the effect of the last paragraph of this Will was to confer a vested interest in the grandsons, deferred only in point of time as to actual distribution. I would myself have thought that there would have been no lack of settled authority for the purpose of considering the proposition now under consideration, but Mr. Patrick Yu, regrettably, has not thought fit to refer me to any cases or, indeed, text books, throwing light on the problem. However, in my judgment, the passage to be found in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Yolume 39, Page 1121, Paragraph 1656, is directly relevant. It reads:-
"Postponement of enjoyment only. In addition to the general presumption in favour of early vesting, particular circumstances may affect the question whether a gift is vested. Thus, where a condition can be fairly read as postponing merely the right of possession or of obtaining payment, transfer, or conveyance, so that there is an express or implied distinction between the time of vesting and time of enjoyment, the gift is held to be vested at the earlier date, if the rest of the context allows. This construction is particularly applicable where the postponement is for the convenience of the testator's estate, or is occasioned by the gift of some prior interest filling up the interval."
In my judgment the effect of the direction contained in the last paragraph of the Will was to confer a vested and absolute right of possession of the Johnston Road property upon the grandsons, postponing only their right in point of time to take possession. If, for example, the executors, considering themselves at all times neither too old nor incapable of managing the property, died before any such division of such property, then it seems to me the grandsons would have been entitled each to one share of that property.
9.The position, in so far as the specified beneficiaries to the Johnston Road property are concerned, is slightly altered by the Codicil to the Will, the first part of which provides:-
"I direct the executors of my will that, when the two persons, Tse Hung Sak and Tse Moon Sak are both old and incapable of managing the business of my said 'Sun Hay Cheung' and my said property, the whole of the house at No. 204 Johnston Road, Hong Kong, (they) may divide, according to the items enumerated below, all the estate in my name among my sons and my grandsons born of my legal daughters-in-law for their enjoyment, to wit:-
|
(1) My eldest son Tse Hung Sak and my second son Tse Moon Sak shall share equally between the two persons the ground floor of the house at No. 204 Johnston Road, Hong Kong, and all income and interests from the business of the said 'Sun Hay Cheung'. |
|
|
(2) My eldest son Tse Hung Sak shall get the share of the first floor of the house at No. 204 Johnston Road, Hong Kong. |
|
|
(3) My grandson Tse Siu Kai shall get the share of the second floor of the house at No. 204 Johnston Road, Hong Kong. |
|
|
(4) My second son Tse Moon Sak shall get the share of the third floor of the house at No. 204 Johnston Road, Hong Kong. |
|
|
(5) My two grandsons Tse Chu Wah and Tse Chu Kwan shall get the share of the first floor of the house at No. 30 Wood Road, Hong Kong. |
|
|
(6) My grandson Tse Siu Cheung (named Wai Kwan) shall get the share of the fourth floor of the house at No. 204 Johnston Road, Hong Kong." |
|
The unfortunate effect of this paragraph is that the Testator, acting no doubt under the erroneous impression that he had title to the house at 30 Wood Road, has conferred an interest in that house upon the two grandsons, Tse Chu Wah and Tse Chu Kwan, to the exclusion of their earlier interest - which they had had under the Will itself - in the Johnston Road property. The result is that, unlike the other grandsons, they now have no interest in the Johnston Road property. However, it is to be hoped that this omission is only one of academic interest since these two grandsons are, in fact, the sons of the 1st defendant who receives, jointly with the plaintiff, a half share in the ground floor of the Johnston Road house.
10.The remaining matter for comment in regard to this paragraph in the Codicil is that, in variation of the concluding paragraph in the Will itself, the plaintiff and the 1st defendant are now to have, in equal shares, "all income and interests from the business of the 'Sun Hay Cheung' pharmaceutical business". I am informed that this business was in fact wound up by the plaintiff and the 1st defendant on the 16th March 1968, so that it remains of no further concern or interest for the purpose of these proceedings.
11.Mr. Patrick Yu submitted that if I came to the conclusion that there was an absolute vested interest in the Johnston Road property given to the persons specified in the first part of the Codicil to the Will, then the remaining questions raised for determination under the provisions of the Originating Summons were no longer relevant and necessary for decision. I do not think that this is so. I am not asked to make a vesting order of the property in favour of those named persons nor, indeed, without considerably further argument and persuasion, would I be prepared to do so. Indeed, to do so at this stage would be to defeat the intentions of the Testator that the property was to be administered and the rents collected for the purpose of payment of allowances to the various persons, the names of whom are specified in the Will itself, and include the Testator's widow, grand-daughters and daughters-in-law. It is true that the Will expressly gives a discretion to the executors "to increase or reduce the above-enumerated monthly allowances" to these persons, but until that discretion is exercised or, alternatively, until a vesting order is made, it seems to me wholly right and proper, and entirely in accordance with the Testator's wishes, that these allowances should continue to be made. I propose therefore to deal expressly, but briefly, with each question raised under the Originating Summons before me. I now do so.
| (1) Q: |
Whether the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant are entitled to the leasehold property described in the Will and Codicil of the Testator as No. 204 Johnston Road Hong Kong as tenants in common in equal share, and if so from what date? |
|
| A: |
No; the Will and Codicil confer a vested interest in this property upon the persons specified in the first paragraph of the Codicil to the Will; such vested interest being deferred only in point of time. |
|
| (2) Q: |
Whether the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant are entitled to the leasehold property described in the Will and Codicil of the Testator as No. 30, Wood Road, 1st floor, Hong Kong as tenants in common in equal share, and if so from what date? |
|
| A: |
The Testator had no interest in this property at the time of the making of his Will; such property having already been assigned to the Plaintiff and 1st Defendant as tenants in common by a Deed of Assignment made on the 20th December 1956. |
|
| (3) Q: |
Alternatively, whether the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant are entitled to the properties referred to in (1) and (2) hereof (hereinafter called "the landed properties") but such entitlement is subject to payment of monthly allowances to the beneficiaries born and/or unborn at the time of the death of the Testator, and if so their respective amounts of such monthly allowances. |
|
| A: |
No; the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant are not entitled to the Johnston Road property, such property being vested in the persons specified in the first paragraph of the Codicil to the Will in accordance with the shares therein stated. But until any vesting order is made monthly allowances should be paid out of the income arising from such property to the beneficiaries as stated in the Will and Codicil in accordance with the respective amounts therein stated, subject to any variations in such amounts as may be later directed by me in a consideration of the remaining questions to be determined. |
|
| (4) Q: |
Whether the income from the rents of the landed properties alone and/or together with the income from the business "Sun Hay Cheung" (hereinafter called "the business") forms part of the residiary estate and as such are to be paid into an account of the estate of the Testator. |
|
| A: |
Until any vesting order is made the income from the rents of the Johnston Road property alone should be collected by the executors and distributed in payment of the allowances specified in the Will and Codicil; subject always to the discretion as provided in the Will for the executors to increase or reduce such allowances. |
|
| (5) Q: |
Whether the income from the landed properties and/or from the business "Sun Hay Cheung" referred to in Paragraph 4 can be applied to the payment of the monthly allowances for the benefit of the beneficiaries specified in the Will if any and whether the balance after such income after payment aforesaid should be distributed, and if so among whom and if not whether the same should be accumulated or otherwise dealt with. |
|
| A: |
The income from the Johnston Road property alone should be applied to the payment of the monthly allowances for the benefit of the beneficiaries specified in the Will subject to the discretion vested in the executors to increase or reduce such allowances; any balance accumulated to form part of the residual estate. |
|
| (6) Q: |
If the answer to Paragraph 1 and/or Paragraph 2 is in the negative, whether the landed properties in question are being held in trust for the beneficiaries to the estate of the Testator, and if so, who these beneficiaries are, the time for vesting such properties in such beneficiaries and whether any such vesting order(s) should be encumbered with the payment of money allowances to the other beneficiaries thereafter, if any. |
|
| A: |
The only property remaining for consideration is the Johnston Road property. The persons specified in the first paragraph of the Codicil to the Will are the persons entitled to such property in accordance with their shares therein stated. No vesting order has yet been applied for and accordingly the question whether any such vesting order, if made, should be encumbered with the payment of money allowances to the other beneficiaries stated in the Will, remains unanswered. |
|
| (6)(a) Q: |
Whether the condition, that is, "when the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant become old and incapable, they may divide" is uncertain and therefore does not create any trust. |
|
| A: |
There is an absolute devise of the Johnston Road property to the persons specified in the first paragraph of the Codicil in accordance with the shares therein stated. |
|
| (7) Q: |
Whether any reasonable rents or monthly rents are payable into the account (if any) of the estate of the Testator by any beneficiaries for occupying any part of the landed properties. |
|
| A: |
No. |
|
| (8) Q: |
Whether the grand-daughters of the Testator are entitled to payment of monthly allowances until marriage; if so, whether they are entitled to $50.00 or $70.00 or $120.00 per month or any other amount as this Court should order. |
|
| A: |
Paragraph 5 of the Will expressly states that the grand-daughters of the Testator are only entitled to a monthly allowance until they are married; such allowance ceases upon marriage. |
|
|
The Codicil provides that such allowance to the grand-daughters shall be $50.00 per month until marriage; to this extent it revokes the earlier direction contained in the Will that the allowance was to be $70.00 a month. |
|
| (9) Q: |
Whether the 4th Defendant the Widow of the deceased is entitled to $200.00 or $400.00 out of the estate of the Testator or any other amount as this Court should order. |
|
| A: |
The Codicil provides that the 4th Defendant, the widow of the Testator, is to receive $200.00 per month; such amount is not to be considered as supplementary and in addition to the $200.00 provided for in the ?? itself. However, there is, of course, always a discretion to the executors to increase this amount. |
|
| (10) Q: |
Whether the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant or either of them may dissolve by notice and wind up the business "Sun Hay Cheung" and if so whether the proceeds of such winding up should be distributed and if so, in what manner or otherwise dealt with. |
|
| A: |
The "Sun Hay Cheung" business was already wound up on the 16th March, 1968. Having regard to the terms of the Codicil that the income and interest in this business was left by the Testator to the Plaintiff and to the 1st Defendant in equal shares, no obligation arises upon them to account for, or distribute, such proceeds as may have arisen upon the final winding up of this business. |
|
| (11) Q: |
Whether the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant are entitled to share the rights and liabilities of the business equally or whether they are so entitled subject to payment of allowances to the beneficiaries and further whether the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant are required to pay monthly allowances to the beneficiaries after the business is dissolved or wound up. |
|
| A: |
The Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant are entitled to share the rights and liabilities of the business equally and without being subject to payment of allowances to the beneficiaries at any time subsequent to the final liquidation of the business. |
|
| (12) Q: |
Whether the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant may divide the estate of the Testator equally; if so, whether after division of the estate monthly allowances are still payable by the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant to the beneficiaries, and whether such division would require the consent of the 4th Defendant. |
|
| A: |
Under the terms of the Codicil the estate - consisting as it now does of the Johnson Road property - was devised by the Testator to the persons named in the first paragraph of the Codicil to the Will in the shares therein stated. Until any winding up order is made the income arising from such estate is to be collected by the executors and paid, in accordance with the discretion expressly vested in them under the terms of the Will, to the persons named in the Will and Codicil in accordance with the shares provided thereunder. |
|
12.The consent of the 4th defendant, the Testator's widow, to any division of the property does not arise for consideration since no such division can be made unless and until a vesting order is applied for by those persons entitled to a distribution and share of the property.
The question of costs remains for consideration.
Representation:
I. Wong (Peter C. Wong & Co.) for Plaintiff
P. Yu (P.C. Woo & Co.) for 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants.
P. Woo (P.C. Woo & Co.) for 5th Defendant.
|