Dora Lee v. Li Vien Chien

HCMC000024/1967

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

DIVORCE JURISDICTION

ACTION NO. 24 OF 1967

-----------------

Coram: Plair-kerr, J.

Date of Judgment: 16 April 1969

-----------------

JUDGMENT

-----------------

1. The parties were married at the Union Church, Kowloon on 22nd March 1952. They have two children. Their daughter Grace was born on 17th January 1957 and their son Felix was born on 4th June 1958.

2. The petition, which was filed on 24th February 1967, contains the following allegations:-

3. At the hearing before the late Mr. Justice Creedon on 29th April, 1967, the petitioner did not call either of her children or any servant referred to in her petition, nor did she call Drs.Lopes, Ada Wang or S.A. Rance. She did call Dr. Dawson-Grove, who, in relation to the allegations in para. 17 of the petition, said:-

"She visited me in November 1966 when she complained that her husband had attacked her 11 days before. I found only tenderness of wrists and some limitation of movements."

4. He also gave evidence relating to the allegations in para. 18 of the petition. The petitioner gave evidence; but she was not asked to state precisely what occurred in regard to each of the allegations in the petition. She was simply asked generally whether the allegations in her petition were true; and in answer to this general question she replied in the affirmative. Her husband, who had indicated that he did not intend to defend, was present in court. The learned judge apparently gave him the opportunity of cross-examining the petitioner; but he declined to do so.

5. Thereupon, the learned judge made an order nisi for the dissolution of the marriage to be made absolute in three months.

6. On 20th June 1968, the respondent's solicitors wrote to the Attorney General as follows:-

In his Plea filed on 8th July 1968, the Queen's Proctor prays that the court will rescind the decree nisi and dismiss the petition on the ground that

"... from 18th day of May 1967 to the 2nd day of July 1968 at 104 MacDonnell Road 7th floor, .......... the petitioner lived and cohabited with the respondent as man and wife with the intention of forgiving and remitting the cruelty of the respondent alleged in the petition herein and thereby condoned such cruelty."

In her Answer to this Plea, the petitioner says:-

"The petitioner will contend that she permitted the respondent to resume cohabitation with her and to have sexual intercourse with her out of fear of, and pity for, the respondent without any intention of forgiving and remitting the respondent's cruelty found proved ............ alternatively, if such resumption of cohabitation and sexual intercourse amounted to condonation (which is not admitted) the respondent's conduct towards the petitioner .......... after such resumption of cohabitation and intercourse amounted to cruelty reviving all the acts of cruelty which the trial judge found proved at the trial and also revived those acts of cruelty prior to the 2nd July 1968 on which date the petitioner left the respondent as she could no longer tolerate his conduct."

7. From the affidavits filed by the parties, it seemed to me at the commencement of the hearing that the real issue would be whether the respondent's conduct after the decree nisi was such as would in law revive the prior acts of cruelty alleged in the petition; and I ruled that the petitioner should begin.

8. Counsel for the Queen's Proctor submitted that it was open to him to cross-examine the petitioner on all the allegations in the petition. Objection was taken by counsel for the petitioner who submitted that it was not open to this court to decide whether the decree nisi had been properly made. Counsel for the Queen's Proctor agreed that it was no part of his function to prove that the decree nisi should not have been made; but he submitted that the court should concern itself with the details of the allegations in the petition in order to decide whether the respondent's conduct subsequent to the decree nisi has been such as to revive the previous cruelty alleged. Counsel submitted that as the petitioner had given no oral evidence before Mr. Justice Creedon in regard to the allegations in her petition, he (counsel) should be permitted to cross-examine her on these allegations. I agreed with the submission of counsel for the Queen's Proctor and ruled accordingly.

9. Throughout her evidence before me the petitioner made general statements to the effect that prior to the decree nisi her husband was nervous, aggressive, dictatorial, prone to outbursts of temper, and that he frequently threw articles at her, banged furniture, slammed doors, and shouted and screamed at her. (Paras. 8, 9, 10 and 13 of the petition.) General allegations of this kind are very easy to make and have to be scrutinised with the greatest care. But, eventually, in cross-examination by counsel for the petitioner, the respondent did admit that on a number of occasions prior to the decree nisi his manner towards his wife had been over-bearing, that he had been impatient on occasion, and that he had sometimes lost his temper, banged the table, and slammed doors. However, there is nothing in his evidence to indicate that he agreed with the allegations in para. 10.

10. In support of the allegation in para. 11 the petitioner produced the alleged suicide note, a translation of which reads:-

The children were then six and five years old. The petitioner found the letter in the children's room next morning and took possession of it. They never knew that it had been written.

11. The petitioner was questioned by counsel for the Queen's Proctor on how she regarded this "suicide" note. My note of her evidence reads:-

Before me the respondent did not admit that he was contemplating suicide when he wrote the note; and there was no evidence as to what was the immediate precipitating cause of his writing it. In his closing address, counsel for the petitioner said that it supported his submission regarding the respondent's instability of temperament.

12. The "terms" referred to by the petitioner in para.12 of the petition were contained in a letter dated 6th May 1966 addressed to the respondent by the petitioner and signed by both parties. It is in English; and she underlined various words. It reads:-

If you agree with these suggestions and will honestly abide by them please sign the letter in duplicate and return the letter to me for my signature. If you wish to place your suggestions in this letter please also write them in the above right hand side space.

13. This letter was described by counsel for the petitioner as an ultimatum to the respondent to mend his ways because the petitioner was unable to put up with his conduct any longer. I do not feel that I can accept this submission. If by 6th May, 1966 the respondent had, over the years, frequently shouted abuse, screamed at the top of his voice, thrown anything that he could lay his hands on at the petitioner, put the children in fear so that they cried and pleaded with him, and in fits of rage thrown such articles as chairs, vases, bowls or plates at the petitioner, one might have expected the petitioner to have made some reference to such conduct in her letter of 6th May 1966, a letter which, according to her, sets out the terms" which the respondent should "abide by", if the parties were "to live harmoniously together."

14. I feel impelled to conclude that paras. 8, 9, 10 and 13 are not an accurate general description of the respondent's conduct prior to May 1966. His admissions in cross-examination were no doubt minimal; but there is also a certain amount of exaggeration in these four paragraphs. On the other hand, it is of significance that when the parties were quarrelling prior to May 1966 there were threats of divorce and separation.

15. Dr. Dawson-Grove said that in giving evidence before Mr. Justice Creedon he had made a mistake in saying that the petitioner had consulted him in regard to the injuries alleged to have been received by the petitioner on 17th November 1966 and that it was his colleague Dr. Rance whom she had consulted. There is, therefore, no admissible medical evidence relating to the petitioner's allegations in para. 17 of the petition. My note of the respondent's evidence in regard to this reads:-

"One evening in the bedroom she said: 'Our friend, Mrs. Loh, has told me that if she was able as I am then she would abandon her husband and children and go away.' I said: 'This is random talk. She is exaggerating. She would not do that.' She said: 'Why not? If I had a friend who was crazy about me why should I not leave you and the children' That year I had established a factory and I was not as patient as I might have been. That day I was not in a good mood as my assistant in the office had not been co-operative. So I hit her this slap in the middle of the back. I apologised at once. So did she. We made it up."

I did not accept the respondent's version as to the extent of his assault on the petitioner on 17th November 1966 namely one slap in the back. I feel satisfied that on this occasion he punched his wife with his fist and twisted her arm as alleged by her in her petition and in evidence.

16. Dr. Dawson-Grove gave evidence before me in regard to the allegation in para. 18. He said:-

"I saw her on 11th January 1967. She told me that her husband had attacked her the previous night and that he had tried to strangle her. She was very weepy and very apprehensive. She had a certain amount of pain in the throat i.e. in talking and swallowing. There was a slight swelling on the right side of the larynx. The swelling was tender to touch. When asked to say 'Ah', her voice was hoarse and painful. That means she had bruising of the larynx. She said she was able to swallow a little milk that morning. I gave her tranquillizers and mild sleeping pills. I was the family doctor. I knew that children were involved; and so I asked to see her husband. On the 14th January 1967 I spoke to her husband. He was terribly upset. My notes of the interview read: 'Very upset, cried, etc.' I asked him if he could give any reason for attacking his wife. He said he had no reason for it. He said he was terribly sorry. It was impossible to get a statement out of him. He was crying quite a lot of the time.'

17. The respondent's version of what happened was that he was actually demonstrating his affection for the petitioner and that her injuries must have been caused by his being over-demonstrative.

18. I rejected that story entirely. On the other hand, her description of the attack was not particularly impressive either. There is no doubt that there was a violent quarrel and the respondent lost his temper and grabbed her by the throat and that she received the injuries described by Dr. Dawsen-Grove in the course of the struggle. But in evidence she said that she still believed that the respondent's intention was to kill her. Yet, she said that during the attack she was able to shout. She said nothing about locking herself in her bedroom afterwards because she was afraid of her husband. I do not think for one moment that he intended to kill her. Nevertheless, she must have been grabbed fairly firmly because there was a certain amount of bruising of the larynx and it must have been a very frightening experience for her.

19. In the proceedings before me, no reference was made to paras. 14 and 16; and, having seen the respondent give evidence I do not propose to put any weight on the allegations in these two paras. There was nothing in the evidence to indicate that the respondent was not a loving father concerned with his children's upbringing or that he found any difficulty in communicating with them. Indeed the evidence was all the other way. Furthermore, I just cannot imagine the respondent using his wife as "bait" to attract prospective customers. The suggestion is so out of keeping with the character of the man that I simply do not believe that such a thing happened.

20. Para. 15 of the petition gives a rather misleading impression of how the family finances were managed. It is true that the petitioner has worked during the whole of her married life. She was employed in her husband's firm (South Textiles Ltd.) shortly after she arrived in Hong Kong in 1949. Later she held an appointment with a shipping company (Williamsons). She was also employed for a time by Canadian Pacific Airlines; and from 1961 she has been employed by the Hong Kong Government in the Secretariat for Home Affairs, firstly in the Public Enquiry Centre in the Central Government Offices, West Wing, and more recently as an Information Officer at Information Centres Headquarters. She has always earned a substantial salary; and she is at present earning $3,155 per month. It is true she has always made available the whole of her earnings for the purpose of meeting household expenditure; and she ran the household. But the respondent was not telling the truth when he said in evidence that he gave her the whole of his earnings. In fact he gave her about $2,400 per month (considerably less than what she is earning now) and she pooled this sum with her own earnings. I do not know how she apportioned the expenditure; but her evidence was that out of her earnings she has always been able to save approximately $1,000 per month and that she gave the respondent this money to invest for her. He had an investment account with the Hong Kong agents of a firm of New York share brokers and this account was later transferred to their joint names. There were also sums totalling US$15,000 from their joint earnings in an account in the name of the petitioner with the Bank of America.

21. The respondent admitted that he had investments of his own. He also admitted in one of his letters to ...(illegible) the petitioner's mother that, without the knowledge of his wife, he had been remitting money to his father in China; but there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the money so remitted was not his own money. It appears, however, that he felt guilty about having made payments to his father without informing his wife. Be that as it may, there is no doubt at all that the petitioner contributed substantially to the family expenditure. The respondent would not have been able to keep up such a high standard of living if she had not been working.

22. As regards para. 20, in childhood the petitioner had an attack of pulmonary tuberculosis and she had one relapse when she was 19. When she consulted Dr. Dawson-Grove the tuberculosis lesion was healed; but he gave her the usual advice about not getting over-tired and advised her to avoid physical and mental strain because there was always a possibility that she might suffer another relapse. He was asked in evidence whether T.B. people were more susceptible to emotional stress. My note of his answer reads:-

"Yes; because treatment is prolonged and boring and they are warned of the possibility of a break-down. T.B. people tend to be more emotional than ordinary people."

I have no reason to think that the respondent was unaware of his wife's medical history. But there was no suggestion either in April 1967 or now that she has not fully recovered from the tuberculosis which she suffered as a young girl of 14 and later at 19.

23. Dr. Dawson-Grove did not give evidence before me in regard to the allegations in para. 21 of the petition; and the petitioner did not call any of the other doctors mentioned in that para. Her only evidence before Mr. Justice Creedon was to the effect that the contents of para 21 was "true and correct." Clearly the injuries inflicted on 17th November 1966 and 10th January 1967 (Paras. 17 and 18 of petition) were of a temporary nature; and there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the alleged irrigularity in her menstrual periods during the latter part of 1966 was other than of a temporary nature. She said she has lost 6 1b. since the decree nisi; but there was no corroborative evidence of that; and, even accepting it to be a fact, she seemed to me to be a very healthy normal woman.

24. The petitioner was born in Tientsin; but she was brought up in Shanghai. Her parents had six children; but her home does not appear to have been a very happy one because her parents, she said, were continually squabbling with one another. It appears that they are now separated. Her father is a lecturer in Law at the Chinese University of Hong Kong; and her mother lives in the United States of America. She came to Hong Kong with her parents in 1949. She is now 38 years of age. She speaks English fluently; and she is very intelligent. Indeed her habit of answering a question before counsel had finished asking it was somewhat irritating. She is a very attractive woman - attractive, I should say, to men of all races. She is very "Westernised"; and, at any rate in recent years, she and the respondent have lived a very full social life. They are members of the Country Club and the South China Bowling Centre.

25. According to the petitioner, she was not really in love with the respondent when she married him. She said she married him "in order to run away from an unhappy home". Her evidence on this reads:-

Later in her evidence she said that he was not a highly strung and nervous man when she married him and that he began to show signs of nervousness and irritability after the birth of the first child. When asked what caused this she said that he began to criticise her for her method of handling the child. She said she felt that as from the birth of their first child she was no longer his wife but simply the mother of his child. Her evidence on this reads:-

" ........ he made a lot of fuss about the kid. Every little thing ........ when the kid was sick I had to sit the whole night through, just watching her, even a little fever, ........ I was not supposed to sleep because she has a fever. I mean, that is the sort of thing. He didn't take me as another human being, he took me as the mother of the kid. The kid is the most important thing. As far as the kid is concerned I am only the mother - nothing else."

26. The court endeavoured to probe this aspect of their early married life more deeply. It appears that in the early years of their marriage they had sexual intercourse regularly about twice a week. She said that she had no complaints to make regarding the physical aspect of their married life during those early years; but that at the end of 1964, or early in 1965, the respondent's sexual powers began to show signs of failing and that he failed to complete the sex act on about one-third of the occasions on which he attempted to have sexual relations. She said that he consulted Dr. Raymond Yang about this. The respondent admitted that he had consulted Dr. Yang; but he denied that this was because his sexual powers were failing. He said that he could not make the sexual act last as long as he could when he was a younger man and that he consulted Dr. Yang because he was particularly anxious to make his wife as happy as possible.

27. Dr. Yang did not give evidence. But I accept the petitioner's evidence in regard to this aspect of their married life namely that as from the end of 1964 or the beginning of 1965, on about one-third of the occasions on which sexual intercourse was attempted, the respondent failed to complete the act.

28. In view of the fact that the petition is silent on this aspect of their married life, the petitioner was asked whether her husband's failure to perform the sex act had reacted adversely on her health at any time since 1965. In answer to this question she said that her husband's inadequacy in this regard had no effect on her health except indirectly in that his failures made him more nervous and irritable and that his outbursts of temper, etc. affected her. She was at pains to stress that the sexual side of marriage was not important to her; but I did not accept her evidence on this. Quite obviously she is a normal healthy woman to whom the physical side of marriage is important.

29. The respondent was born in Tientsin. He is now 48 years of age. He studied at St. John's University, Shanghai, where he graduated B.A. in 1943, majoring in economics. He came to Hong Kong in 1948; and he is now a Director of Dah Fu Development and Investment Co. Ltd., a Director of South Machine Works Ltd. and he also holds a senior managerial position in South Textiles Ltd.

30. He and the petitioner are very different in temperament. She is much the stronger personality; and whereas she is bright, cheerful, gregarious, fond of company, rather cosmopolitan, and has a sense of humour, he is a solid, rather slow-witted, humourless man. He gave no indication of emotional instability while he was giving evidence. I can well imagine how she might have become "bored stiff" living with him. Indeed at one stage in the case she admitted in answer to counsel for the Queen's Proctor, that she had been bored by the respondent. The following passage from her cross-examination is revealing:-

31. The petitioner's answers in this passage do not really support her allegations in paras. 8, 9, 10 and 13 of the petition. If the respondent's behaviour prior to the filing of the petition was really as described by her in these paragraphs she would have been more than bored. But, of course, it may be that in this part of her evidence she had in mind particularly the period subsequent to the decree nisi.

32. The respondent was asked why he did not defend his wife's petition; and it was put to him that the reason was simply that her allegations were true and that he could not truthfully deny them. He would not agree with that. His answer followed the lines of his affidavit, the relevant portion of which reads:-

"At no time did I wish to be divorced from my wife, nor did I admit that any of the allegations contained in her petition were true but I did not defend the said petition because my said wife had previously told me that if I did so, the matter would receive publicity and such publicity might prejudice any chance we might have of subsequently becoming reconciled. As I was very much in love with my wife, I allowed her to seek the divorce and I did not defend, so that I should not be standing in the way of something which she wanted to do and so that we might subsequently have a chance to get together again."

33. What he seems to be saying there is that rather than generate bitterness by defending the petition, he hoped to persuade her to come back to him before the time arrived to make the decree nisi absolute. Further light on this question and on other aspects of the respondent's character are revealed in two letters which he wrote to his wife's mother about this time. Both of them are rather lengthy; but they are worthy of quotation in full. The first written on 7th April 1967 (3 weeks before the hearing of the petition) reads:-

Dated 7th April, 1967."

34. The respondent said in evidence that he sometimes took tranquillizers (that is to say drugs which have the effect of calming the nerves) but that he never took sleeping pills. He said that the references in his letter of 7th April to taking overdoses of sleeping pills were untrue and that these statements were made so as to obtain his mother-in-law's sympathy. The petitioner said in evidence that he began to take sleeping pills after she told him in October 1966 that their marriage had broken down; that he took large quantities of such pills from then until she permitted him to resume cohabitation with her in May 1968; and that he informed her that he had resumed taking sleeping pills after she left him on 2nd July, 1968.

35. I accept the petitioner's evidence that the respondent took very considerable quantities of drugs of some kind during the periods mentioned by her. I do not think it is of vital importance to decide whether the drugs taken were, wholely or in part, sleeping pills or tranquillizers. The petitioner did say that he took drugs during the night; and I accept her evidence on this. Whether it was to calm his nerves after abortive attempts at sexual intercourse, or otherwise to enable him to sleep does not seem to matter a great deal. His general object in writing to his mother-in-law was no doubt to obtain her sympathy; but I do not think that he told her untruths.

36. The second letter which he wrote to his mother-in-law is dated 4th May 1967, i.e. 5 days after the decree nisi was pronounced. It reads:-

The 4th day of May."

37. The petitioner consulted her solicitor with a view to instituting divorce proceedings in October 1966; and she said in evidence that her marriage broke down in October 1966 allegedly on account of the respondent's cruelty to her. As I have already said, it is no part of my duty to decide whether the decree nisi should or should not have been made; but clearly in deciding whether or not this decree should or should not be made absolute, it is necessary that I should have regard to the evidence as a whole; and in my view, one very important part of the evidence adduced before me concerns the petitioner's relations with a man named Philip George Taylor.

38. Mr. Taylor is 36 years of age. The petitioner has known him since 1961. He became Secretary of the Public Enquiry Service in December 1964. He was therefore her immediate superior in this department, and she was in touch with him constantly in matters connected with the work of the department from December 1964 to March 1967 when Mr. Taylor proceeded on home leave to the United Kingdom. She and the respondent and Mr. & Mrs. Taylor had met socially on a number of occasions. To what extent, if any, she was alone with him socially during this period is not known. She denied that she was ever alone with him socially. I do not accept her denial; but there is no positive evidence one way or the other, except a letter dated 8th December 1967 written by her to her mother and I shall deal with it presently.

39. She said in evidence that Mr. Taylor had told her that is marriage was not a happy one and that she and Taylor had found a mutual sympathy and understanding in their discussions. On 17th January 1967, the petitioner's solicitors wrote to the respondent informing him of her intention to institute divorce proceedings. On 28th January 1967, Mrs. Taylor obtained a decree nisi on the ground of her husband's cruelty to her and his adultery with another woman. The petition in this case was served on the respondent on 24th February 1967. Mr. Taylor went on leave to England in March 1967 and returned to Hong Kong in November 1967.

40. On 7th December 1967 the petitioner and Mr. Taylor spent the evening together. Upon her return to the matrimonial home (104 McDonnell Road, 7th floor) she told the respondent where she had been. My note of her evidence reads:

"He"(i.e. the respondent) "became hysterical. He asked me whether there was anything between us. I said 'no'. He pleaded with me to write a letter to my mother saying so. I did so next day. My main purpose in writing it was to pacify him. I gave it to my husband to read. He said he would post it next morning. But he was not pacified. He asked me many questions - how I felt for Mr. Taylor, did we ever kiss and so on."

The petitioner produced this letter in evidence. She really had no alternative because she found out later that the respondent had made a photostat copy of it before despatching it; and there is little doubt but that he would have produced the copy if she had not produced the original. When asked in evidence why he made a copy of the letter, he said:-

"I felt this letter was an apology to me, also a confession, a milestone in my life. She told me she would not see Mr. Taylor again. So, if in the future she did this again, I could produce this copy to confront her."

A translation of the letter reads as follows:-

"Dear, Mother,

41. The petitioner was questioned closely about this letter and she suggested that the translation certified by the Supreme Court translator was inaccurate in certain respects. She called no expert evidence in regard to this; and I accept the certified translation as accurate. I do not accept any of her explanations. The letter speaks for itself; and the extent of her friendship for Mr. Taylor may be judged by the language which she uses. To say the least of it, I do not think that a friendship of this nature developed as a result of a few conversations at leisure periods during office hours. The word "court" is significant. She says Taylor divorced his wife "for her". She is proud of the fact that she did not succumb to his advances and that she did "not have any intimacy with him". She did not do anything "improper". Yet she could not "control" herself. She wanted to test the strength of her "will-power" on 7th December 1967 after 8 months of "separation" from Taylor; and she is glad to say that her will power was equal to the occasion because she believed that her "immature passion" for Taylor was not "true love"; and she says she does not wish to see Taylor again because she and her husband are "reconciled".

42. The respondent said in evidence that about April 1968, the petitioner began keeping irregular hours, that she showed indifference to him, and that sometimes he saw her sitting with her head in her hands and a far-away look in her eyes. He gave a rather graphic demonstration of this several times in court; and he said that what troubled him most was the fact that he had seen this same far-away look in her eyes before she presented her petition for divorce. I accepted his evidence on these matters.

43. The petitioner is not a promiscuous woman. So far as the evidence goes, there has been only one other man in her life, apart from the respondent; and the respondent was well aware of this. There is no doubt that he began to be suspicious of his wife in April 1968, that is to say suspicious that she was associating in some way with Mr. Taylor.

44. In one of his affidavits the respondent says that he was afraid that his wife would apply to have her decree nisi made absolute; and it is a fact that he did consult the Deputy Registrar, Mr. Oliver, on 27th April 1968 about the decree nisi. On the 10th June 1968 his suspicions were aroused, rightly or wrongly, over some appointment which the petitioner was alleged to have had with some firm of hairdressers. He phoned the hairdressers at 6.00 p.m. and they told him that his wife had left at 5.00 p.m. She came home at 8.00 p.m. and said that she had been to some other hairdressers - not the firm she usually dealt with on Sunday mornings. At any rate on the 11th June 1968 he asked the Deputy Registrar whether the petitioner had applied to make the decree absolute. He was told that she had not done so. Nevertheless, as he feared that she would do so, he wrote to the Supreme Court on 11th June stating that he and the petitioner had lived as husband and wife as from the 18th May 1967.

45. The petitioner usually took the children to church on Sunday mornings at 9 o'clock and normally she then went on to the hairdressers, returning for lunch between 1.30 and 2.00 p.m. On 16th June 1968 she did not go to church. About 9.30 a.m. she told the respondent that she did not love him, that she intended to apply for her decree absolute and that she intended to marry Mr. Taylor. My note of the respondent's evidence reads:-

"On the morning when she told me she was going to marry Mr. Taylor I felt very distressed. I said 'Why do you do this again? You know very well your feelings for Mr. Taylor are immature and during the last several months we have been so good to each other and I have done nothing wrong for which I should feel sorry. Give it a thought. Previously you said you would never see Mr. Taylor again, that you would not marry him and that you would be my wife for ever.' She said: 'We have resumed contact for the last one or two months. I will give it a thought; but I think I will finally marry Mr. Taylor because I cannot forget him.' I said 'Let us write to your mother for her opinion.' She said: 'My mother's opinion does not matter. I think finally I will marry Mr. Taylor. I am sorry.'"

She then went to the hairdressers; and about 2.00 p.m. she telephoned. The respondent answered the phone. She said she would not be home for lunch; and then rang off immediately. She had the car; and she gave no indication that she was returning it to enable him to take the children to the Country Club to swim as had been arranged the previous day. He said in evidence that he wanted to get the car; but I am satisfied he also wanted to try to persuade her not to see Mr. Taylor and to spend the Sunday with him and the children. He went to the hairdressers. He sat there while she completed her hair-do. He then followed her out of the shop. She actually tried to run away from him. They eventually found themselves in a church in Seymour Road still arguing. She refused to return with him; and eventually she gave him the key of the car and he drove off, leaving her (to use her own words) "in peace".

46. She gave a different version of this incident. In particular she said that the conversation did not take place in the morning but in the evening. I do not accept this. The respondent's version, with one or two slight modifications, sounded much more likely.

47. Her story of what happened after he left her in Castle Road was that she took a taxi up the Peak and "meditated" somewhere in Lugard Road. She denied that she had spent the latter part of the afternoon with Taylor. The respondent said in evidence that when she returned home, she admitted that she had been with Taylor. My note of his evidence reads:-

"Later at home she said she had been with Mr. Taylor. I said to her: 'How did you meet?' She said: 'I have my own way to find him.'"

48. On 22nd June 1968 the petitioner told the respondent that she had been invited to the home of Mr. Denis Bray, her superior in the Government Department in which she was then working; and the respondent actually drove her down to the Star Ferry. In fact she never had any intention of going to Mr. Bray's home. Early in June she had arranged with Mr. Taylor to go with him as his partner to the Hongkong Motor Sports Club Ball on 22nd June and she did go with Mr. Taylor to that ball that evening.

49. She admitted in evidence that she, Mr. Taylor, and the children (Grace and Felix) have been out to meals in restaurants, and that she and Mr. Taylor have taken the children for walks on Sundays. She also admitted that she and Mr. Taylor and the children had a meal in the Country Club on one occasion. (The respondent alleges in his affidavit that she does this regularly, signing his name on the club chits.) She also said that she and Felix have been with Mr. Taylor to the house of one of Mr. Taylor's friends.

50. Para. 13 of the respondent's affidavit dated 15th November 1968 reads in part:-

"My wife does not appear to have exercised any care over how she behaves in the presence of the children. For instance, one day my son insisted on kissing his mother on the lips. When I asked him where he had learned to do that, he told me he had seen his mother and the said European gentleman doing so often. My daughter once insisted on lighting a cigarette for me saying that she had seen her mother do so for the said European gentleman."

The petitioner was cross-examined on this passage in the respondent's affidavit, the question being: "Do you admit that these things are true". In answer to this question she said: "Yes". She was not present when these conversations between the children and the respondent took place; and I do not know what she could have been referring to by her answer other than that she had in fact kissed Taylor often and had lit cigarettes for him. The children were not called as witnesses in these proceedings.

51. On 12th February 1969, the petitioner filed a discretion statement in which she admitted three acts of adultery with Mr. Taylor. She said that the first act of adultery took place on 30th August 1968, and that the second and third acts of adultery were committed in January 1969, the last occasion being two days before these proceedings commenced. She has given a number of explanations why she committed adultery with Taylor and I do not accept any of them. She has not told me the real reason why she did so, which is simply that she is deeply in love with Taylor. In my view, she is not the sort of person who would commit adultery with any man unless she might one day marry him. She has hesitated long before coming to her decision about Taylor. I asked her whether she would marry Taylor if she were free to do so. She hedged and said she hadn't made up her mind. I suppose it is natural that she wanted to play down her feelings for Taylor so that her husband could not say that he had any justification for his outbursts of temper, pleading, threats to commit suicide etc. alleged by her. But I feel certain that if she were free to do so she would marry Taylor now.

52. This is not the hearing of a petition for divorce by the respondent on the grounds of his wife's adultery. But, clearly, I cannot shut my eyes to the facts; and her allegations of cruelty on his part have to be viewed in the light of the fact that she is in love with Taylor and that she intends to marry him at the earliest possible opportunity.

53. I think that it was in June 1968 that the petitioner finally made up her mind to marry Taylor. She had not finally made up her mind about this when she filed her petition. Indeed I am satisfied that up to June 1968 she was torn between two opposing forces. On the one hand there was her love for her children and her desire to keep her marriage in being, and on the other hand she was unhappy as a result of the respondent's over-bearing manner and outbursts of temper. She also felt that she had never really been in love with him and that she had now found someone with whom she could be happy; but of course he was a Westerner and she hesitated long over the problems which such a union would necessarily involve.

54. It is therefore not surprising that she did not wish to tell her children that her marriage was breaking up. Nor did she tell her friends. Indeed she and the respondent carried on a normal social life both before and after the decree nisi. She told her solicitors not to apply for the decree absolute without further instructions from her. The formal order nisi was not filed till 13th June 1968; and there was no evidence that the respondent had been requested to pay her solicitors' costs.

55. What seems to emerge from all the evidence so far is this: Temperamentally, the parties were not ideally-suited for marriage; after the birth of their first child, the respondent did not give the petitioner the degree of attention to which she felt she was entitled. He devoted more time to his business than to his home. He was very fond of her but in a possessive sort of way. He was very conscious of her ability and popularity; and he was intensely jealous of her. In some respects he felt inferior to her and before the decree nisi he constantly felt that he had to assert his authority as head of the household by unnecessary outburts of temper. This resulted in much wrangling and there were a few instances of actual violence on his part, the most serious being those referred to in paras. 17 and 18 of the petition. These constant wranglings resulted in a cooling off of the petitioner's affection for the respondent; and as from the beginning of 1965 (shortly after Mr. Taylor was appointed Secretary to the Public Enquiry Service) the respondent's sexual powers began to fail; and on a number of occasions he failed to complete the sex act. This, in turn, did not help to soothe the nerves of either party. She began to confide in her superior Mr. Taylor (who apparently had marital troubles of his own) and a close friendship between them began to develop.

56. There is no evidence that prior to the hearing of the petition in April 1967 the respondent suspected that his wife and Taylor were friendly; but I think he began to realise that something was far wrong; that his wife was slipping away from him; that he had to mend his ways if he was going to succeed in holding her; and that he did endeavour to control his temper and over-bearing manner. His words in his letter of 7th April 1967 to his mother-in-law.

".......... considering my complete reform in the last few months, and considering my sincere love, please persuade her to effect a reconciliation

have the ring of truth.

57. The flat (104 Macdonnell Road, 7th floor) is rented in the petitioner's name. In response to her solicitors' letter of 17th January 1967 the respondent moved out of the flat and stayed with a friend nearby. But he returned to 104 Macdonnell Road a few weeks later, and he moved out again a few days before the 29th April, 1967.

58. The petitioner said in evidence that on 29th April 1967 the respondent spoke to her in court and asked her not to proceed with the petition. She says that immediately after the hearing he pleaded with her daily on his bended knees to resume marital relations with him and to start life afresh; that during his pleading he frequently wept, that on a number of occasions he threatened to commit suicide, and that on the night of 29th April after asking her to forgive him and resume cohabitation he rushed on to the balcony and put one leg over the side of it as if to jump, and that she restrained him from doing so. She alleges that it was his tearful pleading and threats to commit suicide that impelled her to permit him to return to the matrimonial home and to resume cohabitation partly because she pitied him and partly because she did not want to have his death upon her conscience.

59. I do not think she is being truthful in this. If she had finally made up her mind to divorce her husband his threats to commit suicide would not have induced her to resume cohabitation. No doubt he did plead with her to forgive and forget and to start afresh etc. (although even on this aspect her evidence is somewhat exaggerated); but the real reason why she permitted him to return to the matrionnial home on 18th May 1967 and to resume cohabitation was that, with Taylor's departure to England in March 1967, she succumbed to her natural desire not to break up her home and decided to try to re-establish her broken marriage. She said in evidence that she was no longer in love with the respondent; and her anguished cry in court: "I was a fool" had the ring of truth. Taylor came back to Hong Kong towards the end of 1967; and by June 1968 she was finally convinced that he was the man she really loved. But in May 1967, her intention was to forgive and forget and to give her marriage to the respondent another chance. The parties cohabited between 18th May 1967 and 2nd July 1968. Intercourse took place regularly between those dates the last act being on 24th May 1968. Clearly there was reconciliation and condonation; and I must now consider the evidence before me in support of the petitioner's contention that the respondent's conduct since 29th April 1967 has been such as to revive the cruelty prior to that date.

60. Before considering the petitioner's allegations, it is desirable to consider a document dated 4th May 1967 i.e. 5 days after the decree nisi was pronounced. It was written by the respondent and subitted by him to the petitioner for her comments. She corrected his English, added various comments of her own and handed it back to him. He typed it; and a copy was produced in evidence.

I submit the terms and conditions that I suggest for your consideration, as follows:-

61. Then what I wish you to do in case we can make up:

62. It would be hard to imagine a more abject apology. Whatever may have been the respondent's shortcomings prior to the decree nisi I get the impression that in this document he is going out of his way to exaggerate them. Of course, his object was to persuade his wife to return to him (an object which he achieved two weeks later); but there is also, in my view, a note of sincerity in the document; and I do not think that there can be any doubt that in May 1967 he intended to do everything in his power to make his wife happy.

63. I shall now consider the petitioner's allegations regarding the respondent's conduct since the decree nisi. In some instances it is necessary to quote from her affidavit because it was clear to me when she gave evidence that she had little or no recollection of certain incidents alleged in her affidavit. When this was put to her she took refuge by alleging that there were so many incidents that she could not remember the details of each; that she chose the more important incidents for the purpose of her affidavit; and that where her evidence differed from her affidavit, her affidavit should be taken as correct. However, it is not open to her to slide out of her responsibilities to the court in this way. It was agreed that the parties would give their evidence on oath and that such evidence would be tested by cross-examination. There is a consent order to this effect on the file.

Item (1): Threats to commit suicide.

(a) The petitioner alleges that on one occasion the respondent took an overdose of sleeping pills. Her evidence was that she woke up one morning to find him in a semicomatose state mumbling something about wanting to die; that she knew that he had been taking sleeping pills and that she assumed that he was suffering from the effects of an overdose; that he asked her to telephone Dr. Raymond Yang; that she did so and then went to her work leaving him in bed.

64. The respondent denied that he was in the state described by the petitioner and denied that he intended to commit suicide. Dr. Yang was not called as a witness; but there is a letter on the Court file addressed by him to the respondent's solicitors which indicates that he attended the respondent on 15th February 1967; that the respondent was suffering from insomnia and nervous tension; and that he was given some tranquillisers. There is no suggestion in the letter that the respondent was suffering from an overdose of sleeping pills. But, in any event, as the incident took place more than two months prior to the decree nisi I do not think that, for my present purpose, it falls to be considered at all.

65. I put no weight on item (iii). I see no reason why the petitioner should assume that because the respondent drove carelessly or jay-walked that he was hoping to be killed in a traffic accident; and, in my view, items (i) (iii) and (iv) may be lumped together. I do not think that the respondent had any intention of flinging himself over the balcony on 29th April 1967, and I do not think that the petitioner thought for one moment that he was going to do so. No doubt he went down on his bended knees and pleaded with her to forget and forgive; and at such times he may often have said that life was not worth living without her and that he might as well be dead if he couldn't have her, or words to that effect. But, in my view, it went no further than that. Furthermore, he achieved his purpose. She permitted him to resume cohabitation. Intercourse was ...(illegible) on 18th May 1967; and this continued till 24th May 1968; and there were no further "threats" to commit ...(illegible) until after 2nd July 1968. I accept that since 2nd July 1968 the respondent has, on a number of occasions, wept and pleaded with the petitioner to return to him; but he has failed to achieve his purpose; and since 2nd July 1968 the only effect such behaviour has had on the petitioner has been to make her despise him. The servant Chan Yuk Sum testified that a few days before these proceedings began the petitioner told her that she despised her husband and regarded him as "worse than a beggar". I accepted Chan Yuk Sum's evidence on this matter. There is no doubt that the petitioner has lost all respect for the respondent.

Item (2): Argument with petitioner's father.

66. The next incident mentioned by the petitioner in her affidavit and in her evidence occurred on 25th December 1967. In her affidavit (para. 13) she said that her father and the respondent became involved in an argument about the stability and future of Hong Kong; that after her father's departure the respondent said that she and her father were slaves to the "foreign devils"; that she was one of the "yellow dogs" and "a slave to the imperialists and poisoned by the Fascists"; that as he said these things he threw both of his shoes at her both of which hit her and that he then went out slamming the bedroom door with great force.

67. In her evidence she said that she remembered her father and the respondent having an argument and that although she realised they had a difference of opinion she did not hear what they said; the afterwards they took her father out for lunch; that the respondent drove the car towards the Star Ferry and that in Pedder Street he bumped into a lorry and had an argument with the lorry driver; that after saying goodbye to her father at the Star Ferry they returned home; that the respondent said that she and her father were pro-British, too Westernised, and that they were "running dogs"; that he threw his shoe at her and that it hit her but that it caused no damage.

68. The respondent's evidence consisted of a complete denial that he had any argument with his father-in-law and he denied throwing his shoe (or shoes) at the petitioner.

69. I accept the petitioner's story that an argument between the respondent and her father took place. I have not seen her father; but I can well imagine the respondent, if annoyed, saying that the petitioner was "too Westernised" perhaps adding a few more of the more common epithets frequently used by persons of Chinese race who have strong views on such matters. But I do not trust her story about the shoe or shoes. Apart from the differences between her affidavit and her evidence, I did not believe that he flung his shoe at her. He may have flung it on the floor in a fit of impatience or temper, but not at her. With that feature of the incident removed, there is really little left to consider as regards para. 13.

Item (3): The "Singer Car" incident.

70. In para. 14 of her affidavit the petitioner says:-

"On or about 28th December 1967 after the respondent and I had returned home after trying a new Singer car the respondent flew into a violent temper and falsely accused me of flirting with the salesman. The respondent proceeded to throw some books at me and said that I was worse than a whore".

71. In her evidence she said:-

"About February or March 1968 we went to try a Singer car. I spoke mostly to the Austrian salesman. My husband did not want the car. When we came back, he accused me of flirting with the salesman, banged a cosmetic jar on the table and threw it at me."

72. The respondent said he remembered trying out a Singer car; but he denied all his wife's other allegations.

73. In my view, neither party told the whole truth. The respondent is very jealous indeed of his wife. With little or no justification for making the accusation, he may well have accused her of flirting with the salesman. But the petitioner had no clear recollection of the incident; and beyond accepting that words passed between them on the subject of her alleged flirting, I cannot put any weight on what she says as regards the alleged violence offered or the language alleged to have been used by the respondent on this occasion.

Item (4): Spiritual infidelity.

74. Para. 15 of the petitioner's affidavit reads:-

"Sometime in the beginning of January 1968 the respondent and I went to a party given by some friends, and during the course of it a discussion arose concerning a mutual male acquaintance who allegedly kept mistresses. When we got home the respondent again flew into a temper and stated that I had not been spiritually faithful to him and he accused me of being still in love with" (Mr. Taylor) "The respondent went on to say that spiritual infidelity was worse than physical adultery. While the respondent was making these remarks he picked up a cosmetic jar off my dressing table and threw it at me and called me amongst other names 'a whore, a cheap woman and a devil'".

75. My note of what she said in evidence reads:-

"He started to suspect me, everything I did. He started big rows, throwing things at me, abusing me. He threw cosmetic jars and shoes and used his fist to hit my back. He threw a cosmetic jar 2 or 3 times nearly always after we came in from a party. He would start to argue and quarrel with me. Nearly always he said I had flirted with someone in the party or said I had said something I shouldn't have, and he said nasty things to me. There was no throwing of cosmetic jars before the decree nisi. The first time was after a party I went to. I came home and told my husband about it. Some man there was keeping mistress. The women were talking about it. My husband accused me of spiritual adultery and said that it was worse than physical adultery. He threw a cosmetic jar at me. It hit me on the back of the right shoulder. He threw a cosmetic jar again; but I cannot remember dates now; but I kept a note of the dates and I referred to my note when I gave my affidavit".

76. The 'notes' she produced in evidence consisted of a few sheets extracted from a loose-leaf diary of social events for the period 2nd December 1967 to 31st May 1968. There were references in several places to throwing jars and shoes, etc. A translation of these references reads:-

Some of these references were in a different colour of ink. In certain instances, the addition was at the side of the entry for the particular day. Some of the references were interpolated between lines. A more suspicious and self-serving set of entries could hardly be imagined. They give the impression of having been prepared for the purpose of this case; and I put no weight on them at all.

77. My note of the respondent's evidence covering the "spiritual infidelity" incident reads:-

"I remember a conversation in a party about a man keeping a mistress. I never flew into a temper afterwards. I did not accuse her of being spiritually unfaithful or say that spiritual infidelity was worse than physical adultery.

78. I have no doubt that the respondent had not forgotten what he had learned about Taylor on 7th and 8th December, 1967; and it only needed her to repeat the conversation about someone keeping a mistress for the respondent to be touched on the raw so to speak. I accept her evidence that the respondent did accuse her of being still in love with Taylor. That being so, he would certainly regard her as "spirtually unfaithful" and he may well have used some such expression. He may even have gone further and called her a cheap woman or something equivalent. But I put no weight at all on her allegation that on this occasion, or on any other occasion, the respondent threw a cosmetic jar at her.

79. She was cross-examined generally about her allegation that the respondent on 2 or 3 occasions threw a cosmetic jar at her. According to her on those occasions she was invariably sitting at the table in front of her dressing table and he was invariably sitting on the bed a few feet away. According to her, he would pick up a cosmetic jar from the table and when he got angry enough over whatever they were arguing about he would aim the jar at her. I simply did not believe a word of this.

Item (5) Throwing cosmetic jar on ground.

80. Para. 16 of the petitioner's affidavit reads:

"Sometime in the middle of January 1968 ............... the respondent again flew into a violent rage and picked up a cosmetic jar from my dressing table and threw it onto the floor. The incident took place after the respondent had tried to have sexual intercourse with me but failed due to his failure to sustain an erection."

The respondent denies that this happened.

81. I accept the petitioner's evidence that on a considerable number of occasions when intercourse was attempted the respondent failed, for one reason or another, to complete the act. If her affections lay elsewhere, or even if he believed that they lay elsewhere, it is perhaps not surprising that he failed on a number of occasions. But perhaps the main cause of his failure was his over-keenness to please his wife. He was, and is, of a nervous disposition. It hurts his ego, of course, to think that he has sexual failures. Hence his exasperation on such occasions and his denials in court. Whether he flung a cosmetic jar on the floor or not is very doubtful indeed.

Item (6) the Lin incident at the Country Club.

82. Para. 17(a) of the petitioner's affidavit reads:

"On 24th March 1968 after my husband and I had been bowling at the Country Club with a Mr. Lin (who is a mutual friend of ours) my husband, when we arrived home, accused me of flirting with Mr. Lin and called me a whore and a prostitute."

83. Her evidence in regard to this was:-

"Once in the Country Club I saw a man Lin (Lam) who had once asked me to dance at a Chinese New Year party. At the Country Club we talked about bowling techniques and that night my husband accused me of flirting. I could not talk to any man."

That was all she said initially about the incident. But when asked whether he ever called her a whore etc., she then said:

"He used that language on so many occasions I really cannot remember whether he used it on that occasion or not."

She was then asked to repeat the Chinese words which she alleged her husband sometimes used; and she said: "Jen (or Jin in Cantonese)", which translated means "cheap woman"; "Yao Tsz Lu Di Lu Yen", which translated means "woman in brothel"; and "Bu Yao Len", which translated means "shameless".

84. At one point in her evidence she said:

"I always emphasized that I either got a divorce or remained 100% faithful to him; and he knew it."

I think that he did know it; and to a person in such a jealous state of mind as the respondent obviously was, and is, if the petitioner even joked with another man, to the respondent that was flirting, and although I can well imagine him using words like "shameless" and "cheap woman" because he was utterly jealous of her even talking to any man, I do not accept that he ever used language which was intended, or understood by her as implying, that she was a woman who would go to bed with any man.

85. What probably happened on this occasion was that in a fit of jeal ousy he said: "I saw you flirting with that man Lin in the Country Club, you shameless creature." He may well have said something to that effect; and she has given his words a slant so as to allege now that he insinuated that she was a woman of the brothel.

Item (7) The South China Bowling Centre incident

86. Para. 17(b) of her affidavit reads:

"On the 12th April 1968, my husband and I went bowling with a Mr. and Mrs. Carl Chow at South China Bowling Centre. During the course of the evening I entered my name for the bowling league. I put down my name as Mrs. Dora Li and my husband then lost his temper and said that I should use the name Mrs. V.C. Li and not Dora Li. My husband said that I was not proud of his name and that no decent married woman would use her Christian name since only such people as cabaret girls used their Christian names. This argument took place in front of our friends and when we got home that evening my husband started to throw his shoes around and slam doors."

Her evidence relating to the incident at the bowling centre was to much the same effect; but as regards the respondent's alleged behaviour at home, she said:

"I think that night he hit me with his fist, on the back behind the shoulder with his fist. Sometimes he hit me with his open hand."

I did not like the way she invariably took refuge in generalizations of this kind. I put no weight at all on her allegation that on this occasion the respondent either threw his shoes around or his her on the back with his fist.

87. The respondent called Mr. Carl Chow, a solicitor of this Court, who is a mutual friend of the parties. Mr. Chow said that he remembered the incident at the bowling centre. He was unable to understand what was said by the respondent because he spoke in Shanghainese; but Mr. Chow would not agree that the respondent was aggressive. He added: "Maybe he was not too pleased."

88. Questioned generally about the respondent's treatment of his wife in public, Mr. Carl Chow said:

"From observation I would say that he treated his wife very well, that he respected her. He treated her like a queen."

89. I accept Mr. Carl Chow's evidence. I do not accept the respondent's denials; and I accept the petitioner's version of what the respondent said in regard to the use of her Christian name on the application form.

Item (8) Her refusal to say that she loved him.

90. Para. 17(c) of the petitioner's affidavit reads:

"On the 13th April 1968, after my husband had asked me to say that I loved him and I had refused, my husband hit me on the back with his fist."

91. In evidence she said:

"On many occasions, on 5 or 6 occasions, after 7th December 1967 he asked me to say that I loved him. I refused; and he always hit me with his fist on the back on the right side as I sat at the dressing table, he sitting on the bed. I refused to say I loved him because I did not love him. After I decided to go through with the divorce I lost all feeling for him."

I do not accept the respondent's denial that he ever asked his wife to say that she loved him. The respondent was suspicious of his wife; and he became more suspicious of her in April 1968 when she began to keep irregular hours and to show her indifference for him. I have no doubt that he did on a number of occasions ask for an assurance of her love. On such occasions she may well have said nothing, or she may have given him some equivocal reply; but I do not accept her allegation that he hit her on the back with his fist as she sat at the dressing table and as he sat on the bed. This was the relative position in which they always sat, according to her, on the occasions when the cosmetic jars were allegedly thrown. The sheer unlikelihood of assaults of this nature happening in this way on every occasion is obvious; and having regard to her manner when testifying, I am not satisfied that the respondent ever did hit her with his fist after April 1967.

Item (9) Party at Kingsgarden Night Club.

92. Para. 17(d) of her affidavit reads:

"On 3rd May 1968 we were invited out to a party at the Kingsgarden Night Club by certain friends and included in the party were three European Government officers. During the course of the evening I danced quite often with these gentlemen. When my husband and I went home my husband accused me of flirting with these three Europeans and hit me quite hard on the back with his fist."

93. In evidence she said:

"Always after a party he made a scene at home. I remember a party at the Kingsgarden Night Club. I always believe in making the most of a party. I sat with some civil servants. We talked and laughed. My husband was sitting there. He did not talk to anybody. He did not dance. When we got home he accused me of flirting. He threw his shoes at me. The shoes hit me on the leg."

94. Clearly she had no recollection of what happened when they got home. All she could say with any degree of certainty was that after a party he always "made a scene". The rest of her evidence was just guess-work. As regards the "scene", I have no doubt that he did express his jealousy by accusing her of flirting and so on; but on her testimony I am not satisfied that he hit her either with his hand or with a shoe.

Item (10) Twisting her arm.

95. Para. 18 of the petitioner's affidavit reads:

"On or about the 11th day of May 1968, the respondent twisted my arm after I refused to tell him that I loved him."

96. Under item (8) I have quoted the only evidence she gave regarding the occasions when the respondent asked her to say she loved him. She said nothing about having her arm twisted on any such occasion; and I put no weight on the entry in her diary under 11th May 1968.

Item (11) Alleged assault on 19th May 1968

97. Para. 19 of her affidavit reads:

"On or about 19th May 1968 I went to my hairdressers, and after my hair had been set I went to buy some fruit: I then returned to my hairdressers in order to have my hair combed. During my absence the respondent had apparently telephoned my hairdressers and when I got home he falsely accused me of going out with someone else, and hit me on the back with his fist."

98. Her evidence was that the respondent telephoned the hairdressers on a number of occasions with the intention of checking up on her movements. The respondent said that he phoned the hairdressers once or twice "for good cause". I accept the petitioner's evidence that he did telephone the hairdressers on a number of occasions; and I can well believe that he did so with the intention of checking up on her movements. He was driven to do so by his suspicions and his jealousy. No doubt he did suggest that she had been out with someone else; but I do not accept her evidence that he hit her with his fist.

Item (12) Frequent telephoning at the office.

99. Para. 20 of her affidavit reads:

"Frequently since December 1967 the respondent telephoned me at the office to ask me what I was doing and who I had been seeing. He would not allow me to have lunch with my female friends nor would he let me attend staff office functions or even the wedding of a friend and business colleague. This caused me great embarrassment on a number of occasions."

100. Her evidence did not support some of these allegations. It reads:

"Even in the office I had to say where I was going in case he rang. He would ring 3 or 4 times a day, and he would come to my office 2 or 3 times a day to check who I was with. My job in the Public Enquiry Centre meant I had to liaise with other departments to get information and I had to make a lot of contacts."

In his affidavit the respondent denied the petitioner's allegations and cited the instance of his driving her to the Star Ferry when she said that she was going to the home of her superior, Mr. Bray, when in fact she was going to the Motor Sports Club Ball with Mr. Taylor.

101. As in so many other aspects of her evidence, the petitioner was exaggerating in alleging that the respondent telephoned 3 or 4 times and came to her office 2 or 3 times a day. But I accept her evidence that the respondent did ring frequently and did come to her office sometimes; and that on many occasions his object was simply to see what she was doing and who she was with. Clearly he was suspicious that she was spending too much time with Taylor. Nevertheless it must have been irritating for her to have frequent telephone calls and visits from him knowing, as she did, the only purpose of such calls and visits.

Item (13) Questioning late at night

102. Para. 21 of the petitioner's affidavit reads:-

"Very frequently since December 1967 the respondent would deliberately and persistently keep me from sleeping by questioning me in bed as to who I had been seeing that day."

103. In evidence she said:-

"As it got on to May, I couldn't sleep because he kept pestering me and questioning me as to where I had been. I did go out. But some office functions do not invite families. So at night he kept on asking what happened during the day. I went to Dr. Dawson-Grove because I could not sleep. He gave me sleeping pills. .......... This questioning and pestering at night would last till 1 a.m."

As regards her visit to Dr. Dawson-Grove she says in her affidavit that she saw the doctor on 29th June. Dr. Dawson-Grove's evidence was that she came to see him on 28th June 1968, and that this was the first time she had consulted him since her visit on 11th January 1967. He made a note of his interview with her on 28th June and his note reads:-

"She was frightened of her husband. Rapid pulse obviously very nervous. Displayed symptoms of fear. Apprehension. 3 grains of seconal."

104. This does not fit in at all with her evidence which was simply: "I went to Dr. Dawon-Grove because I could not sleep. He gave me sleeping pills." The doctor was asked by counsel whether the petitioner had said anything to him about being emotionally involved with a person other than her husband and he replied in the negative. He agreed, however, that if the petitioner was so emotionally involved this could have accounted for her symptoms which, apart from anything which she may have said to him, amounted to nothing more than nervousness and a rapid pulse.

105. The petitioner is quite capable on occasion of what is sometimes described as "throwing an act". Twice in the witness box she burst into tears when giving evidence in support of her allegations that her husband had tried to influence the children against her. I did not believe that her display of emotion on those occasions was sincere.

106. I put no weight on the fact that the doctor appears to have recorded in his case-book on 28th June 1968 that the petitioner told him that she was frightened of her husband. It is very easy for a woman to say to her doctor: "I am afraid of my husband." The doctor's job is to treat functional abnormality whatever the cause of such abnormality may be. He is not primarily concerned in assessing the credibility of his patient.

107. The respondent denied that he persistently questioned his wife in bed as to where she had been; but I do not accept his denials. He was suspicious of her movements and I can quite believe that he questioned her as to where she had been and what she had been doing. But I do not accept her evidence that she was kept awake till 1 a.m. or that the respondent's questioning affected her health. It was annoying. But that was all.

Item (14)

108. Para. 22 of the petitioner's affidavit reads:-

"On or about the 15th June 1968 the Respondent and I went out for dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Wing Chow. During the course of the evening Mrs. Chow mentioned that she kept her salary for herself and I told her that I put all my salary into our joint account, which the respondent and I then used for house-keeping. When we arrived home after dinner the Respondent was in a furious temper and said that I should not tell people how I used my money. At that time I was sitting in front of my dressing table and the Respondent pushed me off the chair onto the floor and hit me on the back with his fist."

In his affidavit the respondent says:-

"I well remember the day in question for it was very happy. Far from assaulting my wife we were very affectionate to each other on the night of 15th June 1968."

The petitioner gave no evidence in support of para. 22 of her affidavit except that when the above para. from the respondent's affidavit was put to her she said:-

"The 15th June 1968 was the night before the incident in the church at Castle Road. What I have said in para. 22 of my affidavit is correct."

I do not accept the respondent's evidence. I do not believe that the parties were affectionate on the night of 15th June 1968. On the other hand, having seen the petitioner testify, I am not satisfied that the respondent pushed the petitioner off the chair onto the floor and hit her on the back with his fist.

Item (15) Withdrawal of $110,000 and $36,000.

109. On 2nd June 1967 the respondent withdrew money from his savings account with South Textiles Ltd. and gave the petitioner the major portion of it. This was done apparently in pursuance of para. (1) of the document dated 4th May 1967. On 14th June 1967 the petitioner opened another account with South Textiles Ltd. in the name "Bui Kee" and placed the greater portion of the money which the respondent had given to her (viz. $20,000) to the credit of this account. The respondent said in evidence that they had agreed that the money in this account should be regarded as a fund for the education of their children and used for that purpose only. The petitioner said that she had no recollection of having so agreed; and I accept her evidence on this matter.

110. On 1st March 1968, she liquidated the U.S. $15,000 standing to her credit in the American bank and placed the proceeds (HK$90,000) in the Bui Kee account. She said in evidence that this $90,000 was money saved by her. I was not given any detailed statement of accounts; but I got the impression that this $90,000 was an accumulation of sums saved from their joint salaries after paying all household expenses. There is no doubt that part, if not all, of the $90,000 was money earned initially by the petitioner.

111. She caused a chop to be made for the Bui Kee account; and the arrangement was that South Textiles Ltd. would pay money out of the account upon presentation of a demand note duly stamped with this chop. The chop was kept in a safe deposit box in the Chartered Bank; and the respondent had access to this safe deposit box.

112. On 16th June 1968 the petitioner finally decided to instruct her solicitors to apply to court for the decree nisi to be made absolute; and she required money for this purpose. On 17th June there was standing to the credit of the Bui Kee account $112,754. On 18th June the respondent withdrew $110,000 from the Bui Kee account and put the money elsewhere in trust for his children.

113. Towards the end of June the respondent also withdrew the money standing to the credit of the account with the Hong Kong agents of a certain firm of New York sharebrokers and put it elsewhere in trust for the children. The sum involved was $36,000; and, on the evidence, the most that I can say is that this money was an accumulation of sums surplus to their joint earnings after all expenses in connection with their joint living had been paid.

114. I have no doubt at all that the petitioner intended to withdraw part of the money in the Bui Kee account to instruct her legal advisers in connection with the application for the decree absolute; and it is equally obvious that the respondent's intention was to prevent her, if possible, from proceeding further with the divorce. He therefore took steps to put the money in the Bui Kee account and the other account beyond her reach.

Item (16) Alleged influencing of the children against the petitioner.

115. Para. 27 of the petitioner's affidavit reads:-

"..... thereafter" (i.e. after the beginning of May 1968) "the respondent began to try to influence the children against me and both my children have frequently informed me that the respondent had told them that I was going to marry 'a foreign devil' and that the 'foreign devil' would treat them badly. He also told my children that I was a very 'bad woman' and that when I married this 'foreign devil' I would desert them. The respondent told my children that foreigners were not good because they bully Chinese people and the respondent told my children that they must not continue to live with me should I move out. My children have also informed me .......... that on one occasion the respondent swore on the Bible in front of them that he would never marry again if I should get a divorce. All these matters have greatly upset my children to such an extent that they have become thoroughly confused and emotionally upset and on one occasion, our son, who was at that time 10 years old, left the house on two occasions thus causing me great alarm. On another occasion the respondent so reviled me to my son, and had so confused him that my son went into the kitchen and got an empty bottle and threatened me with it, saying he was going to kill me. I restrained my son but he kicked me on the back and chest. I realised however that he was behaving in this manner as a direct result of what the respondent had told him."

116. The petitioner gave evidence along the lines of this paragraph. My note reads:-

"He told the children that their mother was deserting them. He often abused me in front of the children. Between 16th and 22nd June 1968 he abused me and my son got violent. As from June 1968 he started saying things about me in front of the children; that I was going to desert them and that I was going to marry a foreign devil. He said I was worse than a where. My daughter started repeating the things my husband said. My son tried to tick me and hit me. My husband asked my son to ask me to swear that I would never run away. I refused. On one occasion my son picked up a bottle and was going to hit me but stopped."

117. Another passage from the petitioner's evidence reads:

"........ between July and November 1968 Felix questioned me about the divorce and asked me if I was going to desert him and Grace or not. He went on and on like a gramophone. And during that period he used to ask me whether I was still taking birth control tablets and whether I had my monthly period. .............................................. My son dashed down to my office on three occasions, once in August and twice in November 1968. On the first occasion he said that his father was questioning him about me and that as he had not said much his father had slapped his face. He begged me not to let him go back to the flat. I phoned the respondent and he said he had slapped Felix because he was naughty. He denied that he had questioned Felix about me. On the next occasion, Felix said his father asked him to spy on me and that his father had slapped him when he refused to do so. I 'phoned respondent and he said he had slapped Felix because he was mischievous. On the third occasion, Felix said his father had asked him whether I had had menstruation or not and that as he had refused to say his father slapped him. He pleaded with me not to let him go near that flat again. On this occasion, the respondent denied hitting the boy and denied what Felix had told me. Next day (27th November 1968) I contacted my old amah and asked her to come every afternoon to look after my son. After she came my son did not go to 104 any more, and I do not think the respondent has seen Felix since."

118. The respondent deals with these allegations in his affidavit thus:-

119. In evidence, he said that his wife's allegations that he had tried to turn the children against her were "too ridiculous". He also said:

"On 5th July 1968 I saw my children. My daughter said that on the previous night, my wife had said to her and Felix: 'I am going to divorce your father. I will have a new husband. You will have a new uncle'. I told them not to mind such things and to concentrate on their studies. I said: 'Your father will try his best to keep the four of us together.' Grace said: 'It is not strange to be divorced, Elizabeth Taylor has been divorced 5 times.' As my wife had told them about the divorce after a long time I told them about it, i.e. in August 1968. My son often said that Mummy was going to divorce me. He said: 'You often said you would keep the four of us together. Are you going to divorce?' I said: 'I will not divorce your mother.' My son said: 'Do you dare to swear that?' and so I swore on the Bible that I would not. That was in the middle of July 1968. Regarding the empty bottle incident, that was the first time when my wife took my son to see Taylor, and they had a meal together. After they came back, my son ran to the store at the rear of the flat and took an empty bottle and wanted to hit his mother."

120. The parties did their best to keep the children in ignorance of the fact that their marriage was breaking up; but if there is tension in a house children very quickly become aware of the fact and begin to ask their parents questions and naturally they get conflicting answers. Children have no desire to "take sides". They usually love both parents; but they find themselves in an impossible position. The petitioner left the matrimonial home in July 1968, but the children were in contact with both parents every day. The petitioner was in contact with Taylor and she and Taylor took the children for outings on Sunday. The children did not give evidence; but their minds must have been sorely exercised as to why their mother was finding pleasure in another man's company. I do not need evidence to inform me that in such a situation children ask questions; and I haven't the slightest doubt that before long each parent was drawn into discussions with one or other child about the activities of the other parent and answering questions as to why both parents were not living under the same roof; and what one parent said would be communicated to the other, and perhaps not very accurately communicated. In the absence of evidence from the children, I am not prepared to make any positive findings of fact as to what the respondent said to either of the children and, if anything was said, whether it was in answer to questions by the children or with a view to instigating them to spy on their mother. The respondent had no reason to think kindly of Taylor and he may well have referred to him as "a foreign devil" or in even less complimentary terms. But I have no reason to think that the respondent ever "abused" the petitioner in front of the children or that he ever said anything with the intention of putting the children against their mother. Indeed, I did not believe her when she said that she believed that he had done so. The respondent's whole object has been, and is, to keep the family together. She well knows that this is so; and she hates her husband for refusing to give her her freedom. In my view what she is really afraid of is that the children may be prejudiced against Taylor. After all she hopes to marry Taylor one day.

Item (17) The scratch on the back; and the burn on the arm.

121. As I have already said under Item 13, Dr. Dawson-Grove said in evidence that the petitioner came to see him on 28th (not 29th) June 1968. As regards the visit on 3rd July the doctor said that she was slightly hysterical and weeping; that she had two obvious burns on her left shoulder (he pointed to a spot two inches behind the tip of the left shoulder) and that the petitioner told him that the respondent had inflicted those burns the previous night. When asked whether, from his professional experience, he could express any opinion as to whether the burns might have been caused by a deliberate attack with, say, a cigarette or perhaps accidentally, he said that in his opinion they were more likely to have been inflicted by a deliberate attack. The doctor then said that when he was examining the petitioner on 3rd July, he saw a seratch on her right shoulder; that she had not mentioned this injury to him; that he asked her what caused the scratch and that in response to his question she then said to him that her husband had attacked her four days previously and that he had "hit her and scratched her". Four days previously was, presumably, the 29th July.

122. In giving evidence in support of para.28 the petitioner said:-

"My husband lost his temper when I told him that I had been to the doctor and he hit me on the back with his fist".

She added later that the respondent scratched her back. She does not allege in para.28 that her husband struck her with his fist nor did Dr. Dawson-Grove see any mark indicative of a blow from a fist.

123. The petitioner's evidence relating to the scratch filled me with the utmost suspicion. She seemed to have no clear recollection of what happened on this occasion and her allegation that her husband gave her a blow with his fist did not ring true. Apart from that, it seems highly unlikely that a man would, at one and the same time, punch his wife with his fist on the back and also scratch her on the back either with his fingernails or with some weapon. Her evidence relating to the incident was, to say the least of it, sketchy. One might have expected her to say when exactly the alleged attack took place, where she and her husband were and what they were doing, whether she was undressing and whether the scratch was caused by fingernails or by something else.

124. As I have already said I do not accept the petitioner's allegation that her husband on numerous occasions struck her blows with his fist. When asked whether any of those alleged blows resulted in a bruise, at first she said 'yes', but quickly withdrew that statement and said that the alleged blows never resulted in anything more than a little redness which disappeared in a day or so. No one seems to have seen her husband use violence of this kind. She did not even allege that any such blow ever caused her to cry.

125. I am quite certain that on 29th June 1968 the respondent did not strike the petitioner a blow with his fist; and I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the scratch on her shoulder was caused by the respondent.

126. My note of the petitioner's evidence regarding the alleged burn reads:-

"In the morning of 2nd July 1968 I told him I was moving out. He said: 'If you want to move out, just move out, but you cannot take the children.' I said I would. We had a fierce argument. I was dressed in a sleeveless cheongsam. I was trying to get a jacket from the closet. A 1 of a sudden I felt a pain on my arm. I saw ash on my arm. My husband was smoking at the time. A blister came out at lunch-time. It was caused by a cigarette. Coming home in the car at lunch-time he said: 'What happened to your arm?' I said: 'Don't be funny; you did it this morning.' He said: 'Did I? Did I?' "

127. She was cross-examined by counsel for the respondent thus:-

128. In his affidavit, and in evidence, the respondent said in effect that if the petitioner did have a scratch and a burn, these injuries were not caused by him. He confirmed that in the presence of the servant the petitioner had said that the burn on the arm was caused accidentally in the office.

129. It was suggested to the petitioner in cross-examination that having decided to proceed with her application for the decree absolute she began to realise the importance of getting some corroborative medical evidence to support her allegations of cruelty, particularly as she had good reason to believe that on this occasion her husband would contest her allegations, the implication being that there was no need what soever for her to consult her doctor on account of being kept awake by alleged questioning or because of a cigarette burn on the arm. I have already found that her allegations regarding her husband's questioning were grossly exaggerated. I must say that it also struck me as somewhat odd that she should consider it necessary to seek medical advice and treatment for such a minor injury as a cigarette burn.

130. As regards the cigarette burn, a puzzling feature of this allegation is that Dr. Dawson-Grove is the only person who saw two burns. The evidence of the petitioner, the respondent and the servant Chan Yuk Sum indicates that they saw one burn; and Chan Yuk Sum and the respondent said that the burn was six inches down the arm from the shoulder, not behind the shoulder. The respondent drew a sketch of what he saw on his wife's arm, and this sketch indicates one injury, not two.

131. I think it is much more likely that there was one injury and that it was on the upper arm and not behind the shoulder.

132. The petitioner's version of how the burn was caused was put to the respondent. He was rather evasive to begin with; and his subsequent denials did not sound convincing. On the other hand I found it difficult to appreciate the logic behind the petitioner's statement in the presence of her servant that the burn was caused accidentally in the office. I must confess that at one stage in this case the possibility did occur to me that the burn may have been self-inflicted. However, this was not alleged in cross-examination by counsel; and I put this thought entirely out of my mind.

133. In my view on the morning of 3rd July the parties did have a violent argument following the petitioner's announcement that she was leaving 104 Macdonnell Road and was taking the children with her. Both parties were undoubtedly in a highly emotional state. She was in the process of dressing and he was smoking and they were standing close to one another. I accept the respondent's evidence that he does not remember causing the burn on his wife's arm. Indeed it is clear from the petitioner's evidence relating to the conversation which they had in the car on their way back to lunch that the respondent did not realise that he had caused a burn on his wife's arm. However, I am inclined to think that the burn was caused during the argument on the morning of 3rd July but that it was caused by him accidentally as he waved his arms around. The last question put to the respondent by counsel for the petitioner was:-

"I suggest that you were waving your arms about having a heated argument with your wife and you burnt her just after she told you she was moving out of the flat."

134. Para. 25 of the petitioner's answer to the plea of the Queen's Proctor reads:-

"..... since the 2nd July 1968 the respondent had frequently come to the residence of the petitioner and has continued to make scenes and has indulged in paroxysms of rage in front of the children. The respondent has admitted to the petitioner that he has continued to take large quantities of sleeping pills against the advice of his doctors."

The petitioner's evidence was to much the same effect.

135. In regard to these allegations, the respondent said in evidence:-

"I have only been once to where she is staying. That was on the evening of 6th July, 1968. I wanted to see where my children were living. She was not there. I only stayed for a few minutes. I never made scenes or went into paroxyms of rage. Sometimes my wife and I quarrelled in front of the children; but not in a very loud voice. Sometimes I wept but not crying loud. I cried because I was heartbroken. I remember once she said I was shameless. She said that because she wanted to leave me and I would not let her. She said she did not love me any more. This sort of conversation happened on a number of occasions. During July and August 1968 she said she did not love me at least 4 times."

I accept the petitioner's evidence that after 2nd July 1968 the respondent began to take sleeping pills (or tranquillisers). But I accept the respondent's evidence in regard to the other allegations in para. 25 of the petitioner's Answer.

Item 19 - Condoning of adultery.

136. The petitioner said in evidence that on a number of occasions both prior and subsequent to the decree nisi, the respondent had said that even although she had lost all feeling for him, even if she took a lover and had a child by that lover, he would accept the situation, but the one thing he would never do would be to divorce her. She mentioned one specific occasion on which, according to her, he used words to this effect. She said that at Xmas 1967 they attended the St. John's Alumni Association Ball; that in the party there was a Chinese couple with a Eurasian child, the offspring of an adulterous union between the Chinese woman and some European man; that this couple introduced the child to everyone present; and that when the petitioner and the respondent returned home he said that he was very sympathetic to the woman's husband and said:-

"No matter what you do, I shall never let you go."

137. I do not understand what the petitioner hoped to achieve by giving such evidence. Even if the respondent did make the statements alleged, they could not be regarded as cruelty in the legal sense, although I have no doubt that such statements would appear "cruel" to any woman who desperately desired to be free to marry someone else. When it was put to the petitioner that she did not refer to the "European child incident" in her affidavit and that it was strange that she should be giving evidence of this nature now having confessed to adultery with Taylor in her discretion statement, she said that she forgot to mention the matter in her affidavit and added:-

"That was part of his pleading he pleaded with me in spite of everything whatever I do."

The Ball referred to by the petitioner took place about two weeks after she wrote her letter of 8th December, 1967 to her mother. So far as the evidence goes the parties were living together at this time. The respondent was not "pleading" with her to allow him to cohabit with her at Xmas 1967. She had just written to her mother to say that she realised that she could not find anyone in the world who loved her as much as the respondent and that she also understood what true love was.

138. It seems most ...(illegible) that at Xmas 1967 the respondent said: "no matter what you do, I shall never let you go". But I make no general finding that he has never used words of a similar nature; and after June or July 1968 in all probability he did tell her on a number of occasions that he would never "let her go". Indeed it is because he has no intention of letting her go that he is defending these proceedings; and it may well be that he did say something to the effect that he would not change his mind about "letting her go" even if he knew that she had committed adultery. But, I do not believe that in saying something of this nature he intended her to understand that he would condone an adulterous union between her and any other man. It is unthinkable that a man who is as jealous of his wife as the respondent is would ever accept such a situation.

139. I have endeavoured, so far as I possibly can, to sort out the lies and exaggerations of each party and to set down what I believe to be the truth in regard to each of the petitioner's allegations. There is no doubt that she is a most unhappy woman. She was not "throwing an act" when she cried in court:

140. "I shall never go back to him; he is a devil."

She has made up her mind that her marriage with the respondent must end. I accept the respondent's evidence that she told him on one occasion that she would obtain her decree absolute "by hook or by crock"; and she calls him a devil simply because he is defending these proceedings.

141. The position, I think is this: Having made up her mind in June 1968 that she wanted to marry Taylor, she realised that the only way she could undo the legal effect of having condoned her husband's previous cruelty was to allege that although he managed to control his temper from May to December 1967, he then began to behave in an unreasonable fashion towards her. And so she had to look around for material from which the court might infer cruelty on his part. In doing so, she certainly has had to "scrape the bottom of the barrel", so to speak. I do not think that she deliberately set out to lie to the court; but when one wishes to achieve a certain object it is so easy to exaggerate and to twist facts.

142. Counsel for the petitioner described the respondent as an unstable character from whom the petitioner was entitled to protection. As I have already said, there was nothing in the respondent's behaviour in the witness box from which a court could infer that he was emotionally unstable. Of course, I am fully aware that he is a man who has been in the habit of taking considerable quantities of tranquillising drugs; and it is just as easy for a person to take such drugs before entering the witness box as it is at any other time; and if one looks at the evidence in this case as a whole, I do not think it can be said that the respondent is an emotionally-stable man. He has not shown himself to be a person who is capable of standing up to the stresses of married life and dealing with difficult situations calmly. Far from it.

143. On the other hand when one has to review the events leading up to the breakdown of a marriage it is seldom easy to know what caused what. The whole true picture of married life is seldom before the court. In this case, was it the respondent's unreasoning jealousy, suspicion, and bad temper which drew the petitioner back to Taylor? or did she find herself inevitably drawn back to this man with the result that her husband became suspicious, jealous and irritable, and when she finally said that she was in love with Taylor and was leaving the family home, the parties had a number of serious rows?

144. I realise it is dangerous to oversimplify a situation of this kind; but having given this matter the most careful and anxious consideration, I think the second of the above two alternatives was the main reason why this unhappy couple have again found themselves in the divorce court. As I have already said, I do not think that the cigarette burn was caused deliberately; and she did not even allege in her evidence-in-chief that it was; and I am doubtful as to whether that scratch on her shoulder was caused even accidentally in the course of one of their squabbles. But, even if it was, one has to remember that these rows in June and early July 1968 were precipitated by the petitioner telling her husband that she was in love with Taylor and that she was going to leave the matrimonial home.

145. The respondent's attitude to his wife's attachment to Taylor is that she is suffering from a kind of immature school-girl infatuation and that she will eventually get over it. I do not agree with his assessment of the situation. She is a woman of 38; she has a strong personality; and she has, in my opinion, at last made up her mind. No doubt the respondent is unable to look at the matter objectively. His "ego" has had a very nasty shock; and he does not relish the thought of his wife leaving him for a "foreign devil".

146. I am in no doubt that this marriage has broken down. I do not think that the petitioner will return to her husband. The respondent has ample ground for filing a petition for divorce on the ground of his wife's adultery; and if the law of Hong Kong contained provisions similar to those at present under consideration by the British Parliament, my approach to any appropriate application for dissolution would naturally have been different. But the proceeding before this court is a petition for divorce on the ground of the respondent's cruelty. ...(illegible), the petitioner condoned the cruelty alleged in the petition, and looking at the evidence relating to the parties' married life during the last two years and looking at it as a whole, I do not think that any court could reasonably come to the conclusion that since April, 1967 the respondent has been guilty of cruelty to his wife in the sense in which this word is understood in this branch of the law. I do not think it matters in the slightest whether one adopts the test propounded by by Scott L.J. in Bertram v. Bertram⁽¹⁾ or by Cairns J. in Ives v. Ives⁽²⁾; it seems to me that the result must be the same.

147. I may say I very much regret that I am forced to come to this conclusion; but there is no alternative open to me upon the facts as I find them.

148. In my view, the Queen's Proctor has shown cause why the decree nisi pronounced by Mr. Justice Creedon on 29th April, 1967 should not be made absolute.

149. For the above reasons, the decree nisi is rescinded and the petition is dismissed.

16th April, 1969.

Representation:

O.V. Cheung Q.C. & Litton (Joanson, Stokes ...(illegible)) for Petitioner.

Gittins Q.C. & C. Ching ( ...(illegible) Co.) for Respondent.

(1) 1944 P. 59 @ 60.

(2) 1967(3) A.E.R. 79 @ 92.