Morinda International Hong Kong Ltd. v. Next Magazine Publishing Ltd. and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCA 4471/2000 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 4 October 2002.
1. This is the plaintiff's application for specific discovery of documents pursuant to RHC O. 24 r. 7. The documents sought to be discovered are set out in 3 paragraphs in the Schedule to the summons dated 13 September 2002. These documents will be set out and discussed in more detail under different headings below. Each heading will deal with each of the said 3 paragraphs of the Schedule.
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HCA004471/2000 HCA 4471/2000 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 4471 OF 2000 ____________
____________ Coram: Hon Chung J in Chambers Date of Hearing: 23 September 2002 Date of Handing Down Decision: 4 October 2002 ______________ D E C I S I O N ______________ Introduction 1.This is the plaintiff's application for specific discovery of documents pursuant to RHC O. 24 r. 7. The documents sought to be discovered are set out in 3 paragraphs in the Schedule to the summons dated 13 September 2002. These documents will be set out and discussed in more detail under different headings below. Each heading will deal with each of the said 3 paragraphs of the Schedule. 2.This action was commenced on 4 May 2000. The plaintiff complains that the defendants published a libelous article in issue No. 527 of the "Next" magazine which was available to the public on about 13 April 2000. The defendants deny the article was libelous. They also rely on the defence of justification and fair comment. 3.It is undisputed that in order to succeed in this application, the plaintiff must at least establish a prima facie case that the documents sought to be discovered:-
The burden of proving that an order under O. 24 r. 7 is not necessary lies with the respondent to the application; in this application, that will be the defendants: O. 24 r. 8 and Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002, para. 24/8/1. Para. (a) of the Schedule 4.This asks for the specific discovery of:-
5.The plaintiff argues that the documents sought are relevant to a number of issues including the extent of publication of the article and hence the question of general damages. Further, they may also be relevant to exemplary damages because the defendants should be deprived of the profits they obtained by the defamation. 6.It can be assumed (and this is undisputed by the plaintiff) that the defendants' accounts relevant to the time of publication of the article in question were not prepared with this action in mind. For this reason, it was pointed out to the plaintiff, during the hearing, that the documents sought are extremely difficult to identify and may well mean the defendants have to furnish the plaintiff with all of their accounting documents. The plaintiff then indicated that, at this stage, this part of the application should be limited to the following documents, namely, the defendants' audited accounts for the financial year which covered the publication of the libelous article, the management accounts for the month (or week) in which the libelous article was published and other documents relating to the income and expenditure and circulation figure of the article in question. 7.The more limited form of specific discovery proposed by the plaintiff at the hearing is of course not what this part of the summons seeks (unless amended with leave) and, for that reason alone, this part of the summons should be dismissed. 8.The defendants make the following further points in relation to, firstly, the accounting documents. In Gatley on Libel and Slander (1998) 9th Ed., para. 9.18 it was stated that:-
At para. 9.21 of Gatley:-
9.The reasoning behind the above passages is obvious. An award of exemplary damages has to be assessed by the judge or the jury (as the case may be) but it is unlikely (if ever) the profits attributable to the libel can be ascertained with objective precision. Furthermore, juries should not be asked to engage in a detailed examination of complicated documents. This is reflected by the exception to the right to jury trial in defamation action set out in s 33A(1) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4) the relevant parts of which read:-
10.Secondly, in relation to the documents relating to circulation figures, the defendants submit (and the plaintiff does not dispute) that the 6-month average circulation figure appears on every issue of the magazine. The plaintiff contends that this is insufficient because the circulation of the issue containing the libelous article might have been substantially higher than the average. This contention is not supported by the "moving" 6-month averages because all the average figures show a more or less constant figure of circulation. Thirdly, even if there should be any substantial "increase" in the circulation of the issue in question, it would be too speculative to attach any weight to the "increase". The "increase" might have been caused by many other factors unrelated to the libelous article. It is not farfetched to infer (and this court's experience in dealing with litigations involving the "Next" magazine tends to confirm this) that each issue of the magazine would contain a cover story. To conclude that any change in circulation was only related to the cover story is very probably an over-simplification of matters. Further, even if the plaintiff's approach was to be adopted, in order for the jury to properly conclude that the "increase" in circulation was caused by the libelous article, it may be necessary for the jury to be shown the other issues and be asked to decide if they find the libelous article more interesting (and hence more "sellable") than the other issues. Leaving aside other potential difficulties which this may pose, such an exercise may prove to be too formidable for the jury which, in effect, is asked to determine what material would be more appealing to the market. 11.For the above reasons, I agree with the defendants that this part of the application should be dismissed. Para. (b) of the Schedule 12.This seeks the specific discovery of:-
13.The defendants' short answer to this part of the application is that they do not own or manage the web site. The plaintiff's case is that the owner and operator of the web site is the defendants' associated company: see, for example, para. 11A, Amended Statement of Claim. This is not admitted by the defendants: para. 15A, Re-Amended Defence. I agree with the defendants' argument that even if the company which owned and operated the web site was the defendants' associated company, this is per se insufficient to establish that the documents sought are, or have been, in their possession, custody or power. 14.Further, the defendants point out that:-
is not a "class of document" within the meaning of O. 24 r. 7. In this regard, the defendants rely on the following passages in Deak & Co (Far East) Ltd v. NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd and Ors [1981] 1 HKC 78:-
For the above reason, the court of appeal in Deak held that:-
not to constitute any "class of document". I agree with the defendants that this is also one of the flaws of this part of the application. 15.By virtue of the above matters, this part of the application should be dismissed as well. Para. (c) of the Schedule 16.This asks for the specific discovery of:-
17.Further to the points made in relation to para. (b) of the Schedule, the defendants' evidence is that the web site was freely accessible at the relevant time. The plaintiff argues that although access to the web site was free, access to the libelous article may not be so. The plaintiff has however adduced no evidence to that effect. Moreover, this argument is based on an unduly restrictive reading of the defendants' affidavit evidence regarding this aspect. 18.By reason of the above matters, this part of the application should also be dismissed. Costs 19.There is no apparent justification for departing from the usual rule that costs should follow the event. There is a costs order nisi that the costs of this application should be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants to be taxed in any event if not agreed. To assist taxation, the time of the hearing spent on this application was about 1 hour 50 minutes.
Representation: Mr Jason Pow, instructed by Messrs Denton Wilde Sapte, for the Plaintiff Mr Anderson Chow, instructed by Messrs Deacons, for the Defendants |
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