Re A Barrister
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 2499/1986 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 19 December 1986.
1. On the application of the bar Committee, the Chief Justice appointed a Committee of Inquiry, under section 34 of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance, to inquire into a complaint brought by the bar Committee against the respondent, a practising barrister at the Hong Kong Bar.
|
HCMP002499/1986
Coram: Roberts, C.J., Clough, J.A. & Hunter, J. Date: 19 December 1986 ----------------- DECISION ----------------- 1. On the application of the bar Committee, the Chief Justice appointed a Committee of Inquiry, under section 34 of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance, to inquire into a complaint brought by the bar Committee against the respondent, a practising barrister at the Hong Kong Bar. 2. The Committee of Inquiry submitted its findings in the form of a report to the Chief Justice, expressing its opinion that a prima facie case of misconduct had been made out against the respondent. Accordingly, the Chief Justice ordered that the matter be set down for hearing before this court in accordance with section 37(l) of Cap. 159. 3. Counsel for the Bar Committee, acting under section 37(2)(a) moved this court to take disciplinary action against the respondent, on the findings of fact and law of the Committee of Inquiry, as contained in its report, to which we would like to pay tribute for its good sense and clarity. 4. The respondent did not appear before the Committee of Inquiry, nor before this Court though given the opportunity to do so in each case. 5. We need deal only with the first of the two complaints which were brought against the respondent, since the Committee of Inquiry concluded that the second complaint was really no more than an extension of the first, which reads as follows -
6. The latter part of this charge follows closely paragraph 6 of the Code of Conduct for the Bar of Hong Kong, which states-
7. It was not necessary to call any witnesses before the Committee of inquiry, since a statement of facts had been agreed between the parties and formed the basis of the Committee's report. 8. The salient facts as found by the Committee, and derived from the agreed statement of facts, are set out in the Committee's report as follows -
9. Upon the basis of these findings the Committee was of the Opinion that the first complaint had been made out. It based its findings on the principle that the public viewpoint was of paramount importance. The report says -
10. The Committee was prepared to accept, in favour of the respondent, that the arrangements between the respondent and the Deputy Judge were not made secretly and that the other counsel involved in the trial knew of the proposed trip to Macau. They were also prepared to accept that there was no evidence to suggest that any financial advantage accrued to either of them as a result of the trip to Macau. 11. Nevertheless, the Committee tools the view, with which we wholly agree, that there must have been a grave danger that a member of the public, had he come to know of the excursion and of the circumstances in which it took place, might have imagined that an undue influence was being brought to bear on the Deputy Judge by one of the counsel appearing before him in the course of a trial.
12. It is, as the Committee of inquiry expressed itself, and as was submitted to us by counsel who appeared on behalf of the Bar Committee, of the utmost importance, especially in our present circumstances, that public confidence should be upheld and strengthened in the proper and impartial administration of justice in the courts. 13. There must, we think, have been a significant risk that the conduct of counsel and of the Deputy judge, would injure that confidence. It was an act of folly for counsel and a Deputy Judge to have done what they did in the course of a trial, aggravated by the fact that money passed between counsel and the Judge in the court-house on their return from Macau. Although innocent in fact, this was something which would inevitably, had it been seen, have given rise to the gravest suspicions. 14. We do not, of course, wish it to be thought that social contact between Judges and members of the Bar is undesirable. Very much the reverse. The administration of justice works better if there is mutual confidence between the Bench and Bar, which can be greatly encouraged by personal relationships. 15. However, as in so many other situations, a line must be drawn and counsel and the Bench must always be aware of the danger that members of the public will misintepret social and personal contacts, if these are not undertaken in conditions of great discretion. 16. In particular, it is well recognized that Judges and counsel, while involved in a case, must be extremely careful, while it in progress, not to behave in such a way that it might be thought that counsel is in a position to influence the Judge outside court. 17. By any test, what happened on this weekend went far beyond the borderline drawn by good sense and need to avoid public misconception. 18. In determining the right course to be taken in relation to the respondent, we have been influenced by the view of the Bar Committee, which is that a censure of the respondent would be an adequate expression of displeasure at the respondent's conduct, a view with which the Attorney General, through his counsel, does not disagree. 19. We also take into account the fact that a Deputy Judge was involved in these transactions. Although we have not of course heard his version of events, he was, on the basis of the findings of the Committee, at least as culpable as the respondent though it is for the Chief Justice to consider what action, if any, should be taken in relation to the conduct of the Deputy Judge. Nevertheless, his presence and his active involvement must lessen the degree of culpability of the respondent. 20. In the result, we agree with submissions as to the appropriate penalty and order that the barrister concerned should be censured. 21. We will not order, under section 37(7) that there should be no Gazette Notice. We think that this is a matter of some public importance and that it should be known that the barrister has been censured. We, therefore, order that a Notice shall be published in the Gazette under that subsection in such terms as may be approved by the court, which will include the respondent's name. 22. We also order that the respondent shall pay the costs of proceedings, both before the Committee of Inquiry and before this Court, the costs to be taxed if not agreed. 23. In due course, this judgment will be circulated to the Bar, to the Law Society and to the respondent, with an indication that there is no objection to the Bar and Law Society circulating it to their members, though the judgment itself does not name the barrister. 24. We hope that, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, the judgment will be included in the Hong Kong Law Reports. Representation: Mr. K.H. Woo (C.Y. Kwan & Co.) for the Hong Kong Bar Committee Mr. N. L. Strawbridge, Senior Asst. Crown Solicitor, for the Attorney General. Respondent - not appearing - not represented. |