Chou Yi Feng v. Chou Yi Chen and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCA 4393/2001 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 November 2002.
1. There are 4 applications which need to be dealt with in this judgment:-
Cited by 7 cases · Cites 1 case
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HCA004393A/2001 HCA 4393/2001 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 4393 OF 2001 __________
___________ Coram: Hon Chung J in Court Dates of Hearing: 3 July, 26 September and 2 October 2002 Date of Handing Down Judgment: 23 November 2002 _________________ J U D G M E N T _________________ Introduction 1.There are 4 applications which need to be dealt with in this judgment:-
Background Facts 2.The plaintiff is the daughter of the 2nd defendant and the sister of the 1st defendant (collectively "the defendants" and respectively "the mother" and "the sister"). The plaintiff is a director and minority shareholder of the 3rd defendant ("Super Asian"). According to the plaintiff, Super Asian is a Hong Kong-registered company engaged in the business of trading in bicycle materials, parts and accessories. 3.On 8 October 2001, the plaintiff commenced this action claiming in effect that her shares in Super Asian have been fraudulently transferred to the defendants and she has been removed as a director by fraud on the defendants' part. Further, a summons was taken out by the plaintiff for an interim injunction and an order was granted on 19 October 2001 ("the 19 Oct Order"). The terms of the 19 Oct Order relevant to this judgment were (in brief):-
A Mareva injunction order was also granted against the sister. The 19 Oct Order was to remain in force until 16 November 2001. The inter partes summons for the continuation of the 19 Oct Order was heard on 16 November 2001. Sakhrani J ordered the 19 Oct Order to be continued (with amendments) until the adjourned hearing of the summons ("the 16 Nov Order"). 4.The adjourned hearing took place on 11 December 2001 before Yeung J (as he then was). Insofar as is relevant to this hearing, an order was made:-
(collectively "the 11 Dec Order"). 5.The plaintiff contends that the defendants have not complied with the above court orders. By a statement pursuant to RHC Ord 52 r 2 dated 22 April 2002, the plaintiff asked for leave to commit the defendants for contempt of court. Leave to do so was given by Yeung J in an order dated 25 April 2002. 6.As will be further discussed below, on 6 May 2002, the plaintiff took out a notice of originating motion asking the defendants to be committed for contempt. The originating motion was first heard on 3 July 2002. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the defendants had breached the 19 Oct Order, the 16 Nov Order and the 11 Dec Order (collectively "the injunction orders"): see para. 4 of the plaintiff's skeleton submissions for use at that hearing. 7.By 3 July 2002, the defendants have (on 26 June 2002) taken out a summons to set aside the leave to commit given on 25 April 2002, essentially on procedural defects including the failure to properly serve the injunction orders on the defendants. The hearing on 3 July 2002 was adjourned because there was insufficient time to hear the parties. Arguments relating to the 4 applications (including the defendants' application taken out on 26 June 2002 and the plaintiff's motion for contempt) were advanced at the hearings on 26 September and 2 October 2002. 8.Between 3 July and 26 September, by an affirmation of the plaintiff's solicitors dated 27 July 2002, the plaintiff applied ex parte for the substituted service of the injunction orders. As a result of the correspondence passing between the court and the plaintiff, it was made known that the application was made for the purpose of the pending committal proceedings. I directed on 12 August 2002 that the application for substituted service (which by then included an alternative application for the dispensation of service of the injunction orders) to be heard inter partes. This explains why there were 4 applications before the court on 26 September 2002. Statement pursuant to Ord 52 r 2 9.The statement pursuant to Ord 52 r 2 dated 22 April 2002 was a document required by Ord 52 r 2(2) the relevant part of which reads:-
10.The importance of such a statement has been discussed in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002, para. 52/2/6:-
The above paragraph in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002 continued to discuss what should be included in the statement. Among other things, the learned editors said that the statement should include:-
11.The statement filed herein ("the statement") apparently alleges that the defendants were in breach of all of the injunction orders: see para. 8 to 18 (the 19 Oct Order) and 21 to 22 and 24 to 48 (the 16 Nov Order and the 11 Dec Order) thereof. Although the statement apparently makes the allegations set out above, whether the statement has adequately (or properly) set out the allegations is a matter in issue. This will be dealt with under the sub-heading "(4) Was the Statement Defective?". 12.At the time of the hearing before me, however, both sides initially proceeded on the basis that only the 16 Nov Order and the 11 Dec Order are relevant: see para. 1.3 of the plaintiff's skeleton argument dated 24 September 2002 and para. 2(a) and (b) of the defendants' skeleton argument dated 25 September 2002 (collectively "the inter partes injunction orders"). 13.It was only at some time during the second day of the hearing (on 2 October 2002) that the plaintiff indicated the 19 Oct Order is also relied upon. The defendants complain in effect that this has taken them by surprise. It may well be so but, since the manner of how to exercise the court's discretion would be the same irrespective of whether only the inter partes injunction orders are involved, I would propose to deal with the applications on the basis all of the injunction orders are in issue. Applications to (a) Set Aside Leave and (b) Dispense with Service, Etc. 14.As stated above, the defendants apply to set aside leave to apply to commit them for contempt whereas the plaintiff applies to dispense with service (and, possibly, also for substituted service) of the injunction orders. Because the matters relevant to (and hence the issues raised by the parties in relation to) these two applications are very closely inter-related (and may even be the same), I shall deal with them under the same sub-headings below. (1) Were the Injunction Orders Served? 15.It is undisputed that the injunction orders have not been personally served on the defendants. Ord 45 r 7(2) provides:-
16.The defendants' first ground in support of this application is that the plaintiff has failed to personally serve, and hence the plaintiff cannot seek to enforce, the injunction orders. The plaintiff contends that substituted service was ordered by Chu J on 12 June 2002 and effected accordingly: para. 4.4, plaintiff's skeleton argument dated 24 September 2002. 17.With respect, the plaintiff's contention has no merit. The order of Chu J was made after leave to commit the defendants for contempt has been given (on 25 April 2002). In fact, it was made after the plaintiff has taken out the notice of originating motion (on 6 May 2002). Para. 1 of the order of Chu J was about the substituted service of "documents of the committal proceedings". It has nothing to do with the service of the injunction orders which, by virtue of Ord 45 r 7(2), the plaintiff is (and was) required to effect. 18.Further, it is unclear if the plaintiff's solicitors also rely on an order made by the master on 10 October 2001 giving leave to serve the writ (and all subsequent proceedings) out of Hong Kong: para. 3 to 8 of the affirmation of Mary Jean Reimer Lau dated 17 July 2002. This was not put forth by plaintiff's counsel at the hearing. I would therefore assume the master's order to be irrelevant. In any event, I do not find the master's order to be able to advance this part of the plaintiff's case. (2) Should Service be Dispensed With? 19.Ord 45 rr 7(6) and 7(7) are relied upon by the plaintiff. They provide:-
While both parties accept that the power conferred by Order 45 rr 7(6) and 7(7) is a discretionary power, they differ both as regards what are the relevant matters when the court exercises this power as well as how the discretion is to be exercised in this case. 20.The defendants submit that, in relation to Ord 45 r 7(7), the court's discretion is to be exercised only in the clearest cases, where it can be shown that the person against whom enforcement is sought (a) has notice of the order and (b) is evading service of it. On the other hand, the plaintiff argues that only the question of that person's knowledge of the order is relevant to the discretion. Once it has been established he knew of the order, whether he is also evading its service is irrelevant. 21.The defendants' above submission can find support in Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt (1999) 2nd Ed.:-
The authority cited by Arlidge is In re Tuck [1906] 1 Ch 692 the material parts of the judgment of which read:-
In re Tuck (and Century Insurance Co. v. Larkin [1910] 1 Ir.R. 91) is also relied upon in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002, para. 45/7/7 for the proposition that the fact that a person was present in court when the order was made is not of itself sufficient to dispense with service of the order. 22.On the other hand, the plaintiff submits that, in relation to Ord 45 r 7(7), the court's discretion is completely unfettered, although in exercising this discretion the court will usually consider whether the contemnor has knowledge of the order. In relation to the nature of the discretion, the plaintiff's submission is supported by the court of appeal's observation in Excel Noble Development Ltd. and Others v. Wah Nam Group Ltd. and Others, unrep., CACV 910 of 2000 (29 May 2001). 23.As has been noted by the English court of appeal in Davy International Ltd. and Others v. Tazzyman and Others [1997] 1 WLR 1256, the court's discretionary power to permit enforcement of its orders even though personal service has not been effected can be found in Ord 65 r 4 [substituted service], Ord 45 r 7(6) [prohibitory orders] and Ord 45 r 7(7). The decision in Davy International was concerned with whether the court's power under Ord 45 r 7(7) can be exercised retrospectively. Morritt L.J. observed that:-
24.The English court of appeal's observation that Ord 45 r 7(7) does not sit happily with Ord 45 r 7(6) is probably related to this. Ord 45 r 7(6) is expressly related to "[an] order requiring a person to abstain from doing an act". This type of order is commonly called a prohibitory order. Conversely, Ord 45 r 7(7) is wholly unlimited in its wording and so can cover both a prohibitory order as well as an order requiring a person to do an act (commonly called a mandatory order). Ord 45 r 7(6) expressly prescribes that the court may in its discretion permit enforcement of a prohibitive order if it is satisfied that the contemnor has notice of it either because he was present in court or because he has been notified by other means. Ord 45 r 7(7) which, at least on the face of its express wording, is not limited to prohibitive orders, does not however contain such express restriction regarding the court's discretionary power. 25.The English court of appeal described the discretion for dispensing with personal service of an order under Ord 45 r 7(6) as a "very limited power of dispensation" and can only be exercised according to the "condition prescribed for its exercise" (see p. 1261H). Having compared the difference in the wordings of Ord 45 r 7(6) and Ord 45 r 7(7), and having taken into account the requirements of Ord 45 rr 7(2) to 7(4), the court of appeal concluded that Ord 45 r 7(7) is not confined in its operation to any particular point in time. 26.Although Davy International was an appeal which merely determined that the discretion under Ord 45 r 7(7) can be exercised retrospectively, a number of decisions relating to the nature of the discretion have been referred to in the judgment:-
27.The following passages in Davy International discussed the nature of the court's discretion for dispensing with service of the order:-
28.The following propositions can be distilled from the above observations and/or conclusions of the Hong Kong court of appeal (in Excel Noble) and the English court of appeal (in Davy International, Turner and Hill Samuel & Co. Ltd.):-
In view of these propositions, I do not agree with the defendants' submission that service of the injunction orders can only be dispensed with if there is evidence not only of (a) the defendants' notice of the orders but (b) their evasion of service of the order. 29.I turn now to the relevant facts of the present case before considering how my discretion should be exercised. The defendants were not personally present in court when the injunction orders were made. Ord 45 r 7(6)(a) is therefore inapplicable. There is no direct evidence that they have been notified of the terms of those orders and so it is doubtful if the condition laid down by Ord 45 r 7(6)(b) is satisfied. The plaintiff, in applying for the dispensation of those orders, relies essentially on Ord 45 r 7(7). 30.It is common ground that it is for the plaintiff to establish her case against the defendants to the court's satisfaction adopting the criminal standard of proof, that is, beyond reasonable doubt. 31.Although there is no direct evidence of the defendants' knowledge of the injunction orders, the plaintiff argues that there is ample circumstantial evidence of the same:-
32.In relation to the above matters relied upon by the plaintiff, her argument that the defendants knew of the injunction orders is correct if, but only if, their legal representatives have informed the defendants:-
It has not been suggested by the plaintiff that the defendants knew of the injunction orders through other means. If it were so suggested, there is no evidence to support it. 33.The fact that the defendants have provided some of the documents or partly performed what was required of them by the injunction orders does not necessarily mean that the terms of the injunction orders were known to the defendants. Their legal representatives might have merely told them to provide the documents or asked them to perform some of the matters required by the injunction orders (without explaining to them the terms of the injunction orders). 34.Although this has not been referred to in the plaintiff's skeleton argument dated 24 September 2002 or the speaking notes dated 2 October 2002, I notice that there is no evidence from the defendants directly denying their knowledge of the injunction orders. 35.No doubt one can reasonably expect legal practitioners in Hong Kong to have informed their clients of the matters set out in sub-paragraphs (1) to (4) above. But a reasonable expectation does not meet the criminal standard of proof which is that the disputed matter has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 36.The plaintiff has not (but could have) argued that there is likewise no evidence from the defendants' legal representatives whether denying or confirming they have informed the defendants of the injunction orders. What they have or have not informed the defendants of is legally privileged information the privilege of which belongs to the defendants. 37.By reason of the matters above, I cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants have knowledge of the injunction orders (or, insofar as it may also be relied upon, the 19 Oct Order). I therefore consider that there is no proper basis to rely on Ord 45 r 7(6). (3) Has Time for Complying with the Injunction Orders Expired? 38.Counsel for the defendants also contends that the time for complying with the injunction orders has not yet expired and so the defendants have not been in contempt of court. This contention can be summarised as follows. 39.Para. 5 of the 16 Nov Order states that:-
Counsel for the defendants argues that an order which stipulates that an act should be done "forthwith" is legally the same as an order which does not prescribe any time for performing the act; in other words, such an order is not one covered by Ord 42 r 2(1) the relevant part of which provides:-
Merely stating that an act should be done "forthwith", so counsel argues, is not specifying the time within which the act is to be done. In this connection, counsel relies on Winner Food Products Ltd. v. Chung Yat-ming [1989] 1 HKLR 371. Godfrey J (as he then was) said therein:-
Winner Food was not a case involving the issue of whether the order made therein complied with Ord 42 r 2(1). 40.The footnote to Ord 42 r 2(1) in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002 states the following with regard to the effect of an order which fails to specify a time for doing an act:-
Hence, the failure of a judgment or order to comply with the strict requirement of Ord 42 r 2(1) will result in the judgment being set aside. Para. 42/2/1 of The Supreme Court Practice 1999 contains the same footnote on this point. In re Tuck was not cited as an authority to the effect that an order which requires an act to be done "forthwith" will not comply with Ord 42 r 2(1). In fact, Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002 (and the English White Book) says this about such an order:-
41.Thus, I disagree with defence counsel's above contention. The injunction orders were validly made. If they had been properly served (or the defendants otherwise knew of them at the time), they ought to have been complied with "as soon as [they] can reasonably be done". If I had been satisfied that the defendants had notice of the injunction orders, I would have been satisfied that they had failed to do so within a reasonable time after the injunction orders have been made. (4) Was the Statement Defective? 42.This part of the defendants' complaint is that the statement failed to specify the following matters:-
At the hearing, counsel for the defendants also complained that the statement has failed to state clearly the alleged breach or to give particulars in support thereof. 43.In relation to sub-paragraph (a) above, the plaintiff does not dispute the lack of a reference in the statement to service (whether personal or otherwise) of the injunction orders. However, the plaintiff argues that it is unnecessary to do so because in fact no service thereof has ever been effected. In this connection, the plaintiff relies on the footnote in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002, para. 52/2/6 quoted above under the heading "Statement pursuant to Ord 52 r 2". The relevant part is repeated here for convenience:-
44.I disagree with the plaintiff. The purpose of Ord 52 r 2 in requiring a statement is obvious. As stated earlier, a statement is treated as an indictment. It enables the court and the contemnor to know what case the contemnor has to meet. This aside, as the statement is presented to the court in support of the ex parte application for leave to commit, the duty to make full and frank disclosure should apply to the contents of the statement. The above passage in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002 states that the statement should refer (among other things) to the personal service on the contemnor (if personal service is necessary). If personal service is unnecessary because, for example, service has already been dispensed with, or substituted service has been ordered and effected, there is no valid reason why the same should not be referred to in the statement as well. After all, service of the order(s) (upon which the committal proceeding is founded) is almost always an important factor in the court's discretion as to whether leave to commit should be given. To conclude, I find that the statement is defective in failing to alert the ex parte judge to the lack of personal service, or the lack of an order dispensing with service, or one permitting substituted service. 45.Having so concluded, it is unnecessary to consider defence counsel's submission whether the contents of the statement are deficient in that the material facts and particulars in support are lacking. I therefore only observe that the statement is at the very least not clear with regard to the inter partes injunction orders. 46.Para. 7 of the statement is about the 19 Oct Order which has not been relied upon at the hearing. Para. 8 to 18 of the statement are concerned with the alleged breach of the 19 Oct Order. 47.Para. 19 and 20 of the statement refer to the making of the 16 Nov Order and the adjournment of the inter partes hearing to a later date. Para. 23 of the statement sets out the relevant terms of the 11 Dec Order. The part of the statement where it is alleged that the defendants have been in breach of the inter partes injunction orders are para. 21 to 22 and 24 to 44 thereof. Para. 45 and 46 of the statement refer to the defendants' legal proceedings in the mainland. Para. 48 of the statement alleges that by reason of the matters in the preceding paragraphs, the defendants have breached the injunction orders. 48.Para. 21 to 22 and 24 to 44 of the statement essentially refer to the correspondence passing between the parties wherein the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were in breach of the injunction orders. Without deciding whether this is sufficient for the purpose of Ord 52 r 2, the plaintiff's case would have been much easier to understand if the plaintiff had expressly and directly set out what were the defendants' act(s) (or omission(s)) said to have constituted the contempt. (5) Penal Notice 49.Since the injunction orders have not been served, it goes without saying that the requirement of Ord 45 r 7(4) regarding penal notice has not been complied with. This point, however, stands or falls with the points raised under the sub-heading "(2) Should Service be Dispensed With?". (6) Full and Frank Disclosure 50.I have already considered the defendants' complaint regarding the plaintiff's failure to state in the statement that the injunction orders have not been served under the sub-heading "(4) Was the Statement Defective?" and so will not repeat the point here. (7) Manner in which Court's Discretion Should be Exercised 51.I already concluded under the sub-heading "(2) Should Service be Dispensed With?" the plaintiff has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants have had notice of the injunction orders. 52.At the hearing on 3 July 2002, the defendants' application to set aside leave to commit was already taken out. Former counsel for the defendants indicated that the application was based (among other things) on the plaintiff's failure to serve the injunction orders. In a letter dated 9 July 2002, the plaintiff's legal representatives apparently recognised the need for service of the injunction orders. They said:-
As stated above, at least at one stage, there was an ex parte application for substituted service by way of the affirmation of the plaintiff's solicitors dated 27 July 2002. 53.At the subsequent hearings, counsel for the plaintiff (correctly) did not pursue the application for substituted service. Such an application would imply:-
54.By reason of the matters set out under sub-headings (1), (2) and (4) to (6) above, I do not consider that there is any proper basis for exercising the discretion pursuant to Ord 45 rr 7(6) or 7(7) in the plaintiff's favour. The plaintiff's application for dispensing with service of the injunction orders is dismissed. On the other hand, it is appropriate to set aside the leave given to commit the defendants for contempt. I will exercise my discretion to set aside leave. Defendants' Application to Discharge Injunction Order 55.This application is limited to para. 5 of the 16 Nov Order (continued by the 11 Dec Order) which reads:-
56.The defendants submit that the reinstatement order should be discharged because of material change of circumstances. The following principles are undisputed:-
57.The material change of circumstances relied upon by the defendants has been set out in the affirmation of Victor Yip-tim Ng dated 26 June 2002. It can be summarised as follows. The plaintiff's husband applied to incorporate a "金多利金屬製品（深圳）有限公司" ("the New Co.") in Shenzhen in September 2001. The plaintiff was the director of Gold Power Industrial Holdings Ltd. ("Gold Power Industrial") in Hong Kong. The New Co. commenced operation in December 2001 with the plaintiff as its managing director. Searches by the defendants disclosed that it has the same registered address as Golden Power Machine. The plaintiff was appointed as the chairman of the New Co. and the New Co. has the same scope of business as Golden Power Machine. Further, it was reported in a bicycling magazine published in Taiwan that the New Co. was the same as Golden Power Machine and the plaintiff was the New Co.'s manager. The New Co. traded through Gold Power Industrial. The association between the New Co. and Golden Power Machine was repeated in the "Taiwan Bicycle Parts Guide 2002-2003". The defendants argue that the above were acts calculated to mislead the customers of Golden Power Machine into believing they were trading with Golden Power Machine when in fact they were trading with the New Co. 58.The plaintiff submits, firstly, that the issue is res judicata because these matters have been raised at the hearing before Yeung J on 11 December 2001 and they have been considered by Yeung J: para. 3.4 to 3.5 of the skeleton argument dated 24 September 2002. 59.The relevant part of the judgment of Yeung J dated 11 December 2001 is para. 11 thereof:-
The judgment of Yeung J merely dealt with the allegation of diversion of funds to Gold Power Industrial. The allegation raised in Mr Ng's affirmation is about diversion (or at least potential diversion) of business to the New Co. I do not consider that the matter falls within the doctrine of issue estoppel or res judicata. 60.Further, the allegation of diversion of funds was apparently disputed by the plaintiff at the hearing on 11 December 2001 and hence Yeung J said in his judgment:-
61.Despite the reliance placed by the defendants on Mr Ng's affirmation, the plaintiff decided not to adjourn the application so as to file and serve affidavit in response. As a result, there is no evidence to contradict the matters summarised above. Plaintiff's counsel submits that since Mr Ng was only the handling solicitor and not a party to the litigation, he does not have personal knowledge of the facts summarised above. The plaintiff argues that no weight should be placed on the allegations contained in Mr Ng's affirmation. 62.It is of course up to a litigant to decide whether he needs to apply to adjourn an application so as to enable evidence to be filed and served. But he has to bear the consequence(s) of his decision. Here the plaintiff has decided not to adjourn and so Mr Ng's affirmation is left uncontroverted by evidence. It is true that Mr Ng was the handling solicitor only. However, hearsay evidence is admissible in interlocutory proceedings: Ord 41 r 5(2). Moreover, most of the important matters Mr Ng deposed to are supported by documents which apparently came from credible sources. In these circumstances, I do not find any valid reason for not giving weight to his affirmation. 63.If the plaintiff has become the managing director of a company the business of which is highly likely to compete with that of Super Asian and/or Golden Power Machine, this is a factor relevant to whether the reinstatement order should be discharged. 64.The defendants also rely on a judgment given by the Shenzhen People's Court dated 5 August 2002 ("the Shenzhen judgment"). They contend that this judgment is final and conclusive on the merits of the plaintiff's claim in the present action. With respect, I disagree. There is no need to set out the details of the Shenzhen judgment. In short, the Shenzhen judgment merely decided that according to the records kept by Golden Power Machine and those kept by the authorities in the mainland, the plaintiff was not entitled to keep the properties of Golden Power Machine, namely, its seal, business documents, machinery or factory premises. The Shenzhen judgment was hence concerned with a claim based in essence on trespass on the plaintiff's part. The issues involved in the present action are very different (see under the heading "Background Facts"). 65.By reason of the above matters, I disagree with the defendants' argument, based on the Shenzhen judgment, that:-
However, taking into account the undisputed evidence that the plaintiff is involved in the management of a company whose business will likely compete with that of Super Asian and/or Golden Power Machine, the balance of convenience lies in discharging the reinstatement order. The Defendants' Right to be Heard 66.The plaintiff contends that the defendants having breached the injunction orders are precluded from seeking to have them set aside: para. 2.1 to 2.4 of the skeleton argument dated 24 September 2002. 67.The general rule is that a party in contempt cannot be heard or take proceedings in the same cause until he has purged his contempt: Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] P 285, 295-296. This is, however, subject to exceptions, one of which being a party in contempt may apply to purge the contempt, or appeal with a view to setting aside the order on which his contempt is founded: 9(1) Halsbury's Laws of England (1998) 4th Ed., para. 511, text to nn. 3 and 4. Even in cases where the rule is prima facie applicable, the court appears to retain a discretion whether to hear the party in contempt: 9(1) Halsbury para. 511, text to n. 8. 68.The defendants either fall within the above exception; alternatively, it is a case where my discretion should be exercised in allowing them to be heard. Plaintiff's Motion to Commit for Contempt 69.It follows that the plaintiff's motion to commit the defendants for contempt should be dismissed. Insofar as it may be argued that even though leave to commit for contempt has been set aside, it is still within my discretion to allow the committal proceeding to continue (see, for example, Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002, para. 52/2/2), I will (assuming such power exists) decline to do so. Costs 70.There is no apparent reason to depart from the usual rule that costs should follow the event. There will be a costs order nisi that the costs of the applications be to the defendants. I shall hear the parties as to whether those costs should be paid by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's solicitors.
Representation: Mr Jonathan Harris and Mr Alex Lok, instructed by Messrs Andrew Lam & Co., for the Plaintiff Mr Wallace Cheung, instructed by Messrs Victor Ng & Co., for the 1st & 2nd Defendants |
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