Hong Kong Stationery Manufacturing Co. Ltd v. World Wide Stationery Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCA 434/1990 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 25 October 1991.
1. This is a contested Order 14 application. The plaintiffs are seeking partial relief in respect of the matters they claim in the Statement of Claim. The hearing lasted 7 days.
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HCA000434/1990
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG HIGH COURT ____________ BETWEEN
______________ Coram: The Honourable Mr. Justice Mayo in Chambers Dates of Hearing: 8 - 11, 14 - 15 and 17 October 1991 Date of Delivery of Judgment: 25 October 1991 ___________ JUDGMENT ___________ 1. This is a contested Order 14 application. The plaintiffs are seeking partial relief in respect of the matters they claim in the Statement of Claim. The hearing lasted 7 days. 2. At the commencement of the hearing Mr. Rogers for the defendants submitted that it was clear from the amount of the material which was before me and the complexity of some of the issues which would be ventilated that it was manifest that the defendants should be given leave to defend the proceedings. Initially I was sympathetic to this view. I now realize that this view of the matter was superficial. 3. The Statement of Claim runs to 29 pages. The plaintiffs are the manufacturers of stationery including a metal binding mechanism for the use on files. The 1st defendant is a competitor to them in the same line of business. The 2nd defendant was a former employee of the plaintiff. He has an interest in the 1st defendant. The 3rd defendant is the manufacturer of a piece of machinery which is used to make the metal binding mechanism which is used on files. 4. It is common ground that the 2nd defendant who is a qualified Engineer was largely instrumental in designing the plaintiffs' machine for making the metal binders while he was in their employment. 5. The plaintiffs claim that the machine drawings which were prepared by the 2nd defendant for the 3rd defendant infringed the plaintiff's copyright in their drawings and also claim a breach of confidential information on the part of the 2nd defendant and a breach of his contract of employment with them. 6. At the time of the commencement of the proceedings the plaintiffs obtained an Anton Pillar injunction. The main basis for obtaining this was their contention that the operation of the machine was secret and that they would be placed at an unfair disadvantage if the 1st defendant were permitted to make metal binders using the machine in competition with them. 7. At the return of the inter parties summons the defendants did not choose to contest the injunction. As Mr. Rogers put it they decided to contest the issue at the trial. In my view the defendants cannot in any way be criticized for this decision. 8. However, Mr. Rogers argued that as the plaintiffs' interests were protected until trial by this injunction this of itself was a good reason for not giving the plaintiffs the partial relief they were seeking under Order 14. Nothing would be achieved by entering a partial judgment against the defendants. 9. Mr. Liao who was representing the plaintiffs disagreed. He argued that there was very clear authority in the White Book in support of the proposition that where it was apparent that a defendant did not have an arguable defence to any part of a claim, a plaintiff was entitled to judgment in respect of that part. I have no doubt concerning the correctness of this contention. 10. The Order 14 was confined to the plaintiffs copyright claim in resepct of 32 of the 170 drawings involved in this litigation. There was no claim to Order 14 judgment in respect of the other causes of action. 11. It may be helpful at this stage to attempt to deal with the main complaints which are made by Mr. Rogers in connection with this application. 12. Perhaps the strongest objection he makes is that if the relevant issues are considered on the 32 drawings at this hearing rather than at trial his clients would have insufficient opportunity of contesting the originality of the drawings or the fact that there had been any infringement of the plaintiffs' copyight. 13. In particular it was wholly unsatisfactory that the plaintiffs should be allowed to place any reliance upon the presumptions contained in s.9 of the Copyright Ordinance C.39. He argued that this section had been repealed by the Bill of Rights Ordinance. 14. I would like to say at this stage that both Counsel presented excellent and very helpful submissions on the Bill of Rights and whether it had the effect of repealing s.9 aforesaid. Mr. Liao however made it clear that his submission constituted a fall back position as it was his contention that the plaintiffs could succeed in this application without placing any reliance upon s.9. 15. As an initial step I propose considering whether this contention is correct. 16. On the evidence lying before me, is it possible for the plaintiffs to succeed without the benefit of s.9? 17. Mr. Liao argued that on the available evidence the issue of originality had hardly even been raised. 18. The paragraph in the 2nd defendant's affirmation dealing with this topic was para. 16:
19. I agree with Mr. Liao that this is only a very general and vague statement. It does not condescend to any particularity. I do however consider that it is incumbent upon me to also consider the observations which were made by 2nd defendant on each of the contested drawings. It would seem to me though that even if I do take cognisance of all these observations, the defendants case is not advanced much further. 20. The 2nd defendant was in a uniquely privileged position to give evidence concerning the originality of the plaintiffs' drawings as they were prepared by him. With the exception of in a few cases making reference to the use of standard parts in the plaintiffs' drawings there is overall in my view an ominous silence on the question of originality. 21. One of the questions which immediately arises is whether the defendants have had a sufficient opportunity to ventilate this issue having regard to the fact that this is an Order 14 application. I think they have. 22. It is apparent in Elram v. Fluid Power [1984] FSR 151 and Shippams v. Princes-Buitoni [1983] FSR 427 that further particulars were sought and both these cases proceeded as Order 14 applications. 23. Had the defendants wished to seek further information on the subject of originality they would have been entitled to receive it. The fact is though that they never asked and this being the case I consider it to be fair to limit myself to the evidence lying before me. 24. Although the circumstances considered by the Court of Appeal in Murjani v. Bank of India [1990] 1 HKLR 586 were very different to those before me, I do consider that I can derive assistance from the judgment of Hunter J.A. It is evident from this that an evidential burden shifts to a defendant in Order 14 proceedings to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that he has a good defence. A general statement along the lines of paragraph 16 is insufficient in my view to comprehensively raise the issue of originality. 25. I accept however that where there has been specific reference to standard parts as part of the commentary made by 2nd defendant on the drawings this suffices to frame an issue. Mr. Liao conceeded that there was such reference in Drawings numbers 7, 8, 12 and 23 and that leave to defend should be given on these drawings. 26. I was taken through all the drawings by both Counsel at some length and I am satisfied that these are the only drawings which can be saved on this ground. 27. The next question which needs to be considered is whether the plaintiffs have established an unarguable case exists that their copyright in the relevant drawings has been infringed. 28. The law on this subject has been conveniently encapsulated in paragraph 3.32 of Laddie's Modern Law of Copyright Butterworths 1980:
29. I am satisfied that this is an accurate statement of the law. As to what constitutes a substantial part of the work Graham J. says at p.9 of Merchant Adventurers Ltd. v. M. Grew & Co. Ltd. [1973] RPC 1:
30. I agree with Mr. Liao that perhaps the most significant point to be considered in this connection is the fact that nowhere does the 2nd defendant deny that he has copied the plaintiffs' drawings. Nor does he attempt to provide any explanation which tells us how the allegedly infringing drawings came into existence. 31. Mr. Rogers spent a considerable amount of time speculating upon how the drawings could have become an independent creation of 2nd defendant's mind particularly having regard to the technical nature of the drawings and the constraints within which it was necessary for him to operate. 32. His submission was based upon material contained in 2nd defendant's affirmation of the 8th February 1991. The 2nd defendant advanced reasons for the similarities which existed between the plaintiffs and the defendants machines. The headings under which he dealt with these reasons were:
33. With the exception of reason no. 4, the use of standard parts, I do not think that any of the reasons which have been advanced assist the defendants case. I find myself in sympathy with the observation made by Mr. Liao that all of these reasons amounted to no more than a series of excuses. 34. Mr. Rogers also placed reliance upon the cases of Francis Day & Hunter Ltd. v. Bron [1963] 2 WLR 868 and International Furnaces Ltd. v. Reaves [1970] RPC 605 to support his contention that it was essential to establish a causal connection between the allegedly infringing work and the subject work and that this meant that copying had to be proved. 35. I accept that each case will depend upon its own particular circumstances. What is however necessary in the present case is to bear in mind the fact that copying has not been denied by 2nd defendant. When this is taken in conjunction with the plaintiff's expert Mr. Siu's evidence concerning the very significant similarities of the respective drawings it is impossible to avoid coming to the conclusion that on the evidence available it is a virtual forensic certainty that there has been copying. 36. I am satisfied that the criteria to be adopted is as set out in Laddie and that the correct approach is to see whether the allegedly infringing drawings are substantially similar to the plaintiffs' drawings. 37. As I have said earlier I was taken through all the relevant drawings by both Counsel. These were in a separate bundle and with the drawings were the remarks of 2nd defendant and Mr. Siu who is also an Engineer for the plaintiffs. 38. In my opinion it is impossible not to be impressed by the highly significant similarities between these drawings. The variations are indeed slight and visually insignificant. 39. Mr. Liao did with a number of the drawings invite me to hold them up to the light and it appeared to be probable that a number of them were tracings. 40. Be that as it may I am satisfied that with the exception of the drawings where Mr. Liao conceeds that standard parts were involved and Drawing 32 which relates to the assembly of the machine the plaintiffs have demonstrated that their copyright has been infringed. 41. When this is taken in conjunction with the undisputed evidence of 2nd defendants' access to the drawings it is clear that the plaintiffs have established a prima facie case. 42. As I have said there is no denial by the defendants that there has been copying. Mr. Rogers took me through a number of passages in Interlego A.G. v. Tyco International Inc. [1988] RPC 343 and endeavoured to persuade me that the law on this subject had been altered by this case. I am unconvinced. Although the case was primarily concerned with originality there is nothing in my view in the speech of Lord Oliver which changes the law on infringement to any significant extent. Indeed Lord Oliver's views would seem to support the position which I have earlier outlined. 43. For the reasons I have given I am satisfied that the plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment for infringement of copyright claimed save in respect of Drawings 7, 8, 12, 23 and 32. 44. As will be appreciated the plaintiffs are able substantially to succeed in this application without placing any reliance upon s.9 of Cap.39. 45. I have given careful thought as to whether I should, in defendant to Counsel's submissions and the obvious work they have put into the case, decide whether s.9 has been repealed by the Bill of Rights. 46. The interpretation of the law relating to the Bill of Rights is still in a formative stage. This is particularly the case on the subject of its application between private individuals. I have been informed that the decision of Downey D.J. which Mr. Rogers placed particular reliance is shortly to be considered by the Court of Appeal. 47. I am doubtful whether much useful purpose is likely to be served by any observations I may make having regard to the fact that they will be obiter dicta. 48. It is also overwhelmingly the case that s. 9 will be called in aid of criminal prosecutions and any comments I make in a civil context are not likely to be helpful. 49. Accordingly, I have decided not to express a view on this subject. 50. I will hear the parties on costs.
Representation: Mr. Andrew Liao, Q.C. & Miss P. Wong inst'd by Wilkinson & Grist for Plaintiff Mr. Anthony Rogers, Q.C., Mr. P. Garland & Miss Winnie Tam, Mr. Mok inst'd by Henry C.K. Tung & Co. for Defendants |