HKSAR v. Renato Cemine Tandoc
Read the full judgment text of CACC 377/2002 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 18 December 2002 before Cheung JA, Jackson J.
Criminal law – sentencing – using a false instrument contrary to section 73 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) – dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence contrary to section 25(1) of the Organized and Serious Crime Ordinance (Cap. 455) – boiler-room share fraud – money laundering – applicant part of Pastrana syndicate opened nominee companies and bank accounts in Hong Kong used to launder proceeds of two-stage fraud targeting international investors – applicant used a false Philippines passport to purchase shelf companies and open bank accounts – whether starting point of 6 years for Count 1 manifestly excessive – held yes, appropriate starting point 4 years reduced to 2 years 8 months for guilty plea – whether sentences on Count 1 and money-laundering counts should be concurrent (one-transaction rule) – held no, offences were separate and distinct even if inter-connected – whether notional starting point of 11 years and total of 7 years 4 months manifestly excessive – held yes in part, notional starting point should be 9 years and total reduced to 6 years – whether sentencing judge erred in describing applicant as a 'trusted lieutenant' – held no, finding well supported by admitted facts – applicant was sole signatory to fraudulent accounts and could have emptied them at any time – whether reliance on cases under section 42 of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115) appropriate – held no, different statutory regime under s.73 Crimes Ordinance – distinction with HKSAR v Rohrer [2001] 3 HKC 371 – applicant was not indicted for conspiracy to defraud – leave to appeal granted – sentence on Count 1 reduced to 2 years and 8 months – sentences on remaining counts not disturbed – total sentence reduced from 7 years 4 months to 6 years.
Legal issues: Starting point for sentence on Count 1 (using false instrument contrary to s.73 Crimes Ordinance) · Whether sentences on Count 1 and the money laundering counts should be served concurrently (one-transaction rule) · Whether the combined total sentence was manifestly excessive (totality principle) · Whether the sentencing judge overstated the applicant's role as a 'trusted lieutenant'
Outcome: Leave to appeal against sentence granted; appeal allowed in part. Sentence on Count 1 reduced from 4 years to 2 years and 8 months; sentences on Counts 2, 3, 5 and 6 not disturbed. Total sentence reduced from 7 years and 4 months to 6 years.
Cited by 4 cases · Cites 1 case
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CACC000377/2002 CACC377/2002 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 377 OF 2002 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO. 343 OF 2001) --------------
-------------- Coram: Hon Cheung JA and Jackson J in Court Date of Hearing: 18 December 2002 Date of Judgment: 18 December 2002 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Jackson J (giving the judgment of the Court) : 1.On 9 July 2002, the applicant pleaded guilty in the High Court before Pang J to an indictment containing one count of using a false instrument contrary to section 73 of the Crimes Ordinance Cap.200 (Count 1), and four counts of dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence contrary to section 25(1) of the Organized and Serious Crime Ordinance Cap.455 (Counts 2, 3, 5 and 6). 2.He was sentenced to a term of 4 years' imprisonment in respect of Count 1; to 2 years and 8 months' in respect of Count 2; to 2 years' in respect of Count 3; to 2 years in respect of Count 5; and to 3 years and 4 months' in respect of Count 6. The terms imposed in respect of Counts 2, 3, 5 and 6 were ordered to be served concurrently as between themselves but consecutive to the sentence imposed in respect of Count 1. In other words, the total sentence ordered to be served was one of seven years and four months' imprisonment and it is against that sentence that the applicant seeks leave to appeal. 3.It is important to set out in full the facts admitted by the applicant relevant to his pleas as follows :
4.In his very full mitigation put before the learned judge Mr Choy, who appeared in the court below for the applicant, laid stress on the applicant's pleas of guilty not only as being indicative of remorse but also as saving of very considerable financial cost to the prosecuting authorities. From there Mr Choy proceeded to deal with the applicant's background and how it was that he first became involved with the Pastrana syndicate in 1997 and why he left it before, subsequently, rejoining it in 1999. 5.As to the nature of the applicant's involvement in the syndicate, Mr Choy said, inter alia, this :
6.When the learned judge proceeded to sentence the applicant he said, inter alia, this :
and this :
7.The perfected written grounds of appeal settled by Mr Bruce SC, who appears before us with Mr Choy on this application, are (in shortened from) as follows :
The first ground 8.In support of his first ground of appeal, Mr Bruce has sought to argue, in essence, that there are a number of judgments of this court concerning sentence for offences of using false passports which suggest an appropriate starting point of the order of 18 months' imprisonment or, in an aggravated case, 2 years' imprisonment. 9.The first thing to be said about that is that each of the cases to which he has referred us in respect of this ground of appeal concerned offences committed contrary to sections 42(2)(b) and (c) of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap.115 which, whilst they are punishable by a penalty of 14 years' imprisonment, relate to "use" or "possession" of false documents for immigration or travel purposes. The applicant was not charged under section 42 of the Immigration Ordinance but under section 73 of the Crimes Ordinance. That section whilst also providing for a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment reads as follows :
10.Mr Bruce submits, if we have understood him correctly, that the gravamen of the applicant's offence concerning the false passport was simply that he was representing that he was someone who he was not, and that insofar as sentence is concerned it should make no difference whether he was charged under the Immigration Ordinance or under the Crimes Ordinance because it is the gravamen of the offence that is relevant to sentence and not the motive behind it. 11.In response to that argument Mr Ryan suggests that motive is highly relevant to sentence in a case such as this (charged under the Crimes Ordinance) where the applicant used the false passport to purchase shelf companies and open bank accounts in furtherance of a criminal enterprise which involved cheating victims of such fraud out of millions of dollars. 12.More particularly, in his helpful written submissions, Mr Ryan says this :
The trouble with that argument, so it seems to us, is partly this. Whatever the admitted facts may say, the applicant was not specifically indicted for a conspiracy to defraud and nor was he indicted for a number of offences of "using a false instrument" over a period of 3 years. The particulars of Count 1 relate to a single offence committed "on a day in 2000" at the premises of Gemini Corporate Services Limited. 13.Whilst we accept, of course, that it was for the sentencing judge to impose a total sentence in respect of the applicant's conduct as reflected in the indictment where supported by the admitted facts, we have some difficulty in this case (in the light of the authorities cited to us) in finding justification for the imposition of a sentence on the first count which, whilst extremely light, would not be wholly inappropriate for an offence of conspiracy to defraud. As we have said, and focusing upon Count 1, that is not what he was charged with, albeit that the admitted facts and some of Mr Ryan's submissions might appear to suggest otherwise. The second ground 14.Mr Bruce submits that as the applicant used a false passport to enter Hong Kong; to incorporate the companies, and to set up the relevant bank accounts it is indisputable that the use of that passport was part and parcel of the scheme to launder the funds involved in the fraud. Mr Bruce goes on from there to suggest that, accordingly, the "one transaction rule" should apply and that it was wrong in principle to impose consecutive sentences in this case. 15.We find ourselves unable to agree with that contention. Whilst it is undoubtedly so that the offences were necessarily "inter connected" it does not follow that they formed a single transaction in the sense that that term is used as a principle of sentencing. In our judgment despite the "inter connection" each offence was separate and distinct. Whilst the prosecution might have charged a single conspiracy to defraud relying upon each count in the indictment as an act in furtherance of that conspiracy (and resulting in the applicant being sentenced for his participation in an offence which, at least arguably, fell just short of being the worst kind) that is not how the prosecution chose to proceed and no criticism is made of that decision. Given the way in which the prosecution did choose to proceed it was plainly open to the sentencing judge to determine the appropriate sentence in respect of each count, and to then consider the question of totality before addressing the question of concurrent or consecutive sentences. That is exactly what he did. Mr Bruce cannot, in our judgment, have it both ways. 16.All of that said, whilst the false passport was used by the applicant only in relation to Count 6 (the sentence for which was in reality made consecutive to that for Count 1) which might arguably militate against a wholly consecutive term in respect of those 2 counts considered in isolation - the sentences for Counts 2, 3 and 5 do not fall into that category and accordingly whilst there might be some technical merit in Mr Bruce's argument - in practical terms it avails the applicant nothing. The third ground 17.It should be apparent from the above and from what we will say later, that in our view there is merit in this ground. We come to that view having sought to answer the question posed by Mr Bruce, and paraphrased by us, which was in these terms :
Our answer to that question is "no" - an appropriate notional starting point would be 9 years' imprisonment. The fourth ground 18.We reject this ground of appeal. In our judgment the sentencing judge was saying no more and no less than that he did not accept any suggestion that the part played by the applicant was minimal. That was a view which he was perfectly entitled to come to on the admitted facts. Indeed, for our part, we would have been surprised had he come to any other view. 19.It is quite plain to us that the applicant was a "trusted lieutenant" of Pastrana. Were it otherwise the applicant would never have been despatched to Hong Kong inter alia to fraudulently set up bank accounts to which he was the sole signatory. He, the applicant, could at any time have emptied those accounts for his own benefit had he chosen to do so. Pastrana (and others) must have been well aware of that, and from that awareness sprang the obvious trust. Summary 20.For all of these reasons it is our considered view that the sentence imposed in respect of Count 1 was manifestly excessive. Given the nature of the offence (and taking into account the motive behind it) the appropriate starting point in sentence was one of 4 years' imprisonment which should then be reduced to 2 years and 8 months' because of the applicant's plea. 21.As to the sentences imposed in respect of Counts 2, 3, 5 and 6 (i.e. 2 years and 8 months; 2 years; 2 years and 3 years and 4 months) these cannot be faulted and nor can the learned judge's decision to make only 3 years and 4 months of those sentences consecutive to the term imposed in respect of Count 1. 22.In consequence we grant leave to appeal against sentence and, treating the hearing of the application as the appeal, we reduce the sentence imposed in respect of Count 1 to a term of 2 years and 8 months' imprisonment; we decline to interfere with the sentences imposed in respect of Counts 2, 3, 5 and 6 which are to be served concurrently as between themselves but consecutive the sentence for Count 1. 23.In the result the total sentence to be served by the applicant is reduced from one of 7 years and 4 months to one of 6 years.
Representation: Mr B.M. Ryan, SADPP of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr Andrew Bruce, SC and Mr Edwin Choy, instructed by Messrs Haldanes, for the Applicant |
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