The Owners of the Ship or Vessel "Zhong Hang Yau No.1" and Another v. The Owners and/or Demise Charteres of the Ship Vessel "Dragon No.1'

Read the full judgment text of HCAJ 207/1998 on BabelCite. This HCAJ judgment was delivered on 17 July 1998.

1. On the 3 rd of July 1998 there was a collision in Hong Kong waters between the 2 nd Plaintiff's ship "ZHONG HANG YAU NO. 1" and the Defendants' ship "DRAGON NO. 1" ('the Vessel") and as result of the collision, the 2 nd Plaintiff as owners of cargo on board the "ZHONG HANG YAU NO. 1" and the 1 st Plaintiff as owners of that ship both suffered loss. The Plaintiffs in this Action contend that the collision was caused by the negligence of the Defendants' Vessel and therefore claim has been broug

Case No.HCAJ 207/1998
Court
HCAJ
Date17 Jul 1998
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAJ000207/1998

AJ Folio 207 of 1998

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SAR

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION

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Admiralty Action in Rem against the Ship "DRAGON NO. 1"

BETWEEN
1. The Owners of the Ship or Vessel "ZHONG HANG YAU No.1" Plaintiffs
2. The Owners and/or those entitled to sue in respect of a cargo lately laden on board the ship or Vessel "ZHONG HANG YAU No.1"

AND

The Owners and/or demise charterers of the ship Vessel "DRAGON NO. 1' Defendants

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Coram: The Hon. Mr. Justice Waung in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 16 and 17 July 1998

Date of Delivery of Judgment: 17 July 1998

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JUDGMENT

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1. On the 3rd of July 1998 there was a collision in Hong Kong waters between the 2nd Plaintiff's ship "ZHONG HANG YAU NO. 1" and the Defendants' ship "DRAGON NO. 1" ('the Vessel") and as result of the collision, the 2nd Plaintiff as owners of cargo on board the "ZHONG HANG YAU NO. 1" and the 1st Plaintiff as owners of that ship both suffered loss. The Plaintiffs in this Action contend that the collision was caused by the negligence of the Defendants' Vessel and therefore claim has been brought against the Vessel. This is therefore a straight forward case of a collision where there is a maritime lien on the Vessel and typically security should be given to the Plaintiffs for their claim and the case will then take their normal course. Unfortunately this did not happen, as the Defendants did not provide security and therefore the Plaintiffs, as they were entitled to do so by statute, invoked the jurisdiction in rem of the High Court of Hong Kong. Plaintiffs' solicitors received instructions from the Plaintiffs late in the afternoon of the 6th July to arrest the Vessel and the writ in rem was prepared immediately and taken to the High Court Registry by the litigation clerk. Unfortunately when the litigation clerk arrived at the Registry at 4.20 p.m., he found that the Registry had closed at 4.15 p.m. and therefore the Writ in rem could not be issued that afternoon.

2. The solicitor for the Plaintiffs then checked with the agent of the Vessel and was informed that the Vessel was to sail at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 7th July 1998 and in the circumstances, an urgent arrest application had to be made the same night of the 6th July. The Plaintiff's solicitor swore the necessary Affidavit in support of arrest and appeared before the Duty Judge, Mr. Justice Yam at 7.00 p.m. The Affidavit of Mr. Ip dated 6th July 1998 informed the Court that the Writ had not been issued because of the closure of the Registry. The Solicitor for the Plaintiffs confirmed to the Duty Judge that the Writ in Rem would be issued first thing the next day (7th July) and the Duty Judge granted a Warrant of Arrest notwithstanding that the Writ in Rem had not been issued. The Vessel was arrested at 10.30 that evening of the 6th July. Early the next morning the Plaintiffs' Solicitors caused the Writ in Rem to be issued by the High Court Registry and to be served by the Bailiff on the Vessel that same day.

3. The Vessel thereafter remained under arrest as the Defendants did not provide security for the release of the Vessel. Yesterday the 16th July 1998, by an urgent application on short service, Mr. Day for the Defendants applied to me to discharge the Warrant of Arrest granted by Yam, J. on the 6th July and for the immediate release of the Vessel. The application was resisted by Mr. Hirst for the Plaintiffs. As a matter of caution, the Plaintiffs also issued an application for the issue of a second Warrant of Arrest in the event that the Court is minded to discharge the first Warrant of Arrest. The questions before the Court are therefore:-

(1) whether the first Warrant of Arrest should be set aside on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant that first Warrant of Arrest and;
(2) whether the Court ought to exercise its discretion to grant a second Warrant of Arrest in the event it decides that the first Warrant of Arrest should be set aside.

4. At the hearing it is common ground that the granting of a warrant of arrest in an admiralty action in rem is discretionary and not a matter of course although that discretion is almost always granted in favour of the applicants.

5. The basis of the Defendants application to set aside the 6th July Warrant of Arrest is that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant a warrant of arrest because at that time the Writ in Rem had not been issued and because of Order 75 rule 5(1), the Court has no jurisdiction to grant a warrant of arrest. Order 75 rule 5(1) reads:-

"After a writ has been issued in an action in rem a warrant in Form No. 3 in Appendix B for the arrest of the propeny against which the action or any counterclaim in the action is brought may, subject to the provisions of this rule, be issued at the instance of the plaintiff or of the defendant, as the case may be."

The other material provisions of Order 75 rule 5 are as follows:-

(4) A warrant of arrest shall not be issued until the party applying for it has filed an affidavit requesting issue of the warrant together with an affidavit made by him or his agent containing the particulars required by paragraph (8) so, however, that the Court may, if it thinks fit, allow the warrant to issue notwithstanding that the affidavit does not contain all those particulars.
(5) Except with the leave of the Court, a warrant of arrest shall not be issued in any action in rem ..... being an action for possession of the ship or for wages, until notice that the action has been begun has been sent to the consul.
(6) Except with the leave of the Court, a warrant of arrest shall not be issued in an action in rem.... until the bottomry bond ..... is produced to the Registrar.
(7) Where, by, or under, any convention or treaty. Hong Kong has undertaken to minimise the possibility of arrest of ships of another state, no application shall be made for the issue of a warrant of arrest in an action in rem against a ship owned by that state .... until a notice.... has been served on a consular officer......."

6. It was however not so much the wording of Order 75 Rule 5(1) of the Rules but the Judgment of Mr. Justice Keith in the case of The Dragon Supreme [1997] 3 HKC 405 which gave vigour to the Defendants' application to set aside the warrant of arrest. In The Dragon Supreme an application was also made to the Duty Judge during the weekend when the Registry was closed and when the writ in rem could not be issued and when the Affidavit leading to the warrant could not be filed. Keith, J. refused the ex parte application on the basis that Order 75 Rule 5 laid down two requirements before a warrant of arrest can be granted, namely the issue of a Writ in rem (Rule 5(1)) and the filing in the Registry of the Affidavit leading to the warrant of arrest (Rule 5(4)). Since both of these requirements were not met because of the weekend closing of the Registry, therefore the learned Judge held that he had no jurisdiction to grant the warrant and he refused the ex parte application of the plaintiff.

7. Mr. Hirst does not accept the contention of two statutory requirements disabling the Court from granting warrants of arrests in the evenings and weekends when the Registry is closed. Nor does he accept the correctness of The Dragon Supreme. A number of arguments were advanced as to why Yam, J. had the jurisdiction and the discretion to grant the 6th July Warrant of Arrest. As I have formed the clear view under the second issue that the second Warrant of Arrest should be issued, it is not necessary for me to discuss in any detail the correctness of The Dragon Supreme, which was of course a judgment based on an ex parte urgent application. What is material for me on this first issue is whether it can be clearly shown that Yam, J. had wrongly issued the 6th July Warrant of Arrest and that clearly he had no jurisdiction to do so. I am not persuaded that this is the case and I would here merely mention a few of the points made in the course of the arguments to illustrate that there are a number of ways looking at the problem:-

(1) Having regard to the expressions used in Order 75 rule 5(1), it seems to me that the issue of the Writ before the issue of the warrant might not be such a strict statutory requirement which absolutely prohibits the court from exercising its discretion to grant the warrant. It is to be noted that the language there used is not something like "a warrant of arrest shall not be issued ....", the kind of language used in Order 75 rule 5(4), 5(5) and 5(6) and 5(7).
(2) It is arguably not necessary for the Plaintiffs to satisfy the requirements of Order 75 rule 5, in so far as they might be deprived of their statutory right to arrest in rem. This is both by reason of the original historical nature of the in rem action which commenced with the warrant and because of the fact that the Plaintiffs are exercising their maritime lien against the Vessel.
(3) There is no reason to believe that Yam, J. was not aware of the provisions of Order 75 rule 5 but nevertheless he decided to issue warrant of arrest, presumably on the basis that he could waive the requirements of Rule 5(1) and 5(4).
(4) This Court could also regard the non compliance with Rule 5(1) and 5(4) as irregularities and thereby under Order 2 exercise its discretion not to set aside the 6th July Warrant of Arrest having regard to the circumstances of the case. The authority of Metroinvest Anstalt v Commercial Union Assurance [1985] 2 AER 318 was invoked by Mr. Hirst. In my view, the liberal approach on procedural non compliance with the rules now adopted by the courts these days would clearly point towards this Court exercising its discretion in favour of the Plaintiffs in these circumstances.
(5) A strong case might be made out that in any event Rule 5(1) and 5(4) are ultra vires the Ordinance, in so far as they purport to deprive the Plaintiffs of the statutory right in rem, after 4.15 p.m. and during every weekend. The very heart of the admiralty jurisdiction in rem conferred by Section 12B of the High Court Ordinance is to enable security to be obtained against ships which sail in and out at all hours of the day and night and during weekend. If by the strict provisions of Order 75 Rule 5(1) and Rule 5(4), any plaintiff is deprived of the very statutory right it is otherwise supposed to enjoy, then Rule 5(1) and Rule 5(4) are ultra vires the Ordinance.

8. In the circumstances, having regard to urgent nature of the present application and that I have not heard full arguments on the various interesting and difficult points, by way of a somewhat tentative view I am not satisfied that the 6th July 1998 Warrant was wrongly issued. It follows therefore that on the first point, I am against the Defendants.

9. My main reason that the Vessel must not be released however is based on my conclusion that in any event the second Warrant should be issued. This is really a very straight forward point. The Writ had been correctly served on the 7th July and there is no application to set aside the service of the Writ in rem. Mr. Day in his submission confessed that if at any time next week or next month, the Vessel comes back to Hong Kong then the Vessel can be validly arrested. Then why should it not be arrested now immediately after the first Warrant was set aside (assuming that I am wrong and it should be set aside): Fair justice certainly calls for such step to be taken to protect the interest and the statutory right of the Plaintiffs conferred by Section 12B of the Ordinance. Mr. Day submits that there had been an abuse of the process and that the Plaintiffs should not be allowed to benefit from their abuse and he refers to The Vasso. For me The Vasso has no relevance because in my view there had been no abuse of the process, no material non disclosure to Yam. J. The Plaintiffs had simply failed to satisfy the requirements of Order 75 rule 5(1) and (4) which are harsh requirements and there is nothing to suggest that the Plaintiffs deliberately misled the Judge or deliberately did something they knew they should not do. At the worse, there had been a mistake and the correction of the mistake is in the setting aside of the first Warrant. But why should that prevent the Court from issuing the second Warrant as otherwise all the requirements of Order 75 rule 5 leading to the granting of the warrant have been satisfied. The Defendants had refrained from giving any security and the only effective way to protect the interests of the Plaintiffs is to cause the issue of the second Warrant of Arrest. Whatever prejudice suffered by the Defendants could be cured by an appropriate order of costs but the prejudice to the Plaintiffs if the second Warrant of arrest is refused could be extremely serious and having regard to the Defendants' pointed failure to provide security and their adamant position of seeking to obtain the release of the Vessel so that it could be immediately sailed away, I have no doubt that in all the circumstances, justice would be better served by the exercise of my discretion in favour of the Plaintiffs. In my judgment, the alternative application of the Plaintiffs for the issue of a second Warrant of arrest succeeds and deserves to succeed.

10. I will now hear the parties on costs and on the various matters arising out of the two applications.

William Waung
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Representation:

Mr. Day of Messrs. Holman Fenwick & Willan for the Defendants

Mr. Hirst of Messrs. Richards Butler for the Plaintiffs