Wong Fat-chuen v. Bachy Soletanche Group

Read the full judgment text of DCEC 142/1978 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 17 January 1979.

1. In this matter the accident is said to have occurred on November 2nd, 1977. The application is dated October 4th, 1978. The applicant workman claims that he is suffering from neuro-post concussion and total deafness of his right ear as a result of injuries which were inflicted upon him while he was protecting the respondent employers' property.

Case No.DCEC 142/1978
Court
District Court
Date17 Jan 1979
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

DCEC000142/1978

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF HONG KONG

HOLDEN AT KOWLOON

CIVIL JURISDICTION

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASE NO.142 OF 1978

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Between:
WONG Fat-chuen Applicant

AND

Bachy Soletanche Group Respondent

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Coram: A.L. Leathlean, D.J.

Date of Judgment: 17 January 1979

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REASONS FOR ORDER

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1. In this matter the accident is said to have occurred on November 2nd, 1977. The application is dated October 4th, 1978. The applicant workman claims that he is suffering from neuro-post concussion and total deafness of his right ear as a result of injuries which were inflicted upon him while he was protecting the respondent employers' property.

2. No answer had been filed when the matter first came before me on November 14th, 1978. However, I gave leave to the respondent to file an answer out of time within 14 days upon the latter's application. Mr. Moss for the applicant did not oppose that application, but referred me to rule 38 of the District Court Civil Procedure (General) Rules, and asked me to order that the respondent be debarred from defending if an answer was not filed within that time. Rule 38 provides as follows:

"The Court may, whether before or after the time limited for the filing of any pleading and whether such limitation be by these rules or by the Court, extend the time allowed therefor on such terms as it may think fit."

In the circumstances I was of opinion that such an order was appropriate, and accordingly made it. The matter next came before me on December 19th, 1978. On that occasion the res-pondent was represented by a solicitor, who applied for yet another extension of time within which to file an answer. It transpired that he was not instructed until after the expir-ation of the extension of time which was granted on November 14th. He sought to rely upon Order 3, rule 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. This time, however, the application was opposed on the ground that I had ordered that the respondent be debarred from defending in default of filing an answer within 14 days of November 14th.

3. Order 3, rule 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court is not inapplicable to the District Court, but rule 9(1) of the District Court Civil Procedure (General) Rules provides as follows:-

"9(1) Subject to the provisions of the Ordinance and of these rules, the Rules of the Supreme Court as for the time being enacted and save as it therein may otherwise be provided shall apply to proceedings in the Court as they apply to proceedings in the Supreme Court with such modifications as are necessary for that purpose."

4. Section 53 of the District Court Ordinance, so far as material, provides as follows:-

" 53(1) Except where a party to the pro-ceedings has obtained leave to appeal and the parties to the proceedings do not agree to the withdrawal of the appeal, a judge, on such grounds as he may think sufficient and within one month from the date of any judgment or order given or made by him, may decide to review any such judgment or order and on such review may re-open and re-try the case, wholly or in part, and may take fresh evidence and may reverse, vary or confirm his previous judgment or order."
" 53(2) The power conferred by subsection
(1) may be exercised -
(a) by a judge of his own motion, on notice to all parties to the pro-ceedings; or
(b) on the application of any party to the proceedings, on notice to the other party."

5. I was of opinion that section 53 of the District Court Ordinance applied to my order of November 14th debarring the respondent from defending if no answer was filed within 14 days. Accordingly, no application for any review of that order having been made within one month of its date, I dismissed the application for a further extension of time within which to file an answer.

6. I might perhaps add that at the last hearing Mr. Moss also sought to oppose the application for a further extention of time within which to file an answer on the ground that the respondent had previously admitted in correspondence and other documents various matters which it was then seeking to deny in its proposed answer, but I did not explore this allegation.

7. Dated this 17th day of January 1979.

(A.L. Leathlean)
District Judge