Wharf Properties Ltd. and Another v. Eric Cumine Associates, Architects Engineers 7 Surveyors (A Firm)

HCA013431/1983

1983, No. 13431

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

HIGH COURT

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Coram: Master Yam in Chambers

Date of hearing: 16th, 17th January 1991

Date of judgment: 13th February 1991

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J U D G M E N T

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1. This is an application to review certain items of taxation on the 22nd October 1990. The subject matter of the review concerned mainly with two items claimed by the 1st defendants:-

(a) costs of space required for the storage of files, records, drawings and equipments plus office space required for partners, staff and legal advisers to operate the case;

(b) staff costs in respect of Mr E. Mottram, employed specifically by the 1st defendants to handle this case.

2. The synopsis of the case was stated by the 1st defendants in the bill and I think it is useful to lay down the background history of the case leading to the taxation of the disputed items.

History

3. In November 1983, the plaintiffs Wharf Properties Limited and Wharf (Holdings) Limited ("Wharf") commenced proceedings against the 1st defendants Eric Cumine Associates, Architects Engineers & Surveyors ("ECA") and 17 other defendants. These proceedings concerned with claims by Wharf, the developer of what is now as Harbour City against ECA, a firm of professional architects for substantial damages for alleged negligence and breach of contract. These proceedings have had a long and convoluted history with numerous interlocutory hearings often argued at great length and over many days.

4. The pleadings go at such an unusual length that are rarely, if ever, seen in the history of litigation in Hong Kong. Mortimer J. said in his judgment dated 1st June 1988 that "The writ was issued in November, the original statement of claim has been replaced by this substituted re-amended statement of claim served now as long ago as January 1986. The pleading runs to 382 pages, has 28 sections and two schedules. Each schedule seems to me to be longer than the main body of the pleading." In addition to this substituted re-amended statement of claim, there were also the plaintiffs' further and better particulars served pursuant to the order of Mortimer J. which run to 274 pages together with two appendices of over 400 pages.

5. Power J.A. in his judgment of 23rd December 1983 described the claim as follows :-

"The first part is comprised of section 1 which is an introductory section detailing the position at the date of the last amendment.

The second part is comprised of sections 2-22 and sets out the obligations of the 1st defendants and the alleged negligence, breaches of duty by it. It is with the allegations of negligence in this second part that we are presently concerned.

The third part is comprised of sections 23-27. We need not concern ourselves with these sections as in June 1988, the respondent Wharf withdrew the claims made therein. The fourth part comprised of section 28, is a claim against the appellant ECA alleging negligence failure to exploit the full plot ratio potential of the site with the consequence that the area was underdeveloped. This claim has been subject of a separate trial in which judgment has been given in the appellant's (ECA's) favour."

[This part of the case subsequently also went to the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council and the judgment of Godfrey J. was upheld and the Wharf's appeal was dismissed.]

6. On the 23rd December 1988, the Court of Appeal, upon ECA's appeal from Mortimer J.'s decision struck out Wharf's claim in the second part, namely, sections 2-22 of the action, finding inter alia, that Wharf had failed to plead a complete cause of action. Only two but relatively minor claims remained outstanding. However, these claims were contained within sections 9-12 of the amended substituted statement of claim which were not material to ECA's application to strike out based, in essence, upon allegation of breach of causing delay. No account for costs relative to these two relatively minor section is taken in dispute in the bill of costs.

7. On the 22nd June 1989, the Court of Appeal heard ECA's adjourned application for costs and after hearing submissions by leading counsel for both sides, ordered that pursuant to the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 23rd December 1988, costs of the claims raised in sections 1-22 of the amended substituted statement of claim, save and except the costs incurred in respect of the claims relating to sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 22.7 (relating to the allegations in sections 9-12) to be taxed on common fund basis forthwith. The costs incurred prior to 29th July 1986 being the date that the fourth part of the claim (section 28) was severed from the remaining sections for trial are to be taxed upon conclusion of the action.

Rental and Staff Costs

8. ECA claimed the following costs which were objected to by Wharf :-

Costs of space required for storage of files, records, drawings and equipments plus office space required for partners, staff and legal advisers to operate the case -

9. 1)         At 28 Yan Ping Road, 2nd Floor (area 4660 sq.ft)

a)         Period 1.8.86 to 31.7.87; rent at $7.41 per sq.ft.

b)         Period 1.8.87 to 1.9.89; rent at $9.38 per sq.ft.

a)     $34,530.60 per month x 12     =    $414,367.20

b)     $43,710.80 per month x 13     =    $568,240.40

10. Costs for 25 months ....                         $982,607.60

11. 1A)       3rd Floor (area 866 sq.ft) at same rental

a)     $6,417 per month x 12           =       $77,004.00

b)     $8,123 per month x 8             =      $ 64,984.00

(1.8.87 - 1.4. 88)

12. For 20 months ....                          =      $141,988.00

13. 2)          Fu Ming Street Flat

a)          Period 1.9.88 - 22.6.89

14. $5,500 per month x 10                    =     $55,000.00

15. 3)          Room 803, No. 1 Hassen Avenue

a)          Period 1.9.88 - 22.6. 89

16. $33, 060 per month x 10                 =     $330, 600.00

Staff Cost

17. 1)           E. Mottram

1.1.88 - 30.4.88 (4 months)

1.10.88-22.6.89 (9 months)

18. 4 x $33,700                                     =      $134,800.00

19. 9 x $36,700                                     =      $330,300.00

20. Total     :                                          =      $465,100.00

At the taxation on 22nd October last year, 20% was taxed off from item 1) and 1A) of the rental and 30% were taxed off from item 3) of the rental.

21. Wharf's primary submission in the review is that rental costs of this type are not recoverable on a common fund taxation and they cited the case of Re Nossen's Patent [1969]1 AER 774 where the court rejected a claim on the taxation of costs (on a party and party basis) for overhead expenses for buildings, plants and equipments. It was submitted that Wharf can find no judicial decisions where rental costs have been allowed on a taxation of costs. They further submitted that it is wrong in principle to allow this rental as a disbursement in the bill of costs as disbursement are payments which have been made by solicitors on behalf of a client and which he seeks to recover from that client in his bill. They can be distinguished from ordinary office expenses in that they can be identified as relating to work done for a particular client rather than for all clients. Barristers' fees, court fees, expert witnesses' fees, enquiry agent's accounts and the loss of wages and expenses of lay witnesses can all feature as disbursement in a solicitor's bill (see Butterworths Costs, Vol.1, para A7).

22. In Re Nossen's Patent, the applicant issued a writ against the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority for infringement of letters patent, the Authority pleaded Crown use and those proceedings were discontinued and the Authority's costs taxed and paid. Subsequently the applicant proceeded by originating motion for compensation but those proceedings were stayed on the applicant's failing to comply with an order for security. On the taxation of their costs of these latter proceedings, the authority claimed the costs of research and experiments conducted, partly as its own research establishment, from the commencement of the initial litigation. No summons for directions had been issued in the latter proceedings. On the review of the latter taxation by the Court, it was held when it was appropriate that a corporate litigant should recover, on a party and party basis, a sum in respect of expert services performed by its own staff, the amount should be restricted to a reasonable sum for the actual and direct costs of the work undertaken. Lloyd-Jacob J. at p.778 said this:-

"There remain for consideration the submissions which were directed to the scale of charges proper for allowance in respect of the activities of the authority and their advisers between 6th December 1962 and 22nd November 1963 excluding the hydrolysis project work of the research group at Harwell. The established practice of the courts has been to disallow any sums claimed in respect of the time spent by the litigant personally in the course of instructing his solicitors. In the case of litigation by a corporation, this has not been strictly applied, for it has been recognised that, if expert assistance is properly required, it may well occur that the corporation's own specialist employees may be the most suitable or convenient experts to employ. If the corporation litigant does decide to provide expert assistance from its own staff as happened in this case, the taxing master has to determine the appropriate charge to allow. For an outside expert, the normal assessment would be based on current professional standards, and this in suitable cases would include a proper proportion of the overhead costs of running his office or laboratory, that is of the costs necessarily incurred by him in his capacity as a consultant as well as a profit element on such expenditure. The taxing master in the exercise of his discretion took the view that it would be an unreasonable burden to place on the chargeable party to include any item in respect of the authority's own overhead expenses or any profit element referrable thereto. As he himself expressed it :

'I allow, broadly speaking, the fees and salaries of those actively engaged in the experiments. I also allow the costs of the materials and stores used, and electricity, steam, water, etc. I did not allow the overhead expenses for buildings, plant and equipment, nor did I allow works and group overheads. The expenses in connection with the authority's qualified staff carrying out these experiments are allowable only on the basis of qualifying fees in connection with expert evidence necessary to the defence of the action. This I considered right as the experiments would otherwise have been carried out by outside experts. I allowed not only the charges I have indicated for the experiments, but also certain charges of the patents staff on making searches and enquiries.'

In this he was plainly right, covering as he did the actual and direct costs of the work undertaken in the sense of indemnifying the authority for the salaries, materials and out-of-pocket expenses of those engaged in the conduct of the experiments. No part of the authority's expenditure on overheads was occasioned by this litigation and it would be unreasonable to transfer to the applicant the burden of meeting some part of it by reason only of the authority's decision to prefer the services of their own staff to those of independent experts."

In summary, and since I have been asked to state the principle involved, it is, as the taxing master appreciated, that: when it is appropriate the a corporate litigant should recover, on a party and party basis, a sum in respect of expert services of this character performed by its own staff, the amount must be restricted to a reasonable sum for the actual and direct costs of the work undertaken."

23. On the same footing, Wharf objected to the staff costs for Mr Mottram. They submitted that they are not recoverable on a common fund taxation of costs since staff costs for Mr. Mottram are not recoverable unless the work is strictly the work of an expert witness, in the sense that the person doing the work could have been called as a witness to give expert opinion, evidence on the particular matters to which the charges relate. They also rely on the case of Richards & Wallington (Plant Hire) Ltd. v. A. Monk & Co. Ltd. (1984) unreported Queen's Bench Division, Bingham J., 11th June 1984.

24. Mr Mottram in his affidavit stated that he was an marine engineer by profession, holding Chief Engineer Certificate. He was engaged by ECA on 5th January 1978 as a mechanical engineer specifically for the Harbour City project and his then employment was for the duration of the project only. His duties during the course of the Harbour City job covered, amongst other things, the attendance of all site meetings with the main contractor and sub-contractors either of his own or with other members of the 1st defendants' site and/or design team. He was asked by ECA to provide technical assistance and support for the legal defence of the plaintiff's claim. He was retained by ECA solely as a consultant for the case until the end of November 1989. For the periods specified therein, the work undertaken by him consisted mainly of two types, namely - (i) assisting the 1st defendants' legal adviser mainly in technical analysis and case investigations in relation to the multitudinous allegations raised under sections 1-22 of the plaintiffs' pleadings and (ii) assisting the 1st defendants' legal advisers in inspecting, examining and evaluating the plaintiffs' documents disclosed in relation to sections 1-22 claims. Because of his engineering background and his special awareness of what had been going on between the parties from his previous involvement in the Harbour City project, he was able to perform the task probably more knowledgeably and in a more costs effective manner than an outside team of experts.

25. Mr Mottram was cross-examined on the review hearing. He agreed that his assistance to JSM in the preparation of the defence concerned mostly with facts finding of the case in order to face the allegations of the plaintiffs. Because of his background knowledge and his practical experience in the field, he could track down any documents or recall the actual facts by ploughing through massive documents. He gave an example in respect of ss.23-27 allegation where the plaintiffs alleged that the architect changed the design of the balcony wall and that was against the client's instruction. He remembered from his memory that that was under the direct instructions of Wharf and he could pin down the document of instructions. He reviewed the pleadings and the documents in their possession and pointed out the gaps of documents which required discovery and he went along for specific discovery, particularly documents which would fill the gaps of their defence.

26. By reason of the foregoing evidence, the plaintiffs submitted that Mr Mottram's position was not an expert properly so-called but just staff of the litigant responsible for digging out the factual material to prove his own case. The case of Richards & Wallington was relied on by the plaintiffs.

27. In that case, the claim on the taxation concerned with two persons - Mr Atkinson and Mr Kottler - who joined Richards & Wallington for the purpose of helping the management of the company with a number of different problems which were facing them including a problem concerning the by-pass in question. Mr Kottler was concerned with the overall presentation and formulation of the claim, he was deciding how it should be put, how it should be represented and what information was needed in order to present the claim and formulate it in accordance with his decision. Mr Atkinson was performing a subsidiary role in effect of digging out the information which was necessary in order to put flesh on the skeleton delineated by Mr Kottler : He was going into the papers and searching and excavating in order to find the actual material necessary to represent the claim in accordance with Mr Kottler's decision. Upon taxation the master said in the course of his reasons :-

"Both Mr Kottler and Mr Atkinson were concerned with the paperwork required to quantify the claim in cash terms. There was no dispute that a great deal of careful work would be necessary in going through the contemporaneous records and making the necessary calculations but the short point was whether these two gentlemen were expert witnesses whose proper fees would normally be allowed on a party and party basis or whether they were members of the staff of Richards with specialised knowledge and experience who were employed by Richards to decide how much to claim. On the original taxation I had decided that the latter was the case."

28. Bingham J. said in his judgment at p.6 that :-

"But essentially, I think, these two gentlemen were engaged on a factual exercise; they were certainly not independent experts; they were not, in truth, acting as experts at all and, in my judgment, these costs fall within the ordinary costs that a litigant must bear of digging out his own factual material, through his own employees, to prove his own case. Had outside experts been introduced to carry out this work then it by no means seems to me to follow that it would in any event have been recoverable as a cost of the litigation.

Accordingly, and on that main point, I conclude that the Devon County Council are entitled to succeed although I reach the decision with some slight regret since this is undoubtedly a very large cost to which Richards & Wallington were put. But the matter is one that falls to be governed by principle and the principle itself is not, I think, in doubt. The paragraph in Nossen's case that I have referred to does undoubtedly assist Mr Butcher [for Richards] to some extent but the facts of Nossen's case were very special and the work that was being done was their work which the client was himself carrying out at the behest of an independent expert, saving the independent expert the cost of doing that work, and it was, I think essentially work of an expert character. Accordingly, on the main issue, I conclude that the Devon County Council are right and that the challenge to the Taxing Master's decisions must fail."

29. For the 1st defendants, Mr Lim submitted that the two cases previously cited were taxation on party and party basis whereas in this very case it was on a common fund basis.

30. The parties before me are in dispute as to the meaning of the common fund basis taxation and the implications in respect of the two disputed items before me. For Wharf, Mr Lewis submitted that 0.62, r.28(4) provided that "on a taxation on a common fund basis being a more generous basis than that provided by paragraph (2) [namely, party and party], there shall be allowed a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred and paragraph 2 shall not apply; and accordingly in all cases where costs are to be taxed on a common fund basis, the ordinary rules applicable on a taxation as between solicitor and client where the costs are to be paid out of a common fund in which the client and others are interested, shall be applied whether or not the costs are in fact to be so paid." It was submitted that upon the wordings of this sub-rule, all allowed items and amounts must be reasonable, both in amount and in respect of being incurred and in practice, the onus of establishing reasonableness is on the claiming party.

31. Paragraph 12 on pp. 3-4 of the "Notes for Guidance on the Taxation of Costs", issued in July 1984 issued by the Lord Chancellor's Department in England, states as follows : -

"Rule 28 (4) describes common fund costs as being more generous but since the decision of the Court of Appeal in Lyon v. Lyon [1952]2 All ER 831, this has been interpreted as meaning more generous or less strict in approach but not in quantum."

Mr Lim, however, submitted that the distinguishing features of the different basis considered in EMI Records Ltd. v. Cameron Wallace Ltd. & Anr. [1982] 2A11E.R. 982. which are summarised in paragraph 14 on page 4 of the aforesaid Notes for Guidance on the Taxation of Costs issued in July 1984 as follows :-

"(a) on the common fund basis the benefit.of any doubt as to whether costs have been reasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount must be accorded to the paying party.

(b) On the indemnity basis all costs must be allowed save those which have been unreasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount and the benefit of any doubt goes to the receiving party. Thus if there is no doubt about the reasonableness of any item then there is no difference between common fund costs and indemnity costs.

(c) On the taxation inter partes on the solicitor and own client basis all costs incurred on the express or implied instructions of the client must be allowed even if they are unreasonable. But unusual costs will be allowed only where the solicitor has warned his client that they would not be allowed on the party and party basis - unless the solicitor can show that they were reasonable. The benefit of the doubt goes to the receiving party."

32. Mr Lim further submitted that on a party and party taxation, a master would allow any items which were necessary and proper. On a common fund basis, a master would allow any item which is reasonably incurred. In case of a party and party taxation and a common fund taxation, if there is any doubt as to any item, the benefit of the doubt would be accorded to the paying party. On an indemnity basis, all costs would be allowed unless they were shown to be unreasonably incurred. The burden is on the paying party to prove that they were unreasonable and if there is any doubts of its reasonableness, the benefit of the doubt will go to the receiving party. In short, Mr Lim submitted that in our taxation here, which is on common fund basis, I should allow any item which is reasonably incurred; if there is any doubts as to whether they are reasonable, then I should give the benefit of the doubt to Wharf. However, if I have no doubts that the costs have been reasonably incurred, then there is no difference between common fund costs and indemnity costs.

33. Mr Lim further submitted that due to the unusually special features of this litigation, the two disputed items are reasonably incurred by ECA, the defendants. The amount of claim under sections 1'-22 was over HK$317,000,000 (exclusive of interest). If the 1st defendants had been adjudged liable to pay damages, it would have meant total financial disaster for all the members of the 1st defendants' firm. Faced with this mammoth claim, together with the claim under s.28, the 1st defendants' firm virtually ceased all active professional work and were compelled to pull together all their resources, including their professional and other staff and office facilities to the effect that they were all, more or less, deployed full time to defend these proceedings since the 1st defendants were sued by the plaintiffs in 1983.

34. The pleadings, as I have said earlier, were unusually lengthy. In respect of discovery of documents, there had been massive discovery in relation to these sections 1-22 claims as can be seen from the voluminous list of documents produced by both parties. In the light of the huge number of documents involved, the parties have adopted a economical way of describing documents by general reference to "files" instead of to individual documents; but still the plaintiffs' list of documents runs to approximately 820 pages and the 1st defendants' list together with the supplemental list runs to approximately 430 pages. Extensive mutual inspection has also taken place over a long period of time subsequent to the exchange of the lists. As many of these documents and drawings were of a highly technical nature, there were certainly a need to engage an expert within the architectual and engineering field to assist the 1st defendants' solicitors in the process of examination and evaluation of the documents and drawings. Mr Mottram was therefore specifically retained by the 1st defendants to assist in this aspect as he was considered as the most suitable and economical expert to be employed for that purpose. If this was undertaken by the solicitors with the assistance of an outside expert, who usually works at an hourly rate, the costs would have been enormously more expensive.

35. Upon cross-examination of Mr Penman, a partner of the 1st defendants, he said that at the end of the Harbour City project, the 1st defendants' firm might have taken another character and certainly would not be in the same form but for this litigation: Mr Webber and Mr Cumine decided to retire, Mr Ling was old and was not in good health and in fact he died in 1985. He himself had some other plans in mind. He exhibited the accounts of the 1st defendants from 1979 - 1989 and we can see that the income of the firm declined from year to year. He said that those fees received were mostly pre-1983 earnings and these late payments accounted for about 80% of the fees received. The main reason is that ever since this litigation arose, most of the manpower was diverted to the preparation of litigation and so no substantive fee-earning work were being undertaken by his firm.

36. In deciding whether these 2 disputed items should be allowed on a common fund taxation, I shall first of all deal with the principle involved. I accept that common fund taxation should be on a more generous basis than party and party (0.62 r.28(4)). In a party and party taxation the guiding principle is to allow what is proper and necessary (r.28(2)). In a common fund taxation the guiding principle is to allow what is reasonably incurred. These two basis of taxation are only similar in the onus of proof (which is on the receiving party) and the benefit of doubt in case of doubt (which is for the paying party).

37. Common fund taxation is different from indemnity taxation in the onus of proof and the benefit of doubt which is reverse of the aforesaid situation. However when there is no doubt about the reasonableness of any item then there is no difference between common fund costs and indemnity costs.

38. Accordingly the question is whether these 2 disputed items are reasonable amounts in respect of costs reasonably incurred. I have no doubt in my mind that they are. ECA could not possibly handle this unusual litigation involving enormous amounts of documents unless they had sufficient space and staff to work on them. The whole firm of ECA virtually ceased all its other professional works and defend the mammoth claim of Wharf. To my mind it is only reasonable that the rental charges involved solely for the defence of this case should be allowed as an item of costs due to the aforesaid unusual nature of these proceedings.

39. Since I have no doubt that ECA has satisfied me these items of rental are reasonably incurred I do not have to consider the benefit of doubt.

40. In respect of the office space claimed Mr. Penman agreed that there were marginal involvement of other matters not concerning this case. Accordingly I would maintain to tax off items (1) and (1A) for 20% and 30% from item (3) and allow item (2) in full.

41. In respect of Mr. Mortram, I agree that he is not intended to be called as an expert but mostly as a witness of facts. However the case involved matters which are highly technical in nature. Mr. Mortram knows this case thoroughly due to his expertise and past involvement. He became the most suitable and economical person to be employed to defend the action. I have no doubt the retention employment for Mr. Mortram is reasonable in light of the circumstances of this unusual case and the amount involved is reasonably incurred.

42. The case of Richards & Wallington is distinguishable. It was a taxation on party and party basis and the consideration was what was necessary and proper. This was reflected in Bingham J.'s judgment when he said "the matter is one that falls to be governed by principle and the principle itself is not ... in doubt". Apparently he had only decided that it would be improper on a party and party basis to allow such an item where an expert only involved in digging out factual material to prove his own case. However in the case before me I consider that this item is reasonably incurred in the circumstances of this case and should be allowed on a  common fund taxation. In a metropolitan city like Hong Kong time and space are money. These 2 items were unavoidably incurred in the circumstances of this case involving enormous amounts of money and documents. It is only reasonable that the paying party should bear the consequence.

Other disputed items for works done by solicitors and counsel

(1) The hourly rate of Solicitors

Wharf submitted that under the Law Society Circular No. 32/85, it was recorded that solicitors works after 1.2.85 would be taxed in the range between $800.00 and $1,500.00. By another circular No. 198/89 for works done after 4.12.89 the hourly rates were changed to between $1,000.00 and $1,800.00.

43. The aforesaid circulars are only guideline for taxation of works done by solicitors on a party and party basis. Even on that basis a master can still apply a higher or lower rates according to his judicial discretion when he considers it appropriate to do so. The taxation before me is on the common fund basis which is a more generous basis. Moreover it is a case of unusual complexity and magnitude. I consider the various amounts allowed are reasonable amounts in the circumstances of this case.

(2)    Arranging travel and accommodation for counsel

44. Wharf also objected to the time spent for Mr. K. Lim in arranging travel and accommodation for counsel and noting and paying disbursements. 14 hours 15 minutes were claimed and 12 hours at full hourly rate were allowed. I accept Mr. Lim's submission that a good deal of the time claimed under these items were spent on negotiating and agreeing the availability of leading counsel of ECA's choice and the fees involved and co-ordinating with other solicitors firms for the employment of leading counsel in one trip. I would allow the item as originally taxed.

(3)     Wharf objected to items of which more than one lawyer has claimed for attending to the same task - described generally on the "team approach" to the litigation.

45. In this litigation I am satisfied that the involvement of several solicitors as a team was both reasonable and necessary having regard to the magnitude and complexity of the case. There was an eminent need to co-ordinate these many and various tasks undertaken by different members of the legal team in the defence. It would be inconceivable that anyone solicitor could handle this case or that the works should be done by one solicitor only and reported to others through various memos or conversation afterwards.

(4) Leading Counsel's fees

46. Wharf objected that the quantum of refreshers and daily consultative fees (6 items altogether) amounting to $159,293.50 as excessive. Further, they objected that leading counsel's refreshers for preparation, time of $87,774.00 (3 items altogether) should be disallowed and they should be covered by the brief fee. However I accepted that the quantum of refreshers and daily consultation fees is clearly reasonable having regard to the seniority and reputation of Mr. Neville Thomas Q.C. I also accept that the preparation time charged was reasonable having regard to the concessionary nature of the brief fee in the sum of GBP10,000.00 only for conducting the appeal.

(5)   Wharf objected to 100 hours of consideration of documents by each of Mr. K. Lim and Mr. L. Baum. Having regard to the complexity of the litigation and the enormous documentations involved I am satisfied that the number of hours claimed was reasonable in this case.

(6)   Wharf objected to the number of hours allowed in respect of Mr. Baum (50 hours) and Mr. Lim (25 hours) in preparing the bill of costs and for Mr. Lim (12 hours) and the articled clerk (36 hours) in preparation for taxation of the bill. The bill of costs runs to over 110 pages and volumous materials were put before the Court. I consider that the various amounts of time spent were reasonable for a bill of this nature.

(7)    Wharf objected to the allowance of Mr. Cheung's attendance at the taxation hearing. However it was clear in the original taxation hearing that the help of Mr. Cheung was invaluable who contributed immensely to the smoothness and the speed of the original taxation hearing. I consider that it is reasonable to allow Mr. Cheung's attendance on taxation of this bill

Conclusion

47. Accordingly I dismiss the Plaintiffs' objections to the aforesaid items on this review hearing. I now proceed to tax a further bill put before me consequential to this hearing.

Representation:

Mr. Lewis instructed by McKenna & Co. for the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs.

Mr. K. Lim and Mr. E. Cheung of Johnson Stokes & Master for the 1st Defendant.