HKSAR v. Lam Kwok Suen Gary
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 138/2003 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 10 June 2003.
1. This Appellant was tried before Miss J M Livesey in the Magistrate's Court at Eastern on three charges of fraud contrary to s. 16A(1)(b) of the Theft Ordinances, Cap. 210. The Magistrate found that he had no case to answer on Charge 2, but she convicted him on Charges 1 and 3. He now appeals against those convictions.
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HCMA000138/2003 HCMA 138/2003 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 138 OF 2003 (ON APPEAL FROM ESCC 2590/2002) ____________
____________ Coram: The Hon Mrs Justice V. Bokhary in Court Date of Hearing: 10 June 2003 Date of Judgment: 10 June 2003 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ 1.This Appellant was tried before Miss J M Livesey in the Magistrate's Court at Eastern on three charges of fraud contrary to s. 16A(1)(b) of the Theft Ordinances, Cap. 210. The Magistrate found that he had no case to answer on Charge 2, but she convicted him on Charges 1 and 3. He now appeals against those convictions. 2.The particulars of the two charges on which the Appellant was convicted were not entirely grammatical, but they were clear enough. Charge 1 was particularised as follows:
3.Very similarly, the particulars of charge 3 read:
4.There are six perfected grounds of appeal against conviction. Grounds 1, 2 and 3 relate to the conviction on Charge 1. These three grounds read:
Grounds 4 and 5 relate to the conviction on Charge 3. These two grounds read:
Ground 6 relates to both convictions. This ground reads:
5.As can be seen, all the grounds are directed to the Magistrate's approach to the prosecution's evidence. There was no defence evidence since the Appellant chose, as was his right, neither to give nor to call evidence. 6.As far as Ground 1 is concerned, I am satisfied that the Magistrate had considered all the evidence and arguments with care and that none of the criticism levelled against her decision in this ground is made out. 7.As far as Ground 2 is concerned, I am satisfied that the inference in question is one which the Magistrate was entitled to draw as the only reasonable one in the circumstances, and that it is not contradictory to any evidence which she accepted. 8.As far as ground 3 is concerned, I am satisfied that the Magistrate neither failed to reconcile any inherent improbabilities or inadequacies nor did so unsatisfactorily, whether by resorting to speculation as suggested in this ground or at all. 9.Without the specific grounds preceding it, namely Grounds 1, 2 and 3 as far as the conviction on Charge 1 is concerned, there is nothing in the general ground which is ground 6. 10.Leaving the conviction on Charge 1, I turn to the conviction on Charge 3. So I come to Ground 4. As to this ground, I am satisfied that the inference in question is like the one to which Ground 2 is directed. I am satisfied that this inference too is one which the Magistrate was entitled to draw as the only reasonable one in the circumstances and that it is not contradictory to any evidence which she accepted. 11.As far as Ground 5 is concerned, I see it in the same way as I see Ground 3. 12.There being nothing in the specific grounds relating to the conviction on Charge 3, the general ground which is Ground 6 is without substance. 13.Upon a careful consideration of all the circumstances disclosed by the evidence and of all the arguments, I am satisfied that there is no basis on which to interfere with either of these convictions. The appeal is dismissed.
Representation: Mr Nicholas Y K Lau, instructed by Messrs Kitty So and Tong, for the Appellant Ms Denise Chan, SGC of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent |