Donald W. Shields v. Many Chan
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1259/1970 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. The Defendant, Mary Chan, is the registered owner of a 2-storey house in the New Territories. She purchased this house from her aunt, Mary Wong, in 1968. The house stands on Lot 351 Section 8 Clearwater Bay Road which Lot is held by Mary Wong under a Crown grant dated 25th of March 1966. The Lot thus granted to Mary Wong was granted in exchange for Lot 344 a holding of the same size in the same locality which she had surrendered in return for the new grant. The terms of the new grant appear a
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HCA001259/1970 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ACTION 1259 OF 1970 -----------------
----------------- Coram: McMullin J. Date of Judgment: 4th June, 1971. ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- 1. The Defendant, Mary Chan, is the registered owner of a 2-storey house in the New Territories. She purchased this house from her aunt, Mary Wong, in 1968. The house stands on Lot 351 Section 8 Clearwater Bay Road which Lot is held by Mary Wong under a Crown grant dated 25th of March 1966. The Lot thus granted to Mary Wong was granted in exchange for Lot 344 a holding of the same size in the same locality which she had surrendered in return for the new grant. The terms of the new grant appear at document 2 in the agreed bundle put in the commencement of the case. No formal Crown lease was ever executed and the present grant is, in effect, her lease and document of title to the Lot. The assignment to Mary Chan referred to part only of this Lot and although the document of assignment is not before me I understand that it covers only that portion of the Lot upon which the house stands which is at present occupied in part by the plaintiff and his family. 2. By written tenancy agreement dated the 9th of August 1968 the defendant let the first floor flat of this house to the plaintiff for a term of 2 years from the 16th of August 1968 at a monthly rent of $1,000 payable in advance on the 16th day every month. Clause 4(d) of the agreement provided as follows:-
3. There are several covenants in this tenancy agreement which are of importance in the case. In paragraph (k) of Clause 2 the plaintiff agreed to provide his own caretaker; in paragraph (c) of Clause 2 he agreed to pay, amongst other charges, all charges in respect of water used by him during his tenancy of the premises. The most important of these covenants is contained in (j) of Clause 2 in which he undertakes:-
There is no specific clause in this tenancy agreement restricting the user of the premises to domestic purposes but condition 3 of the Special Conditions in the Crown Grant to Mary Wong stipulated that the Lot upon which this house is built shall be used for: "Private and Residential purposes only". Condition 9(a) of the General Conditions of the Crown Grant provides that should the grantee fail or neglect to observe or comply with any of the conditions of the Grant the Crown shall be at liberty to re-enter upon the Lot and take back possession of the Lot and all buildings etc. thereon. It is not in dispute that the assignment from Mary Wong to Mary Chan of the part of the Lot upon which the building in dispute now stands is in the usual form of assignments of land in the New Territories and it is not disputed that it, in turn, contains a forfeiture clause in terms similar to the one recited above from the plaintiff's agreement prohibiting the user of the premises in any way which might occasion a forfeiture of the lease under which it is held i.e. the Crown Lease, or more strictly, the Crown Grant. 4. The plaintiff is an employee of the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief a charitable organization more familiarly known as Oxfam. He is in fact, the Field Director of all the operations of Oxfam in the Far East. He is the only representative of that organization stationed in Hong Kong. He and his family, consisting of himself, his wife and three daughters, moved into the flat pursuant to the agreement and continued to reside there during the two-year-period apart from two occasions when he and his family were absent upon vacation. The first of these absences occurred in 1969 and was about 4 days in duration. The second was for a period of 7 or 8 weeks extending from the middle of August to early September 1970. From these absences have arisen certain of the complaints which will be referred to later in greater detail. It is to be noted also that the original term of two years limited in the agreement had actually expired by a few days upon the return of the plaintiff and his family to Hong Kong in September 1970. 5. On the 9th June 1970 prior to his departure upon holiday, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant in the following terms:-
To this letter, the plaintiff received the following reply dated 26th of June 1970:-
According to the plaintiff, he was "flabbergasted" by the contents of this letter since, according to him, there had been no hint of any dissatisfaction with his use of the premises prior to that date. He telephoned the defendant and asked her what the meaning of this letter was. According to him, she replied that it really did not mean anything but that she had to send it to him and she suggested that they should meet and sit down and talk the whole matter over. Nothing came of this, however, and his long leave being imminent, he put the matter in the hands of his solicitors Messrs. Peter Mo & Co. before leaving the Colony in July. Prior to his departure, however, he invited certain friends of his, priests and lay-brothers of a Catholic religious organization, to reside in and use the flat as a holiday home during his absence and to look after it and keep it in good repair and order. He freely admitted that his motive in doing this was, in part at least, due to his anxiety that, in view of the defendant's attitude, he and his family might find themselves dispos essed of the premises during his absence upon leave. The letter from his solicitors to the defendant dated the 3rd July 1970, the first such letter written on his behalf by his solicitors, denied any breach of the agreement and the final paragraph reads as follows:-
6. The plaintiff and his family were absent from the Colony upon leave between July and September and it is common ground that during that period, at the invitation of the plaintiff, and without the prior consent of the defendant, members of a certain Roman Catholic congregation of priests and lay-brothers occupied the premises for recreational purposes. About ten persons in all were involved in this, there being about four of the congregation in residence at any given time. No complaint is made of the manner of their occupation of the premises and it is the plaintiff's contention that they served in the office of caretakers while enjoying at the same time free facilities for their own recreation. 7. The relations between the plaintiff and his family on the one hand and the defendant and her relative Mr. Lam on the other which appear to have been very cordial at the outset must have deteriorated during the currency of the original two-year term. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate why this should have been so and it has never been suggested that the Shields were other than good tenants. Whatever may be the reason, there is no doubt that by the time the notice of intention to exercise the option to renew had been sent to the defendant she had firmly set her face against the grant of an additional term. She told the court that she regards Mr. Lam, her uncle, not merely as her legal adviser but as somebody to whom she stands in a relationship of filial respect. Although he was reluctant to say so, I have little doubt that the conduct of her affairs subsequent to the sending of notice was strongly influenced by Mr. Lam's advice. By the time the matter came to be placed in the hands of her own solicitors it is evident that every possibility in the circumstances of the tenancy and the plaintiff's performance of his covenants thereunder had been closely scrutinised with the purpose of gleaning therefrom a reason, sound in law, for resisting the enforcement of the renewal clause. I put the matter that way because it appears to me that, with the exception to one matter to which I shall refer in some detail, the grounds of complaint on the footing of breach of covenant are so insubstantial, having regard to all the circumstances of user by the plaintiff of the premises, that I can only conclude that the defendant is determined, for some motive not disclosed to the court, to repossess herself of the property by strict insistence upon the observation of terms the breach of any one of which, if any such breach were proved, cannot have occasioned her any true apprehension of detriment to her rights as landlord. For all that, however, it must be added that she was under no duty to disclose what her true motive was and, furthermore, that she was perfectly within her rights in insisting upon any legal device available to her for the purpose of repossessing herself of her own property. It is the plaintiff and not she who is seeking an equitable remedy. Were the position reversed and were she seeking the assistance of the court to enforce a right in equity the flimsy character of at least part of the objections made on her behalf might have weighed heavily in the scales against her. 8. The defendant says that the plaintiff is in breach of the conditions of his agreement in four separate particulars and that these breaches, in sum or singly, are sufficient to disentitle him for enjoying the benefits of the option created in his favour by paragraph (d) of Clause 4 of the Agreement. Firstly, she complains that he sublet, without permission, a part of the premises to Oxfam for the currency of his term. In addition she says that he has parted with possession of the premises to those persons to whom he entrusted possession of the premises during his absence upon holiday. These acts are said to be in breach of the covenant not to assign, sublet, etc. (Clause 2(i) of the Agreement); secondly that he has failed to pay his lawful water charges in breach of paragraph 3 of Clause 2; thirdly that he has failed in breach of paragraph K to provide his own caretaker for the premises; and finally that he is in breach of the provision in the Crown grant whereby the grantee was enjoined (special condition No.3 of the Crown Grant) to use the Lot for private residential purposes only. 9. I find no substance in the first three of these objections. I am quite satisfied that there is no subletting or assignment of the premises or any part of the premises to Oxfam, the employer of the plaintiff. Equally I am satisfied that there has never been any parting with the possession of the premises in favour of the Catholic fathers and brothers who were permitted to reside therein during the plaintiff's absence upon leave. I entirely agree with Mr. Lee that, on the facts of the present case, there has been nothing amounting either to an assignment or a parting with possession in either instance. The line of authorities upon which he relied commencing with Chaplin v. Smith(1) and including Stening v. Abrahams(2) and the Hong Kong Decision Willie v. Lo Man(3) afford ample authority in support of that view. 10. The question of the water charges turns entirely upon the evidence. I am satisfied that Mr. Shields has given me an accurate and truthful account of his understanding of the result of the discussion between himself and Mr. Lam when the question of water supply was being discussed at the latter's house before commencement of the tenancy. The evidence on both sides makes it plain that there existed at the time a relationship of consideratbe cordiality between the parties. I think it is clear that Mr. Lam who is defendant's uncle took a major part in the negotiating of the tenancy, and more especially in dealing with the terms relating to supply of water from his own well to the premises. I find no reason to disbelieve Mr. Shields when he says that Mr. Lam indicated that the water charges for water which would be supplied from his well would be nominal and that, when he sought to quantify the amount a figure of 25 to 30 dollars per annum was mentioned. Mr. Lam rightly points out that this would be ludicrously small charge when one compares it with water charges levied in respect of water from private wells or tankers in that area. But when one remembers the identity of the plaintiff's employer and the nature of his work a philanthropic gesture of that kind might well have been expected and I think it was intended. It is possible that Mr. Lam is mistaken in his memory of this matter and that the discussions were conducted upon his side with such a degree of amiable vagueness that it would have been possible afterwards to conclude that he had suggested that a reasonable charge (rather than a "nominal charge") would be made for water supply and that as figure had been fixed at the time, it is a great pity that nothing was put in writing at the time concerning the matter and this part of the dispute affords a good example of the inadvisability of letting a business arrangement of some considerable importance rest upon a basis of bonhomie and mutual trust. On the whole, however, I incline to the view that the offer of a nominal charge was made and accepted. Even if the arrangement had been that a reasonable sum would be paid, as Mr. Lam contends it was, and even if the figure of $80 which he now demands would, in all the circumstances, be a reasonable one, the point at issue is whether or not the plaintiff's failure to pay the sum demanded i.e. $1,840 for 23 months, constitutes a breach of his covenant to pay for all water used by him. To put the defendant's case at its highest here, she merely says that he has failed to pay her the sum of money which she has said to her uncle on that account. She made no query as to whether the charge was reasonable and she chose to pay without handing over the bill to Mr. Shields. There was a perfectly legitimate dispute between the plaintiff and Mr. Lam concerning the quantity supplied and the proper price to be charged therefor and until agreement had been reached upon the figure or until the matter had been satisfactorily adjudicated by a competent court it could scarcely be said that the plaintiff was unjustified in resisting the charge or that his failure to pay amounted to a breach of his covenant. 11. The evidence at large concerning this issue left me with a strong impression that Mr. Lam regarded the demand made to his niece for payment of water charges followed by her demand to the plaintiff for refund of the same dated 7th of July 1970 as part of a strategy for supplying his niece with grounds for avoiding renewal of the lease. From my observation of her in the witness box I have considerable doubt whether she was either happy or convinced in support of this strategy. When one considers that no levy in respect of water was ever raised for 23 months after commencement of the tenancy; that the neighbouring family in the same house have never yet been charged in respect of water used by them in the currency of their first term of tenancy (although Mr. Lam says that they will in due course be charged); in addition when one considers the fact that this sudden alacrity to insist on payment of water charges followed within a matter of days on the defendant's refusal to extend the term it is difficult indeed to avoid the impression that the claim for payment of water charges at a fairly high rate was an attempt to present the defendant with a pre-fabricated breach of covenant as a make-weight to whatever other complaints she might urge. 12. As to the caretaker, I cannot read clause 2(k) of the tenancy agreement as doing more than to oblige the plaintiff to see that there was somebody upon the premises to look after it when he was absent therefrom. He was absent from the premises on two occasions, once for four days in 1969 and again during his long leave in 1970 for a period of 7 or 8 weeks. On the first occasion he left the keys of the flat with his downstairs neighbours, the Colliers, with the instruction that they should turn on the lights in the evening as a security precaution. He also informed the local police station that he would be absent for that 4 days and asked them to keep an eye on the premises. In view of this it would be very difficult to say that he was then in breach of a clause which provided baldly that his obligation was "to provide his own caretaker". So far as his longer absence is concerned the defendant might more justly have claimed not that he had failed to provide a caretaker but that he had provided altogether too many. I believe the plaintiff when he told me that he had expressly solicited the occupancy of the premises by the Catholic Brothers for two purposes one of which was to provide persons to look after the premises in his absence. There is nothing whatsoever in the clause as it stands to oblige him to provide any particular sort of caretaker or a single caretaker or a caretaker upon wage or salary. Of the three objections so far considered this last is surely the one most widely removed from the reality of the situation and it throws into high relief the artificiality of these objections as a whole. 13. I turn now to the fourth objection which to my mind stands upon an altogether different footing. The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff is the sole employee of Oxfam in the Far East. His official designation is Field Director, Far East. His employment takes him to virtually every independent territory in this vast area so that he spends a considerable part of his time travelling. It is his duty to inspect local conditions wherever he goes and to make recommendations to his head-quarters in London concerning the advisability of applying the funds of Oxfam to the situation which he has been called upon to examine. He does not rent or occupy any office premises in Hong Kong as distinguished from his present place of residence in the Clear Water Bay area. In so far as he has an office or place of business it is his present address the subject matter of this suit. It is the address which appears upon his visiting cards. It is that address which appears also in the yellow pages of the telephone directory where Oxfam is listed under "Charities". As far as I am aware his salary from Oxfam is his only regular income. At his residence he occupies what is properly speaking an amah's room and this he uses as a study. He says, and I have no reason to disbelieve him, that he mentioned the fact that he would be using this room for this purpose at the time when he was being shown round the premises by the defendant. His evidence, which was not challenged, was that he writes all necessary letters concerning his Oxfam business in that office and to that address come all letters concerning him as Field Director of Oxfam operations in the Far East. He says that he does not interview members of the public there. There is no notice board displaying the fact that Oxfam headquarters for the Far East is situated there nor is there any other form of advertisement concerning Oxfam business on the premises or in its vicinity. On the other hand he admits that this address is listed in the telephone directory so that persons having business with Oxfam can find him. The same room is used sometimes by his wife and daughters for writing personal letters or for practising typing and also it is, in part, used for storage of bottles and for the drying of laundry. His occupation is in the highest sense laudable and innocuous. On the evidence before me it could not be said by any stretch of the imagination that anything which Mr. Shields does at the premises is likely in any way to affect the amenities of the neighbourhood or to reduce the quality of the premises or of adjacent premises or of the area generally as a residential area. One can scarcely imagine a departure from the strict terms of the provision in the Crown grant which was more technical or less likely to offend against the true purposes of the inclusion of that term in the grant than is constituted by Mr. Shields' user of this premises in this way. When all that has been said, however, it remains to my mind clear that he has a business in Hong Kong one might say that without this address so furnished and so advertised the business of Oxfam in the Far East could not adequately proceed. The plain fact is that he is conducting what amounts to a business upon premises which are intended for residential use only. It is common ground between counsel that the due observance by the tenant of every covenant in his lease is to be regarded as a condition precedent the performance of which is required of him before he is entitled to avail himself of the privilege conferred by the option for renewal. Mr. Mills-Owens points out that any breach, though trivial or immaterial, may be relied upon as disentitling the lessee to an order for specific performance of the option to renew. In this regard he quoted a number of authorities the leading example of which is Finch v. Underwood(4). It is needless to consider these authorities in detail. In so far as they set out the proposition enunciated above, Mr. Lee does not purport to dispute them. Nor is it disputed that to use the premises for business purposes would be to do something which might result in "the forfeiture of the lease" (i.e. the Crown grant) "under which the said building is held". As I understand Mr. Lee's argument on this head, he says firstly, that no business is being carried on in the amah's room because even that part of the premises is shared by the whole family for non-business purposes. Secondly, while he does not seek to argue that the use of the premises demised to the plaintiff for business purposes would not be in breach of the provision in the Crown grant and would therefore constitute a breach of the covenant in the plaintiff's own lease, (Clause 2(j) which enjoins him not to do or suffer to be done anything which might lead to the forfeiture of the lease under which the building is held i.e. the Crown grant), and while he does not deny that it would be open to the Crown to re-enter and forfeit the Crown lease under Clause 9(a) of the conditions of the Crown grant should the premises be so used, he says that there can be no breach so long as the primary user of the premises is residential and domestic. In this connection he points to section 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance where domestic premises are defined as meaning premises used wholly or primarily for human habitation and also to section 4 of the Security and Tenure (Domestic Premises) Ordinance No.8 of 1970 where domestic tenancy is defined in terms of primary user. As I understood the argument he sought to say that this notion of primary user was available in considering the covenant in the Crown lease which obliged use of the Lot for private residential purposes. He went on to point out that there is no specific covenant in the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant restricting the user of the premises given to the plaintiff to domestic user. Had there been such a covenant in that agreement he says, then the use of any part of the flat for a purpose other than domestic purposes would have constituted a breach of that covenant. Where, however, there is no such covenant but merely a provision in the Crown grant the notion of primary user would apply so that provided that the grantee saw to it that the premises upon the Lot were used primarily for private residential purposes the Crown would be unable to re-enter and forfeit the grantee's interest. If I have followed counsel's arguments thus far successfully I confess I cannot see the substance in them. As to the first point, the fact that the whole family made occasional domestic use of the amah's room appears to me to be immaterial. The fact remains that the premises is being used concurrently as Mr. Shields' family residence and Mr. Shields' business address and the centre of all his business operations. As to the second point the covenant the breach of which is relied upon by the defendant is the covenant which obliges the plaintiff to do nothing that might cause a forfeiture of the Crown grant. It is her contention that his manner of using the premises is such as to infringe the covenant in that grant and thus to put the grant in danger of such forfeiture. It does not appear to me that counsel for the plaintiff can derive any satisfaction from the absence of an express covenant in his own lease excluding all but domestic user and I agree with Mr. Mills-Owens that the concept of primary user employed in the Landlord and Tenant legislation is irrelevant to the circumstances before the court. The wording of the Crown grant is clear: it is not merely that the Lot is to be used for private residential purposes but that it is to be used for private and residential purposes only. That being so to my mind it follows naturally that any user of the Lot other than domestic user whether by the grantee or any subsequent assignee or lessee may draw down the penalty of forfeiture. 14. A question which has exercised me more, although it was not argued before me, was whether or not it might be said, in all the circumstances of this case, that the defendant was well aware that the premises were being used in part for business purposes so that by continuing to accept rent from her tenant in the knowledge that there was a breach of covenant, she might be said to have waived her right to object to specific performance of the option to renew. But the answer to that I think is that the plaintiff is asking for specific performance of an agreement which, if the court grants it, will have the effect that the premises will continue to be used in contravention of the terms of the Crown grant. Even if it is the case that the defendant connived at or at least permitted that contravention it would be a strange result of the exercise of the court's equitable jurisdiction if she were to be required to put herself once more in danger on the sole ground that she had put the grant to risk during the currency of the previous term. In any event the case of Laurie v. Lees(5), although the question is broached from a somewhat different angle, is authority for the proposition that breach of a covenant as to user is a continuing breach which will entitle a landlord to insist on forfeiture notwithstanding that he has received rent with knowledge of the breach. A fortiori, in such circumstances, a landlord must be entitled to resist specific performance of an option to renew. 15. How real the risk of forfeiture is I cannot say but that there is some risk is patent upon the documents. That situation has come about as a direct result of the plaintiff's user of the premises and it amounts to a continuing breach of the covenant not to do anything which might cause a forfeiture of the grantee's interest and with it of the defendant's interest in the premises. It might very well be that the defendant could adequately secure her own protection by seeking from the Crown a modification of this covenant in respect of this particular tenant or an assurance that the Crown would not re-enter. In view of the state of affairs between the parties at the moment it seems in the highest degree unlikely that she would consent to do so. In the absence of such consent I can see no way in which the Court's power could be invoked to compel her to do so. The plaintiff must be held to have had constructive notice of the covenants in his landlord's lease including the restrictive covenants. The fulfilment of all his obligations under those covenants is a condition precedent to his lawful exercise of the option for renewal. The use of the premises in part for business purposes infringed the requirements both of the terms of the defendant's assignment from Mary Wong and of the Crown grant and therefore was in breach of his own covenant which requires him not to put that the Crown grant in danger. This was the situation which existed at the time that he sought to exercise his option to renew, and for those reasons his right to exercise the option was not perfected. The court cannot now decree specific performance of that conditional obligation. 16. A final point made on behalf of the plaintiff by Mr. Lee at the conclusion of his address was that the plaintiff's tenancy was within the protection of the Tenancy (Notice of Termination) Ordinance 1962. He said that even if I were to refuse specific performance it still would not mean that the plaintiff must immediately remove from the premises since no notice complying with the requirements of that Ordinance had been served upon the plaintiff prior to the expiration of the term. This point was never raised upon the pleadings and I have no evidence before me concerning the service or non-service of the notice. Mr. Mills-Owens strenuously objected to the raising of this point at such a late stage and he urged me to disregard it on the grounds, firstly, that notice was not required in a case of breach of covenant and secondly that it was too late to raise the point since to attend to it would be permissible only should I permit the defendant to amend her pleadings and the plaintiff to plead in reply and that it is now too late to do so. Now it is plainly true that, as Mr. Lee says, the defendant has contented herself with pleading in answer to the claim for specific performance, she has not in addition expressly claimed possession on the basis that the plaintiff has forfeited his right of tenancy through breach of covenant. It was unlikely that she would do so since, in her view, the tenancy has already concluded. I think it is clear that if this were an action in which the defendant has been claiming possession of the premises on the basis of breach of covenant then the provisions of section 8 of the Tenancy (Notice of Termination) Ordinance would have made it unnecessary for her to plead or prove that notice had been served under the Ordinance. Even it be the fact that no notice was served it would be a strange result if, although she would have been entitled to sue for possession during the currency of the tenancy on the basis of the breach which she has proved in this court, and without serving any notice of termination, she should now be precluded from relying upon the same breach as exempting her from the necessity for serving notice when she appears in defence to an action for specific performance after the contractual term of 2 years has expired. Although section 3 of the Ordinance provides that a tenancy of this nature shall not cease or be terminated without the necessary written notice being served six months at least before the completion of the term that must in my view be read subject to the provisions of section 8 so that in any case where the question is raised whether the notice was served and where the case discloses that in the circumstances no notice was necessary the fact whether it was served or not becomes irrelevant. 17. I confess to a considerable sympathy for the plaintiff in this action. Mr. Lam regards his conduct in querying the amount of the water charge as ungentlemanly. It is apparently Mr. Lam's view that, having on many occasions received hospitality from Mr. Lam and aspiring to live in a well-to-do locality, the plaintiff should not have ventured to query what Mr. Lam regards as a wholly reasonable charge. No doubt Mr. Lam is right if it be ungentlemanly for a not very well paid employee of a very large charitable organization to express dismay at receiving a very large bill in circumstances which had led him to expect that the bill would be of a trifling nature. If, however, as I believe, the original agreement was that Mr. Shields should pay only a nominal charge and if Mr. Lam eventually chose to present a bill based upon the theory of a reasonable charge and did so moreover to stimulate an objection which could later be made an additional ground for refusing specific performance then I would say that it is the plaintiff who can complain that his treatment at the hands of Mr. Lam was less than gentle. I think, however, from the obvious distress shown by the defendant herself in court that, in so far as she was a party in these rather artificial devices, she was a somewhat reluctant and unhappy party. Nevertheless for whatever reasons she is fully entitled to repossess herself of her own property by whatever legal means is available to her. In the main I found her to be, no less than the defendant, a cautious and candid witness who was at pains to adhere to the truth but one who found herself under the necessity of achieving her aim by insisting upon misfeasances which troubled her, in truth, far less than the prospect of being forced to nonew the tenancy. As I said the law is clearly on her side however unobjectionable the manner of the plaintiff's user of the premises may have been and however unlikely it may be that the head landlord i.e. the Crown would have made any objection whatsoever thereto. 18. The plaintiff's claim of specific performance is dismissed with costs. There will be judgment for the defendant upon her counterclaim for possession with a stay on the order of possession for one month from this date. The claim for damages for trespass is dismissed but there will be an order for mesne profits from the 16th of August until the delivery of possession in a sum equivalent to the current montly rent for the Collier premises i.e. $1,850 per month. The claim for $1,920 for water charge is dismissed and this charge is assessed at a rate of $30 per annum for 2 years i.e. $60 in all.
4th June, 1971.
Representation: Martin Lee instructed by Peter Mo & Co. for plaintiff. R.H. Mills-Owens instructed by P.H. Sin & Co. for defendant. (1) [1926] K.B. 198 (2) [1931] 1 Ch. 470 (3) [1957] H.K.L.R. 512 (4) [1875-6] 2 Ch. 310. (5) [1880] 14 Ch. D. 248. |
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