Mary Patricia Gosling and Another v. Fan Yu Lung and Others

Case No.HCA 652/1975

Court

High Court CFI

Date—

Judge—

Case Document

100%Judiciary

HCA000652/1975

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

ACTION NO. 652 OF 1975

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BETWEEN
	MARY PATRICIA GOSLING	1st Plaintiff
	GLEN ERIC GOSLING	2nd Plaintiff
	and
	FAN YU LUNG	1st Defendant
	FONG TAI WING	2nd Defendant
	THE KOWLOON MOTOR BUS CO. (1933) LTD.	3rd Defendant

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Coram: LI, J. (In Court as Chambers)

Date of Judgment: 26th March, 1976 at 10.30 a.m.

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JUDGMENT

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1. In this case I am only concerned with the assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance - liability having been admitted by the defendants in an action instituted by the widow of the deceased and eldest son, for and on behalf of themselves and all the dependants surviving, in respect of the fatal accident occurring on the 12th July 1974. No address has been made or evidence tendered in support of damages under the Law Amendments and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance Cap.23.

2. At the time of death the deceased was employed by the Ames Company as Director of Marketing Development at a gross salary of $40,380 per month (sic) in United States currency. The Ames Company belongs to one of 7 divisions of the Miles Laboratories Inc. in America, which is a well-established and substantial organisation. The deceased joined this organisation in October 1954 at the salary of $325.00 per month. Since then he earned his increases in salary as well as his promotions, which took place once in every 3 years, rising to the salary scale and the position he held in July 1974. There is evidence that he should have a 60% chance of being promoted to the post of Vice-President in Ames Company in 1976 and a 75% chance to the post of President in one of the divisions in the Miles Group by 1982 with a substantial increase in salary. The past history of his annual salaries since 1954 is in document 'A'. The retirement age for an employee in the Miles Organisation is 65. Had he lived he would have another 17 years' working life, i.e. until 1991. His future salary scale, projected from 1974 to 1991, on the basis that he remained in the same job, is estimated as shown in document 'B'. He would receive, at the peak of his career, a salary of $127,556 per annum. Another estimated scale for the same period of time, but based on his aforesaid chances of promotion, is shown in document 'C'. He would receive a salary of $144,482 per annum.

3. In addition to his annual salary he would, had he lived and worked to retirement age, have benefitted by continuing to participate in the profit-sharing scheme of the organisation. His share in the continued participation would depend on his length of service and his gross salary each year. A table showing his entitlement to such income if he remained in the same job is to be found in document 'F'. Another table showing the same, after taking into consideration his chances of promotion, is in document 'G'. Further, on retirement at 65 he would be entitled to a pension which is worked out in document 'H'.

4. Prior to his death the deceased was a man of good health. He was happily married and a man of moderation. He was the sole bread-winner of his family - his widow and his five children. His interest was in his work and in his family.

5. The eldest son, Glen, was born on 12th of August 1953, that is at the time of the deceased's death 20 years and eleven months old. He entered Indiana University in 1972. He left his College in 1973 but rejoined it in 1975 after working for nearly 2 years. He will have graduated by 1978 when he is 25 years old.

6. The second child, Sandra, was born on the 27th of May 1955 and is now in her 3rd year in the same University. She will proceed with her post-graduate course, which is required in her line of work. She too will finish her studies by about 1978-1979.

7. Jane, the 3rd child, was born on 21st of April 1975. She too is in the same University. She will graduate in 1979.

8. James, the 4th child, was born on 17th of May 1959. He is in High School for another full year before he too will join a private University to study music.

9. The youngest, Daniel, was born on the 23rd of May 1962. He is a good student in a school and intends to join a University. It may be too early to tell, but he has indicated his intention to become a medical doctor.

10. Lastly, the widow, who is one year younger than the deceased, has an expectancy of life for at least another 25 years according to the actuarial table. She is wholly dependent on the deceased for their joint lives. Ever since her marriage she had been the family book-keeper and she kept an account of all the family expenditure. An extract of the family expenses of all items for the period of 10 months immediately prior to July 1974 is found in document 57 in the agreed bundle. It shows that on the average the deceased provided $2,148.04 for the widow and his five children. To this must be added the value of $20 per month for odd jobs used to be carried out by the deceased prior to his death and $63 per month for medical insurance which was paid by the employer. Documents 'D' and 'E' show the projected net spendable income the deceased would have received up to 1991. They show that in the year 1974 the deceased would have a net spendable income of $31,488.

11. The aforesaid are the basic facts for the assessment of damages. Apart from the degree and the period of dependency, they are not seriously challenged.

12. On the aforesaid data learned Counsel for the plaintiffs contends that after minor adjustments the monthly expenditure provided for the family by the deceased during the year immediately prior to his death was $2,211 per month, i.e. $26,532 per annum. Comparing this figure with the deceased's net spendable income for the year 1974, one will find that the dependency amounts to 87% approximately of the net spendable income.

13. He takes the average of the projected spendable income in documents 'D' and 'E' by dividing 18 years of the spendable income by 18 and obtains the figures of $51,890.05 or $56,240.55 per annum respectively. Applying 80% to these two figures, one would obtain a total of $41,512.04 and $44,992.44 per annum. These figures, he contends, represent the loss of dependency of the family for 18 years from 1974. He suggests that either figure be used as the multiplicand.

14. He submits that having regard to the age and the state of good health enjoyed by the deceased at the time of death, a multiplier of 12 is not out of line from the established authorities. On so multiplying the figures of $41,512.04 and $44,992.44, one obtains the figures of $498,144.48 and $539,909.28 respectively. He contends that these figures are approximately in line with the tables in documents 'I' and 'J' which show the present value for the purchase of annuities for the next 18 years at a 6% discount. Accordingly he asks for $500,000 for loss of dependency in future earnings. But that is not all.

15. By reason of his untimely death the deceased had lost his right to participate in the profit-sharing scheme provided by his employer. Had he been able to continue doing so up to retirement the income would have been earned to the benefit of his family - especially his widow. He relies on the evidence of Mr. Betts, who produces the tables in documents 'F' and 'G' showing the entitlements of the deceased under this scheme at the age of retirement in 1991. The present value of the net entitlements if invested at 6% are shown clearly in these two documents. Having taken various discounts, he asks for $20,000 to $30,000 as damages to compensate this loss.

16. On retirement the deceased would have been entitled to a pension of 50% of the average of his total salary in his last 5 years of service. He could have taken it as a lump sum or on annual basis. In the event that he chose the latter method of payment he would have received the sums shown in documents 'L', 'M' and 'N'. Given the adjustment and discounts of 60% dependency he claims for $80,000 as the present value for the loss of pension benefit which would have benefited the family.

17. Learned Counsel for the defendants contends that the plaintiffs claim a total of $600,000 plus. If this sum is invested at 8% p.a., simple interest rate, it would have produced approximately $48,000 p.a., a sum nearly double the annual dependency of $26,532 without touching the capital. This shows that the calculation is on the wrong basis. Further he submits that the present value of the annuity on the basis of investment of 6% interest is far too low. The rate should have been 8%. He submits that as the degree of dependency varied with each dependant it is wrong to choose arbitrarily a multiplier of 12 and a multiplicand based on 80% dependency of the average projected future income for the next 18 years. Adopting the various data in evidence, he contends that the widow is dependant for joint lives: Glen for 3 years, Sandra for 4, Jane for 6, James for 7 and Daniel for 10. As to the multiplicand, he worked out the total dependency to be about $1,400 per month after trimming down various items, especially the University fees, which appears to have been paid out of the item of savings and insurance in the widow's household budget. He contends that the dependency of each surviving member should be taken one by one, with a different multiplier and a different multiplicand, in order to arrive at a total sum of $171,317. Finally he says that the loss of the pension and the profit-sharing entitlements are so remote that only a nominal sum should be awarded.

18. A number of authorities have been cited by Counsel for both parties in support of their respective contentions and methods of calculation. The principle to be applied is sufficiently clear. Difficulty, however, may be found in its actual application to individual cases in assessing damages. The principle, as well as the inherent difficulties in its application, is clearly put in the case of Mallet v. McMonagle (1970) A.C. 166 in which Lord Diplock said at p.174:

"	My Lords, the purpose of an award of damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts is to provide the widow and other dependants of the deceased with a capital sum which with prudent management will be sufficient to supply them with material benefits of the same standard and duration as would have been provided for them out of the earnings of the deceased had he not been killed by the tortious act of the defendant, credit being given for the value of any material benefits which will accrue to them (otherwise than as the fruits of insurance) as a result of his death.
	To assess the damages it is necessary to form a view upon three matters each of which is in greater or less degree one of speculation: (1) the value of the material benefits for his dependants which the deceased would have provided out of his earnings for each year in the future during which he would have provided them, had he not been killed; (2) the value of any material benefits which the dependants will be able to obtain in each such year from sources (other than insurance) which would not have been available to them had the deceased lived but which will, become available to them as a result of his death; (3) the amount of the capital sum which with prudent management will produce annual amounts equal to the difference between (1) and (2) (that is 'the dependency') for each of the years during which the deceased would have provided material benefits for the dependants, had he not been killed.
	Since the essential arithmetical character of this assessment is the calculation of the present value of an annuity it has become usual both in England and in Northern Ireland to arrive at the total award by multiplying a figure assessed as the amount of the annual 'dependency' by a number of 'years' purchase'. If the figure for the annual 'dependency' remained constant and could be assessed with certainty and if the number of years for which it would have continued were also ascertainable with certainty it would be possible in times of stable currency, interest rates and taxation to calculate with certainty the numbers of years' purchase of the dependency which would provide a capital sum sufficient to produce an annuity equal in amount to the dependency for the number of years for which it would have continued. If the estimated 'dependency' did not remain constant, but altered at intervals during the period of its enjoyment, an accurate assessment of the appropriate award would involve calculating the present value of a series of annuities for fixed periods progressively deferred. For reasons to which I shall advert this is seldom, if ever, done. Anticipated future variations in 'dependency' are normally dealt with by an adjustment in the multiplicand to be multiplied by the single multiplier the number of years' purchase."

Later at p.177 he said:

"The starting point in any estimate of the amount of the 'dependency' is the annual value of the material benefits provided for the dependants out of the earnings of the deceased at the date of his death. But quite apart from inflation, with which I have already dealt, there are many factors which might have led to variations up or down in the future. His earnings might have increased and with them the amount provided by him for his dependants. They might have diminished with a recession in trade or he might have had spells of unemployment. As his children grew up and became independent, the proportion of his earnings spent on his dependants would have been likely to fall. But in considering the effect to be given in the award of damages to possible variations in the dependency, there are two factors to be borne in mind. The first is that the more remote in the future is the anticipated change, the less confidence there can be in the chances of its occurring and the smaller the allowance to be made for it in the assessment. The second is that as a matter of the arithmetic of the calculation of present value, the later the change takes place the less will be its effect upon the total award of damages."

The object of the exercise is therefore to find a method of assessment which is fair to all concerned. Thus in Kassam v. Kampala Aerated Water Co. Ltd. (1965) 1 W.L.R. 608, there were no less than 9 dependants, whose years of dependency were different, and yet a lump sum award was made. Lord Guest said in p.671:

"	Gould J.A. delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal in an admirably clear opinion, making some intricate calculations based upon a mathematical basis. He considered each dependant separately and arrived at the conclusion that there were only four dependants, namely, the youngest children. He then took the average dependency of these four children at 11¼ years. As there were, according to his view, only four dependants, he took 4/9ths of the total dependency of £572, which he multiplied by 11¼ This figure was then discounted to represent the advantage to the dependants of obtaining the capital sum instead of the income over the years. This resulted in a figure of 43,218 shillings. From this figure was deducted a sum amounting to 7,305 shillings representing the estimated value to the four dependants of the acceleration of their interest in the deceased's estate which was taken at 89,425 shillings plus the prospective value of the claim for loss of expectation of life under section 13 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordiance, 1953, which claim had been abandoned by the appellant in the course of the hearing before the trial judge. This left a final figure of 35,913 shillings or £1,795, which he apportioned among the four dependants.
	As an arithmetical exercise the above calculation may be difficult to fault. But pure arithmetic does not always in such cases lead to a just result where there are so many imponderables. The aim in assessing damages in a case such as the present is to estimate the loss of reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit. This must in most cases be a matter of speculation and may be conjecture. The more usual method of assessing damages is that adopted by the trial judge of estimating the total dependency as a lump sum and thereafter apportioning it among the various dependants. Another method may be to assess each dependency separately. This was the method adopted with the approval of the English Court of Appeal in Muirhead, Railway Executive, where figures existed for the degree of support of each child. But if the method of assessing the support for each defendant separately leads to a result which is so out of line with what would be a reasonable estimate of the loss of each individual dependant, this suggests that some step in the calculation must be erroneous. 'In what is essentially a jury question the overall picture is what matters. It is the wood that has to be looked at, and 'not the individual trees' (Daniels v. Jones, per Wilmer L.J.)."

19. One cannot apply what appears to be the obiter dictum of Luxmore L.J. in Yelland v. Pawell Duffryn Collieries Ltd. (1941) 1 K.B. 519 at 527 in which he said he saw no objection to considering the case of each dependant separately in the first instance as laying down a hard and fast rule.

20. Bearing in mind the difficulties and the speculative elements involved in assessing future loss, I cannot avoid taking into account the deceased's future prospects and increase in earnings had he lived and worked to the age of retirement. He was a healthy man. Judging from his past he had regular increases in salary and good chance of promotion - further advancement. However, I do not feel that an assessment of $500,000 for the loss of dependency for future earning is correct. If this sum is invested at 8% simple interest p.a. (and I shall say something about the rate of interest later) it will produce an income of $40,000 p.a., i.e. $3,333 approximately per month, which is $1,122 more than the present dependency, leaving the capital of $500,000 intact. Such an award was considered wrong by the Full Court in LEUNG Tai-ah v. CHAN Tak-wait (1968) H.K.L.R. 224. According to document 'E' had the deceased been able to earn his projected spendable income to 1991 the total would have been $1,012,380.00. Let us assume that he spent 80% of this figure. Then at the end of 17 years he would have left 20% of this sum, i.e. a sum of $202,476.00, but not $500,000.

21. The plaintiff's case is that even at the date of death the annual dependency was $26,532, i.e. a monthly sum of $2,211. This monthly sum is worked out according to the adjusted figures in document 57, which is a record of the budget kept by Mrs. Gosling for average monthly spending for herself and the children only for a period of 10 months prior to the death of the deceased. They are made up of the following items:-

	Cash	193.15
	House	679.90
	Clothing	118.03
	Education	87.44
	Savings and Insurance	464.84
	Instalments and large purchase	224.60
	Groceries	153.27
	Gifts	48.15
	Car	128.74
	Medicals	28.94
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	Total:	2,128.04

22. To this must be added $63 for medical insurance premia for the family which was formerly provided by the deceased's employer. Another $20 per month is added for paying a handy man to do odd jobs for home which were done by the deceased prior to his death. These add up to the total budget of $2,211 per month.

23. Mr. Ching, for the defendants, has his comments on only four items, viz. house, savings and insurance, instalments and large purchases and car. He contends that the house is an appreciating assets of which the deceased had a share. As such his share should be apportioned in deduction from the budget. However, on the authority Hay v. Hinghes (1975) Q.B. 791 I do not feel that any apportionment and reduction is justifiable.

24. The next item is savings and insurance. Mr. Ching observes that the children's university fees and school fees had been paid out of this item. After a few years formal education of the children will come to an end. As such this item should be reduced. There is no question of claiming separate college fees for the children. Further the savings may or may not be spent on the children. While I appreciate the force of Mr. Ching's argument I observe that Glen will finish his university education in 1978, Sandra in 1978, Jane in 1979. James will not be in a university in another year's time for four years. Daniel will also go to a university and will take a four-year course. The current fees of Indiana University is $1,950 per year, i.e. $162.50 per month. Taking the university fees of the three elder children on the average Mrs. Gosling will have to pay out something like $487.50 per month for the years 1975 to 1978. This sum is reduced to $325 per month when James enters university and Sandra and Glen would have left university for 1979. Daniel will then be ready for university education in a few years' time. Thus from 1974 to 1984 the education for the children alone would have cost on the average approximately $316 per month. This figure is obtained by calculating two years fees at $487.50 monthly, two years fees at $325.00 monthly and three years fees at $162.50 monthly, and dividing the aggregate by seven. After that no more university fees will be payable. In this connection I have to mention that consideration should be given that it was the intention of the parents to send James who wanted to study music to a private university, the fees for which would be considerably higher. Daniel who wanted to be trained as a doctor will take more years to qualify. Further, whatever savings not spent would eventually enure to the benefit of the dependants. Some deduction has to be made for that portion of saving which the deceased would have benefited personally had he lived. Taking these into consideration I think it is fair to assess $380 per month for this item. In this way I have taken into consideration that educational commitment will last arithmatically for about seven years and that the award is for a lump sum and for a longer period. This makes up for the deficit of about $90 per month for the first two years.

25. Referring to the item for instalments and large purchases it is contended the monthly budget ran at the high rate of $224.60 per month because the Gosling family acquired a new house not too long before Mr. Gosling died. Thus more provision had to be made for items of funiture and household equipments. However this item had been spent for hire purchase instalments for family cars as well. While some reduction is justified since the purchase of household equipment, furnitures and cars is not a regularly recurrent expenditure I am of opinion that a sum of $160 per month is fair to cater for occasional change of cars and furnitures. Finally I have to look into the item of $128.74 for cars. The family ran two cars. This item is used for payment of petrol and maintenance. The deceased's share had been apportioned at $5 per month. It is alleged that he seldom used the car - approximately 20-30 miles a month. There being no evidence as to the cost of petrol or to contradict the mileage I am not prepared to interfere with this figure.

26. Having taken off $84.84 per month from the item of savings and insurance and $64.60 per month from the item of instalments and large purchases the net sum of monthly dependency at the time of death is reduced to $2,211 minus $149.44 which is equal to $2,061.56 per month. This figure has not taken into account the increase in future earnings and prospect of promotion. In this respect I accept Mr. Schlegel's evidence as unbias and objective. The deceased was killed at the prime of his life. He had every prospect of promotion had he been able to work on to retirement. With this there will be increase in spendable income and more generous provision for the family.

27. While I cannot follow the simple calculation of the deceased's projected earnings in total as shown in document E, I feel that some adjustment with the element of advancement and increase is justifiable. With increased spendable income or advancement in position there might be a more expensive car or more expensive form of holidays for the family. The groceries, and clothing and gift budget will be increased to commensurate with the enhanced income or status. Taking these into consideration I am of opinion that it is not excessive to take the total sum of $2,100 per month as the amount of monthly dependency.

28. I do not feel that I am justified in using different multipliers for individual dependants. The deceased was practically the sole bread-winner. Despite the 2nd plaintiff suing in his own right I feel that I should consider him together with the other dependants. The only reason why he sues in his right is that he has come of age. After all, all expenses came from one single expenses account. It came from the same purse. When the elder children are independant more money will be released for more liberal provisions for the others of the family. The balance still enure to the benefit of the family. In any event I can see no good reason to out the years of dependency of each child to an abrupt end as soon as he or she graduates from a university. In this day and age the more afluent is the family the more are the parents inclined to provide longer education and training for the children so as to give them a better start in life. In a family of an artisan the children might start to earn a living at the age of 16 or 17. In a family of an executive children may not start work until they have finished post-graduate studies. The deceased's family belongs to the latter class. Bearing in mind that there is no dispute as to using a multiplier of 12 in the case of the widow I am of opinion that an overall multiplier of 10 is fair. In this way I take into consideration the shorter dependency of the three elder children and the vicissitudes in life. If I use the overall multiplier of 12 on the monthly dependency of $2,100 per month the lump sum will be 12 x 12 x 2,100 = $302,400 which at the simple interest of 8% p.a. will produce an income of $24,192 p.a. The sum of $21,492 comparing with the annual dependency of $25,200 would give only a deficit of $1,008 per annum.

29. If the sum of $1,008 p.a. is invested in the aggregate at compound interests at 8% p.a. for 17 years it will produce $34,290. Even if this sum is taken away from the sum of $302,400 it leaves the capital sum of $268,110 untouched after 17 years. Another way of approach, of course, is to apply the principle in the case of Wang Wai Chun v. The China Navigation Co. Ltd. (1969) H.K.L.R. 471, or alternatively the approach of Lord Diplock in the McMonagle case. This is to find out the present value for an annuity of $25,200 for 17 years by which time both capital and interests will be exhausted. Apply the factor of 9.122 which is a factor obtained from a table in Cost Accounting by Charles J. Horngren p.942 the present value is $229,874. Incidentally, that factor in a table can be obtained in any book of cost accounting. When one compares this figure with $252,000 the difference is only $22,126. I am of opinion that a sum of $252,000 coupled with further sums for future savings is fair.

30. I calculate the rate of interests at 8% not because of the principle in the case of The Montrose (1923-4) H.K.L.R. 91. That was a case for determining the rate of interest for damages already accrued and for the loss of use of money which should have been paid. The present case is to determine an interest rate for assessment of damages to someone living in the U.S. If I find that the prevailing rate of interest in the U.S. is 6% I will have no hesitation to apply it. However, from the documents produced by Mr. Betts - documents F and G - it is apparent that investments in the U.S. can earn interest as high a rate as 15% gross. In his evidence he says that some of the investment fund earn interests at even a higher rate. Thus I find that despite taxation prudent investment can produce a net return of 8% without risk to capital.

31. It is observed that the $252,000 assessment has not taken into account of the loss of the deceased's profit-sharing and pension had he lived to retirement age. Mr. Ching says that such profit and pension will accrue only in 17 years' time. As such it is too remote. But as I have said before the deceased was a healthy man. His interest was in his work and in his family. The fact that he had been deprived of further chance of earning was a loss to his widow and children who would benefit ultimately from such income in the form of inheritance, if not in some other form. It may well be that had the deceased lived he could have spent money on them from his savings.

32. If only $252,000 were awarded, the whole sum would be exhausted by the drawing of $2,100 per month by the end of the 17th year. That would not have been the position had the deceased been able to work to retirement age. The profit-sharing scheme and the pension should be regarded as his savings which will enure to the benefit of members of his family. Surely the deceased on retirement, had he lived, would not be penniless when he stopped work. He would still have his savings from the profit-sharing scheme and the pension. In Taylor v. O'Connor (1971) A.C. 115 Lord Pearson when he was dealing with the question of future earnings said at p.142:

"The judge estimated that of the deceased's net spendable income, estimated at £6,000 per annum, two-thirds, that is, £4,000 per annum, would have enured to the benefit of the respondent and the daughter. That must include both elements of the lost pecuniary benefit, namely, the maintenance element and the savings element. Presumably the deceased would in the later years of his working life have been both maintaining the family and saving for the benefit of the family. The savings would have provided some present financial security not only for the deceased but also for the respondent and the daughter, and probably the savings or the residue of them would ultimately have been inherited by the respondent and the daughter or one of them. I think the $4,000 per annum was a moderate estimate of the lost benefit."

Thus loss of savings may be taken into consideration in assessment of damages in such cases.

33. Mr. Twiggs suggests $20,000 to $30,000 as the present value to compensate for the loss of savings from the profit-sharing scheme. The deceased would have earned the net sum of $223,472 under this scheme if he takes a lump sum on retirement. The present value of the said sum at 6% compound interest p.a. is $82,988 - see document G. When calculated on the basis of 8% it is $63,037.44. Thus I find the figure $30,000 appears to be reasonable.

34. As to the loss of pension the net lump sum to be earned is $308,392 according to document L. If 60% dependency is adopted as a guide this sum is reduced to $185,035 the present value of which at 6% compound interest p.a. is $68,721. The present value at 8% would be $49,959.45. Mr. Twiggs suggests a sum of $80,000 as the present value which appears to be too high. I am of opinion that a sum of $40,000 is fair.

35. In both instances I have calculated on the basis that the deceased would accept a lump sum payment on retirement. There is no evidence that he would opt to receive annual payments or a lump sum. I shall not speculate whether he would accept annual payments. The reduction of the present value for the pension is to give some allowances for uncertainties in the future.

36. In view of the foregoing I will assess damages in a lump sum for the plaintiffs under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance as $252,000 plus $70,000, which is equal to $322,000 together with special damages at $3,433 making a total of $325,433. There will be judgment accordingly for the sum of $325,433 in the U.S. currency to the plaintiffs against all the defendants with costs of this action. For the purpose of conversion into Hong Kong currency the rate of exchange to be applied shall be at 5.1 to 1. In this way the sum is HK$1,659,708. It is further ordered that such portion of the sum representing general damages will carry interests at 8% p.a. and the portion representing special interest at 4% for one year up to the day of judgment. There will be certificate for 2 counsels. The defendants will pay $600,000 in 7 days. There will be a stay as to the balance for 14 days or pending appeal whichever is later.

Representation: