Thomas Lo Contracting Ltd. v. William Strathearn Dock
Read the full judgment text of HCA 10205/2000 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 June 2001.
1. This is an appeal against the Master's decision who gave judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,455,557 together with interest. The defendant now appeals against the decision.
|
HCA010205/2000 HCA10205/2000 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO.10205 OF 2000 ------------------
------------------- Coram: Hon Cheung J in Chambers Date of Hearing: 20 June 2001 Date of Judgment: 20 June 2001 ------------------------- J U D G M E N T ------------------------- The appeal 1.This is an appeal against the Master's decision who gave judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,455,557 together with interest. The defendant now appeals against the decision. The facts 2.The plaintiff's claim is based on three cheques drawn by the defendant in its favour. The cheques were dishonoured on presentation. The background of this case is this. The plaintiff is a contractor and had entered into a contract to carry out interior design decoration work of a restaurant for a company called Charlie Luciano's (HK) Limited ("the Company"). The defendant is a director of the Company. The contract sum was about $6 million which was subsequently adjusted. The defendant contends that the plaintiff had delayed in completing the work despite the extended deadline and also the work was defective. The Company needed to instruct other workers to complete the work. 3.I will set out what the defendant said in paras. 11, 12 and 13 of his affidavit :
4.The defendant stated that there was no consideration for the cheques and the Company had a defence and counterclaim to the plaintiff on the contract. 5.The contract provided for the payment of the contract sums by instalments. The plaintiff admitted that there was delay of one month in completing the work. This was due to the failure by the Company to pay for the initial payment despite the certification by the designer who was a party to the contract. The plaintiff had stopped work as a result of the non-payment. 6.The initial payment under the contract was subsequently paid, but by 15 December 1999 substantial amount of money was due to the plaintiff under the contract. In a letter dated 15 December 1999 and countersigned by the Company, the Company agreed to pay at least $2,950,000 and make the payment by instalment to the plaintiff. I say "at least" because one of the payment terms is not so clear. Despite this agreement, two of the required sums were not paid by the Company. 7.According to the plaintiff, the project was completed on 28 December 1999. It is not necessary nor appropriate for me to express any view on whether the work was completed or not. What is significant is that by that stage, the Company admitted that it owed substantial sums of money to the plaintiff. In a letter dated 28 December 1999 from the Company to the plaintiff, it was stated that :
8.The total amount of money was $3,705,557. The defendant then drew ten cheques for the specified amounts to the plaintiff. The first three cheques to the value of $1,250,000 were later returned by the plaintiff to the Company because the Company had made cash payments of $1,250,000 to the plaintiff. The next four cheques were not presented because according to the plaintiff, their validity period had expired due to the time taken for the negotiation by the parties. The plaintiff is now suing the last three cheques drawn by the defendant. 9.In the light of the letter of 28 December 1999, what the defendant said about issuing the cheques as a comfort to the plaintiff is clearly incredible. The issue, however, is whether there is consideration for the three cheques. Section 27 of the Bills of Exchange Ordinance provides that :
10.As shown in Oliver v. Davis and another [1949] 2 All ER 353, the plaintiff cannot rely on the provision of antecedent debt and liability because the defendant did not own any antecedent debt or liability to the plaintiff when he drew the three cheques. The debt belonged to the Company. 11.As to section 27(1)(a), a consideration sufficient to support a simple contract includes forbearance to sue or a promise to forbear to sue which may be implied or expressed. In Oliver v. Davis, the English Court of Appeal decided that on the facts of the case there was no promise to forbear to sue or actual forbearance. In the present case, substantial sums of money were then due to the plaintiff by the Company. Although in the letter the Company agreed to pay by instalments, by agreeing to take the post-dated cheques of different dates from the defendant, the plaintiff had clearly promised impliedly to forbear from pursuing the claim against the Company. Furthermore, there was actual forbearance by the plaintiff to sue the Company. As Lord Denning observed in Oliver v. Davis:
12.In respect of the $1,455,557 represented by the three cheques, the plaintiff had changed its position on the faith of the promise by the defendant to pay. Although there were subsequent demands by the plaintiff against the Company, it was the defendant alone who the plaintiff had sued in this case. This is unlike Oliver v. Davis where the plaintiff sued both the original debtor and the drawer of the cheque. In the present case, the only purpose of providing the post-dated cheques by the defendant was for the intention of gaining forbearance. In my view, there clearly was consideration for the three cheques. 13.The other defence based on delay and defects are clearly not defence available in a case based on cheques. Conclusion 14.Judgment was rightly entered against the defendant and the appeal is dismissed with costs to the plaintiff.
Representation: Mr Sam Tung of Messrs Coudert Brothers, for the Plaintiff Mr Francis Burkett, instructed by Messrs Tanner De Witt, for the Defendant |