The Queen v. Lau Chuen Sum and Another
Read the full judgment text of CACC 323/1986 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment.
1. These are applications for leave to appeal against sentence. The sentence in each case was one year's imprisonment. The 1st Applicant was convicted on one charge only - that of conspiracy. The 2nd Applicant was convicted on the same charge of conspiracy but also on four charges of aiding and abetting the making of a false representation to an Immigration Officer and a charge of forgery.
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CACC000323/1986
BETWEEN
Coram: Sir Alan Huggins, V.-P., Silke, J.A. & Mayo, J. Date of Hearing: 3rd September 1986 Date of Judgment: 3rd September 1986 __________ JUDGMENT __________ Sir Alan Huggins, V.-P.: 1. These are applications for leave to appeal against sentence. The sentence in each case was one year's imprisonment. The 1st Applicant was convicted on one charge only - that of conspiracy. The 2nd Applicant was convicted on the same charge of conspiracy but also on four charges of aiding and abetting the making of a false representation to an Immigration Officer and a charge of forgery. 2. The two Applicants were living together as husband and wife. The 1st Applicant has as his main business, apparently, a language school, at which he met the 2nd Applicant. He, however, put up the money for her to start an employment agency. The agency has been run almost entirely by the 2nd Applicant and she has used it to organize a scheme for enabling Filipinas who had come to Hong Kong for the purposes of employment to remain in Hong Kong after their employment had ceased. 3. The learned judge properly took a serious view of the case: it is a type of case of which we have had several instances in the courts in recent months and I need say very little more about it. 4. We endorse the decision in Reg. v Marie Edward Cyril Durup Crim. App. 1986 No. 194, to which reference has been made and in which it was said that a sentence of three years' imprisonment was appropriate for a particularly bad conspiracy of like nature. Certainly in the present case we are unable to say that the sentences on the 2nd Applicant were in any way excessive. We have paid full regard to the submissions made to us by Mr. Sarony - he in particular drawing attention to the unfortunate circumstances of this woman but the discretion was that of the trial judge, and tie are unable to find sufficient grounds for interfering with his exercise of that discretion. 5. The position of the 1st Applicant is, however, different. He was convicted on one charge only and that was a charge which related solely to one particular person and the signing of one particular letter in which he said, dishonestly, that a person named Julieta Pacurza would "continue" in his employment. She had in fact been in his employment, had absented herself and then come back and asked to be re-employed. At the 2nd Applicant's request the 1st Applicant signed this, letter. That is the sole degree to which it was proved before the judge that he was involved in the dishonest side of this business. For that we think that a sentence of twelve months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive and that the proper course is to allow the application, treat this as the hearing of the appeal and substitute for the sentence of twelve months' imprisonment on the 1st Applicant such sentence as will enable him to be released forthwith. 6. The application of the 2nd Applicant must be dismissed. 3rd September 1986. Representation: Polson for 1st Applicant. Sarony for 2nd Applicant. Hodge for Respondent. |