The Queen v. Cheung Lap-sau
Read the full judgment text of CACC 382/1985 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment.
1. On 8th August of this year at Victoria District Court CHEUNG Lap-sau was convicted after trial by His Honour Judge Ryan of unlawfully and maliciously wounding LEE Yat-king with intent to do him grievous bodily harm. He had earlier pleaded guilty to forcedly imprisoning LEE Yat-king and detaining him against his will in a storeroom at the Lady Trench Rehabilitation Centre, Kwun Tong. Against the conviction for wounding CHEUNG Lap-sau applies to this court for leave to appeal.
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CACC000382/1985 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
BETWEEN
Coram: Hon. Li, V.-P., Kempster, J.A. & Hunter, J. Date of Hearing: 8th November 1985 Date of Judgment: 8th November 1985 ___________ JUDGMENT ___________ Kempster, J.A.: 1. On 8th August of this year at Victoria District Court CHEUNG Lap-sau was convicted after trial by His Honour Judge Ryan of unlawfully and maliciously wounding LEE Yat-king with intent to do him grievous bodily harm. He had earlier pleaded guilty to forcedly imprisoning LEE Yat-king and detaining him against his will in a storeroom at the Lady Trench Rehabilitation Centre, Kwun Tong. Against the conviction for wounding CHEUNG Lap-sau applies to this court for leave to appeal. 2. The grounds of appeal set out in his Notice were firstly that the learned trial judge erred in ignoring the discrepancies and doubts cast on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses by the medical evidence. As I understand the way the case has been urged upon us, this means that the learned judge did not give due weight to the fact that the evidence of the doctors was equivocal as to whether injuries sustained by the victim resulted from a thrust from a knife or by his having fallen against some other sharp object. There is nothing in this point. The learned judge said in his Reasons for Verdict "The doctors who gave evidence would only say the wound to the left thigh had been caused by a sharp object and that the wounds to the lower front right leg were abrasions." So he did not in any way ignore the effect of the medical evidence. 3. The second ground of appeal was that the learned trial judge erred in ignoring the discrepancies in the evidence of the police prosecution witnesses. That has been rather developed before us in the suggestion of discrepancy between the evidence of the victim and that of the several police witnesses. We have been referred to the evidence in question and to the evidence of the victim himself. This was, at the material point:
The first policeman who entered the room in which the victim had, wrongfully been imprisoned said:
And a further police witness said:
Then he went on to say how the victim, whom he called "the hostage" called out "help" and kicked his legs. There was some cross-examination as to whether or not this particular police witness had seen the applicant pick up a knife from a shelf and it may be that if the chronology as described by one or more police witnesses and that of the victim were compared second by second there might be a slight discrepancy. It would be very surprising were the evidence otherwise and, indeed, would be suspect in a situation where such tension and concern for the well-being of the victim prevailed. In our view the evidence was fully and accurately reflected by the learned judge when, in his Reasons for Verdict, he described it in these terms:
And then he went on to find that the evidence of the complainant was a true and correct account of what took place. The learned judge rejected the evidence given by the applicant. In the circumstances there is nothing in this ground of appeal either.
But no argument has been addressed to us on this ground.
We have been referred to the photographs in the context of sharp objects but again no argument has been addressed to us in support of this ground of appeal.
We do not find this to be the case and the application for leave to appeal against conviction is dismissed. 4. Before parting with this particular application we think it proper to say that an attack has been made, in the course of argument, on the character of the victim. This attack, which was, of course, made on instructions from the applicant, we do not accept for a moment and as far as we are concerned the integrity and the character of the victim remain untarnished.
Representation: Mr. McLanachan (Theresa P.F. Chow & Co.) for appellant Mr. G.J.X. McCoy, Miss L.M.A. Shine, C.C. for respondent |