HKSAR v. Wong Wah Yee
Read the full judgment text of CACC 40/2000 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 17 November 2000.
1. The applicant was convicted after a trial before Deputy Judge Longley and a jury on an indictment containing two counts of attempted robbery and one count of carrying an imitation firearm with intent to commit an arrestable offence. The first count alleged that WONG Wah-yee, on 30 August 1998 at the Hong Kong Bank, Ground Floor, Kornhill Plaza South, Quarry Bay, in Hong Kong, attempted to rob Yeung Sui-yee. The second count alleged that he, on 7 December 1998 at the Hong Kong Bank, Ground Flo
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CACC000040/2000 CACC 40/2000 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 40 OF 2000 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO. 79 OF 1999)
Coram: Hon Stuart-Moore, AgCJ/HC, Wong and Stock JJA in Court Date of Hearing: 19 October, 2000 Date of Handing Down Judgment: 17 November 2000 _________________ J U D G M E N T _________________ Wong JA: (giving the judgment of the court) Introduction 1. The applicant was convicted after a trial before Deputy Judge Longley and a jury on an indictment containing two counts of attempted robbery and one count of carrying an imitation firearm with intent to commit an arrestable offence. The first count alleged that WONG Wah-yee, on 30 August 1998 at the Hong Kong Bank, Ground Floor, Kornhill Plaza South, Quarry Bay, in Hong Kong, attempted to rob Yeung Sui-yee. The second count alleged that he, on 7 December 1998 at the Hong Kong Bank, Ground Floor, Kornhill Plaza South, Quarry Bay, in Hong Kong, attempted to rob Lam Wai-ching. At the time of his arrest on 7 December 1998, the applicant was found in his possession an imitation firearm, namely a replica of a Smith and Wesson pistol, which, the prosecution alleged, the applicant intended to use to commit an arrestable offence and this was the subject of the third count. The applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for a total period of four years. He now applies for leave to appeal against the convictions. Count 1 2. The evidence against the applicant in relation to Count 1 was mainly from Madam Yeung Sui-yee who testified that at around 10 a.m. on the morning of 30 August, 1998, she had taken a taxi from her home in Braemar Hill and had gone to the ETC machine outside the Kornhill branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. She intended to withdraw $1,000 from the machine. After she had inserted her card into the machine, a man came up and stood to her left. She described this man as a bit aged, around 60 with a round face, round eyes, round nose. He was wearing a peaked cap on his head, a blue checked shirt and denim jeans. He had a wart on his lower lip. He was not very tall, about 1.56 metres in height. The man told her : "This is a robbery. I have a gun." and showed her that he was holding a gun inside a small plastic bag. She asked the man "How much money do you want?" He did not at first reply but instead started to push buttons on the keyboard. He selected the Chinese language option. She asked again how much he wanted and he replied $20,000. She keyed in $20,000 but the display on the machine indicated that that sum of money could not be withdrawn. By this time, people were queuing behind, and he left. He had not taken any money. 3. Madam Yeung attended an identification parade on 11 December 1998 and identified the applicant as the man who had attempted to rob her. Each participant on the parade had covered his lower lip with sticking plaster and wore something to cover his head. She also pointed out the applicant in the dock during the trial and said she was 100% sure that the applicant was the man. Counts 2 and 3 4. The evidence in support of Counts 2 and 3 also came principally from one witness, and that was Madam Lam Wai-ching, the victim of the second attempted robbery. She said that at about 7:20 a.m. on 7 December 1998, she went to withdraw money at an ATM machine of the same branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank at Kornhill Plaza South, which was just a short distance from the machine where Madam Yeung tried to withdraw her money. When she inserted her card into the machine, she felt that someone was standing close behind her. She nonetheless continued and keyed her PIN number into the machine. As she was doing this, the man behind her placed his hands on her left shoulder. She felt his breath against her ear after he had moved to her right. She turned her head, thinking that it was someone she knew but when she turned round, she saw that it was an old man wearing a black coloured cap, a blue windcheater and a pair of sunglasses whom she had never seen before. She asked the man "What do you want?" The man patted her shoulder and said "Do not be nervous. Take it easy, go on." She felt very nervous as there were only the two of them there. She walked up the stairs and shouted loudly, "Help, robbery". After she walked up the stairs, she kept looking in the direction of the man down the stairs. She saw that the man's hand appeared to be on the keypad and was moving but she could not see if he was actually pushing any keys or not. Realising that she had left her ATM card in the machine, she went back to the machine and said, "What are you doing? Are you trying to take my money?" At this point, the man took out a gun from his waist area and pointed at her. She was very frightened and went up the stairs she had just come down from shouting out : "Help, robbery, he has a gun." At that stage, a passer-by in white sports wear came up to her and asked what happened. After having been told of what happened, this passer-by, later known to be a Mr. Lee, gave chase. The man, who turned out to be the applicant, was later arrested by the police and an imitation pistol was found in his possession. 5. Madam Lam attended an identification parade on 17 December 1998. She said in her evidence that as soon as she entered the room, she suspected that the person standing at number 7, who was the applicant, was the man. But she admitted that she went on viewing the parade for several more minutes before saying to the officer that the lighting had been dim but that number 7 looked similar, and she then requested that all the men on the parade said the words that she said the man had said to her when they were by the ATM machine. She said she had made this request because she had a very strong recollection of the voice of that person. After the men in the parade had all uttered the words, she identified the applicant who was standing at number 7. Defence 6. The defence on Count 1 was an alibi. In relation to Counts 2 and 3, his case was that it was all a misunderstanding on the part of Madam Lam, who must have seen the butt of his gun inside his waistband. As to the gun, he said he bought it at a toy shop in Mongkok for self-protection because there were quite a number of wandering dogs barking at passers-by during his walk from his flat up to Kornhill every day to take exercise. 7. It is clear from their verdicts of guilty, the jury had rejected the defence and concluded that the applicant was the very man who attempted to rob Madam Yeung and Madam Lam and had the imitation pistol with intent to commit the second attempted robbery. Grounds 1 and 2 8. A number of grounds of appeal were advanced. It is only necessary to deal with Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 5 in the Perfected Grounds of Appeal because Grounds 4, 6 and 7 were general grounds alleging insufficient evidence or the verdicts were unsafe and unsatisfactory. Grounds 1 and 2 can be more conveniently dealt with together. Ground 1 complains that the deputy judge erred in law by directing the jury that they could
when the issue in relation to Count 1 was the very identity of the robber. Ground 2 says, alternatively, the deputy judge failed to make clear that such evidence of similarity must be such as to exclude the possibility of a mistake having been made. Moreover, his confusing and unhelpful references to a "coincidence" undermined the cogency of the evidence required in using the facts of one count in proof of another. References were made to p.19K-L and p.20K-T of the summing-up. We will examine what the deputy judge says in these passages. Starting from p.19K, the deputy judge said:-
Earlier in the summing-up at p9E to p10M, the deputy judge had given a full Turnbull [1977] Q.B. 224 direction in relation to Count 1. 9. It was submitted by Mr Marash, SC on behalf of the applicant that the deputy judge erred in :
Similar Fact Evidence 10. Mr Marash referred us to the decisions of the English Court of Appeal in R v McGranaghan [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 559; R v Downey [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 547 and R v Barnes [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 491 and complained that the deputy judge when directing the jury had not adequately followed the tests (the sequential approach) set out in these cases. 11. The question of admissibility in situations where similar fact is relied upon is always essentially one of probative value. What must first be addressed is the purpose for which the evidence is sought to be led, the issue to which it is relevant; and then to ask whether the similar fact evidence is genuinely and logically probative of that purpose and, only if so, assess the weight of that probative value, and the prejudice which it imparts. 12. In this particular case, the purpose to which the deputy judge referred by his allusion to the December incident and its possible relevance to the August robbery, was not its potential to establish an original identification of the applicant as the perpetrator of the August offence, but merely to suggest that it could provide possible support for, or corroboration of, the identification already made by Madam Yeung in relation to the August incident. There is, in the circumstances of this case, no need for close analysis of cumulative or sequential approaches. It was established beyond any doubt that in the December incident, this applicant was the man who, armed with a gun, was standing behind the complainant, Madam Lam, at the bank in Kornhill Plaza. His identity in relation to that occasion was proved. And the deputy judge invited the jury to consider the December incident, when addressing Count One (the August event), only if they were satisfied that Madam Lam was correct "when she says that the defendant, wearing a cap, pointed a gun at her outside the ATM machine on 7 December 1998". One proceeds, for the purpose of the present point, on the assumption, therefore, that the applicant's identity in relation to the December incident was proved, and that it had been established that he had pointed a gun at Madam Lam whilst she stood near the ATM machine in the Kornhill branch of the Hong Kong Bank. Once that was proved, and assuming features of sufficient similarity between the two incidents to which features we shall shortly turn and given the limited purpose for which the evidence was to be utilised, we see nothing wrong in the deputy judge's direction. 13. It was suggested that it was necessary, however, before evidence of the applicant's December conduct could be utilized in relation to the August event, that it first be proved that his conduct in December amounted to attempted robbery. The point does not really arise because the jury found the applicant guilty of attempted robbery. But in any event, we do not agree with the proposition, as a proposition of law. In other words, we say that it was open to the jury to use the applicant's December conduct, even though falling short of attempted robbery (had that been their conclusion) to support the identification in relation to the August offence. That is because :
In each case, the incident occurred by an ATM machine at the same branch of the Hong Kong Bank. Each case concerned a middle aged lady as the object of the man's unusual attention. The man in each case was elderly. In each instance, he wore a cap. In each instance, he had a mole or a wart on his lip (and we think too much has been made of the variation in description). In the course of each event, the lady in question had inserted her card, and thereafter the man had himself sought to operate the keyboard. In each case the man took no money. In each case the man carried a gun, and Madam Yeung described the gun seized in December as about the same size and colour as the gun pointed at her in August. To suggest in such circumstances that the failure to prove the final constituent of the offence of attempt, if failure there was, must result in the casting aside of all the other evidence of the December incident, which nonetheless could realistically be said to support the identification, is to defy the meaning of "probative value". There is, furthermore, authority against the proposition advanced (see R. v. Barrington [1981]1 WLR 419; R. v. Ball [1911] AC 47; Griffith v. R. [1937]58 CLR 185; and discussion of this point in Cross & Tapper on Evidence, 9th Ed., pp.345-347). There can be no doubt but that these common features, taken in combination, were unusual and clearly supportive of the identification of the offender in the August offence. In these circumstances, the direction given by the deputy judge that, once they accepted Madam Lam's evidence, it was open to them to consider its possible utility in relation to Madam Yeung's identification, was a direction that accorded with principle as well as with common sense. 14. We also find no substance in the complaint of the use of "coincidence". The word has to be looked at and understood in the full context of the summing-up. These two grounds therefore fail. Ground 3 15. Ground 3 starts with a passage of the summing-up at p.28 E-J where the deputy judge said :
16. It goes on to complain :
17. It was also submitted by Mr. Marash S.C. that it was the duty of the prosecution to disprove the alibi and the failure on the part of the prosecution to challenge the evidence of Sister Joanna was unfair and prejudicial. 18. The deputy judge gave a correct and, in our view, adequate direction of the defence in relation to Count 1 and in particular the abili evidence. One must read the summing-up as a whole and not just one or two short paragraphs in isolation. The summing-up in this particular aspect started from p20 T to p26 C. All this was before the passage at p28 E-J which the applicant complained of. We do not propose to reproduce the passages in our judgment. We only need to recite two short passages to demonstrate the careful approach by the deputy judge in relation to the abili evidence and the defence case. At p25 N-T and P26 A-C :
19. Immediately after the passage at p28, the deputy judge also gave this direction at J-M:
20. There is no hard and fast rule as to how a witness's testimony should be challenged : see R v Wong Hing-tong Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 1993; R v Hart [1932]23 Cr.App.R. 202; paragraph F7.4, Blackstone's Criminal Practice, 2000 edition and paragraph 8-116 Archbold 2000 edition. 21. The prosecution case and the defence had been one of stark contrast from beginning to end. The jury could not have been misled or confused in this regard. We are satisfied that the summing-up was, on the whole, balanced and fair. 22. There is no substance in this ground and it also fails. Ground 5 23. Ground 5 is in these terms:
24. This was what the deputy judge directed the jury at p33 I-S:
25. At p.35 C-N, the deputy judge had this further to say:-
26. We have to some extent dealt with this ground under similar fact evidence. As it can be seen from the passages to which we have referred, everything that was of any importance or relevance was put to the jury. It had been pointed out to us during argument that the steps which Madam Lam walked up and down were only a very short distance of a matter of feet from the ATM machine. This was wholly a matter of fact for the jury, who having heard the evidence of the witnesses and observed their demeanour, was perfectly entitled to draw the inference from the totality of the evidence that the applicant was attempting to rob Madam Lam. Conclusion 27. There is no substance in any of the grounds of appeal. We are satisfied that the convictions are neither unsafe nor unsatisfactory. The application for leave to appeal must therefore be dismissed.
Representation: Mr. D.G. Saw, SC, D.D.P.P. and Ms. Bianca Cheng, S.G.C., of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr. Daniel Marash, SC & Hylas Chung, instructed by K.Y. Woo & Co., for the Applicant Remarks: |
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