The Queen v. Quan Kwok-hing and Others

Read the full judgment text of HCMA 833/1985 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.

1. This is an appeal by QUAN Kwok-hing, WONG Kwok-keung and LIU Kam-chuen against their convictions at Causeway Bay Magistrate's Court on 5th August of this year. QUAN Kwok-hing was convicted of managing a vice establishment, WONG Kwok-keung of assisting in the management of a vice establishment and LIU Kam-chuen again of managing a vice establishment.

Case No.HCMA 833/1985
Court
High Court CFI
Date
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCMA000833/1985

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

Magistracy Appeal

No. 833 of 1985

BETWEEN

THE QUEEN

and

QUAN KWOK-HING & 2 OTHERS

Coram: Hon. Kempster, J.A. (sitting as an additional High Court Judge)

Date of Hearing: 9th October 1985

Date of Judgment: 9th October 1985

___________

JUDGMENT

___________

1. This is an appeal by QUAN Kwok-hing, WONG Kwok-keung and LIU Kam-chuen against their convictions at Causeway Bay Magistrate's Court on 5th August of this year. QUAN Kwok-hing was convicted of managing a vice establishment, WONG Kwok-keung of assisting in the management of a vice establishment and LIU Kam-chuen again of managing a vice establishment.

2. Against those convictions they appeal on a number of grounds which have been reduced to writing and which have been the subject of submissions to me this morning on their behalf by Mr. Lau.

3. Section 139 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200, provides that:

"A person who on any occasion -

(a)  keeps any premises as a vice establishment; or

(b)

manages or assists in the management, or is otherwise in charge or control, of any premises kept as a vice establishment,

shall be guilty of an offence."

"Vice establishment" is not specifically defined as such but section 117(3) of the Ordinance provides:

"Premises shall not be treated as a vice establishment for the purposes of this Part" (that Part covers section 139) "unless -

(a)

the premises are used wholly or mainly by 2 or more women for the purposes of prostitution; or

 

(b)

the premises are used wholly or mainly for or in connexion with the organizing or arranging of prostitution."

It is with the definition in section 117(3)(b) with which we are concerned in this appeal.

4. The first complaint made in relation to the finding of the Magistrate was that he was wrong in law to admit evidence as to what took place in two adjacent premises on the first floor of block C, No. 137-141 Lockhart Road, Wanchai on the 3rd of April of this year. No charge is brought against the appellant in relation to that date. However that evidence was, in my view, properly admitted and considered and taken into account by the Magistrate on a principle explained by the Lord Chancellor Lord Herschell in a Privy Council case, Makin v. The Attorney-General for New South Wales(1) at p. 65:

".... the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to shew the commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the jury, and it may be so relevant if it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were designed or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to the accused."

5. In the present case the evidence relating to what transpired on the 3rd April went to show that what took place on the date of the charge, namely the 23rd of May, took place by design and as a matter of practice and that the circumstances described in evidence were not fortuitous.

6. In his Statement of Findings the Magistrate described what transpired on 23rd May. Two police officers entered the Chung Yee Escort Company on the floor in question and were there provided with a young woman each. The girls were told to take these men next door. The men paid a fee which I think is the escort fee. Next door they were received and a further fee was paid for accommodation and then the girls proceeded to offer and afford sexnal services. I do not think it is necessary for me to go into any more detail because, having read the evidence, I am satisfied that the Magistrate was prefectly entitled to find as he did that from the evidence viewed as a whole, including the documentary evidence submitted by counsel at which I hare just looked, I am satisfied that the two premises in question, namely the escort company premises and the  Lai Sin Apartment next door, operated in conjunction with one another and that their primary if mot sole purpose was the provision of prostitutes to the general public. As regards QUAN Kwok-hing and WONG Kwok-keung the charges in question related to the "Chung Yee Tour Companion" being the escort agency premises, and as regards LIU Kam-chuen the adjacent Lai Sin Apartment. As regards each it could properly be said that insofar as they were used for the provision of prostitutes they were used for or in connection with the organizing or arranging of prostitution within the meaning of section 117(3) (b).

7. The further points appearing in the grounds of appeal against conviction are really based on an approach to the evidence which would be repugnant to reality and might indeed be treated with derision were they made to a jury. A Magistrate, like jury, has to approach the evidence with common sense drawing reasonable, if not, as here, inescapable inferences. In the circumstances I do not think it necessary for me to say more save that the appeal of each appellant fails.

(M. Kempster)

Justice of Appeal

(1) [1894] A.C. 57

Representation:

Mr. Alexander Lau for appellants

Mr. J. Abbott for D.P.P.