Louis Pao v. Leung Kim-ping t/a Brothers Co.

Read the full judgment text of HCMP 2403/1985 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.

1. The applicant, Louis Pao, who is a dancing master, claimed damages for trespass to goods in the Kowloon District Court. He alleged that during 1982 the defendant, LEUNG Kim-ping, had taken down and damaged one of his advertising signs at Mirador Mansion in Nathan Road. On 8th October 1984 Judge McClelland dismissed the claim as unsubstantiated by evidence and made a like finding when he reviewed his judgment on 17th May of this year. On the same day the judge gave the applicant leave to appea

Case No.HCMP 2403/1985
Court
High Court CFI
Date
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCMP002403/1985

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

Miscellaneous Proceedings

No. 2403 of 1985

BETWEEN

LOUIS PAO

and

LEUNG KIM-PING trading as BROTHERS CO.

Coram: Hon. Li, V.-P., Kempster, J.A. & Power, J.

Date of Hearing: 10th December 1985

Date of Judgment: 10th December 1985

___________

JUDGMENT

___________

Kempster, J.A.:

1. The applicant, Louis Pao, who is a dancing master, claimed damages for trespass to goods in the Kowloon District Court. He alleged that during 1982 the defendant, LEUNG Kim-ping, had taken down and damaged one of his advertising signs at Mirador Mansion in Nathan Road. On 8th October 1984 Judge McClelland dismissed the claim as unsubstantiated by evidence and made a like finding when he reviewed his judgment on 17th May of this year. On the same day the judge gave the applicant leave to appeal to this Court on terms that he paid $5,000 into Court by way of security for the defendant's costs. Being dissatisfied with the condition imposed the applicant, by Notices dated 24th October, seeks leave to apply to us, out of time, for unconditional leave to appeal. Rather usually his application has been listed before a Court of three whereas normally it would be dealt with by a single judge pursuant to section 35 of the Supreme Court Ordinance. Having regard to the provisions of section 63(6) of the District Courts Ordinance the applicant should have applied to this Court for leave to appeal by 1st June. But this Court has power to extend time by virtue of section 63(5). In order to exercise our discretion to extend time we must be satisfied that there is some good reason for the delay. We look for a particularly cogent explanation when the matters sought to be appealed took place over three years ago. The applicant has furnished us with a substantial volume of documents, some of them bearing interesting colours, illustrations and including photographs. But from these documents the only page that is relevant to the lapse of time is what he describes as and is labelled as "*P(A2)". The applicant has read us a great part of this page. But we find the explanation set out on that page quite inadequate to explain the delay. The provisions made by the District Courts Ordinance for appeals are normally to be observed. It is important that legal proceedings should be brought to finality within a reasonable time. It is not right for a defendant or a potential defendant to have the liability of legal proceedings hanging over him indefinitely. In the circumstances the application for leave to apply to this Court for leave to appeal out of time is refused.

(M. Kempster)

Justice of Appeal

Representation:

Applicant/plaintiff in person

Respondent/defendant in person