Thorn Security (Hong Kong) Ltd v. Cheung Kee Fung Cheung Construction Co Ltd
Read the full judgment text of CACV 211/2003 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 20 July 2004.
1. This is an appeal from (1) the order dated 30 April 2003 of HH Judge C B Chan granting the defendant a stay of the proceedings commenced by the plaintiff and (2) the order dated 16 June 2003 refusing the plaintiff's application for leave to appeal. At the conclusion of the hearing, the appeals were allowed. Written reasons were to be handed down later which we now do.
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CACV 211/2003 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 211 OF 2003 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCJ NO. 7482 OF 2002) _________________________
_________________________ Coram: Hon Le Pichon JA and Hartmann J in Court Date of Hearing: 20 July 2004 Date of Judgment: 20 July 2004 Date of Handing Down Reasons for Judgment: 30 July 2004 _________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT _________________________ Hon Le Pichon JA: 1.This is an appeal from (1) the order dated 30 April 2003 of HH Judge C B Chan granting the defendant a stay of the proceedings commenced by the plaintiff and (2) the order dated 16 June 2003 refusing the plaintiff's application for leave to appeal. At the conclusion of the hearing, the appeals were allowed. Written reasons were to be handed down later which we now do. Background 2.The defendant who was the main contractor entered into a subcontract with the plaintiff who was the nominated subcontractor for the latter to carry out certain fire services and water pump installations for a project known as Tung Chung Area 30 Phase 3 ("the project"). Clause NS10(4) of the Special Conditions of the subcontract provided for the accrual of interest on any amount due but not paid to the plaintiff within 28 days after certification by the surveyor. The plaintiff claimed default interest accruing between October 1999 and October 2001 from the defendant. A dispute arose between the parties over the question whether such default interest was due and owing to the plaintiff. 3.The subcontract contained provisions for the resolution of disputes or differences of any kind between the plaintiff and the defendant. In issue is whether, on the true construction of those provisions, there was an arbitration agreement between the parties. 4.It is common ground that on 16 April 2002 the plaintiff wrote to the Hong Kong Housing Authority which was the contract manager of the project. In pertinent part the letter read:
The attachments included Appendix A which was the Interest Calculation Table which showed exactly how the interest claimed had been computed. This table was amended at a later date so that the final figure claimed became HK$112,610.70 but nothing turns on that. 5.By letter dated 7 June 2002, the contract manager wrote to the plaintiff in these terms: "Construction of Tung Chung Area 30 Phase 3 Re: Notice of Dispute
This letter was copied to the defendant. 6.Whilst it was common ground that there was a Notice of Dispute, Miss Cruden argued that the letter of 7 June 2002 from the contract manager was not a "decision" within subclause (3) and that the defendant should not be deprived of the opportunity of having this point decided by arbitration. Suffice it to say that although expressed infelicitously, when read together with the Notice of Dispute and the Table showing how the default interest was computed, it is quite plain that the letter was a "decision" within subclause (3). 7.On 11 June 2002, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant and after referring to the contract manager's letter of 7 June, demanded payment of interest monies due based on the calculations attached to the Notice of Dispute. The defendant did not respond to this demand and on 3 December 2002, the plaintiff commenced an action in the District Court (District Court Civil Action No. 7482 of 2002) to recover the default interest. On 24 December 2002, the plaintiff took out a summons for summary judgment. Some three weeks later, on 17 January 2003, the defendant applied for a stay of proceedings. It is common ground that the defendant maintained total silence and did nothing after receipt of the plaintiff's demand which was issued following the contract manager's letter of 7 June 2002 until it took out the summons for a stay. 8.The judge granted a stay of the District Court proceedings on 30 April 2003 and ordered costs against the plaintiff in any event. On 16 June 2003, the judge refused the plaintiff's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The plaintiff obtained leave on 29 July 2003 by way of an ex parte application to this Court. The defendant took out a summons to rescind the grant of leave to appeal but by a consent order dated 17 December 2003, the defendant withdrew its application with costs reserved for argument at the hearing of the substantive appeal. Dispute resolution framework 9.As this appeal turned on the true construction of the provisions of Clause NS11 of the Special Condition ("Special Condition 11"), it is necessary to set that out in full:
This appeal 10.At the heart of this appeal is whether Special Condition 11 was an arbitration agreement. Did the provisions require disputes or differences to be resolved by arbitration or did it merely confer an option on the parties to arbitrate? The judge ruled that the clause was an arbitration agreement and it is this ruling that was challenged. 11.Subclause (1) of Special Condition 11 mandates that all disputes or differences "be settled in accordance with the following provisions". There was no reference to arbitration or to the settlement of disputes or differences by arbitration. One therefore has to read the remaining provisions to see what steps had to be taken for the resolution of disputes. 12.The first step to be taken to initiate the process is the service of a Notice of Dispute (which must be in writing) by either party to the contract manager. Under subclause (2), this Notice defines the dispute and requests a decision by the contract manager who, under subclause (3) is required, within 60 days of receiving a Notice of Dispute, to give his written decision on the dispute or state, in writing, his inability to make such a decision. This first part is thus self-contained, with its own time-frame. 13.Subclause (4) enjoins the parties to "give effect forthwith" to every decision of the contract manager rendered under subclause (3) and provides that "such decisions shall be final and binding" on the parties unless and until "as hereinafter provided" which was the happening of one of two events, namely, either the parties agree otherwise, or, the decision of the contract manager is revised by an arbitrator and an award made and published. The two events contemplated by subclause (4) form the subject matter of subclauses (5) and (6). Subclause (5) which deals with mediation is not relevant for present purposes. 14.The procedure for invoking subclause (6) is by service of a written Notice to Refer to Arbitration. The first matter to note is the wording used, viz. that the contractor or subcontractor "may require the dispute to be referred to arbitration". It is not expressed in mandatory terms: rather, it is framed as an option. Moreover, there is a time limit stipulated for invoking this procedure: under paragraph (a), that has to be done within 28 days of receipt of the contract manager's decision or his notice of inability to make a decision in respect to a Notice of Dispute. 15.In my view, subclauses (4) and (6) read together provide the second part of the framework devised by the parties for the resolution of disputes and differences between them. The decision made by the contract manager under the first part i.e. subclauses (2) and (3) is "final and binding" upon the parties unless and until the procedure contained in subclause (6) is invoked in accordance with its terms, namely, within the time limit stipulated. 16.It was argued that assuming the letter of 7 June were a decision for the purposes of subclause (3) of Special Condition 11 and in the event of the defendant refusing to pay the amount found due, on a proper construction of Special Condition 11, the plaintiff must go to arbitration and obtain an arbitral award before any question of enforcement could arise. Miss Cruden submitted that the effect of subclause (6) is that the parties must refer to arbitration and that the provision in subclause (4) that the decision of the contract manager is "final and binding" is subject to there being an arbitral award made under subclause (6) so that nothing is enforceable without such an award. That, to my mind, is not the plain meaning of Special Condition 11 when read a whole. I cannot agree that whenever the word "arbitration" is mentioned in any provision, it necessarily has to be interpreted as meaning an arbitration agreement. There is no bar that I can see to parties agreeing to an option to arbitrate which is exercisable only within certain time limits without necessarily creating an arbitration agreement. In such a situation, the option must be exercised in accordance with its terms. 17.In my view, the argument that nothing is final and binding absent an arbitral award frustrates the clear purpose of the provisions contained in Special Condition 11. The dispute resolution mechanism agreed to by the parties provides an efficient means for achieving finality. The parties agreed to be bound by the decisions of the contract manager which are to be final and binding unless the option to arbitrate is invoked within the time limits stated. That is a commercial arrangement that is readily comprehensible to render finality to disputes and at the same time maintaining some flexibility by giving either party an option to elect to arbitrate if it were dissatisfied with the decision of the contract manager. But in such a case, the conditions for exercising the option must be strictly complied with. 18.As it is my view that there was no arbitration agreement, the authorities relating to the effect of a time bar in the context of arbitrations are beside the point and need not be addressed. Hon Hartmann J: 19.I agree fully and have nothing to add.
Representation: Ms Terry S C Chan, instructed by Messrs C C Lee & Co., for the Plaintiff/Appellant Ms Liza Jane Cruden, instructed by Messrs Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, for the Defendant/Respondent |
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