Paul William Halloran v. Tsang Ming Sang and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCPI 1216/2003 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 21 July 2004.
1. This is an appeal by the defendants against the order of Master Kwan dated 31 March 2004 whereby she refused their application for leave to adduce expert evidence on liability.
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HCPI001216/2003 HCPI 1216/2003 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO.1216 OF 2003 ---------------------
---------------------- Coram: Deputy High Court Judge Poon in Chambers Date of Hearing: 9 June 2004 Date of Handing Down Decision: 21 July 2004 ---------------------- D E C I S I O N ---------------------- 1.This is an appeal by the defendants against the order of Master Kwan dated 31 March 2004 whereby she refused their application for leave to adduce expert evidence on liability. ACCIDENT 2.This action arose out of a traffic accident that took place at 16:23 hours on 6 November 2002 at Choi Yuen Road, Sheung Shui, involving a taxi (KG2867) and a motorcycle (JF3685). At the point where the accident occurred, Choi Yuen Road is a three-lane, two-way, straight road, separated by a double white line with a speed limit of 50km/hr. 3.The 1st defendant was then driving the taxi along Choi Yuen Road in a north-westerly direction towards Po Chek Wu Road. The plaintiff was riding the motorcycle in the opposite direction along Choi Yuen Road in a south-westerly direction towards Pak Wo Road. Intending to join the taxi stand outside Sheung Shui KCR station, the 1st defendant turned right, crossed the double white line and drove into the plaintiff's path. As a result, a collision occurred. THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURY 4.The plaintiff suffered multiple severe injuries, including brain damage. He was hospitalised in the Prince of Wales Hospital until 18 December 2002 and continued to receive treatment as an inpatient at the Union Hospital. On 4 January 2003, he was flown to Australia where he was admitted to the Princess Alexandra Brain Injury Rehabilitation Unit in Brisbane, Queensland. He remained there as inpatient for one month and thereafter attended as an outpatient. CONVICTION 5.The 1st defendant was subsequently prosecuted for the offence of careless driving. On 28 April 2003, he appeared before the magistrate in the Fanling Magistracy. According the brief facts read out before the magistrate and admitted by the defendant, "the accident was brought about by the inattentive manner of the defendant who had failed to ensure traffic clearance on the opposite lane before turning his vehicle thereto". On his own plea of guilty, the defendant was convicted as charged and was fined HK$1,500. CLAIMS 6.On 6 November 2003, the plaintiff, a pilot with Cathay Pacific Airways, commenced the present action against the 1st defendant for negligence and the 2nd defendant, the taxi owner. He claimed for no less than AUD$35,000 and HK$37 million. DEFENCE 7.In the defence filed on 3 December 2003, the defendants denied that the accident was caused by the 1st defendant's negligence as alleged. They further alleged that it was caused or contributed to by the negligence on the part of the plaintiff by reason of, inter alia, failure to ride the motorcycle with a dipped headlamp during daylight hours and driving the motorcycle at a speed which was excessive in the circumstances. WITNESS STATEMENTS 8.Pursuant to directions, the parties have already filed their witness statements with the court. (1) The plaintiff's statement 9.In his statement dated 29 April 2004, the plaintiff said that he received his driver's licence in Australia when he was 16. He could and did drive motorcycles and cars. In Hong Kong, he drove a motorcycle not as a means of transport but purely for pleasure, which he enjoyed. It was his practice to have the headlight on when he drove. Because of the brain damage, he could not remember anything about the accident or how it happened. 10.The accident was eye-witnessed by three pedestrians in the vicinity, Mr Leung Kai Ming, Mr Wong Wing Ming and Mr Wong Chun Hung. Their witness statements are summarised below. (2) Mr Leung's statement 11.Mr Leung and his wife were walking on the pedestrian walkway to the Sheung Shui KCR Station. When he was at Choi Yuen Road about four to five meters near the accident spot, he suddenly heard a very long vehicle braking sound. He looked at that direction and saw that the 1st defendant taxi had just begun to turn right from the second land of Choi Yeun Road into the taxi station at the opposite bound lane. At the same time, the plaintiff applied the brakes and collided head first with the taxi's left front side passenger door. The braking sound lasted for about two seconds from the moment he heard it until the collision. He was certain that the braking sound came from the plaintiff's motorcycle. The taxi did not immediately stop and continued to turn right into the taxi entrance before stopping. 12.Mr Leung did not pay attention as to whether the 1st defendant had turned on his right turn signal indicator or he had looked at the conditions ahead of him prior to his turning right. But Mr Leung saw that the 1st defendant's face was looking towards the taxi station entrance when he was turning right and he did not look at the traffic conditions in the Po Shek Wu Road direction. 13.Mr Leung did not pay attention as to whether the motorcycle's headlights were on, either. But according to him, the speed of motorcycle at the time was not fast. It was very slow. (3) Mr W.M. Wong's statement 14.Mr W.M. Wong was walking along the pedestrian walkway to the Sheung Shui KCR Station. When he had walked up to a distance of about 50 feet from the accident location, he noticed the plaintiff's motorcycle driving on the right side heading towards Yuk Po Court. Its speed was very steady, not fast, kind of going for a leisurely drive. From Mr W.M. Wong's own extensive driving experience, he estimated that its speed was about under 40km/h. He continued to walk on a straight path thereafter. About 10 seconds later, he heard a "bang" sound. He then saw the motorcycle lying on the ground and the 1st defendant's taxi horizontally drive to the vehicle lane towards Yuk Po Court direction, in front of the motorcycle. Mr W.M. Wong did not see how the collision took place. (4) Mr C.H. Wong's statement 15.Mr C.H. Wong was walking with a few friends on the pedestrian walkway (adjacent to the vehicle lane heading towards Yuk Po Court) to the Sheung Shui KCR Station. When he was about 25 feet from the accident location, he was the plaintiff's motorcycle on the right side pass by, heading in the direction of Yuk Po Court. At the same time, he saw the 1st defendant's taxi on the opposite side of the lane begin to turn right into taxi station. Once the taxi passed the double white lines, the front part of the motorcycle collided with the nearside front of passenger door of the taxi. The taxi did not switch on its right turn indicator light. At the time, the traffic was light and there was no obstructions obstructing the 1st defendant's looking ahead at the traffic conditions of the opposite lane. Mr C.H. Wong was not aware of the motorcycle's speed but thought that it was a little faster than normal. (5) The defendant's statement 16.In his witness statement, the defendant had this to say :
THE EXPERT'S REPORTS 17.The defendants have engaged Professor Murray Mackay, a motor accident reconstruction expert to prepare various reports which they sought to adduce on the issue of liability. They intended to rely on the reports to support their allegations that the plaintiff failed to pave proper regard to the circumstances of Choi Yuen Road and by implication was driving too fast for the conditions ("the Speed Point"); and that the plaintiff had failed to illuminate his motorcycle headlamp, any by implication, thereby made it difficult for the 1st defendant to judge the motorcycle's speed and the separation distance between the motorcycle and his taxi ("the Illumination Point"). 18.I do not propose to set out in detail these reports. Suffice to say that I have already considered them carefully. I only wish to make two points. In respect of the Illumination Point, Professor Mackay sought to deal with whether the headlight of the plaintiff's motorcycle was "in fact" on. Mr Jones, counsel for the defendants, rightly conceded that this part of his reports is inadmissible. In respect of the Speed Point, Professor Mackay took into account of a number of technical factors, including the tyre marks of the motorcycle on the road and the braking coefficient. He came to a range of 40km/h to 60km/h. THE LAW 19.As noted above, the learned master refused the defendants' leave to adduce the expert's reports. Now that the defendants appeal, it falls upon me to determine, by way of rehearing, whether leave should be so granted. 20.I first remind myself of the applicable legal principles. 21.The court has an inherent jurisdiction to exclude expert evidence which is irrelevant, inadmissible or speculative. 22.In road accident cases, the law in relation to when expert evidence on liability may be admissible has been succinctly set out by the English Court of Appeal in Liddle v. Middleton [1996] PIQR P36 relevant, which has been followed in Hong Kong. The relevant passage of the judgment is at P42-P43 where Stuart Smith LJ said :
He then gave a warning at P43-P44 :
I now turn to consider if Professor Mackay's reports are admissible. WHETHER EXPERT EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE 23.Mr Jones accepted that he had to first persuade me that the present case falls within the exception to the ordinary traffic accident cases. He cited three main reasons in support. 24.The first reason is that the present case is not a simple or usual collision because it involves a motorcycle and a car. With respect, I disagree. It is a simple collision case. Contrary to Mr Jones's submissions, the courts have extensive experience in dealing with traffic accidents involving a motorcycle and a car. 25.The second reason is that the speed and illumination of the motorcycle prior to the collision are highly relevant matters. The illumination and speed of the vehicles involved in the accident are almost relevant in all cases. I fail to see how they would constitute an exception. Mr Jones referred to Professor Mackay's point that according to its specification, the plaintiff's motorcycle did not have a light circuit that automatically switched on the headlights when the engine was started. However, it should be noted that it is not the plaintiff's case that his motorcycle's headlight was switched on automatically when the engine was on. He only said that he used to drive with the headlight on. In any event, whether the headlight was on is a matter for the judge. As to speed, I will deal with in the next paragraph. 26.The third reason is that technical matters such as braking coefficients, vehicle load, skid mark interpretation and so forth are all relevant and probative and are outside the knowledge and experience of a layman and the court. These matters are mainly pertinent to the Speed Point. These matters may be of valuable assistance if there are no eye-witnesses. But we do have three independent eye-witnesses. The court can derive assistance from them as to the circumstances leading to the accident, in particular, the approximate speed of the plaintiff's motorcycle at the time. Mr W.M. Wong is able to say that it was at about 40km/h. Mr Leung said it was slow while Mr C.H. Wong said it was faster than normal. No doubt their evidence will be further canvassed at trial. With the assistance of their evidence and that of the 1st defendant, the court should have no difficulty in making a finding on the approximate speed of the plaintiff's motorcycle prior to the accident. The court does not need expert's assistance on technical matters in determining the Speed Point. CONCLUSION 27.In my view, the expert reports that the defendants sought to adduce are clearly inadmissible. The learned master was correct in refusing leave. I, too, will refuse leave. This appeal is therefore dismissed with costs against the defendants, to be taxed if not agreed.
Representation: Mr Nicholas Pirie, instructed by Messrs Haldanes, for the Plaintiff Mr Douglas Jones, instructed by Messrs Hoosenally & Neo, for the 1st and 2nd Defendants |
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