Cheuk Chiu v. The Queen
Read the full judgment text of HCCC 625/1969 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 31 October 1969.
1. The appellant was charged with possession of dangerous drugs for the purpose of unlawful trafficking contrary to Section 7(1) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance (41 of 1968) and was convicted of simple possession and fined $350.00. He now appeals against conviction.
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HCCC000625/1969 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 625 OF 1969. -----------------
----------------- Coram: Pickering, J. Date of Judgment: 31 October 1969 ----------------- DECISION ----------------- 1. The appellant was charged with possession of dangerous drugs for the purpose of unlawful trafficking contrary to Section 7(1) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance (41 of 1968) and was convicted of simple possession and fined $350.00. He now appeals against conviction. 2. The facts are set out in considerable detail in the resume of the evidence contained in the magistrate's Statement of Findings where they appear as follows:-
3. Upon the hearing of the appeal before me, Crown counsel said that he deemed it his duty, in the interests of the appellant, to put forward for my consideration a possibility which had occurred to him in view of the extremely lenient sentence imposed for the possession of dangerous drugs in a quantity sufficient to attract the presumption of possession for the purpose of unlawful trafficking contained in Section 46. of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance. The quantity and type of drug found by the magistrate to have been in the possession of the appellant, was 0.6 grammes of salts of esters of morphine and possession of any quantity greater than one half gramme is sufficient to attract the presumption. The possibility which Crown counsel invited me to consider was that the lenient sentence imposed was in fact a compromise sentence imposed in lieu of a term of imprisonment because of residual doubts in the mind of the magistrate as to the guilt of the accused. 4. In the absence of very clear evidence that the reason for the imposition of a very light sentence was in fact a doubt in the magistrate's mind as to whether the accused. was in fact guilty, I would not for one moment impute such a reason. There is not the slightest evidence that the learned magistrate was so motivated and no thought in my mind that he was guilty of a dereliction of duty of the nature postulated. 5. Nor do I think that I am entitled to pursue a reflection which at one stage presented itself to my own mind. This was that an appellant with a clear record and a decent income who has been visited with a small fine in respect of an offence for which he might well have expected a prison term, so far from displaying relief at his lenient treatment has felt sufficiently incensed to appeal against conviction and to go the expenses of employing counsel for that purpose and that this emphatic reaction to his conviction might well be indicative of innocence. Tempting as that speculation may be however, I am not entitled to entertain it. My function is to decide whether or not, at the date of the trial and irrespective of subsequent events (unless they constitute admissible new evidence), there was evidence to justify the conviction. The motives for appealing are irrelevant and indeed might well rest not upon the factors I have set out above but on quite separate factors as, for example, an intention to emigrate and a fear that this conviction would thwart that intention by reason of the unwillingness of the authorities in the chosen country to accept immigrants with a criminal record. 6. The appeal must be decided upon the evidence as it was presented in the Court below and without speculation as to either the reasons for the imposition of an undoubtedly lenient sentence or the causes undulying the decision to appeal. 7. Mr. Arculli, for the appellant, raised six grounds of appeal. The first of which was that the learned magistrate failed to give any or any sufficient weight to the fact that a "powder form substance" was allegedly taken from the appellant and that a granular form substance was produced in Court as Exhibit P1. The facts were that P.W.1, P.C.7577 Chow Fong testified to finding a cellophane packet containing "some powder form substance" in the right hand side pocket of the appellant's shorts. This packet was subsequently placed in an envelope at the police station and the envelope sealed in the presence of the appellant. Evidence of the type common in case involving dangerous drugs was given of the passage of the sealed office to the Government Chemist and of its further eventual transmission to the magistrate's court. That chain of evidence was complete but undoubtedly the packet produced to the magistrate and inspected by me, contains a granular substance. Unfortunately the learned magistrate did not specifically deal with this apparent metamorphis. Crown counsel has suggested that the use of the description "powder form" by the police constable was nothing more than loose phraseology and whilst the magistrate does not say so it does appear that in fact he was dismissing the police constable's description as such. What is important in regard to this ground of appeal is the magistrate's finding, expressed in his "Note" made for the purpose of this appeal, that the exhibit P1 had been found in the "right shorts" pocket of the appellant when he was searched by P.W.1. That specific finding is sufficient to dispose of this ground of appeal as also of grounds (2) and (3) which relate to the same matter. 8. The fourth ground was that the learned magistrate misdirected himself on the burden of proof in that he convicted the appellant on a preference for the evidence for the prosecution. On this ground of appeal Mr. Arculli argued that there was no indication in the magistrate's findings that he had directed himself as to the burden of proof and that he appeared to be balancing the evidence of one side against the other whilst under the erroneous impression that it was incumbent upon him to accept one story or the other as opposed to disbelieving both. Counsel further complained that in saying he "did not believe" the appellant's account of events the magistrate had shifted the onus of proof to the appellant. I find no substance in these arguments. In my view it is unnecessary that a professionally-qualified magistrate should specifically use the formula "beyond reasonable doubt" when assessing evidence in a criminal case and the failure of a person so qualified to invoke that or some similar phrase cannot be said, in the absence of some strong evidence to the contrary to indicate that he has either overlooked or put behind him one of the axioms of his daily task. Nor can I accept that in saying he "did not believe" the appellant the magistrate was shifting the onus of proof regarding possession on to the appellant. 9. The fifth ground of appeal was that in observing that the appellant had said in evidence that the police constable (P.W.1) had said that he was going to "fix" the appellant but had not said "I am going to fix you, I will say I found the packet in your right hand shorts pocket" the magistrate had wrongly drawn the conclusion that there was no hole in that pocket. I confess that I am at a loss to know what significance the magistrate was seeking to place upon the fact that the sentence quoted above was not said in evidence by the appellant but I do not construe him as inferring from the fact that these words were not spoken that therefore there was no hole in the pocket. He reached that conclusion because he had found that the packet was indeed found in that pocket and because he did not believe the appellant as to the existence of any hole at the time of his arrest. It is significant that in re-examination the police constable, P.W.1, said that he examined the pockets of the appellant's shorts and found no holes in them. This fifth ground of appeal fails. 10. Mr. Arculli's final argument was that since the magistrate rejected the evidence of the two arresting police officers as to the colour of the shirt worn by the appellant at the time of his arrest, he ought to have rejected or at any rate not accepted, the remainder of their evidence. I can see no reason why the magistrate should not have believed the general evidence of the arresting officers whilst accepting that they were mistaken as to the colour of the appellant's shirt which I should describe as fawn. The magistrate himself said, "Whilst I was prepared to accept that P.W.1 and P.W.2 were wrong regarding the shirt worn by the appellant at the time of his arrest I did not consider this reason enough to reject all their evidence" and with that observation I entirely agree. 11. There is one further matter to which I think I should allude. The magistrate having found that the appellant was in possession of this drug, there arose, by virtue of the quantity so possessed, a presumption that the possession was for the purpose of trafficking (s.46 of the Ordinance) and it was for the appellant to show, on the balance of probabilities that this was not so. No attempt was made to do this and the presumption was never rebutted. In those circumstances I am at a loss to understand how the magistrate came to convict for the offence of simple possession only. His proper course was to convict of the offence as charged. For the purposes of this appeal however nothing turns upon the point. 12. The appeal is dismissed.
31st October, 1969. Representation: Judgment read Mr. Arculli (F.Zimmern) for Appellant Mr. Lucas,c.c., for Respondent, |