Shui Hing Co v. Chan Kwai and Others
Read the full judgment text of DCMP 1/1945 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 28 January 1946.
1. In this case, the Landlord seeks to recover or certain premises under Proclamation No.15.
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DCMP000001/1945 STANDING MILITARY COURT OF HONG KONG GENERAL MILITARY COURT TENANCY TRIBUNAL APPEAL No.1 of 1945 (Application No.19 of 1945) -----------------
Coram: Leo D'Almada, President Date of Judgment: 28 January 1946 ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- 1.In this case, the Landlord seeks to recover or certain premises under Proclamation No.15. 2.His claim is defeated by an agreement found from increases of rent demanded and paid by the tenant. 3.It is to be noted that:
4.Applicants now allege that the First Opponent, who claims to be the tenant, is not the tenant at all, i.e. that he is not the person from whom rents were received which formed the basis for the finding of the agreement. 5.The case may be likened to one in which an agreement is raised in defence to a claim, where the burden of proof of the affirmative, i.e. of the agreement, would rest on the person pleading it, whether there was a simple joinder of issue without further pleadings, or a specific plea in reply that the defendant was not a party to the agreement. 6.The difference lies only in that the point was not raised at the Tribunal hearing, wherefore evidence was adduced on appeal to prove the Applicants' case, leave having been given for this. 7.The Opponents not being legally represented at this appeal. I was at pains to explain the position to them more than once, both for the purposes of the case itself and because of the gravity of the implications in the Applicants' further evidence. This was done after each witness's evidence, and again at the end of the Applicants' further evidence. The importance of the Opponents' adducing evidence on their own behalf was also stressed. 8.Despite this, the Opponents contented themselves with a few questions in cross-examination, some points made in argument, and ex parte statements to which I can naturally attach no value. 9.Leaving aside for the moment the question of the onus on the above analogy, the evidence before me is this :
11.Applying the above-quoted observations to the present case and ignoring the question of the onus of proof on the analogy mentioned earlier, do not the evidence and the Opponents' failure to contradict or explain it warrant a reasonable and just conclusion that judgment must be for the Applicants? Upon a careful consiceration of the whole case, I can arrive at no other view. And, if the true view is as I suggest, that on the said analogy the burden is on the Opponents, how can the Court find otherwise than that the Applicants must succeed? 12.Upon this further evidence, therefore, uncontradicted and unexplained by the Opponents, I hold that the Applicants are entitled to the premises as against the First Opponent, who must vacate them and give up possession to the Applicants before February 1st. 13.The Second Opponent did not give evidence before the Tribunal or on appeal. His claim to remain on the premises can only be through the First Opponent, whose claim has failed. There will therefore be the same order in the case of the Second Opponent. 14.I make no order as to costs. It seems to me that if the employees of the Applicants had exercised ordinary intelligence they would have drawn the attention of their employers or counsel for the Applicants to the position at the Tribunal hearing, and there would have been no appeal.
28.1.46. |