Chan Lau Fong and Others v. The Attorney General
Read the full judgment text of CACV 35/1991 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment.
1. This is an appeal in judicial review proceedings by thirteen applicants against the order made on the 30th January 1991 by Mr. R.G. Kotewall Q.C., sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, dismissing the applicants' application for (1) an order of certiorari to quash an order under the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance (Cap. 124) for the resumption by the Crown of 19 lots of land ("the resumed lots"), seven of which are owned by the first applicant, Mr. Chan Lau Fong ("Chan"), the remainder
Cited by 1 case
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CACV000035/1991
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------------------------------------------------ Coram: Sir Derek Cons, V.-P., Kempster and Clough, JJ.A. Date of Hearing: 15, 17 and 18 October 1991 Date Judgment handed down: 17 December 1991 ----------------------- J U D G M E N T ----------------------- Clough, J.A.: 1. This is an appeal in judicial review proceedings by thirteen applicants against the order made on the 30th January 1991 by Mr. R.G. Kotewall Q.C., sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, dismissing the applicants' application for (1) an order of certiorari to quash an order under the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance (Cap. 124) for the resumption by the Crown of 19 lots of land ("the resumed lots"), seven of which are owned by the first applicant, Mr. Chan Lau Fong ("Chan"), the remainder being jointly owned by various groups of the other applicants in manner not material to these proceedings; and (2) a declaration that the order for the resumption of the resumed lots was null and void. 2. The resumed lots are situated in Hoi Pa Village in Tsuen Wan in the New Territories. Their aggregate area was agreed by the parties at the hearing of the appeal to be about 18,364 square feet, as indicated on the relevant resumption plan. Nine of the lots are building land and ten are agricultural land. They are all held under a Block Crown Lease dated the 24th January 1905 to clansmen. The Lease would have expired in June 1997 but for the benefit of the extension of 50 years without payment of additional premium conferred by section 6 of the New Territories Leases (Extension) Ordinance (Cap. 150) subject, during the period of the extension, to the increase in annual rent provided for in section 8 of that Ordinance. 3. The relevant resumption order is related to town planning considerations stemming from the Tsuen Wan District Outline Zoning Plan ("the zoning plan"), which was approved by the Governor in Council under Section 9 of the Town Planning Ordinance (Cap. 131) on the 13th November 1973 and has subsequently been amended from time to time under the provisions of that Ordinance. The zoning plan applies inter alia to the resumed lots which are shown within Area 18 of the plan in a zone set apart for "commercial/residential" development. Area 18 is in the Tsuen Wan New Town and is one of several numbered areas constituting the "town centre" of Tsuen Wan to form a mixed residential and business shopping area. 4. Approved plans under the Town Planning Ordinance merely serve as standards for guidance. Section 13 of the Ordinance provides:
A measure of direct statutory planning control (in designated comprehensive development areas) is provided for under section 4A of the Ordinance, but no such control affects the resumed lots. 5. However a non-statutory explanatory statement of the zoning plan issued by the Town Planning Office in August 1978 included the following paragraphs regarding the object and implementation of the plan: "2. Object of the Plan
8. Implementation
It has not been contended on behalf of the Crown at any stage of these proceedings that the recommendation at paragraph 2.3 above was a statutory recommendation by the Town Planning Board under section 4(2) of the Town Planning Ordinance which authorises the Board to recommend to the Governor in Council the resumption of inter alia, any land that interferes with the lay-out of an approved plan (and provides that resumption to avoid such interference shall be deemed to be resumption for a public purpose within the meaning of the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance); nor has it been contended on behalf of the applicants that the effect of section 4(2) is to preclude the resumption of land under the latter Ordinance to implement the scheme of an approved plan save in a case where there has been a recommendation under section 4(2) of the Town Planning Ordinance. 6. "Block resumption procedure" was adopted to acquire all the private land involved in the development scheme of the zoning plan which could not otherwise be timeously acquired. This procedure was mentioned in the affirmation of Mr. Wan-Min-Kee You Chin ("Wan"), the Tsuen Wan District Lands Officer. It seems that an area ("the Hoi Pa Village area") of about 1.1 hectares of Crown land and 1.7 hectares of private land (of which the resumed lots formed a part) in Hoi Pa Village (and in Area 18) was regarded as necessary to implement the scheme of the zoning plan which included provision, in the area in question, for the extension of Yan Chai Hospital, a primary school, commercial and residential development, public parking facilities, the extension of Tsuen Wan Market Street and district and local open spaces. 7. The "Block resumption procedure" adopted, to enable the Hoi Pa Village area to be resumed over a period of years in implementation of the scheme of the zoning plan is described by Wan in terms which we find obscure. Suffice it to say that the vires of the procedure is not here in issue and it involved the obtaining of blanket approval from the Governor in Council on the 28th July 1981 for the resumption of the whole of the Hoi Pa Village area, followed by a succession of Gazette notifications of the resumption orders of the Governor (or his delegate the Director of Lands) made under section 3 of the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance in relation to specified lots in the Hoi Pa Village area as and when they were required to be actually resumed for the implementation of the scheme of the zoning plan. 8. The resumption and clearance of the Hoi Pa Village area was planned in two stages. The resumption of Stage I has been completed by orders gazetted on the 25th September 1981 (GN 2952), 24th December 1982 (GN 4033), and the 4th March 1983 (GN 714). The first part of Stage II has been the subject of two gazetted resumption orders published on the 18th May 1984 (GN 1523) and the 20th August 1984 (GN 2517). The implementation of second part of Stage II (Stage IIB) which includes the resumed lots was delayed for various reasons including the refusal of the owners of the resumed lots to surrender their land upon the terms offered to them by the Crown. 9. In July 1988 Chan, the Chairman of Tsuen Wan Rural Committee and a Justice of the Peace, (who started acquiring parts of the resumed lots in November 1988) began negotiating with Government, on behalf of himself and the other applicants, concerning the future of the resumed lots. As indigenous owners the applicants, through Chan, sought to persuade Government not to implement the "Block resumption procedure" in relation to the resumed lots but to agree to the applicants surrendering their lots in return for an "in situ" exchange which would, in effect, enable them to develop the resumed land themselves in accordance with the zoning plan pursuant to two agreements made by Fong with the other applicants on the 12th July 1988 and the 28th June 1989 respectively. The financial consequence of this proposal would be that the applicants would not be deprived of the very substantial development value of the aggregate area of the resumed lots by the implementation of the resumption procedure which would be followed by Government clearing the lots (and the land in the vicinity) preparing sites for development and then putting them out to tender at a premium to other private developers who were holders of letters A or B, in implementation of Government's policy for the development of Area 18. 10. The attitude of Government in opposing Chan's claim on behalf of the applicants for "in situ" exchange of the resumed lots was expressed inter alia in the following passages in a letter dated the 2nd December 1988 from the Director of Buildings and Lands to Chan:
11. Chan's reactions to the Director's letter included the following observations contained in Chan's letter dated the 23rd January 1989 to the Secretary for Lands and Works:
12. On the 19th May 1989 the Secretary for Lands and Works, replying inter alia to Chan's letter dated the 23rd January 1989 upheld the decision of the Director of Buildings and Lands but indicated that he proposed to seek the confirmation of the Governor in Council for the implementation of the "Block resumption". In his letter the Secretary said:
13. I am sorry I cannot be more helpful in this case." 14. Chan and the applicants did not give up. They continued to press their case for "in situ" exchange with the Director. In a letter dated the 16th October 1989 Chan stressed that there were "practically no genuine public work items" affecting the resumed lots. He claimed there were precedents for "in situ" exchange in the present situation and specified them. The original approval of the "Block resumption" on the 28th July 1981 which had not been implemented, was, he claimed, outdated and should not be implemented. He added:
15. These representations were evidently of no avail, because on the 21st May 1990 Chan petitioned, separately, Dame Lydia Dunn (the senior member of the Executive Council) and the members of that Council. In his petition to the members of the Executive Council Chan contended inter alia that:
16. In the event Chan's petitions were unsuccessful. The resumed lots (together with 10 other lots in Stage IIB) were ordered by the Governor to be resumed, as appears from G.N. 2540 dated the 10th July 1990 published in the Gazette pursuant to section 4 of the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance. The notification was in the following terms: "GAZETTE NO. 29/1990 G.N. 2540 BUILDINGS AND LANDS DEPARTMENT CROWN LANDS RESUMPTION ORDINANCE (Chapter 124) PWP ITEM NO. 5CG RESUMPTION OF LAND FOR DEVELOPMENT AT HOI PA VILLAGE - REMAINING ENGINEERING WORKS TSUEN WAN, NEW TERRITORIES To the owners of and every person interested or having any right or easement in the following lots shown coloured orange and orange hatched black on the plan numbered TWPR72B which is deposited in the District Lands Office, Tsuen Wan at 10th Floor, Tsuen Wan Station Multi-Storey Carparking Building, 174-208 Castle Peak Road, Tsuen Wan, New Territories and which is available for inspection there:- Lots Nos. 861, 862 Sec. A, 862 Sec. B, 862 Sec. C, 862 Sec. D, 862 R.P., 863 Sec. A, 863 Sec. B, 863 Sec. D, 864 Sec. A, 864 Sec. B, 865 R.P., 866, 867 Sec. A, 869, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876 R.P., 900, 902, 904, 907 Sec. B, 908, 909 R.P., 964 Sec. A, 979 Sec. D all in Demarcation District No. 449. TAKE NOTICE that the Governor in Council having decided that the above-mentioned lots are required for a public purpose, the Governor has ordered that the above-mentioned lots shall be resumed and revert to the Crown on the expiration of THREE MONTHS from the date of affixing of this notice to the said land. 10 July 1990 C.M. MO Principal Government Land Agent" 17. The Resumption Plan number TWPR 72B mentioned in the body of the notification shows all the 29 lots (comprising about 26,236 square feet) in Stage IIB which have been ordered to be resumed, including the 19 resumed lots comprising about 18,364 square feet. Stage IIB comprises a 'P' shaped area. The resumed lots are all situated in the lower part of the downward stroke of the 'P'. They are not all contiguous and do not form an unbroken site but fall into three (or possibly four) irregularly shaped areas which are segregated by government and other land. At the base of the plan, in the middle, there appear the words "RESUMPTION PLAN" followed by the same PWP reference as appears in the notification and the same words as appear in capital letters in the notification immediately beneath that reference. On the left hand bottom corner of the Resumption Plan there is a reference to Engineering Drawing No. TWCE/835B (T.D.D.) 18. On the 28th September 1990 the applicants obtained leave under Order 53 rule 3 from Ryan J. to apply for judicial review. The application, made in the prescribed form (No. 86A), indicated that relief was sought in respect of the "Decision of Governor in Council in resuming" the resumed lots. The relief sought was expressed to be "An order of certiorari to quash the order for the resumption of the" resumed lots and a declaration that that order was null and void on the grounds that "the decision of the Governor in Council to order the resumption" of the resumed lots was ultra vires in that (1) the resumption was not for a public purpose and (2) "the Governor in Council" had failed to take into account relevant facts and/or taken into account irrelevant factors "in deciding to order the redemption" of the resumed lots. The order granting leave was expressed to relate to "leave to apply for judicial review on the ground that the decision of the Governor-in-Council to order the resumption" of the resumed lots was ultra vires (for the reasons expressed in the application for leave). 19. The applicants' subsequent notice of motion dated the 12th October 1990 sought an order of certiorari to quash "the order of the Governor-in-Council for the resumption" of the resumed lots and a declaration that "the order for the resumption" of those lots was null and void. No technical point was taken below, or on appeal, that the resumption order was made, not by the Governor in Council (defined in section 3 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) as meaning the Governor acting after consultation with the Executive Council in accordance with Royal Instructions but not necessarily in such Council assembled) but by the Governor pursuant to section 3 of the Ordinance which provides:
20. There is no provision requiring the Governor's order for resumption to be in writing, but provision for notification to the public and the accomplishment of reverter to the Crown is contained in sections 4 and 5 which provide:
21. Section 2 of the Ordinance contains a definition of "resumption for a public purpose" which confers a wide discretion upon the Governor in Council to decide what is a public purpose for the purposes of the Ordinance. After providing for the inclusion within such purpose of the purposes (not here material; specified in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), the following provision is made in paragraph (d) of the definition:
22. Material to the above provisions are sections 16 and 19 which respectively provide:
23. The applicants' case was supported by the evidence contained in two affirmations of Chan and in an affirmation of Mr. G.M. Moffoot ("Moffoot"), a chartered surveyor. The Crown relied on the evidence of Wan supplemented, on matters not now material, by the affirmation of Mr. WOO Kwok-Wing, a Senior Land Executive in the District Lands Office, Tsuen Wan. There was a conflict of evidence, which the judge did not find it necessary to resolve, regarding the permitted forms of development and the value of the resumed lots if permitted to be disposed of on the open market. However the judge observed (at p.25) that it was accepted that such value was higher than the aggregate compensation payable to the respective applicants in respect of the individual resumed lots in the event of the resumption order being sustained. 24. Again there was no evidential consensus between Moffoot and Wan regarding the precise area of the resumed lots required for roadworks, but the judge commented (at page 22) that the parties were agreed that only a very small part of some of the lots in question would be affected. On appeal it was accepted by the parties that whatever the precise area concerned (which on Wan's evidence could amount to 0.5 percent of the resumed lots) the area required for road works was only a small part of the resumed lots. 25. The judge arrived at his conclusions in his judgment by reference almost entirely to the evidence of Chan and Wan. He said (at p.25) of Moffoot's evidence:
26. The evidence of Chan in his first affirmation had exhibited the relevant correspondence and outlined the history of the matter which we have endeavoured to summarise earlier in this judgment with the aid of references to some of Wan's evidence. In paragraph 15 of Chan's first affirmation (which the judge set out at pp.24-5 of his judgment) Chan summarised the applicants' case in the following forensic terms:
27. At pages 30 to 34 of his judgment the judge set out material parts of the evidence of Wan which had been relied upon by the Crown. Thus Wan had described the background of the zoning plan and referred to paragraphs 2.1 and 6 of the explanatory statement mentioned earlier in this judgment. He had added a reference to the Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines issued by the Planning Department of the Hong Kong Government in 1979 (and subsequently revised from time to time, the purpose of which, in relation to plan implementation, was stated in paragraph 3.5 to be to ".... provide yardsticks to measure the sufficiency of facilities and the degree of balanced development in an area." Wan had set out in his affirmation the following definition of "Balanced Development" which occurred in Appendix A of the Guidelines:
He then affirmed that the achievement of a balanced development had been and remained the Government's objective in implementing the Tsuen Wan Central Development Scheme. 28. Having affirmed that outline development plans and layout plans were used within Government to guide development (see section 13 of the Town Planning Ordinance) and were followed by Government departments once approved, Wan had mentioned that the Tsuen Wan District had been divided into 18 planning areas, Moi Pa Village being in Area 18 in respect of which a detailed outline development plan (which he exhibited) had been prepared in 1975 and adopted for implementation in 1981. 29. The judge set out paragraphs 11 to 14 of Wan's evidence which was as follows:
30. In fact, as appears from the correspondence to which we have referred above, the intervention of Chan resulted in a re-submission to the Governor in Council of the question of the resumption of the resumed lots and the other lots subsequently specified in G.N. 2540. The judge set out (at p. 55) Wan's evidence about this. In paragraph 21 of his affirmation Wan had said:
31. The judge added:
The memorandum in question is dated the 11th July 1990 and purports to have been sent to the District Lands Officer, Tsuen Wan by the Principal Government Land Agent (Specialist) in the Lands Administration Office of the Buildings and Lands Department. The memoranddm is in the following terms: "Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance (Chapter 124) PWP Item No. 5CG Resumption of Land for Development at Hoi Pa Village - Remaining Engineering works Tsuen Wan, New Territories ----------------------------------------------------------------------- On 26 June 1990, having considered memorandum XCR(90)100, the Council ADVISED and the Governor ORDERED that -
2. The resumption of the private land referred to in paragraph 7 of the above-mentioned memorandum has accordingly been ordered under section 3 of the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance. A notice to this effect giving the three months' notice of resumption will be published in the Government Gazette on 20 July 1990.
At the hearing of the appeal this court was informed by leading counsel for the Crown (who did not appear below) that, according to his junior counsel (who did appear below), the admissibility of Wan's evidence of the resumption order had been questioned by the applicants' leading counsel (who did not appear on the appeal), whereupon the Crown had produced the memorandum without objection from the applicants' counsel. 32. The judge set out (at p.33) paragraph 23 of Wan's affirmation in which he had said of the specific need for the resumption of the land in Stage IIB.
33. In reply to Chan's summary of the applicants' case in paragraph 15 of his first affirmation (set out above) Wan had affirmed, (in a passage in paragraph 47 of his affirmation which the judge set out at p.34) that:
34. In a careful judgment the judge addressed a number of the applicants' and Crown's arguments which are not material to this appeal. In particular his rejection of the argument, advanced by Mr. Martin Lee Q.C. on behalf of the applicants, that the Governor and/or the Governor in Council had failed to take into account all relevant factors and/or had taken into account irrelevant factors, has not been pursued on appeal. 35. It appears from the judgment that the applicants had two bases for their argument in support of their ultra vires argument. The first basis was that foreshadowed in paragraph 15(a) and (b) of Chan's first affirmation. The judge encapsulated this argument in the following passage (at p.25) of his judgment:
36. The Crown's answer to this argument, advanced by Mr. McNamara in reliance on Wan's evidence, was summarised by the judge (at p.34) as follows:
37. The judge defined the issue (at p.35) between the parties as follows:
38. The judge accepted the Crown's answer to the first basis for the applicants' argument on the ultra vires issue. He concluded (at p.55) that ".... road widening" was "only one aspect of the whole balanced development concept" and accepted that Government's proposal to sell off some parts of the resumed area for commercial development was, ".... but part of, and on the evidence, a necessary part of the overall scheme, to ensure a balanced development in accordance with government policy as to the best way to develop this new town." He held (at p.35) that the fact that the applicants might be able to do what the government could do "by the imposition of special conditions" was "not necessarily to the point. It does not detract from the public purpose of the resumption although it may go to Mr. Lee's second ground." 39. At the end of his judgment (at p.38, after rejecting Mr. McNamara's contention that the Ordinance empowered the Crown to resume land for the sole purpose of raising revenue by selling it) the judge stated clearly the ratio of his decision to reject the first basis for Mr. Lee's argument on the ultra vires issue. He observed:
40. There was a second basis for the applicants' case on the ultra vires issue. It is this basis which has been pursued on appeal. In substance it was contended that, properly construed, the gazetted resumption notice had identified "REMAINING ENGINEERING WORKS" as the purpose of the resumption, and that since the only engineering works contemplated were road works which affected only a miniscule part of the resumed lots, the resumption was ultra vires in respect of the remainder of those lots. The judge outlined the argument (at p.29) as follows:
41. The Crown's answer to this argument was accepted by the judge in the following next ensuing paragraph of his judgment:
42. On appeal Mr. John Griffiths Q.C. for the applicants raised the question whether the judge is to be understood in the above passage as accepting only Mr. McNamara's argument regarding the evidence of the clearance and drainage civil engineering works, and as leaving undecided Mr. Lee's argument on the construction of the resumption notice. In our opinion, in their context, where the judge was addressing both Mr. McNamara's contentions, the words emphasised by underlining in the above citation indicate the judge's rejection of Mr. Lee's argument on the construction of the notice. Any possible doubt on this point must, in our opinion, be removed by the judge's last words on the ultra vires issue (at p.38) which were.
43. On appeal it has been the second limb of the applicants' argument on the ultra vires issue that has been advanced by Mr. Griffiths on the applicants' behalf. The applicants' amended notice of appeal contained four grounds of appeal, two of which (grounds (3) and (4)) were not expressed to be dependent upon the construction of the resumption notice contended for by the applicants. Mr. Griffiths having made it clear during the hearing of the appeal that (a) the foundation of the applicant's case was the construction of the resumption notice contended for on their behalf below and on appeal and (b) the court was not competent (leaving aside Wedhesbury unreasonableness) to challenge the decision of Government that the re-sale of the resumed lots was necessary to ensure balanced development, the only two grounds of appeal which were effectively argued were grounds (1) and (2). 44. Ground (1) was to the effect that the judge had erred in holding that the resumption of the resumed lots was for a public purpose since the resumption notice had specified the particular public purpose of "REMAINING ENGINEERING WORKS", giving a public works reference (PWP ITEM No. 5CG) which showed that the works in question were road works which affected only a small portion of the resumed lots. It followed that the resumption notice, having purported to cover the entirety of those lots, must be pro tanto ultra vires. 45. Ground (2) attacked the judge's finding (at pp.29 and 33) stated in the ground to be that "if the words 'REMAINING ENGINEERING - WORKS' in the resumption notice were part of the stated purpose, the Crown would still be justified in resuming "(emphasis supplied) the resumed lots ".... because of the necessity for the government to do the clearance and drainage civil engineering works of the whole area of which the said lots only, formed a part.....". The basis for this ground was that there was no evidence (a) that PWP ITEM NO. 5CG showed any such clearance or drainage civil engineering works or (b) that such clearance or drainage civil engineering works (if any) would affect the entirety or substantial portions of the resumed lots. 46. We mention that (at p.29 of his judgment) the judge did not use the words appearing in ground (2) which we have emphasised by underlining above, but he accepted the words "they are justified by the evidence" which he mentioned as having been used by Mr. McNamara in argument. We accept that later in his judgment (at p.35) the judge, after holding that "The road widening is only one aspect of the whole balanced development concept", added:
However, reading his judgment as a whole in the light of the passages cited above in relation to the ultra vires issue we understand the judge to have rejected Mr. Lee's "second string" argument (based on the narrow construction of the resumption notice as confined to engineering works) and to have decided the ultra vires issue on a wider basis than that implied in ground (2). 47. At the hearing the substance of Mr. Griffiths' argument on behalf of the applicants was that, properly construed, the resumption notice, read in conjunction with the data on the resumption plan mentioned in the notice, had not simply referred to requirement for an unspecified public purpose in accordance with section 19, but had described the particular purpose of the resumption, namely remaining engineering works. It was contended that those works were identifiable as road works by reference to the relevant public works expenditure item (PWP ITEM No. 5CG referred to in the heading of the resumption notice and at the foot of the resumption plan No. TWPK 725) and by reference to Engineering Drawing NO. TWCE/835B (T.D.D.) mentioned in the resumption plan. The latter drawing, it was contended, had been inspected by a member of Moffoot's staff and showed only minimal impingement by the proposed road works on two (according to Moffoot) or four (according to Wan) of the resumed lots. 48. On the basis of this interpretution of the resumption notice it was further contended that in the absence of any evidence that clearance works (which could not in any event be called engineering works) or drainage works were identified by the relevant public works expenditure item or engineering drawing, the judge could not have properly had regard to such works as "REMAINING ENGINEERING WORKS" within the meaning of the resumption notice. Emphasis was also put on the fact that there was no evidence in the correspondence or the affirmation of Wan to contradict Chan's assertion that no works other than road works were required to be executed on any of the resumed lots, as distinct from land in Stage IIB or other parts of Area 18 which had been affected by the "Block resumption". 49. On this basis the necessary inference was that any part of any of the resumed lots which was not required for road works would not be required for a public purpose and therefore its inclusion in the resumption notice was ultra vires. Recognising that the relief sought by the applicants related to the resumption order made by the Governor under section 5, and not in terms to the resumption notice, Mr. Griffiths contended that, having regard to the scheme of the Ordinance, which does not provide for the publication of the resumption order (or indeed that a resumption order should be a written order), the parties and the court should proceed on the basis that the resumption notice reflected and was in the same terms as the order made by the Governor. 50. There had been no discovery in the proceedings below and no regard seems to have been had to the requirements of Order 53 rule 9(2), but the judge admitted the hearsay evidence of the order contained in the affirmation of Wan and he admitted without objection the buildings and Lands Department memorandum dated the 11th July 1990 which was produced below by counsel for the Crown as evidence of the terms of the decision of the Governor in Council and of the terms of the Governor's order under section 3. There was no ground of appeal directed to this matter. On the other hand it has not been contended by the Crown at any stage of these proceedings that the resumption notice contains anything inconsistent with the order to which it relates. 51. We accept the submission of Mr. James Findlay Q.C. for the Crown that if the resumption notice is invalid, or partially invalid, but the order itself is valid, this would only result in the postponement of the reversion of most of the resumed lots under sections 4 and 5 and would not preclude the publication of a fresh valid resumption notice. However Mr. Griffiths contended that, in any event, the memoranddm containing the terms of the order included the same heading as the resumption notice and was therefore afflicted with the same vice as that notice. 52. Having concluded, for the reasons given below, that the resumption notice is not to be interpreted as purporting to relate to a resumption order which is pro tanto ultra vires in relation to those parts of the resumed lots which are not required for road works, we find it unnecessary to determine what would be the effect on the order itself (the body of which identifies a specified public purpose) of holding the published notice of that order to be framed in terms reflecting an order which would be pro tanto ultra vires. 53. In construing the resumption notice, which is a creature of statute, we have borne in mind the following settled principles relied upon by Mr. Griffiths:
54. On the other hand, for the Crown Mr. Findlay stressed the great width of the power conferred by the Ordinance upon the Governor in Council to determine what is a public purpose for purposes of land resumption. Whilst conceding that the conciusive evidence provision in section 19 did not apply if the resumption notice stated a particular purpose for the resumption, he contended, citing Wheeler v. Kelly [1956]30 A.L.J. 176, 178 that save in exceptional circumstances (such as bad faith or unreasonablehess which did not exist here) the resuming authority should be the final arbiter of what is a public purpose. He relied on Mamabal Framjee Petit v. Becretary of State for India (1914) A.I.R. 20 (P.C.) for the proposition that, even without the power conferred by paragraph (d) in the definition of "resumption for public purposes" in section 2 of the Ordinance, the courts could not "easily" hold the resuming authority to be wrong. 55. The crucial question of construction that arises in this case is whether the heading of the resumption notice may be permitted to be taken into account when construing the body of the notice and, if so, to what extent may it be permitted to influence or control the meaning or ambit of the operative provisions in the notice. No authority was cited on this question. We can see no reason why, in appropriate circumstances, the ambit of very general language "required for a public purpose" in the body of the notice should not be considered as intended to be limited to a specific purpose or purposes specified in the heading. Put another way, the heading is part of the notice and may be regarded as having a purpose. 56. By analogy with headings in a statute it seems to us that the heading in a statutory notice may be used as a guide, albeit a brief and unexhaustive guide, in the interpretation of the meaning or scope of the operative provisions of the notice. c.f. the majority opinions in Director of Prosecutions v. Schildkamp [1971] AC 1 cited in Cross on Statutory Interpretation, 2nd edition at p.129 and Bennion on Statutory Interpretation at p.550 para 281. 57. In the present case we have no difficulty in accepting that the heading of the resumption notice was intended to limit the generality of the purpose stated in the body of the notice. However, as Mr. Findlay rightly submitted, the applicants must show that the effect of the heading, read in conjunction with the body of the notice and the contents of the resumption plan is that the notice specifies only the remaining engineering works as the public purpose of the resumption. This they cannot do. Assuming in the applicants' favour, contrary to the Crown's submissions, that the only engineering works identifiable under the notice and the contents of the resumption plan is the road works, the heading of the notice is, in our opinion, clearly not confined to engineering works. The full text and spacing is. "G.N. 2540 BUILDINGS AND LANDS DEPARTMENT CROWN LANDS RESUMPTION ORDINANCE (Chapter 124) RESUMPTION OF LAND FOR DEVELOPMENT AT HOI PA VILLAGE - REMAINING ENGINEERING WORKS TSUEN WAN, NEW TERRITORIES" (Emphasis supplied) 58. It seems to us to be inescapable that, as Mr. McNamara argued before the judge, the reference to remaining engineering works is only part of the heading. The reference to those works clearly has to be read, (as Mr. Findlay contended without any effective answer from Mr. Griffiths), as conjunctive to the earlier words emphasised by underlining. The emphasised words unambiguously state that the proposed resumption is for development at Hoi Pa Village. The public works expenditure reference relates to the engineering works. Assuming those works to be only road works we nevertheless can see no reason for interpreting the words relating to development at Hoi Pa Village as limited by the public works reference to road works. The combined effect of the heading and the body of the notice is therefore that the resumption order which is being notified is an order for development at Hoi Pa Village including remaining engineering works and that that is the public purpose for which the Governor has made the order. 59. In his reply Mr. Griffitns submitted that the resumption notice was at least ambiguous, that the hyphen before the reference to engineering works in the heading arguably required that reference to be given a disjunctive meaning and that accordingly the notice should be read in favour of the subject and not the Crown. We are unable to accept the submission on ambiguity. The heading seems to us to be wholly unambiguous and we can see no basis for ignoring or qualifying the words referring to development at Hoi Pa Village which indeed relate to the Crown's repeatedly stated purpose for the resumption. 60. Accordingly the corner stone of the applicants' argument on appeal falls away, and, with it, the entire edifice built upon it in relation to the judge's conclusions on the evidence regarding engineering works. 61. The appeal is therefore dismissed. We make an order nisi awarding the costs of the appeal to the Crown.
Representation: John Griffiths, Q.C. & Warren Chan (Liad, Ho & Chan) for Appellants/Applicants J. Findlay, Q.C. & Miss V. Hartstein (Crown Solicitor) for Respondent |
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