The Queen v. Wong Seck-hung and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 1133/1988 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 24 February 1989.
1. On the 13th September 1988 the appeallants were both convicted in the Magistrates Court at North Kowloon on three charges of offering an advantage to an agent, contrary to section 9(2)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. It is against these convictions that they appeal and it is said, that for a number of reasons set out in separate grounds that the convictions are unsafe and unsatisfactory.
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HCMA001133/1988 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG (Appellate Jurisdiction) MAGISTRACY CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1133 OF 1988 -------------------- BETWEEN
------------------- Coram: Hon Hooper J. In Court Date of hearing: 15 February 1989 Date of delivery of judgment: 24 February 1989 --------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- 1. On the 13th September 1988 the appeallants were both convicted in the Magistrates Court at North Kowloon on three charges of offering an advantage to an agent, contrary to section 9(2)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. It is against these convictions that they appeal and it is said, that for a number of reasons set out in separate grounds that the convictions are unsafe and unsatisfactory. 2. In Charge A, it was alleged, inter alia, that on or about the 27th March 1987 they offered a gift, fee, commission or reward of HK$4,750 td an agent Wong Kong-sang, an employee of Nicetime Industrial Limited (Nicetime) as an inducement to or reward for, or otherwise on account of his doing or having done an act in relation to his principal's affairs or business, namely the purchase of piece goods by Nicetime from (the two appellants) of Sun Hing Trading Company (Sun Hing). 3. Charges B and C were couched in identical language except that the dates are 1st April 1987 and 1st May 1987 respectively and the amounts HK$17,580 and HK$1,650 respectively. 4. So the Crown case against the appellants was in essence that on three occasions they both offered kickbacks to WONG of Nicetime in return for WONG (as agent for Nicetime) purchasing piece goods from their company Sun Hing. 5. Most of the evidence against the appellants in the court below consisted of their own answers under caution to questions in interviews conducted by I.C.A.C. officers. As these answers could only be admissible against the maker, it is convenient first to look at the evidence of a general nature against them. 6. PW1, Ho Kin-wah, a director of Nicetime, gave evidence that there were two shareholders of Nicetime namely he himself, and a Madam Fung. However, he was the person solely in charge of the operation of Nicetime whose business was the export of garments and wholesaling of finished garments. In January 1987, he employed Wong Kong-sang whose duty was to be responsible for the wholesaling department on terms that he would obtain 30% of the profit, the other 70% going to Nicetime. Apart from Mr Wong Kong-sang there was another employee, a Mr Fong. Both were on similar terms. Each would be paid $12,000 per month to be accounted for in due course when the profits were calculated. 7. When Nicetime purchased piece goods from other suppliers, the procedure was that Mr Wong would be responsible for dealings with the other company and he would also select the piece goods and make the necessary order. When the relevant invoice was presented to Nicetime, after obtaining the goods, somebody from Nicetime usually wrote the cheques to be supplied for payment. After payment was settled, Nicetime would ask for a receipt from the supplier. None of the employees for Nicetime was authorised to solicit or accept any advantages in relation to the affairs of the company. He had never authorised WONG or FONG to accept advantages. As far as he knows, Mrs Fung did not do so. 8. He apparently had no personal recollection of these three transactions. 9. He testified "From the records kept by my company Nicetime, I was aware my company had dealing with Sun Hing." 10. He then purported to state what these transactions were but his evidence in this respect was hearsay. I do not propose to refer to it. 11. He said that when he settled payment with Sun Hing Trading Company there were three persons in Nicetime entitled to sign cheques, himself, Madam Fung and a Mr Law. He only learned from the records who had signed the cheques. 12. The business records would be kept in a particular part of his company. After he checked company 's record in relation to Sun Hing, he went to the bank and asked for photocopies of the cheques. As far as he could recall, the cheques Nicetime drew involved three banks. He went on to give evidence about his invest investigations at the banks and how he received a cheque and two certified copies of cheques. However these cheques were not produced in evidence in the court below. There was therefore no admissible evidence to establish that the cheques he was referring to related to these three transactions. 13. He produced three cash sale memos, exhibits P1, P2 and P3, which he said he found amongst his company's records when he traced back the transactions with Sun Hing. 14. He then purported to explain these invoices but of course his evidence in relation to these was hearsay. 15. He testified ''From my knowledge, I do know whether payment has been made on these three invoices, but I am not in a position to tell is the specified dates of the payments of the cheques. 16. It would appear that his evidence as to whether payment was made on these cheques is hearsay because no cheques or bank records were ever produced and his knowledge appears to have been based upon his inquiries. He said :-
17. In cross-examination, he said, inter alia, "......the matter of negotiating with other organisation was left entirely up to Mr Wong". 18. And later ''Before Mr Wong joined our company we usually discussed on the price of cloth first, and after he joined our company we fixed the amount of capital and he was then allowed to do dealings by his own." 19. He admitted that the fixing of price levels was very much a matter of negotiation. He agreed he often received cheques to sign. Often there were a number of cheques for him to sign that had already been written out. 20. It was his accountant who was responsible for the book keeping of the company. He admitted that sometimes people associated with the company would receive money from the company and pay it into the books of the company. 21. The accountant did not give evidence. No bank records were produced and it would appear that all PW1 knew about the three transactions between Nicetime and Sun Hing was what he had gleaned from perusal of the records and from his inquiries. 22. The next witness who gave evidence of a general nature was PW2 Mr Lo Fat-yiu, an investigator of the I.C.A.C. He testified that on the 26th November 1987 he attended Sun Hing where he saw the two appellants. He executed a search warrant issued under section 17 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance and seized a number of document. Amongst these were exhibits P5(a) and (b) and exhibit P6, which purport to be duplicates of the three invoices, exhibits P1, P2 and P3 respectively. He also seized a cheque book of Kwong On Bank, exhibit P7, containing a cheque stub No. 145790 in which was written "27/3" and the figure "4750". He seized another cheque book of Hua Chiao Commercial Bank Limited, exhibit P8, containing a cheque stub No. 229713 on which was written "¼"and the figure ''17,580''. 23. He then returned to the I.C.A.C. offices at Murray Road Building. Between 2:10 p.m. and 5:15 p.m. he interviewed the 1st appellant. He t en produced in evidence as exhibit P9 the record of interview with the 1st appellant (who was D1 in the court below). 24. The third and last witness for the prosecution was PW3 Yeung Kwong, another investigating officer of the I.C.A.C. He merely gave evidence of his interview with the 2nd appellant (D2 in the court below) on the 26th November 1987 commencing at 1:45 p.m. It concluded, he said, at 5: p.m. He also produced it as evidence against the 2nd appellant as exhibit P10. 25. Neither appellant gave evidence or called any witness. 26. It can be seen at once that without the evidence of the statements made by the appellants, the Crown did not have a case as there was no evidence that either of them had offered any advantage to Wong or that Wong had been paid any sum at all 27. The Crown rely very much upon the individual records of interview signed by each appellant as a basis for his conviction. Mr Blanchflower, who appears for the Crown, recognises that these records did not amount to completely unequivocal confessions and concedes it was necessary for the magistrate to be selective in his approach and to draw inferences to establish the essential ingredients of the offences. 28. The task of the magistrate and that of Mr Blanchflower for the Crown has not been made any easier by the way in which the case was presented in the court below. No cheques were ever produced. No bank records were produced. No receipts were ever produced. No accountant, accounts clerk or book keeper from Nicetime or Sun Hing was called. When the magistrate reached his findings of guilt, he relied very much on inference. His findings are attacked by Mr Wong for the appellants in respect of the inferences he drew arid his alleged to consider other matters. It is also suggested that he was wrong in admitting the record of interview, exhibit P9, in evidence against the 1st appellant. It is also complained that having admitted it, he used part of one caution statement of one appellant against the other appellant in coming to his conclusion that they each knowingly involved in a joint enterprise. 29. The first three pages of the magistrate's statement of findings consist of a summary of the evidence. He then sets out his findings of facts as folllows :-
30. It is the magistrate's act of setting out his findings of facts against the two appellants, jointly in the same paragraphs which provides the basis for the criticism this he considered the cautioned statements, exhibits P9 and P10 together. I think it would have been better had he dealt with his findings against each appellant separately, but he in his reasons for decision that he was aware that the statements were only admissible against the maker and that he did not use one appellant's statement against the other. Had he set out his findings separately in respect of each appellant, this criticism in ground 6 of the Grounds of Appeal could not have been levelled at him. 31. So far as the magistrate is criticised for failing to exclude exhibit P9 in ground 5 of the grounds of appeal, on the basis that the 1st appellant had not been properly cautioned objection was raised to the admission of this exhibit at the trial and defence counsel relied specifically upon its contents in his defence a of the 1st appellant. There is, therefore nothing in this ground of appeal. 32. The grounds of appeal specifically attack the findings of fact set out in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15 and 16 referred to above. 33. Having set out the evidence admissible generally against both appellants and the magistrate's findings of fact, it will be seen, how very much the magistrate was forced to rely upon the contents of the individual records of interview to bring in these findings. The Record of Interview of the 1st appellant, exhibit P9 34. In answer (3) the 1st appellant admitted that he is the sole proprietor of Sun Hing and in answer (4) that he has a customer called Nicetime. In answer (5) he stated that Lee Shui-cheung was responsible for making business contact with Nicetime and went on to state in answer (6) that Lee Shui-cheung was his door-to-door salesman. 35. Pausing for a moment, I think the magistrate was justified in drawing the inference from this evidence and the identification of PW2, the I.C.A.C. officer, of the 2nd appellant as one of the two persons he met in the office of Sun Hing, that the Lee Shui-cheung the 1st appellant was referring to as his salesman was in fact the 2nd appellant. 36. PW2, the interviewing officer, in the course of the interview with the 1st appellant showed him there photocopies of three cash sale memoranda marked 6127, 6142 and 6247. (i.e. the same numbers as appear on exhibits and P3 and exhibits P5 (6127, 6142) and exhibit P6 (6247)). In answer (8), the 1st appellant states that he recognises that these were related to business transactions made with Nicetime. In answer he states he did not know which person in Nicetime his company contacted when doing business and suggests that the interviewer should ask Lee Shui-cheung. 37. Now it is apparent from this answer that the 1st appellant did not have any personal knowledge of the negotiations that went on between the representative of Nicetime and Mr Lee Shui-cheung. All he knew about it was what he had been told by Lee. Thus, when he was asked in question (10) ''Did Nicetime requested to have commission or discount when doing business with Sun Hing?'' he was asked a question which invited a hearsay answer and it a hearsay answer. The answer was ''Yes, it is to overstate the amounts on the bills and to give Nicetime staff the difference between the overstated amount and the actual price related to the bill.'' 38. Of course a man can confess to his own acts, knowledge or intentions, but he cannot confess as to the acts of other persons which he has not seen and of which he can only have knowledge by hearsay. Surujpaul v. R. (1958)42 Cr. App. R. 266, 273 P.C., Archbold, 43rd edn. Vol 1, paragraph 15-52. 39. Answer (10) can therefore only be an indication at the most of the 1st appellant's belief of what had happened based upon what he had been told. 40. In answer (11) the 1st appellant says that he doesn't know which staff of Nicetime would be paid, saying that he only wrote a cheque to give to Lee Shui-cheung. 41. In answer (12) he admits that it was Lee Shui Cheung who suggested to overstate the amount on the bill so as to affect the discount ''in such a manner''. 42. Question (13) was "Why, did you give discount to Nicetime staff in such a way?'' And the answer is merely a way of doing business moreover my company suffered no loss." 43. This question seems to assume that the 1st appellant had given a discount to staff of Nicetime, when the 1st appellant had not said that he personally gave the discount. The answer can be taken to mean no more than that the 1st appellant intended to give such a discount to the staff of Nicetime as it was merely a way of doing business and he would suffer no loss. 44. The interviewer then started to question the 1st appellant on the individual transactions. He referred to invoice ''6127'' (presumably exhibit Pl or 5(a)) :-
45. The words ''should be'' do not indicate that this actually happened but that it is what, should have happened or what he would have expected to happen. 46. The interviewer then turns to a book of cheque stubs.
47. In view of the reference to the account number cheque stub number, this must refer to exhibit P7. 48. It is not evidence that the cheque really was used to pay the staff of Nicetime, because the lst appellant had no dealings with the staff and did not even know who the staff was. It can only be evidence of intention as far as the 1st appellant is concerned. 49. In answer 18, the 1st appellant states that if the name of the payee is not written on the stub, it should be a cash cheque. 50. So that answer is either supposition or a statement of what he would expect to happen. 51. The interviewer then turned to a document which was not produced in evidence at the trial.
52. As this ''bank transaction book" was not in evidence, the assumption of facts set out in question 19 is hearsay as is the answer. The answers to both questions 19 and 20 can prove no more than that the 1st appellant records on a document not produced the words ''discount paid to Nicetime''. It is not evidence that a discount was in fact paid because the 1st appellant does not say he personally paid it or was present when it was paid. He merely made such an entry. 53. Mr Blanchflower argues that the 1st appellant accepted that he made the entry on page 7 and he agreed with that assertion of fact and had was able to do that because he was the author of those entries. With respect to Mr Blanchflower that cannot be so. Unless the 1st appellant had personal knowledge that a discount was paid to Nicetime or anybody else, he could not confess to that. At the most, it was evidence of what the 1st appellant intended should happen. Even Mr Blanchflower accepts that the statement cannot be completely accurate because it purports to say that Nicetime got the discount and it is his case that Nicetime didn't in fact get the discount. However, even here he is in difficulties because we have no accounts or bank documents of Nicetime in evidence showing what sums were paid to Nicetime during the period in question. 54. The position is the same in respect of the second transaction. The interviewer shows the lst appellant the written memo stated to be numbered 6142 dated the 28th March 1987 (presumably exhibit P2 or exhibit P5(b)).
55. So these answers indicate what the 1st appellant's understanding of the matter was and what he himself did, in other words, write out a cheque and give it to Lee. 56. The interviewer then turned to a cheque book which he stated to be Sun Hing's account opened at Un Chau Street Branch of the Hua Chiao Commercial Bank numbered 064-790-00002713, cheque stub number 229713 dated 1/4 discount for Nicetime"amount $17,580. Presumably this relates to exhibit P8. He asked in question 24 if this cheque was used to pay Nicetime staff the difference. 57. The answer was "yes". Again, this answer can only be hearsay or supposition, because the 1st appellant did not deal with the staff member of Nicetime himself. It is evidence that the 1st appellant wrote out the cheque intending that it should be used to pay the staff of Nicetime. 58. When asked in question 25 if the name of the payee was written on the cheque, the answer was "probably no", which again is supposition. 59. The interviewer then showed the 1st appellant what he called a "bank transaction book" "Hua Chiao" which was not admitted in evidence before the magistrate. Again, the answer that the 1st appellant gave to the assumption made by the interviewer from that document is of limited use to the Crown.
60. The Crown cannot rely on these answers to prove that that a deposit of $93,760 was made in the name of Nicetime on the 30th March which the interviewer said was stated on page 6. The 1st appellant's answer concerning page 7 is evidence that the entry was written by him and that he was intending to pay $17,580 on the 1st April as a cash discount for Nicetime and was intending to refer to memo 6127. 61. The interviewer then turned to the third transaction.
62. This is evidence of the 1st appellant's intention at the time.
63. This is of course supposition and not evidence that payment was made at all, let alone in cash. 64. In answer to question 31, the 1st appellant supposed that Nicetime's staff made the suggestion to Sun Hing's salesman lee that Lee mentioned it to the 1st appellant and that he the 1st appellant had not objected because it did not cause loss to his company. 65. In answer to question 32, the appellant did not even know who wrote out the three memoranda. 66. In question 33, the interviewer assumes that Nicetime staff received the difference between the price on the memo and the actual price and asked if the 1st appellant knew if he gave the difference back to Nicetime. Again, the 1st appellant's answer was that he didn't know. 67. When asked in question 34 why he termed the difference in prices as ''discount",the 1st appellant replied "the difference in prices were not received by my company so they were written as discount''. 68. When asked in question 35 why he did not make a cheque payable to Nicetime, the 1st appellant replied "anyone can collect payment for a cash cheque''. 69. When asked in question 36 ''Why didn't you directly write Nicetime as the payee of the cheque'', the 1st appellant replied ''at the request of their staff''. 70. Of course, that is evidence of his understanding Since no request had been made directly to him. 71. With regard to the two cheques for $4750 and $17,580 respectively, he was asked to whom he gave them and he replied ''After I wrote out the cheques I put them in the petty cash box. However, I am not sure whether its Nicetime staff who came to collect the two cheques himself or its my staff who gave the cheques to him.'' 72. So again he does riot have personal knowledge about what happened. That was the totality of the evidence against the 1st appellant. 73. Leaving aside ground 1 of the grounds of appeal, ground 2 is that there was no or no sufficient evidence for the magistrate to draw the inference ''that if the prices were not inflated, the orders would not have been placed with Sun Hing'' and to come to the conclusion that "the offer of the private benefit to Wong preceded the placing of the contracts''. Ground 4 is that there was no or no sufficient evidence to support the magistrate's finding of fact under paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 1 5 and 16 of his findings of fact referred to earlier. 74. With respect to the magistrate, think the 1st appellant must succeed on both these grounds. As far as the evidence against him was concerned, there was ample evidence that he intended that payment should be made to a staff member of Nicetime representing the difference between the cash price and the inflated price, but there was no admissible evidence against the 1st appellant that an offer was made to Wong Kong-sang by Lee on his behalf or that the money was ever paid to Wong Kong-sang. For that matter there was no evidence to prove that the goods were ever delivered, that the goods were ever paid for, that the discount cheque was ever cashed, or that cash was ever offered or handed over to Wong Kong Sang. With the greatest respect to Mr Blanchflower, I do not agree that there was sufficient evidence in these answers to indicate that the 1st appellant had offered anything to Wong Kong-sang. The fact that he admits agreeing to the suggestion which had been put to him by Lee, does not amount to an offer within the meaning of section 2(2)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. The agreement referred to in that provision means an agreement with the person to whom the offer is being made. There is no admissible evidence against the 1st appellant that he, himself, or the 2nd appellant on his behalf, agreed anything with Wong. I respectfully disagree with the submission of Mr Blanchflower that an inference can be drawn that the offer was made because of the presence of the invoices and the cheque stubs. For these reasons I allow the appeal of the 1st appellant and set aside the convictions arid sentences. The record of interview of the 2nd appellant Exhibit 75. In answer (3) the 2nd appellant purports to admit working for three odd years with Sun Hing and that Sun Hing does business in the wholesale and retail of piece goods. There were two proprietors the 1st appellant and a person called Wong Yun-kam. The business of the company was managed by the 2nd appellant. In answer (7), he is recorded as saying that Miss Chan Pui-wah handles the daily accounts. 76. He was then asked some irrelevant questions and then asked in question (10) how long he had known Mr Wong Kong-sang of Nicetime and he replied that he got to know him about March 1987". He is then asked about the transactions : -
77. In answer (13) the 2nd appellant is recorded as describing how the prices were inflated. He was asked about his own actions.
78. It can be reasonably referred from the reference to Wong Shek-hung that the 2nd appellant was referring to the 1st appellant since he was found if the premises by PW2 when the I.C.A.C. executed a search warrant at Sun Hing's premises on the 26th November. 79. In answer (15), the 2nd appellant says he understands the words "when the money arrived'' in the answer to 14th question to bean when a cheque has been received and honoured, the difference resulting from the inflation of price and requested by Wong Kong-sang would be given back to him. 80. The 2nd appellant was asked :-
81. So the 2nd appellant purports to admit there that he actually paid cash to Wong Kong-sang representing the difference between the inflated price and the real price and that this had been agreed to by the lst appellant. The interviewer deals with the first transaction in question (17). In answer to question (17 the 1st appellant purports to admit that a cash sale memo 6127 (presumably exhibit P5(a)) was written by him and that it should be relating to March and not April, since he had made a mistake about the month. In answer (18), he says that the cash sale memo which is white in colour, which was issued to Nicetime (presumably exhibit P1) had been corrected by the accounts clerk of Nicetime. 82. He admitted in answer (19) that his is the handwriting at the bottom of the white bill (presumably exhibit P1) but the handwriting in question was not actually identified. The interviewer then showed him the duplicate the cash sale memo 6127 of Sun Hing (presumably exhibit P5 (a)) and asked him the question :-
83. So far as the second transaction is concerned, the interviewer asked :
84. Although the 2nd appellant in his answers claims to have no idea whether Wong was ever paid in regard to these first two transactions, it is clear that he is admitting that the second transaction was the same as the first, and that he related Wong's request to the 1st appellant, and that after the 1st appellant had agreed, he agreed with Wong to give him the difference between the price. 85. That would be conduct which could fall within the term "offer" in section 9(2)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. The word "offer" as, explained in section 2(2) (a) is as follows :-
86. The 2nd appellant's answers indicate a confession that he agreed to Wong's request on both the first and second transactions to pay Wong the difference between the prices. 87. So far as the third transaction is concerned, the position is similar. He was shown by the interviewer a duplicate of cash sale memo 6247 (presumably exhibit P6) and asked the following questions :
88. However, in this transaction the 2nd appellant admits in answer (29) paying the sum of $1650 in cash. So there is not only conduct which would constitute an ''offer'', but there is also payment in cash on the third transaction by this appellant. 89. Later, the interviewer probed the 2nd appellant's understanding of Wong's position in Nicetime. Wang replied ''I have no idea but I believe he might be a buyer for In question (37), the interviewer stated he stated he had tome more questions, reminded the 2nd appellant he was still under caution and asked him if he understood. On the 2nd appellant's confirmation that he did, the interviewer asked the following questions :-
90. So this shows the practice of the 2nd appellant's company in paying a commission to a broker. 91. The 2nd appellant was then asked question (39) if Sun Hing gave any commision to Wong Kong-sang in the three transactions referred to and replied 'No, because he suppressed the price. The company also knew later that the difference between the prices had to be given to him, so he company treated it as commission."
92. The 2nd appellant's reference to the rebates being in the nature of cash discounts forms the basis of the 2nd appellant's grounds l and 3 which read :-
93. So far as ground 1 is concerned, whilst I agree with Mr Frank Wong that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that money had not been received by Nicetime, I consider that it is irrelevant. It is the mind of the appellant that must be looked at not the mind of Mr Wong Kong-sang. 94. So far as ground 3 is concerned, I consider that the offences of conspiracy to defraud and offering an advantage to an agent, etc. can exist side by side and are not mutally exclusive. 95. When Party A enters into an agreement with the agent of Party B that the price of goods being sold by Parity A to Party B should be inflated to enable the agent of Party B to make a secret commission as an inducement to or reward for or on account of his committing his principal (Party B) to the purchase of these goods, and these facts are known to both the agent and Party A, then Party A will be guilty of the offence of conspiracy to defraud Party B (by making him suffer the loss in the difference between the inflated price and the genuine price) and Party A will also be guilty of the offence under section 9(2)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (because the agreement to pay the secret commission) will constitute an "offer" within the meaning of section 2(2) (a) of that ordinance. 96. The real question in this case is whether there is sufficient evidence on the record of interview, exhibit P10 to enable the magistrate to convict the 2nd appellant on these three charges. 97. In my judgment there was. The magistrate was entitled to be selective in his acceptance of the answers to the record, exhibit P10. It is a reasonable inference for him to have drawn from the admissions contained therein that the 2nd appellant knew that Wong Kong-sang was after a secret commission in respect of his placing orders on Nicetime's behalf, by reason of the suggestion that the prices should be inflated on the invoices to go to Nicetime and that payment of the difference should be made to him, Wong Kong-sang. The 2nd appellant's agreement to this with Wong (having discussed the matter with the 1st appellant) was an offer within the Meaning of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. 98. For these reasons, I dismiss the appeal of the 2nd appellant and uphold the convictions. There is no appeal against sentence.
Representation: Mr M.C. Blanchflower, Sr. C.C., for Crown Mr Frank Wong (Tang, Wang & Cheung) for both Appellants. |