Wong Yung Kwai v. So Wai
Read the full judgment text of HCA 12929/1997 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 16 September 2004.
1. The plaintiff’s claim is for possession of a portion (about 72 sq ft) of Lot No.15, Pokfulam, of which the plaintiff is the registered owner. The said portion was let to the defendant as from 1 January 1967 at a yearly rental pursuant to an undated agreement between the plaintiff’s agent Wong Tam Po (“WTP”) and the defendant (Ex P1). The agreement stated that only three months’ notice was required to be given by the plaintiff to the defendant to repossess the portion, without payment of any
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HCA12929/1997 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO.12929 OF 1997 --------------------- BETWEEN
---------------------- Before : Hon Nguyen J in Court Dates of Hearing : 23-25 June 2004 Date of Judgment : 16 September 2004 J U D G M E N T The plaintiff’s claim 1.The plaintiff’s claim is for possession of a portion (about 72 sq ft) of Lot No.15, Pokfulam, of which the plaintiff is the registered owner. The said portion was let to the defendant as from 1 January 1967 at a yearly rental pursuant to an undated agreement between the plaintiff’s agent Wong Tam Po (“WTP”) and the defendant (Ex P1). The agreement stated that only three months’ notice was required to be given by the plaintiff to the defendant to repossess the portion, without payment of any compensation to the defendant. The plaintiff through his solicitors in a letter dated 11 March 1997 gave three months’ notice of termination and demanded possession on or before 30 June 1997. 2.On or about 13 October 1995 without the plaintiff’s consent the defendant trespassed on 207.70 sq ft of the plaintiff’s lot which was adjacent to the portion leased to the defendant. An illegal structure was built on the land trespassed. 3.The plaintiff claims for possession of the portion leased and the further portion trespassed upon, an injunction to require the defendant to remove the illegal structure, and mesne profits totalling $86,169.22 from November 1997 to June 2002 inclusive. The plaintiff’s evidence 4.According to the plaintiff and the documents filed, the chronology appears to be as follows :
5.The plaintiff agreed that before 13 October 1995 he suggested raising the rent but the defendant indicated she did not agree to any rent increase. The plaintiff agreed that all the solicitors’ letters were written on his behalf based on instructions given by him. He agreed he did not tell Szeto & Yeung about the existence of Ex P1. The defendant’s evidence 6.She is aged 80 and said that she lived in the house next door to the plaintiff’s lot and asked WTP if he would rent that lot to her. He said yes. This was 40 years ago. The lot was vacant. WTP allowed her to live there. She said she would pay $30 per annum as rent. After 8 to 10 years he asked her to increase it to $50 per annum. She agreed. She paid the rent to WTP. There was never any discussion about the length of the notice to quit. The lot which exists today is the same as it was then. The plaintiff is WTP’s son. After WTP died, the defendant paid the rent to WTP’s wife but she would not accept. She asked the defendant to pay it to her son. The defendant’s son took the rent to the plaintiff’s house in the village but he would not accept it. The rent was paid once a year in about October. 7.Forty years ago the defendant erected a house made of wooden planks but it became dilapidated so she rebuilt it. The present house was the third house and was made of bricks. She offered the rent to the plaintiff but he would not accept. 8.When the defendant first rented the lot, she did not sign Ex P1. WTP wrote three lines on a piece of paper which was not as wide or long or contained as many words as Ex P1. This was about one to two years after she rented the lot. WTP said it was only to show that the defendant paid him rent. The defendant was illiterate and signed on no paper. She used a chop for her bank account. She is willing to carry on renting the lot but is not paying rent at the moment. The last time she paid rent, it was $50 per annum. The plaintiff proposed that the new rent should be at $5,000 per annum. The defendant’s son suggested signing a lease for 20 years but the plaintiff would not agree. 9.The wooden house was used for living and not as a kitchen. Thirty years ago the defendant and her family comprising her husband, father‑in‑law and six sons moved to Wah Fu Estate and surrendered her original lot (adjacent to the plaintiff’s lot) to the landlord. Five of her sons moved to Wah Fu and the defendant and her husband and 3rd son remained in the plaintiff’s lot. The lot of the plaintiff was 300 sq ft. The new wooden house which was built was attached to the defendant’s original house. The present brick house was built about 10 years ago. The second house was also made of wood and was about the same size as the first house. 10.The defendant never allowed others to use the plaintiff’s lot. In 1989 the defendant and the plaintiff went to the Lands Tribunal and the judge ruled that the defendant need not leave and could stay on the plaintiff’s lot. That time what was produced in Court was the three‑line note written by WTP, not Ex P1. 11.So Ka Chau is the defendant’s brother. He did live on the plaintiff’s lot once, and stayed there for 10 odd days. The defendant never left the lot and allowed her brother to use it. Her brother only used a bedspace on the lot. The defendant lived in Stanley for two years and during that time her 3rd son lived on the plaintiff’s lot with his family. Presently, for 10 days in a month, the defendant lives on the lot. The brick house is the same size as the wooden hut. Assessment of the evidence 12.The plaintiff’s evidence that his agent WTP had rented 72 sq ft to the defendant at the rental of $50 per annum and that only three months’ notice was required to repossess the lot, without any compensation being payable, is hearsay. WTP has been deceased since 1985. The plaintiff admitted that all the letters written on his behalf by solicitors were based on instructions given to them by him. Taking into account the first letter written by Philip K.H. Wong & Co. on 26 November 1987 when the solicitors gave the defendant one year’s notice to quit, and the following letters culminating in the letter of 22 March 1996 written by Paul T.S. Lam & Co. when the solicitors spoke of a trespass “on a date unknown to our client”, and taking into account the letters written between those two dates, for example, the letter of 2 April 1990 by Philip K.H. Wong & Co. giving the defendant about one year and nine months’ notice to quit, my view is that the plaintiff’s conduct during those years is totally inconsistent with his case as presented in Court, namely, that there was an agreement signed by the defendant leasing 72 sq ft as from 1 January 1967 and agreeing to only three months’ notice to quit and that on 13 October 1995 the plaintiff witnessed the defendant trespassing onto his land which was adjacent to the 72 sq ft leased to the defendant by the defendant building a new house thereon. On a balance of probabilities, I prefer the evidence of the defendant to that of the plaintiff. Despite her age (80), the defendant gave clear and consistent evidence. Her evidence was she was illiterate and could not have signed any agreements. The plaintiff’s land which was leased to her by an oral agreement between herself and WTP was always the same size, about 300 sq ft and she never trespassed onto the plaintiff’s land. The brick house which now stands on the land was the third house built by her and it replaced the previous two wooden houses which were either dilapidated or torn down. I therefore find as a fact that Ex P1 was not signed by the defendant, either at the commencement of the tenancy on 1 January 1967 or at any time. 13.I find as a fact that the defendant leased the plaintiff’s lot some 40 years ago by an oral agreement between herself and the plaintiff’s agent WTP. The rental agreed upon was $30 per annum and that was later increased to $50 per annum. The whole of the plaintiff’s lot measuring about 300 sq ft was leased to the defendant and there were no discussions at any time between herself and either WTP or subsequently, the plaintiff himself, about the length of any notices to quit for the plaintiff to terminate the tenancy. I find as a fact that the defendant at no time trespassed upon any part of the plaintiff’s lot as the whole lot was leased to her right from the beginning. The law 14.My finding above is that there was created some 40 years ago a yearly tenancy between the plaintiff and the defendant at the annual rental of $50. As such, the tenancy enjoys the protection of the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance, Cap.7, section 50 of which states that subject to subsection (6), Part II of the Ordinance applies to every domestic tenancy and domestic sub‑tenancy of post‑war premises, whether the same was effected orally or in writing and notwithstanding any provision in such tenancy or sub‑tenancy, including any provision purporting generally or specifically to exclude Part II. Subsection (6) states that Part II shall not apply to inter alia, a tenancy or sub‑tenancy of agricultural land, which expression shall have the meaning assigned to it by section 36 of the Rating Ordinance (Cap.116), including such a tenancy or sub‑tenancy where there is on the land a dwelling house occupied by persons working the land. Section 36 of the Rating Ordinance, Cap.116 defines “agricultural land” as “land used as farm land, a fish pond, a market garden, a nursery ground, an orchard or for animal husbandry”. 15.Mr Boey for the plaintiff submits that the land in question is agricultural land. He relies on the plaintiff’s evidence that before the lot was leased to the defendant, it was used by other villagers of the village to plant small trees and sweet potatoes. However, there was no evidence from either the plaintiff or the defendant that after the defendant leased the lot, it was ever used for anything other than as a dwelling for herself and her family. That is, to my mind, an incontrovertible fact and I rule that the lot was not agricultural land. Mr Boey quite properly concedes that if the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance applies to this tenancy, the plaintiff will not be entitled to possession because none of the matters under the ordinance which would entitle him to possession are applicable to this tenancy. Mr Boey also concedes that the three‑month notice to quit given by the plaintiff’s solicitors on 11 March 1997 does not comply with the requirements of the ordinance. 16.In the circumstances, I dismiss all the prayers of the plaintiff’s claim except the prayer for mesne profit at the rate of $50 per annum from November 1997 to date, for which I give the plaintiff judgment. The defendant will be awarded her costs of the action, to be taxed if not agreed. The defendant being legally aided will have her own costs taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations. The order nisi for costs is to be made absolute at the expiration of 14 days from the date of the handing down of judgment.
Mr Boey Chung, instructed by Messrs Cheng, Chan & Co., for the Plaintiff Mr Tony Ng, instructed by Messrs Hui & Lam, for the Defendant |